EVALUATION REPORT


6 October 2016

Assignment No.: IED-16-015
Function

“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organisation. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organisation;” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Recognizing that the work of the United Nations on peace, security, social and economic progress and human rights are inextricably linked and mutually supporting, the need for integration has consistently received high-level attention by experts, intergovernmental bodies and successive Secretary-Generals since 1992. From 2006, joint efforts from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFPs) have developed operational guidance on integration with the goal of maximizing the individual and collective impact of the United Nations response for peace consolidation\(^1\) in countries where both peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and AFPs are present.

This evaluation assesses the implementation of integration, as per United Nations policy requirements, between the peacekeeping missions of MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUC/MONUSCO and the United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) in Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2008 and 2014.\(^2\)

The three missions and their corresponding UNCTs varied greatly in meeting the minimum requirements of integration. MINUSTAH and the UNCT in Haiti were most compliant; UNOCI and the UNCT in Côte d'Ivoire less so, and MONUC/MONUSCO and the UNCT in the DRC were the least compliant.

Shortfalls in monitoring and evaluation efforts at the country level made it difficult to assess the results achieved by integration. Examples of coordinated efforts that appear to have contributed to peace consolidation include improving conditions of detainees in Haiti, enhancing justice for women in Côte d'Ivoire, and supporting conflict-free minerals in the DRC.

There were a few factors identified to have supported integration and were also symptoms of poor integration. These included the specificity and clarity of Security Council language on issues related to children and armed conflict, the distinct roles of missions and AFPs in elections, project financing provided by the Peacebuilding Fund, and integrated work in the areas of logistics, security, and mission drawdowns and transitions. The United Nations system was found to have integrated well in response to emergencies, mass outbreak of diseases and natural disasters, but only in a short-term manner.

Additional factors have hampered integration. One such key factor is that Member States have yet to systemically pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates and allocating resources throughout the system as requested by the Secretary-General more than 10 years ago.\(^3\) Similarly, some senior mission leadership cited the lack of specific reference to integration in Security Council mandates as a constraint, despite the guidance given by the Secretary-General’s Decision in 2008 establishing integration as a guiding principle of United Nations engagement in post-conflict work. The perception of commitment to

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\(^1\) The term peace consolidation is used in the 2015 report of the Advisory Group of Experts "The Challenge of Sustaining Peace", referring to the concept/principle of ‘sustaining peace’ during the periods before, during and after violent conflicts.

\(^2\) With limited data on integration also collected in 2015.

\(^3\) SG 2005 report A/59/2005 ‘In larger freedom towards development, security and human rights for all’.
integration from the headquarters of AFPs appeared weak, with integration viewed as a lopsided burden upon missions. While the role of mission leadership was viewed as pivotal, its contribution to integration was seen as impeded by inadequate authority, systemic fragmentation and unclear accountability. Finally, the seemingly lacking common understanding of what integration entails poses another challenge.

Other factors constraining integration included limiting attitudes and beliefs that missions and AFPs held about each other and the pursuit of entity-specific visibility curtailed opportunities for coherence, collaboration and joint contributions. Instead, integrated planning, designed to be the bedrock of integration, was done in isolation in missions and agencies alike. Such planning was hampered by the lack of dedicated resources, differing lengths of mandates and work plans, and claims of planning fatigue and habitual culture of resistance towards the concept. The integrated strategic frameworks were viewed as unimplemented, duplicative and an imposition in two of the three countries. Evidence also suggested the risk of parallel and similar functions being performed by missions and AFPs in various domains, including in stabilization, communication, governance, quick impact projects (QIPs), gender, HIV/AIDS and child issues.

Financing and differing budgetary streams supporting missions and AFPs emerged as a key hindrance to better integration, with difficulties made apparent at the strategic and operational levels.

Missions and AFPs rarely exchanged staff with each other, displaying limited cases of co-location. Partial data also suggested limited joint local procurement despite a significant amount of local expenditures on goods and services.

OIOS has made three important recommendations to the Secretary-General and DPKO/DFS to address strategic, operational and field level constraints to integration, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness and implementation. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General and DPKO/DFS have accepted all the recommendations. The action plans for implementation of the recommendations are included in Annex 2 and Annex 4.
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I. Introduction

1. The Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS-IED) identified, through its 2013 risk assessment exercise, the integration between peacekeeping missions and United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFPs) as an area of continuing and important strategic concern and selected it for evaluation. The topic was communicated by OIOS-IED to the Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC) and to the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC).4

2. The general frame of reference for OIOS is set out in the General Assembly resolutions 48/218 B, 54/244 and 59/272, as well as ST/SGB/273, which authorizes OIOS to initiate, carry out and report on any action that it considers necessary to fulfil its responsibilities. OIOS evaluation is provided for in the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation.5

3. The overall evaluation objective was to determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of integration activities in relation to objectives, and to enable systematic reflection among Member States and the Secretariat, with a view to increasing effectiveness of integration.6 The evaluation has been conducted in conformity with the norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

4. The evaluation focused on three countries which have long-standing peacekeeping missions and UNCTs established in them: Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with the peacekeeping missions of MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUSCO, respectively, on their territory. The United Nations agencies in UNCTs vary according to the country and comprise 20 in Haiti, 25 in Côte d’Ivoire and 20 in the DRC.

5. Management comments from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and relevant stakeholders were sought on the draft report and were taken into account in the preparation of the final report. The formal DPKO response is included in the annex.

II. Background

Integration has consistently received high-level attention and analysis

6. The United Nations has learned through long experience that peace and security, social and economic progress and human rights are inextricably linked and mutually supporting.7 This led to initial efforts in 1992 by the Secretary-General, in his Agenda for Peace to instil greater unity of purpose in the Organization’s conflict and post-conflict engagements.8 Integration has since become both a principle and a functional concept for the United Nations’ work in conflict and post-conflict areas.

7. In 1997, for the first time, the Secretary-General explicitly referred to “integration” by stating that “present-day conflicts have many dimensions that must be addressed comprehensively and require more integrated and coordinated actions.” He also called upon the United Nations “to act with greater unity of purpose, coherence of efforts and agility in

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4 A/70/72, Para 48.
5 ST/SGB/2000/8; Regulation 7.1.
7 ‘Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet - Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the post-2015 Agenda’ (December 2014) - Page 25, Para 85.
8 An Agenda for Peace (A/47/277), Para 81.
responding to the many challenges it faces. Since then, the topic has consistently received high-level attention in experts’ reports and from intergovernmental bodies. In 2015, both the report of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (“HIPPO report”) and the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (“AGE report”), entitled “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace”, have referred to the issue of integration. In 2016, in a rare bicameral event, the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted substantively identical resolutions on the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture that inter alia, requires the United Nations to utilize its peace and security, development and human rights engagements more coherently both in headquarters and in the field.

8. Integration has many facets, including those relating to the governance structures of the United Nations system, as well as substantive and procedural aspects. The need for integration arises from the fundamental fact that different intergovernmental bodies have authority over missions and agencies and task them through their mandates with overlapping elements: missions are accountable to the Security Council and General Assembly, whereas agencies primarily answer to their respective governing bodies and donors. Mandates of missions are also country-specific, whereas agencies have mandates that are global and priorities that go beyond peace consolidation activities. The challenge of integration has been to overcome this structural division and to instil greater unity of purpose in the Organization’s engagements by drawing upon the specialized skills and resources of various parts of the United Nations system.

9. Integration also finds its rationale in the tendency of organizations of the system to broaden their activities in areas that overlap with others. In several instances, these have been viewed as making it difficult for the United Nations to address countries’ needs in a consistent, coherent and cost-effective manner. Experts’ reports have recommended that Secretariat-led operations should narrow down the number of focused tasks performed, using the principle of comparative advantage. The highest intergovernmental body directly dealing with integration issues is the Peacebuilding Commission. Established in 2005, its main purpose is, inter alia, to “bring together all relevant actors to […] advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery” and to “provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations.”

10. The highest intergovernmental body directly dealing with integration issues is the Peacebuilding Commission. Established in 2005, its main purpose is, inter alia, to “bring together all relevant actors to […] advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery” and to “provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations.”

11. At the level of heads of agencies, the highest and oldest United Nations mechanism for internal coordination and integration efforts is the United Nations System Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB). Under the CEB, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) works to enhance “efficiency gains” and, inter alia, to harmonize business practices to reduce operational costs. DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) are not members of the UNDG, though, recently, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) acquired the status of an observer.

