With some peacekeeping missions deployed in theatres requiring responses more akin to peace enforcement, force generation is a critical upstream process long-critiqued for being overly numbers-based, which, despite significant recent progress, is still insufficiently transparent, consultative, coordinated and performance-oriented.
FUNCTION

“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organisation. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organisation;” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

Project team members include:

RAHUL SUR, CHIEF, PEACEKEEPING EVALUATION SECTION AND PROJECT LEADER
PETER DIXON, TEAM MEMBER
JOHANNES HAINZINGER, TEAM MEMBER

CONTACT INFORMATION

OIOS/IED Contact Information:
phone: +1 212-963-8148; fax: +1 212-963-1211; email: ied@un.org

RAHUL SUR, CHIEF, PEACEKEEPING EVALUATION SECTION
Tel: +1 212-963-0495, Fax: +1 212-963-1211
e-mail: sur@un.org

(EDDIE) YEE WOO GUO, DIRECTOR
INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION
Tel: +1 917-367-3674, Fax: +1 212-963-1211
e-mail: guoy@un.org
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations currently deploys over 85,000 troops in 16 peacekeeping missions, yet has no standing army. The Organisation generates its forces exclusively from Member States. The timely generation and deployment of forces capable of implementing mission mandates is of critical importance, as increasingly peacekeeping operations are deployed in theatres requiring peace enforcement.

Over the past year, there have been important reforms to the force generation (FG) process; moving from a ‘numbers-based’ to a ‘capability-driven’ approach. A single capability and performance framework is in development, and a Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) has been newly established to bolster the Secretariat’s strategic FG capacities.

This evaluation assessed the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations in planning during the FG process, and related engagement with the Security Council and Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs). To do so, it considered both Member States’ expectations, as defined in Official Documents and through the perceptions of Military Advisers (MilAds), and factors internal to the Secretariat’s FG process.

Despite positive aspects, some expectations of Member States were not fully satisfied, reducing both the relevance of FG to their needs and its effectiveness in securing their contributions. Dissatisfaction was highest among Member States who are more active in United Nations Peacekeeping, and focused on three areas: (i) the timeliness and utility of formal triangular consultations for FG matters, (ii) opportunities for Member States to contribute their field-based experience to military planning and (iii) access to information about potential contributions. While DPKO staff were mostly responsive to Member State requests for information, DPKO maintained a mostly reactive approach to information sharing, which favoured TCCs with established links to DPKO/DFS and/or institutional knowledge about United Nations peacekeeping.

In addition, Member States contributing technological capabilities (TechCCs) and some permanent Security Council Members expressed particular expectations of the FG process, which were not fully satisfied by DPKO/DFS.

As regards TCC selection, DPKO/DFS made progress toward assessing TCCs’ prior conduct and performance. Member States also expressed general optimism toward the PCRS. But selection criteria remained unofficial, contributing to concerns about transparency and risking potential gains in effectiveness and relevance offered by current reforms. The links between performance and FG remained to be fully articulated and established in policy. Furthermore, while the declaration of caveats is now solicited from TCCs at two stages of the selection process, unwritten caveats remained a critical issue.

Finally, inadequate coordination between DPKO and DFS hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of FG planning. DFS staff were insufficiently involved in early DPKO-led discussions with TCCs about potential contributions. This resulted in downstream inefficiencies and, in some cases, contradictory messages. For example, there was discord between DPKO and DFS on the issue of procuring air assets. Reforms to improve coordination, however, are underway.

External changes and internal reforms to FG are likely to increase the base of TCCs, put
pressure on the limited staff resources of DPKO/DFS, and generate greater technological
diversity of contingents. At the same time, the need for frank and objective DPKO
assessments for the Security Council will only become more urgent as peacekeeping
operations face more asymmetrical environments.

OIOS-IED made eight recommendations to address these issues established by the
evaluation.
A. Despite positive aspects, some expectations of Member States were not fully satisfied, reducing the relevance of force generation to their needs and effectiveness in securing their contributions.

B. There was progress toward the inclusion of conduct and performance as factors in TCC selection, as well as optimism toward the PCRS, but selection criteria remained unofficial, contributing to concerns about transparency and risking potential gains in effectiveness and relevance offered by current reforms.