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11 A/51/950 Para 149.
12 Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (A/65/747- S/2011/85), Para 61 (b).
Successive guidance issued between 2006\textsuperscript{15} and 2013 by the United Nations has aimed to advance the mechanisms for implementing the integration agenda. In 2008, a Secretary-General’s decision established integration as the “guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the United Nations has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated”.\textsuperscript{16} Integration’s overall goal was to “maximize the individual and collective impact of the United Nations’ response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace.” In 2011, another decision by the Secretary-General\textsuperscript{17} “strongly reaffirm[ed] the principle of integration.” Taken together, previous guidance and the currently operational policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP, 2013) stipulate four minimum requirements for integration, including:

(a) A shared/common vision between the mission and the UNCT: This is a “description of the UN’s combined mandate and partnerships in a country and expectations regarding its future strategy”, as well as the peace consolidation “end state that the United Nations seeks to achieve over the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) timeframe.”\textsuperscript{18}

(b) Integrated planning/mechanisms in United Nations headquarters (UNHQ) and in the field to carry out integrated strategic, programmatic or technical assessments: Key mechanisms for implementing integration are teams that are drawn from both DPKO/DFS and agencies, and are present both in UNHQ and in countries with missions. In UNHQ, since 2008, an inter-agency group of principals at the Assistant-Secretary-General (ASG) level, chaired by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) of DPKO, forms the Integration Steering Group (ISG) and provides a high-level guidance on integration. At the working level, integrated (mission) task forces (I(M)TFs) have been tasked with offering strategic direction, planning oversight, information-sharing, analysis, coordination, advice on resource allocation and resolve policy differences between United Nations entities.\textsuperscript{19} In the field, mission leadership and a joint analytical and planning capacity are assigned a critical role in promoting integration, including through an overarching planning document that unifies mission and agencies around a common set of peace consolidation priorities (the ISF, or equivalent).\textsuperscript{20}

(c) Agreed results, timelines, respective responsibilities and priorities for the missions and UNCTs: These have to be incorporated in the ISF\textsuperscript{21} and timelines should be aligned, to the extent possible, with those of other existing planning processes.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{15} See the Secretary-General’s Guidance Note on Integrated Missions 2006, paragraph 3, which “…acknowledged that ‘integrated missions’ is an evolving concept and that further guidance will be required. This Note of Guidance will, therefore, be updated at regular intervals to reflect these and other emerging considerations.”


\textsuperscript{17} Decisions of the Secretary-General — Follow-up to the 16 December Meeting of the Policy Committee (4 May Meeting of the Policy Committee). Decision N0. 2011/10 – Integration, 4 May.


\textsuperscript{19} Page 51, IAP Handbook (2014) and IAP (2013).

\textsuperscript{20} A relevant principle of integration is ‘form follows function’ (See page 4 IMPP (2006) and para 18 IAP (2013)) or, in other words, that ‘mission structure should be tailored to the specific characteristics of each country setting’ and ‘flexibility to context’ (para 20 IAP, 2013).

\textsuperscript{21} As per 2009 and 2011 guidelines and IAP.

\textsuperscript{22} IAP Handbook (2014).
(d) Agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation/reporting: The 2008 Secretary-General’s decision required monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, until the 2013 IAP guidance shifted towards a requirement of “monitoring and reporting”.
Figure 1

Milestones in the chronology of UN integration

Source: Adapted from IPI - Arthur Boutellis (August 2013)
III. Scope and methodology

13. The evaluation’s objective was to assess the extent of integration between MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUSCO and their respective UNCTs/agencies for the period 2008 to 2014, with the assumption that greater integration produces better results for peace consolidation. All three missions have a long-standing presence and are currently undergoing transition. OIOS-IED acknowledges the continuing integration efforts made by missions and UNCTs after 2014, which, however, fell outside the scope of the evaluation.

14. Data for the evaluation was collected from a range of sources, through both qualitative and quantitative methods. Limitations of the methodology include the inability to interview mission and UNCT staff from the full-time period under review, reliance on self-reporting from missions and perception data from interviewees, including for indication of effectiveness. OIOS-IED further notes the broad-ranging nature of integration, the data and interviewees being dispersed over time and the changing nature of integration as additional constraints.

15. The evaluation did not cover the issue of integration between Special Political Missions (SPMs) and UNCTs, nor integration within mission components, nor between missions and humanitarian organisations, which was the subject of an in-depth review in 2011. However, following the evaluation, OIOS-IED circulated the draft of this report for comments to all organizations represented in the ISG. The replies received have also been taken into consideration while formulating recommendations.

IV. Results

A. There was marked variation in meeting the minimum requirements of integration

16. Missions and agencies demonstrated overall unevenness in implementing the minimum requirements of integration. MINUSTAH and agencies in Haiti were the most successful, followed by UNOCI and agencies in Côte d’Ivoire. The performance of MONUSCO and agencies in the DRC was the weakest. The following table summarizes the progress achieved in each country.

24 See the policy on United Nations Transitions in the context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (endorsed by the Secretary-General on 4 Feb 2013 following endorsement by the ISG).
25 This included: (a) Structured content analysis of Security Council mandates, budget performance reports, Secretary-General reports for MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUC/MONUSCO for 2008-2014; (b) Review of strategic planning documents for the three missions for 2008-2014, for requirements stipulated by the Secretary General’s Decision 2008/24; (c) Field missions to Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and DRC; (d) Questionnaire administered to focal points in three missions; (e) Field missions to Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and DRC; (f) 77 interviews with mission staff from MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUSCO; (g) 42 semi-structured interviews with members of the UNCT in three countries; (h) 18 interviews with Government and civil society representatives in the three countries; (i) 15 semi-structured interviews with the Integration Working Group members and UN System Focal Points and staff in the Secretariat; (j) Direct observations of meetings in missions and at UN HQ. Meetings attended as observers included: ISG (2014), IWG (2014), senior management group on protection in Goma (March 2015). Where the analysis relies on statements from one or two interviews, it is based on the rationale of their expertise and their function and level of seniority.
26 Some former key staff members were interviewed and end of assignment reports, after action reviews and relevant documentation were reviewed.
27 Wherever possible, interviews have been triangulated with secondary evidence to corroborate perceptions.
28 E.g. Integration requirements shifting from ‘monitoring and evaluation’ to ‘monitoring and reporting’
30 This assessment does not consider external factors that may shape the dynamics on the ground between a mission and the UNCT, such as the relationship with the Government.
Table 1  
Assessment of the progress achieved vis-à-vis the four minimum requirements for integration (a-d) in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC (2008-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration requirements</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Democratic Republic of the Congo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **A shared/common vision** | • Successfully developed in subsequent ISFs since 2010 (2010-2012, 2012 extension and 2013-2016) “Achieved” | • Articulated in the 2 ISFs developed (2010-2011 and 2011-2013 revision), yet unclear from subsequent informal documents (e.g. United Nations system strategic priorities, 2012) “Partially achieved” | • Articulated only in the broadest sense in the only ISF developed (United Nations Transitional Framework for the DRC, 2011-2013)  
Recent efforts by Integrated Office to identify strategic areas of convergence “Not achieved” |
| **Integrated planning/mechanisms** | • Dormant at senior level (Integrated Strategic Planning Group not convened since 2012)  
• Suffered from sporadic filling of posts (P3 and P5/SRSG’s Office) and leadership vacancies (Integrated Office Chief)  
• Unequal commitment to providing resources (DPKO with only informal involvement from Office of DSRSG/RC/HC)  
• Close working relationships between senior planning officer (SRSG Office) and coordination officers (DSRSG/RC/HC Office) “Partially achieved” | • Suffered from lack of regular forum at strategic level (Strategic Coordination Group inactive since 2010)  
• Recent UNCT (DOCO) contributions to resources (Strategic planning advisor in RC Office, funded only for 50 per cent since transition)  
• Weak links between planners in SRSG’s office and in DSRSG/RC/HC Office  
• OIOS-IED unable to assess UNHQ support due to lack of ITF meeting records “Partially achieved” | • Suffered from lack of regular forum at senior level (Strategic Policy Group reactivated in 2014 after years of inactivity)  
• UNCT (UNDP) contributions to resources (Strategic planning advisor, Integrated Office)  
• Collaborative processes between Strategic Planning Cell and Integrated Office  
• OIOS-IED unable to assess UNHQ support due to lack of ITF meeting records  “Partially achieved” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration requirements</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Democratic Republic of the Congo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Agreed results, timelines, respective responsibilities and priorities | • Identified in all ISFs at the strategic level “Achieved” | • Outlined in most planning documents “Partially achieved” | • Matrix lacked roles and responsibilities and timelines generally stated as July 2011-June 2013  
• Indicators missing “Not achieved” |
| Agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation/reporting | • M&R efforts conducted since 2010, with 4 ISF progress reports developed  
• Mechanisms prescribed not always taking envisioned form (e.g. M&E Group envisioned by ISF 2013-2016 inactive) “Partially achieved” | • M&E mechanisms envisioned in planning documents, yet no M&E effort ever put in place except for Peace Building Fund (RC Office) “Not achieved” | • Envisioned monitoring efforts by ITF, yet no effort or mechanism ever put in place “Not achieved” |
B. While there were cases of ad hoc coordination efforts, there was little evidence available on results achieved through integration

17. Shortfalls in monitoring and evaluation requirements on integration (see (d) in Table 1) affected the extent to which results of integration were reported and the extent to which integration can be said to have succeeded in its goal of supporting peace consolidation.

Missions’ reporting on work conducted with agencies was largely confined to activities and outputs

18. Missions reported on work conducted with agencies both through their budget performance reports and their respective mission-specific reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. Within their budget performance reports, missions used typical phrases, such as, “in collaboration”, “in coordination”, “in cooperation” or “worked closely with.” This mirrored the language used by the Security Council when it requires that missions and agencies work in an integrated manner. However, missions’ results-based reporting only included activities and outputs and gave very limited indication of positive changes resulting from integration.

19. Similarly, the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council also focused on activities and outputs. An analysis on a random sample of 21 Secretary-General’s reports for the three missions between 2008 and 2014 found rather limited reference to results of “integration.” A relatively greater attention to work implemented with agencies was included in the Secretary-General’s MINUSTAH reports, where, starting from 2011, one section of the report was specifically dedicated to “coordination between the Mission and the UNCT.”
Table 2
Examples of how missions reported on work conducted with agencies in budget performance reports and Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Performance Reports</th>
<th>MINUSTAH, 2012-2013</th>
<th>MONUSCO, 2008-2009</th>
<th>UNOCI, 2012-2013</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• MINUSTAH worked closely with other United Nations entities, in particular the UNDP, in assisting the Government to prepare for the partial legislative, municipal and local elections...</td>
<td>• 12 monthly meetings with United Nations agencies...to coordinate the withdrawal of 2,500 children from armed groups</td>
<td>• Training of 300 ex-combatants as HIV/AIDS peer educators...in collaboration with the UNFPA, UNDP and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretary-General’s reports</th>
<th>MINUSTAH, 2010 and 2012</th>
<th>MONUSCO, 2014 and 2009</th>
<th>UNOCI, 2011 and 2013</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integrated partnership between MINUSTAH and UNDP across the rule-of-law sectors</td>
<td>• Reinvigoration of the electoral integrated taskforce, comprising MONUSCO and UNCT</td>
<td>• Integrated HR monitoring and investigation taskforce for human rights violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integration of efforts to combat cholera</td>
<td>• MONUSCO and the UNCT’s close work with the Ministry of Gender on implementing the national strategy on SGBV</td>
<td>• Assessment mission between UNOCI and the UNCT on the border with Liberia</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Reports issued by agencies varied in terms of reference to peacekeeping missions

20. Analysis of a random sample of 31 public reports by agencies on the work at the country level suggested widely different practices on reporting on work conducted with missions. In some cases, missions were listed as an operational partner of an agency, or not

31 A/68626.  
32 A/64/583.  
33 A/68/632.  
34 S/2010/446.  
35 S/2012/678.  
36 S/2014/450.  
38 S/2011/211.  
39 S/2013/197.  
40 OIOS asked some agencies to indicate the main report that conveys to HQ the work done by the agency at the country level over a specific period of time. UNICEF and UNHCR pointed to the Annual Reports of Country Offices and the Global Report, respectively.  
41 E.g. UNHCR Global report Cote d’Ivoire (2008; 2011).
mentioned at all.\textsuperscript{42} In other cases, some positive results of working together with missions have been clearly stated, as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3**

Examples of how UNICEF/UNHCR reported on work conducted with missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNICEF Annual Country Reports</strong></td>
<td>• Female staff enhanced security awareness because of training provided by MINUSTAH and UNPOL (2011) &lt;br&gt; • Obtained MINUSTAH’s support for pre-positioning containers in nine key regions for storage of supplies (2012) &lt;br&gt; • Reduced its fuel costs by 29 per cent, between 2013 and 2014, by using UNOCI flights to the country’s main cities (2014) &lt;br&gt; • Worked closely with the MONUSCO to monitor and report on six grave children’s rights violations (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNHCR Global Reports</strong></td>
<td>• Redefined mandate of MONUSCO offered UNHCR greater opportunities to advocate on behalf of its people of concern within MONUSCO (2010) &lt;br&gt; • WFP and UNICEF worked in close collaboration with UNHCR, and the three agencies coordinated their activities with MONUSCO (2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results of integration reported mainly comprised ad hoc coordination efforts

21. Interviewees could only provide anecdotal evidence on the results of integration, with few clear trends. Results were presented in different ways, suggesting varied levels of understanding of what integration implies, ranging from thematic areas of work (e.g. elections), types of efforts (e.g. information sharing and meetings, training and logistics), means-enabling integrated work (e.g. quick impact projects/PBF) and partnerships (e.g. UNDP-UNPOL).

22. Overall, the United Nations system in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC appears to have yielded several cases of ad hoc coordination efforts. There were indications of integrated activities, yet limited evidence of results of integrated work whose origin lay in plans that had been agreed upon beforehand. There were no cases of joint programming completed or finalized to such a degree that resulted in concrete accomplishments.\textsuperscript{43} There

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\textsuperscript{42} E.g. WFP Annual Report Haiti (2011); UNHCR Global Reports from 2008 to 2013 made no reference to MINUSTAH in Haiti. UNHCR Global Reports made no references to work conducted with MONUSCO since 2012.

\textsuperscript{43} In the DRC, a multi-year joint justice support programme in support of the justice chain was developed by UNDP, MONUSCO, UNODC, OHCHR and the Government. It was signed in December 2014 and was yet to be implemented at the time of report writing. OIOS further notes that following a Policy Committee decision (Decision No. 2012/13, 11 September 2012 meeting) a working arrangement was established between DPKO and UNDP to ‘enhance the predictability, coherence, accountability and effectiveness’ in the rule of law delivery at country and international levels, the so-called “Global Focal Point arrangement.” The purpose of this was to ‘bring together complementary capacities and increase accountability for the HQ response, and hence improve delivery on the ground.’
was, similarly, limited evidence of agreements on what not to work on together, as inherent in
the principle of comparative advantage.

23. Below are three examples that illustrate how missions and agencies have coordinated
efforts in the three countries.  

**Some examples of ad hoc coordination efforts in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC**

**Improving conditions for detainees in the overcrowded and insecure civil prison in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti:** In 2009, joint efforts by MINUSTAH and UNDP (funded by the
Peacebuilding Fund), in partnership with the Haitian government, led to the construction of
two perimeter walls, roughly 380 meters long, topped with lighting, barbed wire and seven
watchtowers in the highly overcrowded prison in Port-au-Prince. This enhanced prison
security created 230 square meters of extra space for inmates’ free time activity. As a result,
there was better compliance of the conditions of prisoner’s detention with the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

**Increasing justice for women through national dialogue in Côte d’Ivoire:** Côte d’Ivoire
underwent successive crises from 1999 to 2011. While both men and women suffered,
women were the principal victims, being subjected to homicide, abduction, disappearance,
serious injuries and sexual exploitation. In 2011, joint efforts by UN Women, UNICEF and
UNOCI enabled thousands of testimonies to be gathered (72,483 in total, including 28,024
women and 757 children) and given before the Commission on Dialogue, Truth and
Reconciliation established by the government. These efforts afforded victims a chance to
recount their stories, suffering and indignities and an opportunity for catharsis.

**Supporting conflict-free minerals in the DRC:** In 2011, consultants for the International
Organization of Migration (IOM) worked under MONUSCO’s supervision on the issue of
illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, which have long fuelled conflict and
instability in the country. The consultants undertook field visits to several mining sites and
trading centers to validate and certify that the minerals traded were conflict-free. Tagging
systems allowed for cooperatives of artisanal miners to sell “green” minerals and, over a
period of only two months, in North Kivu, 100 tons of “green” minerals were reportedly sold
by one cooperative of miners in Masisi territory.

C. Various factors have contributed to integration

24. Interviewees, both from missions and agencies, referred to a wide range of factors that
contributed to integration. Simultaneously, a number of these were seen as having aspects
that hindered integration and can be considered examples of poor or failed integration,
suggesting the multifaceted and ambivalent nature of progress realized.

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44 Coordination can be viewed as a necessary condition for integration, yet insufficient in itself to implement integration
requirements

45 Based on ‘Note d’information relative à la phase pilot de recherché de la verite’ par la Commission Dialogue, Verite’ et
Reconciliation (CDVR)’ shared by OHCHR.

46 S/2014/450.
i. The specificity of Security Council language supported subject-specific integration, while not fully addressing the risk of duplication

25. Child protection was mentioned by some interviewees as an area affected by duplication (see Table 5), but also considered by interviewees as having achieved good results in terms of integration. Interview and document analysis indicated that the specificity of Security Council mandates on issues related to children and armed conflict, where it established the joint responsibility of both the missions and the UNCTs for action, supported integration.\footnote{S/RES/1612(2005), Para 10. This does not discount the important role that the mutually agreed mechanisms and policies have in this field of work in providing clarity on respective roles and responsibilities.}

26. With the exception of Haiti,\footnote{MINUSTAH stopped reporting on Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC) violations following a change in its mandate.} child protection was identified by mission and UNCT interviewees in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC as an area of positive and constructive relations, which was clear “because it’s coming from the Security Council,” and was a mandate that was “integrated per se.” Interviewees referred to general clarity in the division of work whereby the mission would identify the children released by armed groups, interview them and then hand them over to UNICEF.
ii. In elections, distinct roles of missions and agencies were seen as supporting integration, while not being entirely free of turf-related tension

27. With the exception of Haiti, where past elections had reportedly caused friction among United Nations stakeholders involved, elections were mentioned as a positive example of coordinated work, especially in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC. Some attributed this to the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between the mission and the UNCT.49 Efforts for providing a coordinated and integrated system-wide framework to the field of electoral assistance have indeed been numerous and longstanding, including General Assembly resolutions, Secretary-General decisions and policy directives.50 A distinctive feature has been the existence of a focal point with clear leadership on electoral assistance matters, including in supporting system-wide coherence in this field.

28. However, other interviewees called for greater clarity in electoral support. One desired a definition of what was meant to support an election process, and another asked for a Security Council “resolution that specifies that elections [should be] done by X and technical assistance done by Y.” These suggest turf-related tension.