C. Insufficient coordination between DPKO and DFS hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of planning during the force generation process.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAVs</td>
<td>Assessment and Advisory Visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent-Owned Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-34</td>
<td>Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPET</td>
<td>Policy, Evaluation and Training Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBFD</td>
<td>Field Budget and Finance Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCs</td>
<td>Financial Contributing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Force Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Force Generation Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAAC</td>
<td>Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITS</td>
<td>Integrated Training Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>Letter of Assist</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>Logistics and Support Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCMS</td>
<td>MOU and Claims Management Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MilAd(s)</td>
<td>Military Adviser(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVCON</td>
<td>Movement Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAC</td>
<td>United Nations’ Military and Police Advisors Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Military Planning Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIOS-IED</td>
<td>Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OO</td>
<td>Office of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCs</td>
<td>Police Contributing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRS</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Procurement Division (Department of Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD SRS</td>
<td>Police Division Selection and Recruitment Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual exploitation and abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFGC</td>
<td>Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUR</td>
<td>Statements of Unit Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAM</td>
<td>Technical Assessment Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCCs</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TechCCs</td>
<td>Technology-Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMUM</td>
<td>United Nations Military Unit Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangement System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Introduction

1. Acting under authority of its mandate, and in compliance with organisational rules and professional norms, the Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS-IED), carried out, as systematically and objectively as possible, an evaluation with the objective of assessing the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of DPKO/DFS planning for military force generation, and related engagement with the Security Council and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs).1

2. This topic was identified through a risk assessment that highlighted it as an area of continuing and important strategic concern and was communicated to the Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC).2

3. Management comments from the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) and relevant stakeholders were sought and are included in the annex.

II. Background

4. As of 31 December, 2016, the United Nations had 85,451 military troops deployed across 16 peacekeeping operations.3 Without a standing military force, it is fully dependent upon Member States to contribute all uniformed personnel. The process through which the Organization plans, finds, deploys, rotates and repatriates uniformed personnel and equipment is called ‘force generation’ (FG)—a complex political and technical exercise.4

5. Historically, the United Nations has relied on a relatively small number of Member States to provide the majority of its uniformed personnel (Table 1). Since 1990, 138 countries have contributed troops, three of which (Pakistan, Bangladesh and India) have provided 27 per cent of all military personnel across all peacekeeping operations.5 Over four-fifths (84 per cent) of peacekeeping troops have been provided by only one-third of TCCs.6

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1 The general frame of reference for OIOS is set out in General Assembly Resolutions 48/218 B, 54/244 and 59/272, as well as ST/SGB/273. OIOS evaluation is provided for in the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2016/6, p. 16, Regulation 7.1). The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the norms of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).


4 While there are FG processes also for police units and military observers, this evaluation focused only on military troops, which constituted 85 per cent of all uniformed personnel (United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet – as of 31 December 2016).


### Table 1: Top 10 Troop Contributing Countries since 1990 and by Decade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total since 1990*</th>
<th>1990-1999</th>
<th>2000-2009</th>
<th>2010-present*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Through 31 August, 2016

6. Reliance on a few countries for the majority of troop contributions has encouraged a “numbers-intensive” approach to peacekeeping by limiting the capabilities available to DPKO/DFS planners to meet mission needs. The 2009 DPKO/DFS New Horizon Report called for a shift to a “capability-driven approach”, focused not only on generating the required number of troops for a mission, but on “the skills, capacity and willingness of personnel, as well as materiel, to deliver required results.” Key to this approach, according to the Report, was growing the base of contributing countries so as to offer “both greater depth and flexibility to deploy the right combination of actors and capabilities in a particular situation.”

7. Furthermore, contributions under 40 uniformed personnel, which do not constitute a specialized unit, have also been “remarkably common” and considered “inefficient from a military perspective”. The non-participation of countries which support peacekeeping financially (Financial Contributing Countries, herewith FCCs) but do not provide troops has also been considered insufficiently representative of the universal nature of the United Nations.

8. In this context, the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) recently reiterated its call to “expand the base of TCCs to encompass new contributors.” The Security Council has also recognized the “urgent need to increase the available pool of troop...contributors.”

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7 OIOS-IED analysis of raw data from ‘Providing for Peacekeeping’.
9 New Horizon, page 33.
11 See, Ban Ki-moon, speech to the United Nations Security Council, August 26, 2011. Available from www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statements_full.asp?statID=1275 (accessed 9 November, 2016). “Achieving a collective response is also complicated when key stakeholders such as those who mandate missions, those who contribute uniformed personnel and those who are major funders are separate groups. If these groups remain distinct even as mandates become more demanding, tensions and divisions are inevitable, with potentially negative impacts on our operations.”
13 S/PRST/2009/24, p. 3.
FG occurs across five phases and involves a number of functional units inside DPKO and DFS

9. FG occurs over five overlapping phases (Figure 1). Its main functions are carried out in the DPKO Office of Military Affairs (OMA) by the Force Generation Service (FGS) and Military Planning Service (MPS); in the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET), which co-leads the SFGC along with FGS; and in DFS, by the Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD) and the Logistics and Support Division (LSD).

10. Of the following five FG phases, the evaluation focused on the second (planning) and third (TCC selection) because of their high relevance to ongoing reforms to the FG process.