29. A study sponsored by DPKO, DPA and UNDP on integrated electoral assistance found “a healthy degree of creative learning and adaptation within and between countries in UN Mission settings”, but also found “many misunderstandings from poor knowledge, a lack of trust, and inaccurate perceptions, between and within parts of the UN in the field.”51

iii. Common funding sources provided by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) supported integration

30. Funding from the PBF supported integration, especially in Côte d’Ivoire. Specific examples included PBF micro projects through which, starting in 2009, UNDP and UNOCI’s Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) provided short-term employment opportunities to ex-combatants, militias, women affected by conflict and youth at risk. The PBF also allowed for training of the national police to continue after the country’s electoral crises, as provided through a tripartite set-up that included UNPOL, UNDP and the government.

31. The PBF was referenced by a number of interviewees in the DRC, though fewer concrete examples of coordinated efforts triggered by the fund were given. Interviewees in Haiti referenced the PBF to a lesser extent, most likely due to the closure of PBF programming in Haiti in 2012.

32. The PBF was recently recognized as having “contributed to risk sharing and integration within the UN system.”52

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49 With reference to the elections in 2010, in Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, the division of responsibility included the mission certifying the election results and providing for security and logistics. The UNCT coordinated with UNOCI on the construction of temporary shelters for open-air polling stations, assisted in transporting electoral material to the electoral commissions and visited polling sites throughout the country on Election Day to monitor the process (S/2010/600 Para. 9, S/2011/211 Para 4 and S/2011/807 Para 13). In the DRC, MONUSCO provided good offices, technical and logistical support and UNDP trained electoral commission and temporary staff to conduct various functions for the presidential and assembly vote.

50 These efforts include: GA Resolution 47/137 (1991); SG decision 2010/23; SG decision 2011/23; policy directive FP/1/2012 (11 May 2012). DPA informed OIOS of upcoming resolution 70/168 (2015), also relevant in this respect.

51 See Lessons Learned: Integrated Electoral Assistance in UN Mission Settings - A Study Commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Department of Political Affairs & the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

52 “Messages relayed by the Chairs of the United Nations Working Group on Transitions on Financing for peacebuilding” (15
iv. The missions’ greater resources in logistics and primary role in security-related matters seemed to consistently bring Missions and UNCTs together

33. Logistics and security were frequently mentioned in all three countries as areas of convergence between missions and agencies. The missions’ assets, air services, military and security escorts, communication and medical services were generally mentioned appreciatively by agencies as an area of effective strategic partnership. However, mission interviewees viewed this more as agencies’ dependence on the mission, where missions were viewed as a “service provider”.

v. The need for a quick and multi-faceted response following emergencies, such as mass outbreaks of diseases and natural disasters, triggered integrated responses, but only temporarily

34. Both agencies and mission staff in the field recognized missions’ quick and flexible deployment capacity immediately after an emergency as a strong asset for the United Nations system.

35. The response to an Ebola outbreak in the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire were considered good examples of sustained partnerships between the mission and the UNCT. In Haiti, while views were less clear on the level of integrated response to the cholera outbreak, a coherent response mechanism was reportedly put in place when natural disasters struck the country, including the earthquake in 2010 and more recently hurricanes and tropical storms.

36. However, heightened coordination and integration during emergencies and disasters receded with the return of normalcy. As one interview stated, “coordination is natural in crisis, the problem…is during normal days.” “Emergencies help”, said another senior official.

vi. Security Council decisions on transitions triggered comparative assessments and transition planning with mixed results, with many activities to be discontinued due to lack of funds

37. Decisions to drawdown and reconfigure missions triggered a number of analytical and planning exercises which appeared to have brought missions and UNCTs together at some level. These were not without drawbacks, however.

38. Interviewees suggested that these were generally UNHQ-driven exercises, implemented by the missions without collective responsibility from the United Nations system as a whole. In Haiti, transition planning was generally perceived to be among the most tangible example of integration that the mission and the UNCT had recently experienced, yet interviewees had divided opinions with respect to whether MINUSTAH’s transition had been addressed in an integrated way. Interviewees in the DRC had consistently less positive views about the exercise, with senior management in the mission perceiving transition planning as not integrated and only very few believing it had been addressed in an integrated manner. Perceptions about the level of integration of the comparative advantages exercise in Côte d’Ivoire were inconclusive.

39. Field agency staff viewed transitions as highly problematic because of the lack of financing to support responsibilities to be transferred to them. Similarly, AFPs at UNHQ

similarly pointed to limited resources and capacity as key hindrances to integrated transitions. To agencies, it was an incorrect expectation that they would have the resources to accept and pursue tasks that the mission wanted to entrust to them, and that donors would pay for such tasks. 53

D. A mix of factors constrained integration, with some emerging as symptoms of poor or failed integration

40. Interviewees have also referred to a wide range of issues, from strategic to practical obstacles in the field, which have hindered integration. Some of these factors can also be seen as examples of symptoms of poor or failed integration.

53 This issue has been raised in the Secretary General reports of all three missions: MINUSTAH: S/2011/540; UNOCI: S/2013/761 and MONUSCO: S/2013/757. The ISG has also considered this issue in 2013.
Figure 3
Factors that constrained integration and were symptoms of poor or failed integration

Source: OIOS fieldwork
i. **Structural constraints at the intergovernmental level limited integration**

42. Some interviewees from missions and agencies stressed that integration was a structural issue with considerable barriers at the intergovernmental level, including those they saw in relation to the Security Council, the governing bodies of agencies, and the Fifth Committee.

43. The role of the Council in promoting integration was seen as important to some senior leaders in missions and in the Secretariat at UNHQ, as the Council’s mandates directly guided their work. These senior leaders believed that the Council should play a more active role with respect to integration, providing greater clarity and more explicit references to integration in missions’ mandates.

44. Analysis of the three missions’ mandates established that, from 2008 to 2014, the Council explicitly mentioned integration only once, in the case of MINUSTAH, where it was referred to in a general sense. The Council mostly used alternative language such as: “in coordination”; “work with”; “in cooperation with”; “in liaison with”, while referring and addressing the “UNCT”, the “UN system”, “relevant UN bodies” and “humanitarian agencies”.

45. This preference for clearer direction from the Council on integration was, however, challenged by a number of UNCT representatives who were sceptical about addressing structural constraints at the intergovernmental level, and whether the Council should or could promote integration at all. To them, the agencies did not report to the Council, and “should not,” and the Council did not task the agencies and their respective fixed mandates. To them, wanting the Council to become more involved in promoting integration was a “fundamental misunderstanding.”

46. A senior official in the Secretariat with technical expertise on the matter stated that the authority of the Council over agencies was a “grey area”; that it was “not codified” and it remained “unclear if the power of the mandate goes through the whole system or not.”

47. In addition to the role of the Council, some interviewees pointed to the lack of alignment between the governing bodies of their agencies and the Fifth Committee as a key obstacle to address. One senior agency official stated that it would be helpful if the Member States of their executive boards at country level were to work more explicitly and systematically with the mission.

48. The fact that the root causes of poor integration can be traced back to the decisions, actions and preferences of Member States has been long recognized. In 2005, the Secretary-General called upon Member States to coordinate their representatives on governing boards to make sure that they pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates. In 2015, the AGE report noted “the fragmentation of the UN into separate ‘silos,’” and observed that “several principal intergovernmental Organs, and especially the Security Council, hold pieces of the peacebuilding ‘puzzle,’ each from the vantage point of their particular Charter responsibilities.”

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54 S/RES/ 1892 (2009), Page 3.
55 Other examples include: S/RES/2062(2012), Para 6; and S/RES/1906(2009), Para 39.
ii. Perceptions of the adequacy of UNHQ guidance and support to integration were mixed

49. About half (31 out of 59) of mission interviewees indicated a lack of direction from UNHQ on how to translate policy and strategic guidance into work plans and to concretely implement integration.\(^58\)

50. MONUSCO respondents were relatively positive, with 10 out of 23 reporting limited guidance from UNHQ. UNOCI staff was slightly more negative with 14 out of 22 indicating inadequate guidance from UNHQ. Half (7 of 14) of MINUSTAH respondents reported no guidance received. Planners in both MONUSCO and UNOCI recognized the support received through the annual practice workshops for integrated planning organized by UNHQ.

51. Operationally, UNHQ was, at times, seen to be limiting integration. For example, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for integration took two years to be signed, and the Office of Legal Affairs’ (OLA) interpretation of a global MOU only allowed the mission to offer services to the UNCT, as opposed to a reciprocal arrangement. DPKO HQ has acknowledged the gap between policy and practise and the need to create clearer documents on implementation.

iii. The commitment to integration from the AFP’s headquarters appeared weak

52. A number of agencies have provided direction on various aspects of integration, including UNICEF, UNDP, WFP and UNHCR.\(^59\) Fourteen out of 32 agency respondents, however, reported having no guidance on integration from their respective headquarters. The HIPPO report emphasized how strong leadership and effective backstopping from headquarters, including from those of agencies, funds and programmes, is critical for bringing together all parts of the United Nations system.\(^60\)

53. Key DPKO stakeholders and document analysis suggested that integration is conceived by some within the department as a “one way street” that allows agencies to benefit from support without offering much in return, leaving the Secretariat with the burden of what should be a “collective responsibility.”

iv. Support from mission leaders was regarded as critical to integration, with varying perceptions about their actual role and leverage to promote it

54. The level of support of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) and Deputy SRSGs (DSRSGs) for integration emerged as an important factor. In two of the three missions, 19 of 46 interviewees who expressed views on the issue, saw a need for more leadership and priority setting by mission leadership in implementing integration.