(a) **Strategic force generation:** FG begins when Member States register available forces outside the scope of specific missions via the newly constituted Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), at which point the newly established Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell (SFGC) engages with Member States to get more details about pledged units and to plan an assessment and advisory visit (AAV). During the AAV, DPKO gather information related to the readiness of troops and equipment for deployment and the political willingness of the country to deploy forces to particular theatres of operation. Reforms related to strategic FG seek to expand dialogue with, and outreach to, current and potential TCCs; improve Secretariat understanding of Member States’ intentions; enhance the availability and readiness of capabilities; encourage the participation of new and emerging TCCs; and, ultimately, make the FG process faster, more predictable and more transparent.

(b) **Planning:** When the Security Council considers mandating a new mission or changing the mandate of an established mission, officials in DPKO/DFS start to plan the required capabilities. They draft mission planning documents like the military Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Force Requirements and Statements of Unit Requirements (SURs); engage in a parallel process of informal dialogue with Member States about potential contributions; and support the Security Council in drafting a resolution. Among planning documents, the SUR is of particular importance to TCCs during the FG process. It specifies the mission, tasks, required capabilities, organization, equipment and personnel for each unit to be contributed, forming the basis of a discussion between OMA and TCCs to negotiate gaps between required capabilities and the potential TCCs’ available capabilities.

(c) **TCC selection:** DPKO formally requests pledges from TCCs identified during informal meetings, who then respond via Note Verbale(s) with any mission-specific caveats. The final decision is taken by the Under-Secretary-General of DPKO on the recommendation of the Assistant Secretary-General in the Office of Operations (OO) according to a set of informal criteria, which include both

15 SFGC Strategic Engagement Plan 2016-18; Draft Force Generation Manual. Before the PCRS came online, DPKO and DFS set a performance parameter of six months for the overall FG process, from planning to deployment. No new parameters have since been set.
political and technical factors.

(d) **Pre-deployment:** During this phase, TCCs negotiate with DFS over the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), a formal agreement which outlines the administrative, logistical and financial terms and conditions that govern TCCs’ contributions.¹⁷

(e) **Deployment:** Finally, personnel and contingent-owned equipment (COE) are deployed to the mission area.

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Figure 1  Generation and Deployment of United Nations Uniformed Personnel

**Strategic Engagement**

- **Purpose**: Strategic engagement prepares Member States for UN Peacekeeping through dialogue, capacity building and support. Strategic engagement includes support to assessments of uniformed units in order for Member States to be able to more quickly deploy to UN peacekeeping operations once they are authorized.

- **Key UN Entities**: Strategic Force Generation and Capacity Engagement with Member States on force generation and the PCSG represents Member States in building capacity and partnerships.

- **Figure from Draft Force Generation Manual.**
External factors and ongoing Secretariat initiatives are expanding the number of countries contributing to peacekeeping and changing the FG process

11. Recent important initiatives to expand the number of military and police capabilities offered to United Nations peacekeeping include the Leaders’ Summit convened by the United States of America in October 2015, and a follow-up ministerial-level event convened by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in September 2016. These summits resulted in pledges from 77 Member States, including three countries that had never contributed troops, and 12 out of the 13 countries designated by the SFGC as “new and emerging”.

12. Included among these Member States, furthermore, are countries which were participating in North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) operations in Afghanistan and have returned or are returning to United Nations peacekeeping. These countries have provided or pledged capabilities including troops, an intelligence fusion cell, transport and attack helicopters, senior mission personnel and more.

13. Following the HIPPO Report and evaluations by external think tanks, furthermore, the Secretariat has significantly reformed the FG process to help move it from a ‘numbers-based’ to a ‘capability-driven’ approach. The SFGC was established in 2015 and the PCRS became operational in September 2015, replacing the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). The Secretary-General has also pledged to establish a single capability and performance framework for uniformed personnel.

14. New guidance has also been or will soon be issued, including the United Nations Military Unit Manuals (UNMUMs), which specify the generic requirements of various units, and the Draft United Nations Manual for Generation and Deployment of Military and Police Units to Peacekeeping Operations (Draft FG Manual), which will orient Member States to the FG process.

15. These reforms, coupled with growing Member State participation in peacekeeping, have increased the demands on DPKO/DFS staff. Some examples of new DPKO/DFS staff responsibilities include following up with TCCs who register pledges in PCRS and updating the system accordingly; preparing and conducting AAVs; and vetting and certifying the human rights records of military contingents and individuals.