55. SRSGs were seen by interviewees to be driven by different priorities, with integration not ranking high among them. Several interviewees stressed that the lack of prior United

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\(^{58}\) SG decision no. 2011/10 reflected the commitment of the ISG principals to ‘ensure more consistent and effective implementation within their own department/agency’ by sending clear messages and guidance to staff at headquarters and in the field.


\(^{60}\) Para 119.
Nations experience among mission leadership was detrimental to integration and for understanding the role of the UNCT.\textsuperscript{61}

56. Two UNHQ interviewees noted instances of resistance they had encountered from mission leadership to the guidance and backstopping offered on taking integration forward.

v. The authority of both SRSGs and DSRSG/Resident Coordinators (RCs)/Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) with respect to integration appeared inadequate

57. The lack of requisite authority of the SRSGs with respect to implementing integration has been consistently observed and commented upon.\textsuperscript{62}

58. Under current guidance, though the SRSG has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations in a country, he/she cannot direct the agencies to implement anything specifically but can only “request” them to reorient their planned interventions. Nor can he/she engage directly with the UNCT and does so only through the DSRSGs.\textsuperscript{63}

59. Interviews suggested three instances of senior agency staff not accepting the authority of the head of mission as the spokesperson of the United Nations system, even though this is explicitly provided for in guidance issued in 2006.\textsuperscript{64}

60. The DSRSG’s role was consistently viewed as the main pillar and reference point for integration, but its challenges were also recognised. Eight interviewees (including three in senior roles in the field) commented upon its limited leverage and influence on other actors of the United Nations system, with the RC viewed as having no real authority on United Nations agencies.

61. Such perceptions of the weakness of the position were expressed despite interviewees’ positive views about the dedication with which certain DSRSG/RC/HCs were seen as striving to further integration.

vi. The extent to which senior leadership is held accountable for implementing integration is unclear

62. Recent developments related to the annual compacts that SRSG’s have with the Secretary-General suggest an increased emphasis on enhancing senior leadership accountability for integration. Though they are not made public, the SRSG’s compacts with the Secretary-General identify the strengthening of the integration of the United Nations system as one of the SRSG’s “special objectives.”

\textsuperscript{61} Conversely, the arrival of new mission leaders who had previously served with agencies, funds and programmes was recognized and raised to the attention of OIOS-IED following the data collection phase of the evaluation.


\textsuperscript{63} The guidance also recognizes that there may be a need “[…] for parts of the UN […] to retain a public advocacy role.”

\textsuperscript{64} Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 17 January 2006, Paras 11, 14 and 15.
63. However, given the marked variations observed in implementing the minimum requirements of integration in the three countries (See Section A), the extent to which senior leadership is held accountable for integration is unclear and, prima facie, appears rather ineffective.  

vii. Attitudes and beliefs on both sides appeared to be constraints to integration

64. Interviewees indicated that there was no common mind-set, conceptualization and shared vision among missions and UNCTs as to what constituted integration and how to implement it.  

65. Staff in missions and UNCT thought of each other with a marked sense of “us-versus-them.” A majority of both mission (41/63) and UNCT respondents (23/39) in the field did not think there was a common vision between the mission and the agencies. Even when interviewees thought that there was a common vision, they were not able to readily explain it except in very general terms of peace for the country.  

66. Several factors created distance between missions and UNCTs:

- **Time horizon and tempo of work**: UNCTs saw themselves as long-standing and permanent actors, present before, during and after a mission’s lifespan in a country. Missions perceived themselves to be “driven by a sense of urgency”, giving higher priority to bringing peace quickly and exiting.  

- **Size**: The sheer size of missions, as well as their greater financial resources compared to that of agencies, was seen as problematic.  

- **Difficulty in understanding each other’s contribution**: Agency interviewees believed that missions did not fully understand how development contributed to security; mission interviewees thought agencies did not appreciate how ensuring security enabled development.  

- **Desire for separate identity among UNCTs**: United Nations agencies wished to maintain their identity separate from missions. This was acknowledged and accepted by interviewees from missions, the agencies and technical officials at HQ.  

- **Different understanding of “integration”**: Views also diverged on the appropriateness of using the word “integration.” Some preferred the words “coherence” or “harmonization” instead. Others thought that integration should not mean unconditionally working together, losing each one’s diversity and should not be about “power play” but, rather, “like ratatouille”, in which both agencies and missions keep their identity, yet work together harmoniously. Yet others had concerns about what they saw as “limited codification.”

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65 SG decision no. 2011/10 stated that ‘delivery against ISF priorities will also form an element of major accountability mechanisms, including but not limited to SRSG Comapcts and Reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council’.  
66 JIU/REP/2009/9, Para 111.  
67 This was so even though all three have been in existence more than a decade. The overall trend, as highlighted by the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, is that PKOs are increasingly becoming longer in duration.  
68 UNICEF Frequently Asked Questions – UN Integration, January 2015. A UNICEF document noted that during early integration efforts, an ‘over-emphasis on structure was perceived as an attempt to subsume UN agencies into the mission.’
• Negative events in a mission’s existence: These also acted as specific disincentives for integration for members of the UNCT. One example was the role of MINUSTAH in the cholera outbreak in Haiti, which appeared to have created an incentive for some agency staff to distance or disassociate themselves from the mission.

viii. The pursuit of visibility was seen as hindering opportunities for joining efforts

67. Competition for publicity has negatively affected integration. Interviewees referred to “turf battles”, waving of “flags”, and fights over “corporate mottos.” Missions were seen as blocking visibility for UNCTs due to their bigger size and increasingly broad-ranging mandates. Missions, on the other hand, viewed agencies as pursuing visibility for fear of losing donors.69

68. According to the United Nations civil affairs handbook, one potential disadvantage of partnering with agencies on quick impact projects (QIPs) was that they “may place the visibility of their organization first (and visibility for the mission may be negatively impacted).”70

ix. Integrated assessment and planning appeared to be constrained by various factors

69. Interviews established that integrated assessment and planning efforts were hampered by the following:

• Missions and agencies both planned in isolation and made little effort to accommodate each other;

• Agencies felt they were presented with plans that had already been decided and asked to contribute only subsequently;

• Shorter mandates of missions and multi-year work plans of the agencies led both to develop dissimilar assumptions and goals;

• Planning fatigue;

• Planning was considered a wasteful exercise to comply with New York’s bureaucracy; and

• Lack of specific resource allocation and joint funding.

70. There were rare cases of joint programming or projects. Even in cases of successful joint assessments, it was observed that partners often followed up independently.

71. ISFs were viewed as unimplemented, duplicative and an imposition. The ISF was considered problematic in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC, with their strategies rarely affecting work plans of missions and the UNCT and these documents reflecting pre-existing work, rather than jointly identified activities.

69 In 2009, a JIU analysis reported the issue of the ‘fear of losing operational independence, visibility and ability to mobilize funds’. See JIU/REP/2009/9, Para 55.
70 Page 230 of the UN Civil Affairs Handbook.
72. Three senior leaders in two missions agreed on the limited value added of having both
the UNDAF and the ISF. They preferred one integrated planning document, which could be
either the “UNDAF Plus” or the ISF (which, since 2010, has replaced the UNDAF in Haiti).

x. **There is the risk of duplication of work between missions and agencies**

73. As stated above, in 2005, the Secretary-General called for policy coherence among
Member States in assigning mandates, implicitly referring to the risk of duplication of
activities.\(^71\)

74. In this regard, the majority view among interviewees in the field was that there was no
such duplication. Rather, interviewees chose to frame the issue in terms of
“complementarity” of roles. Agency representatives at UNHQ also refrained from
mentioning duplication, with only two out of nine interviewees believing it was an issue.
However, some acknowledged the existence of “friction” and “disconnect” between missions
and UNCTs.

<p>| Table 4 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of mission and UNCT field respondents reporting duplication as an issue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission interviewees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source: OIOS-IED fieldwork**

75. Those who believed that duplication with the UNCT was an issue included three
senior leaders in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC and one senior leader in UNHQ. Stabilization,
communication, governance, QIPs, gender, HIV/AIDS and child issues were reportedly most
at risk of duplication. A senior mission official in Haiti had also reported “considerable
overlap” of work between the mission and the UNCT to UNHQ. Areas identified included
justice, corrections and human rights sections and, to a lesser extent, electoral affairs, police
and border management.\(^72\)

76. There were cases of reported friction between missions and UNCTs. There were
references to capacities in the mission and agencies running parallel without working
together. Some advocated, “contracting peacekeeping, not expanding it,” and the need for
missions to “back pedal” after the start-up phase. The table below shows the areas of
duplication as perceived by mission and UNCT interviewees.

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\(^71\) ‘Delivering as One’ report (A/61/583).