FG is embedded in the framework of ‘triangular consultation’

16. FG is embedded within triangular consultation, a term used to denote meetings and
dialogue sessions between the Secretariat, Security Council and TCCs. The framework for triangular consultation was established in Security Council Resolutions 1318 (2000), 1327 (2000) and 1353 (2001) and has been reinforced through a series of Notes, Letters and Presidential Statements. The C-34 has since 2010 included in its annual report a section on triangular “cooperation.” In 2015, the HIPPO Report concluded that “the lack of effective dialogue through so-called triangular consultations...has generated frustration on all sides and affected mandate implementation.”

17. FG matters are addressed through triangular consultations in a variety of fora. Formal TCC meetings chaired by the President of the Council and attended by DPKO are carried out before a mandate establishing a new mission or the renewal of an existing one. In the case of mandate renewals, a relatively new practice has developed of informal, mission-specific discussions between Council members, contributing countries, and, sometimes, DPKO. These tend to focus more on operations, but also occasionally address FG issues.

18. DPKO convenes formal and informal meetings with TCCs throughout the lifecycles of missions. Again, these generally focus on operational challenges, but can also include or focus exclusively on FG. In the lead-up to new missions, DPKO holds formal FG meetings and follows up informally with TCCs which express interest. Sometimes, DPKO calls mission and/or, more recently, capability-specific FG meetings to address current or forthcoming capability shortfalls.

The Council and Member States have expectations of the Secretariat relevant to FG in the context of triangular consultation

19. The Security Council and Member States have expressed various expectations of the Secretariat related to FG, focused on (i) consultation and information and (ii) inclusion in planning:

(a) Consultation and information:

(i) While the Security Council plays an indirect role in FG, its decisions set the FG targets and parameters within which DPKO/DFS must operate. The Council expects the Secretariat to provide it with options for action based on objective assessments of missions’ challenges and opportunities prior to and following the establishment of a mandate, not on what Member States are presumed to be willing to support. It expects that triangular consultations should enhance its ability “to make appropriate, effective and timely decisions in fulfilling its responsibilities,” including decisions related to new mandates or mandate changes. It also expects that the

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25 Note that “triangular consultation” and “triangular cooperation” are often used interchangeably, with the latter also used to denote partnerships between developed countries and two or more developing countries (see SSC/17/3 (2012)). This Report uses “triangular consultation”.

26 HIPPO Report, para 188.

27 HIPPO Report, para 190.


Secretariat’s consultations cover cross-cutting issues related to FG like TCCs’ conduct and performance.30

(ii) Member States seek information about potential missions, operational challenges of ongoing operations, security incidents on the ground and the details of unit requirements.31 In their view, the Secretariat’s consultation and information should enable them to come to “a shared understanding of appropriate responses and their implications for the mandate and conduct of an operation.”32

(b) Inclusion in planning: Both the Security Council and Member States expect the Secretariat to draw upon TCC experience and expertise when planning new missions or mandate changes, drawing especially on those serving in the field.33 While Member States and the Council have expressed this expectation generally for both new and ongoing missions, Member States consider it particularly relevant when modifying existing mandates.34

20. In this respect, DPKO and DFS budget documents commit to “providing timely advice and analysis” and to providing information to Member States “on all phases of peacekeeping operations, paying particular attention to the requirements of [TCCs] that need to make informed decisions about their engagement in United Nations peacekeeping.”35

III. Scope and Methodology

21. The evaluation focused on the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of planning and TCC selection in the FG process and related engagement with the Security Council and TCCs. It assessed the extent to which DPKO/DFS met the FG-related expectations of the Security Council and TCCs and the extent to which DPKO/DFS practices and policies were efficient and effective in planning and selecting required capabilities, in the context of new missions and significant mandate changes.

22. It covered the period between March, 2013, when the Force Intervention Brigade of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was mandated, and September, 2016, which marked a year after the PCRS became operational.

23. The evaluation did not assess strategic FG, pre-deployment or deployment. Furthermore, it did not assess the timeliness of the complete FG process. Nor did it consider the downstream effects of HQ-based FG decisions in specific mission contexts. It was entirely HQ-based with no field visit conducted or mission feedback solicited.

24. The universe of TCCs was defined as the 97 Member States whose Military Advisers (MilAds) were members of the United Nations Military and Police Advisors...
Community (MPAC). The evaluation used the attitudes of MilAds (or Deputy MilAds) as a proxy for Member State views for two reasons. First, MilAds are the primary contact between Member States and the Secretariat on FG matters; and second, the MPAC provided an accessible universe of Member States from which a sample could be obtained.

25. The evaluation employed quantitative and qualitative methods, triangulating all results:

(a) **Survey:**

(i) A confidential, online survey of MilAds (or Deputy MilAds) of the 97 Member States was conducted. The survey received responses from 59 MilAds or Dep. MilAds (61 per cent).

(ii) Survey results were disaggregated between ‘active’ Member States (40 responses out of 59) and ‘other’ Member States (19 responses out of 59).