\(^72\) End of Assignment report of senior leader in Haiti.
Table 5
Reported areas of duplication/overlap between missions and agencies from the perspective of the minority of Mission and UNCT interviewees who observed duplication (2008-2014)

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<th>Mission interviewees</th>
<th>UNCT interviewees</th>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>- Child protection</td>
<td>- Child protection</td>
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<td>- Gender</td>
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<td>- HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>- Reporting</td>
<td>- Capacity building/training</td>
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<td>- Community policing</td>
<td>- Vehicles/logistics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Training youth at risk</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Electoral assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>- DDR/training</td>
<td>- DDR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Destruction/storage of weapons/ Restoration of buildings</td>
<td>- Electoral assistance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Reporting</td>
<td>- Humanitarian assistance/response to refugees</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Social cohesion/restoration of State authority/QIPs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Child protection</td>
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<td>- Governance in support of Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
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<td>- Quick impact projects</td>
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<td>- Mine action</td>
<td>- Procurement</td>
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<td>- Stabilization-development nexus</td>
<td>- Humanitarian issues</td>
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<td>- Communication</td>
<td>- Gender</td>
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<td>- Reporting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Discussions with the Government</td>
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Source: OIOS-IED fieldwork
Further analysis suggested that assessing “comparative advantage”\textsuperscript{73} to minimize duplication and overlap – a core principle of integration – had not been fully explored. Rather, the preferred approach in the ISFs in Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire was to designate one or two agencies as the lead and list all the other in a “laundry list” fashion, without considering their “demonstrated capacity” or “unique contribution”.

There are also indications of duplication in the strategies and policies developed by missions and in UNHQ. In the DRC, for example, the comprehensive strategy on combating sexual violence noted “duplication of efforts” as a “major obstacle” to its effective implementation along with programmatic gaps.\textsuperscript{74} The policy on mainstreaming the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict\textsuperscript{75} explicitly stated there was a need for more clarity on the role of child protection advisors vis-à-vis the role of other operational partners. It required that DPKO should strive, inter alia, to “minimize duplication to achieve optimal impacts on the protection of children affected by armed conflict.”

On the issue of duplication, it is pertinent that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations underlined the importance of the clarity of the roles and responsibilities between the PKO and the UNCT, emphasizing the “need for progress in clarifying roles and responsibilities in the field and at [UNHQ]” and urged the Secretary-General to “continue efforts to clarify roles and responsibilities for critical peacebuilding tasks.”\textsuperscript{76} Similarly, the HIPPO report observed that “Secretariat departments and UN agencies, funds and programmes have yet to arrive at clear divisions of labour.”\textsuperscript{77} An independent evaluation commissioned by the ISG also recommended reviewing relevant components within United Nations integrated missions and providing guidance to Member States to minimize overlapping functions and duplications of resources with United Nations humanitarian agencies.\textsuperscript{78}

xi. Financial and administrative systems and provisions constrained integration, with difficulties at strategic and operational levels

The issue of the different financial streams, including assessed contributions supporting missions and the voluntary contributions supporting agencies, is well-recognized as fundamental. DPKO recently issued practice notes to guide missions in this respect.\textsuperscript{79} Interviewees identified finance as a key hindrance to better integration at various levels.

At the strategic level, a high-value example related to one mission being unable to spend 76 per cent of the $22 million and 27 per cent of $22.04 million allocated to it for DDR for the budget years 2013-2014 and 2014-2015, respectively. The unspent money was returned to the Controller in both budget years.

\textsuperscript{73} IAP, Para 19 - Page 5.  
\textsuperscript{75} Mainstreaming the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict within United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Page 9, Para 54.  
\textsuperscript{76} Para 127, A/68/19.  
\textsuperscript{77} Para 35, A/70/95, S/2015/446.  
\textsuperscript{78} See footnote 26 (Recommendation on page 50).  
82. UNCT interviewees in the country were aware of such unspent funds and believed that they should have been transferred to agencies, as they were better placed to use them. DPKO, however, explained that the mission was unable to do so because of a 2005 General Assembly resolution which required that short-term “reinsertion” money, granted from the regular peacekeeping budget for stabilisation purposes, not be used for long-term “reintegration” objectives, which are required to be resourced through voluntary contributions. DPKO pointed out the inherent contradiction as the General Assembly resolution also called for an “integrated approach” with the UNCT. 80

83. Owing to this definitional rigidity set by intergovernmental bodies, relevant DPKO staff believed that the issue of funding of reintegration should be re-visited. It was pointed out that while the Security Council often mandated DDR, peace operations were not mandated to carry out reintegration, which is a long-term development activity. Specific prohibitions prevent the mission from carrying out any such activities beyond the one-year period defined under reinsertion. At the same time, as there was no specific body accountable to the Security Council to carry reintegration mandates, DPKO staff believed this represented a critical gap that compromises the success of future DDR operations.

84. At the operational level, examples of the difficulties linked to finance included:

- Delay in food distribution due to challenges in determining the cost-sharing arrangements for providing delivery trucks from one mission to one agency;
- Difficulty in transferring funds by mission to agency due to mismatching administrative procedures compelling a mission to substitute one agency with another as the implementing partner; and
- Challenges in paying shared consultants.

85. Overall, interviews suggested deep scepticism towards the United Nations’ current financial architecture in supporting better integration. UNHQ Secretariat officials dealing with finance conceded rigidities in how the United Nations financed peacekeeping.

xii. Missions and agencies rarely sent or received staff from each other

86. Staff in missions and agencies remained generally confined within their respective organizational boundaries, with little “cross-fertilization”.

87. There were nine examples of “bridging”, mainly from the DRC. For a limited time, between 2007 and 2008, MINUSTAH’s child protection unit of five staff members had been seconded to UNICEF offices. This did not go well, with suspicions of “stealing work.” No cases of secondment had been reported between UNOCI and the UNCT in Côte d’Ivoire.

88. In the rare cases of secondments, problems arose, reportedly constrained by incompatible information technology systems.

80 See SG’s response to the HIPPO Report (Para 69, A/70/357 S/2015/682).
xiii. Co-location was undertaken in a minor way

89. The IAP policy refers to co-location as a possible dimension of integration and the Secretary-General considers co-location as a means of enhancing United Nations financing in support of sustaining peace.81

90. In Haiti, co-location of many agencies and the mission through the establishment of common premises occurred in 2010, post-earthquake, out of necessity. At the time of this evaluation, a number of agencies (UNFPA, UNDP, UNHCR and WFP) were co-located in one wing of MINUSTAH’s “Logbase” headquarters. A case of co-location at the project-level also occurred with a MINUSTAH post and a UNDP post located at the Ministry of Justice.

91. In Côte d’Ivoire, there was no co-location between UNOCI headquarters and agencies. In the west of the country, only three out of the five planned sub-offices were integrated and shared resources,82 while the others featured no agency presence at all. In the east of the country, UNFPA was the only agency represented at the time of report writing.

92. Even in the DRC, there was no co-location between MONUSCO headquarters and agencies. MONUSCO’s “antenna” offices were established in six locations no longer affected by armed conflict,83 following the experience of the United Nations area coordinator (AC) mechanism, which remained restricted to its pilot phase due to lack of financial sustainability and lukewarm support from MONUSCO’s headquarters.

xiv. Vested organizational interests on both sides led to limited common procurement at the local level and missed opportunities for greater efficiency

93. Common procurement between missions and UNCTs in the three countries appeared limited by vested organizational interests. Comprehensive figures were difficult to obtain and the available evidence is summarized in Table 6 below.

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81 HIPPO report (A/70/95, S/2015/446) Para 149 (e) iii).
82 Toulépleu, Guiglo and Man. In addition, UNCT joint programme staff in San Pedro is hosted by UNOCI.
83 Bas Congo (Matadi), Bandundu (Bandundu town), Equateur (Mbandaka), Kasai Occidental (Kananga), Kasai Occidental (Mbuji-Mayi) and Maniema (Kindu).
Table 6
Local procurement between peacekeeping missions, UNCTs and UNDP in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peacekeeping missions</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total local procurement by mission</td>
<td>Local procurement in common with UNCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>$2,700,000 (approximate) (2008-2014)</td>
<td>$27,419 (1%) (2008-2014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations Procurement Division and UNDP Procurement Support Office

The available evidence suggested the following:

94. In Haiti, according to the United Nations Procurement Division (PD), common procurement between MINUSTAH and the agencies increased in efficiency in the years 2011 to 2014, rising from eight per cent to 35 per cent of the total value of local procurement. This included fuel and communication services procured by MINUSTAH using the World Food Programme’s contract. However, efficiency decreased when no joint procurement occurred between UNDP and MINUSTAH over the past ten years, despite the considerable amounts at stake.

95. In Côte d’Ivoire, the only goods or services locally procured in common between UNOCI and the UNCT from 2008 to 2014 were condoms, procured by UNFPA on behalf of the mission. UNOCI noted its participation in the UNCT Operations Management Team and the UNCT Procurement Working Group. UNDP informed that its country office benefitted from a collaborative partnership with UNOCI, including the use of the mission’s fuel services, and piggybacking on its long term agreements for transit, security guards and travel. However, no supporting figures could be retrieved.

96. Local procurement figures were not available for MONUSCO. There was no common procurement with agencies. According to UNDP, however, the mission had piggybacked on agencies’ long-term agreements for fibre optics.\(^{84}\)

\(^{84}\) Missions have the delegated authority, for informal solicitations when purchasing from local sources, for amounts up to US$ 40,000, while UNDP allows its country offices to purchase locally up to US$ 150,000.
97. The combined procurement of goods and services of the United Nations PD and UNDP from vendors registered in Africa amounted to $776.1 million in 2013 and $815.9 million in 2014. Based on the available, though limited, information provided, it appears that the opportunity to increase efficiency by realizing economies of scale through joint procurement at the local level, potentially worth substantial sums of money, has not been fully utilized.

V. Conclusion

98. Some progress has been achieved in implementing integration. A comprehensive body of policy and planning tools have been developed and disseminated. Inter-agency support structures exist in UNHQ. In the field, staff from both missions and agencies, at all levels, are required to come together regularly to jointly analyse, plan and implement. The three missions have progressed to varying degrees in conducting integrated assessment and planning. There is increasing awareness of the issue of integration.

99. Serious shortcomings, however, remain. Despite progress, integration lags in implementation and demonstrating tangible results. It is constrained by fragmented governance structures, senior leadership without the requisite authority or engagement, the risk of duplicative activities, differences in funding sources and financial procedures, incompatible support systems, the pursuit of press visibility, a pervasive “us versus them” mentality both in missions and agencies and is foregoing possible substantial economies of scale, in goods procured.

VI. Recommendations

OIOS-IED makes the following three important recommendations to improve integration. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General and DPKO/DFS have accepted all the recommendations. The plans of action for the implementation of the recommendations are included in Annex 2 and Annex 4.

Recommendation 1

The Secretary-General should, in his capacity as the Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), bring the results of this report to the attention of the Chief Executives of relevant agencies, funds and programmes, requesting it to continue to address, in the context of its on-going engagement with the broader topic of integration within the United Nations system, the issues related to integration between missions and UNCTs, and dedicate, as appropriate and possible, one session per year to strengthening integration. (Paragraph 49-97)

Indicators of Implementation: (1) The Secretary-General transmits this report to the Chair of the CEB. (2) The CEB devotes, as appropriate and possible, one session per year on strengthening integration.

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85 Procurement Division/Annual Statistics Review, UNGM website.
86 Delivering savings, promoting a culture of working together and developing solutions for common operations has been the object of the recent session of the CEB’s High level Committee on Management on the post-2015 ‘Fit-for-purpose’ discussion (29th session, March 2015 -Para 19, CEB/2015/3). See also Para 39 of the Annual overview report of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination for 2014, E/205/71.
87 Agencies, funds and programmes with field-based presence in countries with an integrated peacekeeping operation.
Recommendation 2

The Secretary-General should request the Chair of the UNDG to include the Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO/DFS as observers within the UNDG, based on the rationale of the United Nations’ position that there are inextricable and mutually reinforcing linkages between development, peace, security and human rights.
(Paragraph 64-66, 73-79)

Indicators of Implementation: (1) The Secretary-General requests the Chair of the UNDG to include the Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO/DFS as observers within the UNDG. (2) The Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO/DFS are included as observers in the UNDG.

Recommendation 3

DPKO/ should ensure that missions report on results of their integrated work with agencies funds and programmes, wherever present, in relevant existing sections of documents to the Security Council.
(Paragraph 19-25)

Indicators of Implementation: DPKO/DFS requires missions to record the results of their integrated work and its outcomes in relevant existing sections of documents to the Security Council.

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88 DPA has recently been granted Observer status at UNDG.
Annex 1: Comments from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Note to Ms. Mendoza

Formal draft report on the 'Evaluation of the integration between peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Country Teams in Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo'.

1. Thank you for sharing the formal draft report on the above-referenced evaluation and for providing EOSG with the opportunity to submit a response and action plan.

2. The Secretary-General has consistently emphasized the importance of the application of the principle of integration and the responsibility of senior managers in this regard, in accordance with Notes of Guidance and Policy Committee decisions. Although good progress has been made over the years on integration between peace operations and UN Country Teams (UNCTs), we take note of the findings of this evaluation, which highlights continued shortcomings and areas for improvement. Please find below EOSG’s comments on the three recommendations addressed to the Secretary-General in the report.

3. Recommendation 1 asks the Secretary-General to encourage the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to support effective implementation of the Integrated Assessment and Planning policy (IAP) and the reporting thereof. As noted above, the Secretary-General has consistently emphasized the importance of integration and continues to advocate for more coherent policies, clearer mandates and better alignment of financial incentives in his engagement with Member States. Moreover, the Secretary-General already provides the above-mentioned bodies with regular reports on implementation of the IAP, which is above all an internal tool to guide UN-system wide analysis and planning. It is unclear what additional steps the Secretary-General should undertake to signal his commitment to integration among Member States, who are well aware of his stance on this important matter. It is therefore difficult for us to accept this recommendation in its current form.

4. With regard to Recommendation 2, the Secretary-General stands ready, as Chair of the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), to bring the results of this report to the attention of the Chief Executives of relevant agencies, funds and programs, and to request the CEB to continue to address, in the context of its on-going engagement with the broader topic of integration within the United Nations system, issues related to integration between missions and UNCTs, including through its subsidiary bodies, which are already active on issues of system-wide coherence and integration in programmatic and management terms. Hence, this recommendation is interpreted as applying to the CEB as well as indirectly to its subsidiary bodies. We also do not advise to specify too rigidly the CEB agenda as flexibility may be needed to address any pressing matters of the day.

5. If there is a need for an executive level policy discussion on integration at this juncture, it might also be pursued through the Policy Committee, through an update on the previous decisions taken on integration (Decisions 2008/24; 2011/10); integrated missions (Decision 2005/12); human rights in integrated missions (Decision 2005/24); and the integrated mission planning process (Decision 2006/26).
6. We welcome recommendation 3, which would formally involve the Under Secretaries-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) in the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). This would reaffirm the commitment of the United Nations to integration of the three pillars of the UN Charter and would enhance collaboration going forward in support of a UN development system that stands united to deliver on the 2030 Agenda. A closer relationship would be valuable in taking forward key UN reform initiatives, including the one-country framework and joint analysis and planning in humanitarian-development contexts.

7. Following the reform of the UNDG working arrangements and membership in 2014, departments of the UN Secretariat that are represented in the CEB but which are not members of the UN development system are eligible for UNDG observer status. Since the criteria for UNDG membership would preclude DPKO from being a full member, DPKO/DFS should participate as an observer. Both UNDG members and observers can contribute to draft documents and participate in meetings of UNDG and its working mechanisms. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Public Information (DPI), and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) already hold UNDG observer status. We would also suggest addressing this recommendation directly to the Chair of UNDG.

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Edmond Mulet
1 September 2016

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CC:
The Deputy Secretary-General
Ms. Clark
Mr. Fellman
Mr. Ladsous
Mr. Khare
Ms. Petrova
Ms. Wignaraja
Annex 2: Recommendation Action Plan from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General

**Recommendation Action Plan**
(for those recommendations addressed to the Secretary-General)

**Evaluation of the integration between peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Country Teams in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo**
August 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IED Recommendation</th>
<th>Anticipated Actions</th>
<th>Responsible Entity(ies)</th>
<th>Target date for completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 1: The Secretary-General should encourage the Security Council,</td>
<td>The Secretary-General has consistently emphasized the importance of integration in his engagement with</td>
<td>CEB</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<td>General Assembly and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to support effective</td>
<td>Member States.</td>
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<td>implementation of the IAP and the reporting thereof. (Paragraph 42-48)</td>
<td>The Secretary-General already provides these bodies with regular reports on implementation of the IAP,</td>
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<td>which is above all an internal tool to guide UN-system wide analysis and planning.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>It is difficult for EOSG to accept this recommendation in its current form.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation 2: The Secretary-General should, in his capacity as the Chair of</td>
<td>Building on recent and ongoing work, the CEB will continue to engage with broader issues of</td>
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<td>the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), bring</td>
<td>coherence and coordination within the UN system at the strategic and global level, which are</td>
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<tr>
<td>the results of this report to the attention of the Chief Executives of relevant</td>
<td>contributing to the promotion of integration between missions and UNCTs.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>agencies, funds and programmes, requesting it to continue to address, in the</td>
<td></td>
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<td>context of its on-going</td>
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</table>

1 Agencies, funds and programmes with field-based presence in countries with an integrated peacekeeping operation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 3: The Secretary-General should request the Chair of the UNDG to include the Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO/DFS within the UNDG, based on the rationale of the United Nations' position that there are inextricable and mutually reinforcing linkages between development, peace, security and human rights. (Paragraph 64-66, 73-79)</th>
<th><strong>The Secretary-General stands ready to bring the findings of this report to the attention of CEB members.</strong></th>
<th>EOGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EOSG welcomes this recommendation. Following the reform of the UNDG working arrangements and membership in 2014, departments of the UN Secretariat that are represented in the CEB but which are not members of the UN development system are eligible for UNDG observer status. While the criteria for UNDG membership would preclude DPKO from being a full member, we would recommend that DPKO/DFS participates as an observer.</td>
<td>UNDG Chair UNDCCO</td>
<td>By end 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* DPA has recently been granted Observer status at UNDG.
Annex 3: Comments from DPKO/DFS

Evaluation of the integration between peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Country Teams in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Evaluation scope and methodology

1. UNOCI concurs with the assessment that there are continuing issues around integration to be fully addressed, such as those around the coordination of budgets, the strengthening of communication, and the imperative of avoiding duplication. As emphasized in the Mission’s earlier comments, integration requires not only will, but also resources that have been scarce on the ground, including for coordination and the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation (with reference to Table 1 of the report). Notwithstanding, these and other pertinent negative observations vis-à-vis the weakness of integration in general, including specifically in Cote d’Ivoire, UNOCI would wish to refer to the significant efforts in Cote d’Ivoire to strengthen integrated planning in the context of the transition process, particularly since 2014 (the report only covers the period from 2008 to 2014. The Mission is of the view that it should also look forward).