- **Active Member States:** (a) Members of the MPAC contributing 300 or more troops, or who have a history of large contributions,\(^{36}\) (b) technology-contributing countries (TechCCs) who are members of the MPAC\(^{37}\) and (c) permanent or elected members of the Security Council;

- **Other Member States:** All other Member States that are members of the MPAC.

(iii) Survey responses were geographically similar to the actual MPAC membership, although European respondents were overrepresented by seven per cent and African respondents were underrepresented by eight per cent (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>MPAC</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iv) The survey included a mid-point option to all questions.\(^{38}\) This provided

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\(^{36}\) The value of 300 troops is close to the median of current troop contributions among members of the MPAC (277).


\(^{38}\) OIOS-IED policy is to use five or seven response categories with a neutral mid-point. OIOS-IED Inspection and Evaluation Manual p. 66.
those with a neutral opinion to express their point of view, especially useful given the broad range of involvement in peacekeeping across the MPAC universe.

(b) **Interviews:** Thirty four interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of MilAds (and/or in three cases Dep. MilAds) from 23 Permanent Missions.\(^{39}\) There were also 26 meetings with staff from the Secretariat, mostly DPKO/DFS, along with five meetings with external experts.

(c) **Document analysis:** A semi-structured document analysis was conducted to assess key planning documents and Secretary-General Reports from five missions: MONUSCO; the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID); the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS); and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). All Mission Concepts and military CONOPS for these missions were analysed, along with a selection of SURs and Secretary-General Reports.

26. The evaluation has the following limitations. First, MilAds are based at Permanent Missions on two-to-three year cycles, meaning that some had just left or just arrived while data was collected. Where a MilAd had just left, efforts were made to contact them in their new post. Second, reforms related to strategic FG are ongoing, with no significant test of the new PCRS having yet taken place. This precluded their full evaluation, but did allow for an assessment as to how well such reforms will plausibly respond to challenges identified by the evaluation.

IV. Results

27. DPKO/DFS made significant progress over the last year to address longstanding weaknesses in the FG architecture. At the same time, important improvements are still needed. The results in this section are presented according to (i) fulfilment of Member State expectations, (ii) processes related to TCC selection and (iii) issues related to DPKO-DFS internal coordination, each of which has important implications for the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the FG process.

A. Despite positive aspects, some expectations of Member States were not fully satisfied, reducing the relevance of FG to their needs and effectiveness in securing their contributions

28. Overall, results about the extent to which DPKO/DFS met the general expectations of Member States were mixed, but reflected a general trend in which ‘active’ Member States expressed less satisfaction than ‘other’ Member States (Figure 2). Areas of dissatisfaction expressed in both survey and interview results, and particularly by ‘active’ Member States, included (i) the timeliness and utility of formal triangular consultations for FG matters, (ii) opportunities for Member States to contribute their field-based experience

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\(^{39}\) The purposive sample reflected the varieties of ways in which Member States are involved in United Nations peacekeeping: large or longstanding contributors, TechCCs, emerging contributors and members of the Security Council.
to military planning and (iii) access to information about potential contributions. In addition, TechCCs and some permanent Security Council Members expressed particular expectations of the FG process, which were not fully satisfied.

**Figure 2  Satisfaction with DPKO/DFS planning for peacekeeping operations**

"Overall, to what extent is DPKO/DFS's planning process for peacekeeping operations meeting your expectations?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mostly/Completely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Mostly not/Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Member States had mixed views of the state of triangular consultations on FG matters, with frustrations with formal meetings apparent, particularly regarding the timeliness of notifications**

29. Respondents from both ‘active’ and ‘other’ contributors were split on their overall level of satisfaction with triangular consultation, with roughly a third expressing equal parts satisfaction and dissatisfaction (Figure 3). The survey asked for perceptions of “triangular consultation” in general as there are some consultations devoted exclusively to FG, some devoted exclusively to operations and others devoted to both. The interviews focused on triangular consultations where FG matters were specifically addressed, although Member States’ complaints tended to address both operational and FG consultations.

**Figure 3  Overall satisfaction with triangular consultation**

"Overall, how satisfied are you with the current state of triangular consultations between the Security Council, TCCs and the Secretariat?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mostly/Completely satisfied</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Mostly not/Not at all satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

30. There were, however, marked differences in attitudes toward formal and informal meetings. Despite the opportunity for TCC representatives in formal meetings to ask

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40 While formal meetings necessarily include representatives from the Security Council, Secretariat and TCCs, informal meetings are called by the Security Council on mission-specific matters, to which representatives of DPKO are sometimes, but not always, invited.
questions, and specific requests from DPKO leadership for meaningful dialogue, formal
meetings were seen as venues for less open exchange (Figure 4).41