2. UNOCI is of the view that there are several positives relating to integration that could be given more prominence in the report, including in the conclusion in paragraph 98 of the report. Most notably:

- Transition planning has developed and utilised integrated planning frameworks. Notwithstanding the absence of a joint transition plan during the early stages of planning in 2014-2015, the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes incorporated transition planning needs into their One-United Nations Programmatic Framework for 2017-2020. Close coordination between UNOCI and the United Nations agencies in early 2016 also resulted in the incorporation of UNOCI planning assumptions and identified residual needs into the development of a United Nations Country Team (UNCT) transition plan, as well as the development of a $50 million joint programme to guide UNCT engagement on peace consolidation after the departure of UNOCI. Similarly, the preparation of a joint United Nations transition plan took place in June and July 2016 in the form of thematic working groups that were attended by Mission, Agency, Government representatives and development partners. In short, since the cut-off date for this report is 2014, transition planning has been increasingly integrated, which should be reflected, as appropriate, in Section vi on pages 21 to 22 of the report.

- Transition planning and comparative advantages assessments have been driven at the country level. Contrary to the reported perception that these processes were United Nations Headquarters-driven, as referred to in paragraph 39 of the report, the United Nations Country Team in Côte d’Ivoire has played a strong role in driving this process itself. This could be flagged further in Section vi on page 21 of the report.
In late 2013, United Nations Headquarters provided guidance in support of a comparative assessment around the identification of shared strategic objectives. However, this process was driven at the country level and resulted in the transfer of tasks in the areas of HIV/AIDS, gender and child protection to relevant agencies. In this context, UNOCI disagrees with paragraph 77 of the report that “comparative advantage to minimize duplication and overlap – a core principle of integration – had been almost completely ignored.”

The role of United Nations agencies in supporting transition has evolved positively. The incorrect expectation that agencies have the resources to accept and pursue tasks that the Mission wanted to entrust to them, as mentioned in paragraph 40 of the report, or that specific responsibilities were being transferred to the agencies, no longer exists. There is indeed consensus that residual tasks cannot be transferred automatically to the United Nations agencies, unless assessed resources are made available to ensure continuity and/or consolidate peace building gains. As encouraged by the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations report, this understanding is reflected in the joint development by the agencies and UNOCI of projects that can be implemented by agencies, but funded from UNOCI’s assessed budget. In turn, this undertaking has resulted in active and ongoing efforts to harmonise agencies’ and Mission budget-related processes, which are identified as an impediment to better integration in Table 2 on page 16 of the report.

Integrated efforts are being made to address the issue of funding for reintegration of ex-combatants, however, the lack of funding for reintegration is given considerable prominence in paragraph 83 of the report. This is a critical issue that should be addressed effectively at the risk of jeopardizing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration processes. It should be noted, that subsequent integrated efforts are now being made to ensure resources in this area, particularly through the above-mentioned $50 million UNCT joint programme for peace consolidation, as well as the related programme that has been developed jointly between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNOCI, for financing from UNOCI’s assessed budget, to support community disarmament.

Elections and Ebola-response provide positive examples of integration in Cote d’Ivoire. The report, in paragraphs 28 and 36, references that both these issues have supported integrated behaviours, but both could be given further emphasis. In particular, reference could be given to the integrated structure that was established to coordinate United Nations support to the presidential elections in 2015. Likewise, the integrated response of the United Nations system in preventing an outbreak of Ebola gets only a passing mention. It was, however, a major example of sustained integrated behaviour over a two-year period.

3. The report, in paragraph 91, refers to the fact that there was no co-location between UNOCI headquarters and agencies. It should be noted, however, that the Resident Coordinator Unit (from UNDP) is located in the UNOCI’s main headquarters. The Mission also have a joint office in Guiglo and the UNCT joint programme staff in San Pedro is hosted by UNOCI.
Annex 4: Recommendation Action Plan from DPKO/DFS

Management Response

Evaluation of the integration between peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Country Teams in Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Accepted ? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Indicators of Achievement</th>
<th>Implementati on date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Secretary-General should encourage the Security council, General Assembly and Economic and Social council (ECOSOC) to support effective implementation of the IPA and reporting thereof.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>The Secretary-General encourages, through written communication, the Security Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC to support effective implementation of the IAP.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>The recommendation does not fall within the preview of DPKO/DFS. We trust that the EOSG would provide its comments on this recommendation.</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>The Secretary-General should, in his capacity as the Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), bring the results of this report to the attention of the Chief Executives of relevant agencies, funds and programmes, requesting it to continue to address, in the context of its on-going engagement with the broader topic of integration within the United Nations system, the issues related to integration between missions and UNCTs, and dedicate one session per year to strengthening integration.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(1) The Secretary-general transmits this report to the Chair of the CEB, (2) The CEB devotes one session per year on strengthening integration.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>The recommendation does not fall within the preview of DPKO/DFS. We trust that the EOSG would provide its comments on this recommendation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Secretary-General should request the Chair of the UNDG to include the</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(1) The Secretary-General requests the Chair of the</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>The recommendation does not fall within the preview of DPKO/DFS. We trust that DM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec. no.</td>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Accepted ? (Yes/No)</td>
<td>Indicators of Achievement</td>
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<td>Client comments</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO/DFS within the UNDG, based on the rationale of the United Nations' position that there are inextricable and mutually reinforcing linkages between development, peace, security and human rights.</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNDG to include the Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO/DFS within the UNDG. (2) The Under-Secretaries-General, of DPKO/DFS are included in the UNDG.</td>
<td></td>
<td>would provide its comments on this recommendation. Nevertheless, DPKO wishes to clarify that observer status of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) would be appropriate for DPKO and DFS, similar to DPA. Full membership would be inconsistent with the UNDG's guidelines about membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(a) DPKO should ensure that missions report on results of their integrated work with agencies funds and programmes, wherever present, with an emphasis on outcomes. (b) In this respect, DPKO should also consider including a separate section on integration in the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council and in budget performance reports.</td>
<td>(a) Yes (b) No</td>
<td>(1) DPKO requires missions to record the results of their integrated work and its outcomes (2) Secretary-General reports to the Security Council include a section reporting on the results of integrated work completed and outcomes achieved.</td>
<td>(a) Second quarter of 2017 (b) N/A</td>
<td>DPKO is of the view that reporting by missions on their 'integrated work' should be tied to the monitoring and reporting on Integrated Strategic Frameworks and other integrated planning tools (e.g. as part of the Global Focal Point), rather than creating separate reporting requirements. The Department also does not support an entirely separate section on integration in Secretary-General’s reports, but would prefer that those reports reflect integration related aspects in relevant existing sections (e.g. on justice and corrections, elections and transitions). Nevertheless, DPKO would support a stronger focus on integration related aspects, as relevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS in consultation with the Department of Management should work with agencies, funds and programmes to increase joint local procurement, in accordance with the applicable regulations and rules, and report the results, including economies of scale realized, if any thereof, to the United Nations Global Marketplace.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(1) DPKO/DFS, in consultation with the Department of Management mechanisms, works to increase local procurement and report the results of the United Nations Global Marketplace, (2) Local procurement increases.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>The recommendation does not fall within the preview of DPKO/DFS. We trust that DM would provide its comments on this recommendation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 5: Comments from the Department of Management

From: Yanwei Huang@NYUNO
To: Yes-Woo Guo@UNHQ, Zachary Ilia@NYUNO@UNHQ, appenzeller@un.org, George Herman@NYUNO@UNHQ, Myriam Short@NYUNO@UNHQ, cultiss@un.org, Rahul Sur@NYUNO@UNHQ
Date: 28/09/2016 01:04 PM

Dear Mr Guo,

DFS referred the subject draft report to DM for comments on recommendation 5 in mid September.

Please find the below OCSS comments on the recommendation 5.

The recommendation as currently drafted is not implementable for the following reason:

UNFRR under Regulation 5.12 requires Secretariat procurement to follow four general principles: best value for money, fairness, integrity and transparency; effective international competition; and the interest of the United Nations.

When carrying out procurement exercises, UN Secretariat needs to ensure best value for money through effective international competition.

In addition, we already encourage cooperation (FRR 105.17) to be used by all actors in the field whenever practicable, in accordance with appropriate delegation and rules. However it should be noted that increase of cooperation does not in itself lead to a direct increase in local procurement as this recommendation seems to suggest.

It is also not clear why the recommendation was made for results to be reported to UNGM, which is a portal for vendor registration.

In light of these comments, we strongly suggest recommendation be removed in its entirety.

Rgds,

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