Figure 4 Value of formal versus informal meetings as venues for open exchange

"In your experience, do participants from TCCs speak openly about their views and experiences during TCC Briefings?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Often/Always</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Never/Rarely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

"In your experience, do participants from TCCs speak openly about their views and experiences during informal meetings?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Often/Always</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Never/Rarely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31. Open exchange was considered important by MilAds as a prerequisite to fulfilment of their expectation for meaningful inclusion in the planning process, a key FG-related expectation (paragraph 19(b)). In interviews, 11 out of 23 MilAds cited the lack of open dialogue in formal meetings as a concern. Formal meetings were described as formalistic; providing information already available; called only to endorse decisions already taken; only addressing operational matters and not key concerns like robust mandates; and as fora where “no one talks”. This dissatisfaction was not with the content of the information provided to MilAds, which was generally considered relevant and useful, but rather with the forum itself.

32. This silence was due to three factors. First, some Permanent Missions had insufficient staff to fully engage in all formal meetings. Second, in cases where MilAds represented their Member States instead of Permanent Representatives, some MilAds lacked authorization to speak officially without the prior consent of their capitals. Third, MilAds generally had insufficient time to prepare for meetings on account of receiving short notice. As the first two factors are outside the control of DPKO/DFS, the evaluation focused on the third.

33. In interviews, 12 out of 23 MilAds stated that they generally did not have sufficient time to consult their capitals or field missions before meetings called by the Secretariat or Security Council. Survey results confirmed the gap between the timeliness of DPKO/DFS

41 Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous Statement to the Fourth Committee, 30 October 2015.
invitations and MilAds’ expectations, particularly among ‘active’ contributors (Figure 5). According to ‘active’ MilAds, notice about upcoming meetings was given within one-to-three days of the meeting, which they deemed far too short. Over 60 per cent of ‘active’ MilAds responded that DPKO should give at least one week’s notice, with a fifth asking for the relevant information two-to-four weeks in advance, for sufficient time to consult their capitals and their troops deployed in the field, especially when mandate renewals were envisaged.

34. There were no corresponding DPKO/DFS guidelines specifying notification times for Permanent Missions, nor data on DPKO/DFS performance in this area. DPKO/DFS staff highlighted the urgency of consulting with Permanent Missions at the earliest on important developments, decisions or incidents. Yet, in interviews, senior DPKO leadership also considered silence and lack of participation in formal meetings a material issue.

**Figure 5  Notifications for meetings**

"Before a meeting about a peacekeeping operation, how soon DOES / SHOULD DPKO/DFS provide you with the relevant information and documents?"

- 1-3 days before
- 4-7 days before
- 1-2 weeks before
- 2 or more weeks before

|       | "does" | "should"
<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. Silence at formal triangular consultations impacted negatively on the FG process in two ways. First, it contributed to MilAds’ sense that they were insufficiently included in planning, largely because they had insufficient time to consult their capitals and field personnel. Second, it reduced the effectiveness of formal meetings as fora to discuss missions’ current or foreseen capability shortfalls.

36. At the very start of a mission, the established practice has been for FGS officials to call a formal TCC meeting to assess Member State interest and then follow-up informally through targeted outreach. Most formal triangular consultations occurred in the context of discussions about operational matters in ongoing missions. Recently, however, FGS officials have begun calling select groups of Member States for more targeted FG meetings to address specific capability requirements like helicopters or other key enablers. These targeted meetings, similar to the established NATO practice of ‘FG conferences’, were supported in interviews with all MilAds from TechCCs.

37. At the same time, this new practice presented a tension for DPKO between the norm of universality, according to which DPKO must provide the same information simultaneously to all potential TCCs, and the practice of specifically engaging with a limited number of TCCs, who may be more likely to contribute as they are known to possess the required capabilities. The PCRS offers a potential resolution by offering all
potential TCCs equal opportunity to register their available capabilities, from which DPKO can call select groups.

**Member States were mostly dissatisfied with the opportunities afforded to TCCs by DPKO/DFS to contribute to mission planning, particularly through their field-based experience**

38. The Security Council and Member States have consistently called upon the Secretariat to draw on TCC expertise, particularly their field-based experience. Member States are recognized in DPKO/DFS policy, furthermore, as important stakeholders in the planning process. The Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations recognizes the importance of outreach to and consultation with TCCs for informing the development of options for UN responses. DPKO/DFS has also taken steps to implement the HIPPO Report’s recommendation that heads of mission and force commanders engage with contingent commanders on planned changes to a mandate.42

39. TCCs, however, were not fully satisfied with the opportunities afforded to them as stakeholders. Slightly over half of ‘active’ MilAds either disagreed or strongly disagreed that DPKO/DFS provided opportunities for TCCs to inform planning (Figure 6), while a third agreed. These results were confirmed by interviews, in which 12 out of 23 MilAds expressed disappointment with the extent to which they were consulted by DPKO/DFS staff when planning new missions or mandate changes.

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**Figure 6 Perceptions of MilAds’ inclusion in the planning process**

(Agree/Disagree) "DPKO/DFS provides opportunities for TCCs to inform the planning process with their experience and expertise, including through the views of those serving in the field."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree/Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree/Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>56%</td>
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</table>

40. Across the key mission planning milestones, the strongest dissatisfaction was expressed vis-à-vis the SUR, CONOPS, Mission Concept and rules of engagement (ROE), while reactions to inclusion in “early planning”, the technical assessment mission (TAM) and mandate formulation were mixed (Figure 7).

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42 HIPPO Report, para 191.
41. While DPKO/DFS policy recognizes TCCs as important stakeholders to be consulted, and despite consistent expectations to be more including in planning, Member States have no influence on the elaboration of mission planning documents like the SUR, according to OMA.

42. Yet, once drafted, the SUR forms the basis of DPKO/DFS interaction with prospective TCCs, in part to negotiate gaps between the required capabilities and their eventual contribution. This is one phase of the planning process where TCC consultation could be strengthened and TCCs’ expectations better met, recognized also in the HIPPO report’s section on triangular consultation, which called for SURs to be the “basis of the

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* SG Report = Secretary-General Report

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There has been one instance where a TCC for a highly specialized unit for which no prior model existed was consulted during the design of the SUR.
FG dialogue.\footnote{44}

43. This dialogue takes place largely at HQ with MilAds who are based at United Nations Permanent Missions as the liaison between the field and HQ. The responsibility to provide field perspectives into the planning process rested primarily with these officials. There was no evidence to suggest any direct link between contingents in the field and the HQ planning process.

44. Two MilAds interviewed expressed particular concern with their lack of consultation prior to Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013), which established the Force Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO.

45. One potential avenue to more systematically include TCC field-based input into planning could be via Secretary-General Reports, which inform new mandates and mandate changes. An analysis of Secretary-General Reports revealed that they made no references to TCC consultation. Consultations with TCCs and other stakeholders are not part of the process for drafting and coordinating the Secretary-General reports, nor do general DPKO guidelines for drafting Secretary-General Reports refer to TCC consultation.

While DPKO was mostly responsive to Member States’ requests for information, it maintained a largely reactive approach

46. Member States generally found access to information to be mixed-to-easy (Figure 8). Ten out of 23 MilAds interviewed commended the overall responsiveness of DPKO/DFS staff, with one MilAd from an emerging TCC explicitly thanking them for their “patience”. MilAds described DPKO/DFS staff as providing “unfettered access” and as being “very receptive”. These MilAds also expressed high satisfaction with the information they received about the PCRS, the newly reformed capability gap list, AAVs, training and other issues related to strategic FG.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8.png}
\caption{Ease of access to peacekeeping information}
\end{figure}

"How easy or difficult is it to access information from DPKO/DFS about peacekeeping operations where your country is currently contributing or considering making a contribution?"

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Easy/Very easy</th>
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<th>Mostly/Very difficult</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mostly/Very easy</td>
<td>Mostly/Very easy</td>
<td>Mostly/Very difficult</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mostly/Very easy | Mostly/Very easy | Mostly/Very diffi

47. Respondents were mixed-to-positive on whether DPKO/DFS staff enabled TCCs to make informed decisions about their contributions (Figure 9), although one-fifth of ‘active’ MilAds were neutral on the matter and one-fourth disagreed.

\footnote{44 HIPPO Report, para 218(c)}
48. While overall, Member States had mixed-to-positive views on DPKO/DFS information and consultation, ten out of 23 MilAds interviewed said they were not as well informed as they would have liked to be about missions to which their countries were considering contributing capabilities. Across these ten MilAds, who were from both new and established TCCs, a common theme emerged: DPKO/DFS maintained a reactive approach to information sharing, putting the burden to seek information upon TCCs.

49. This reactive approach posed relatively few obstacles to TCCs familiar with the system, however it challenged TCCs who had never contributed, who lacked personal links to DPKO/DFS staff and/or who lacked institutional knowledge about peacekeeping. With regard to access to information about peacekeeping operations, five of the ten MilAds cited above noted the importance of personal connections inside the Secretariat and gave examples of the difficulties they had encountered therein.

50. Six of the ten MilAds cited above noted the lack of a single hub or package where potential or current TCCs could access all documents pertaining to a particular mission, such as the CONOPS, ROE, SUR, etc. Interested Member State officials had to seek these out across DPKO/DFS offices. This, in turn required knowing where to go and who to call.

**There was broad agreement from all Member States as to how DPKO/DFS could better meet their expectations for information, with emphasis on safety and security**

51. The survey and interview responses demonstrated that MilAds considered a wide number of subjects, derived from official documents, as suitable for briefings by the Secretariat and important to their informed decision-making (Table 3) and that many of these expectations had been met, with the main exception being information about safety and security (Figure 10), including medical support.

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*Figure 9  Support to TCCs to make informed decisions about contributions

(Agree/Disagree) "DPKO/DFS provides prospective TCCs with a common understanding of a planned operation so they can make informed decisions of whether or not to commit personnel."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree/Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree/Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45 See also, Karlsrud and Smith 2015.
Table 3 “Which of the following topics should be considered during DPKO/DFS’ briefings and meetings on peacekeeping operations?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety and security of peacekeepers in the field</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical security incidents in the field</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability gaps in missions</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-deployment threat assessments</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance of peacekeepers in the field</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of protection of civilian mandates</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct/discipline of peacekeepers, including allegations of SEA</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance of equipment in the field</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National caveats</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(s), please specify</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. Survey respondents reported largely positive results about the extent to which they were briefed on a variety of FG-related matters prior to a new or reconfigured operation (Figure 10). Results were less positive, however, with regard to the frequency of pre-deployment threat assessments.

Figure 10 Content of DPKO/DFS assessments prior to new/reconfigured mission

"Prior to the launching of a new peacekeeping operation or reconfiguration of an existing operation, does DPKO/DFS generally provide you with assessments of the following?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Never/Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often/Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-deployment threat assessments</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The operation's logistical resource requirements</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Details about the equipment that is needed</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The operation's required capabilities</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The operation's specific unit requirements</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. In interviews, furthermore, MilAds expressed low satisfaction with the threat assessments provided to them by DPKO. This was problematic for potential TCCs without such capacity in their domestic security services. In one instance, a Member State turned down a request from DPKO to contribute when not provided with sufficient information on possible security threats.

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46 Survey options were derived from A/70/19.
47 Survey options were derived from A/70/19.
TechCCs had specific expectations of DPKO/DFS during the FG planning process, which were not always met

54. TechCCs had particular expectations of DPKO/DFS, which stemmed from their familiarity with NATO planning and their own domestic decision-making processes. Where DPKO/DFS was unable to accommodate these requests, the risk was lost or delayed contributions.

55. All four TechCC MilAds interviewed described the predominant DPKO/DFS mode of interaction with TCCs as “bilateral”, whereas TechCCs were more accustomed to NATO-type multilateral planning. TechCCs required, in particular, information about which other Member States would provide enablers and force multipliers. The onus, however, was upon them to seek out this information from DPKO on an ad hoc, informal basis.

56. This practice of bilateral engagement with TCCs was also challenged by TechCCs who preferred to provide single capabilities through rotation systems. A current innovation related to several TechCCs who jointly offered C-130 heavy transport aircraft units for MINUSMA for two years with effect from 2018. MilAds involved reported facing some procedural difficulties with regards to the SUR and the MOU, despite the predictability that such a rotating/combined contribution would provide for all actors involved. While this is the only such contribution to be facing these difficulties, it is for a major air asset whose loss would undermine MINUSMA’s effectiveness.

57. No final decision had yet been made about whether or how to adapt this single MOU system to TechCC demands for a multilateral approach, but DPKO/DFS expressed willingness to find a solution.

58. All four MilAds from TechCCs, furthermore, expressed concern about receiving more detailed information about medical coverage in missions to which they were considering contributing. While medical coverage is a cross-cutting issue relevant to all TCCs, it emerged as a particularly strong theme among the sub-sample of TechCCs, who all noted that their domestic planning processes required clarity on the issue as a precondition of contributing. In two of these cases, the TechCCs decided not to contribute their enabling capabilities in part because of the incompleteness of information about medical support arrangements on the ground provided by DPKO, despite domestic willingness to contribute. In both of these cases, the PCRS had just been introduced, but was not yet fully functional. In one additional case, this resulted in a delayed contribution.

59. Furthermore, two out of these four TechCCs noted that some operational details were only present at the mission level, constituting a hurdle for new TCCs without access to the field. One MilAd emphasized that access to specific information needed to convince the country’s capital to contribute was only available after making the decision to join, recognizing that lack of mission-specific information at HQ could be accounted for by limited DPKO staff resources.

60. DPKO officials noted that in new missions, information about which other countries are contributing key elements like medical support is not necessarily available when TCCs are signing up. For ongoing missions, however, officials responded that as a general rule, they should be able to provide such information, and suggested these cases
were exceptions to the rule. The new systems in place to support strategic FG, furthermore, seek to frontload much of the planning process so as to better meet countries’ information needs and to orient new TCCs to the FG process.

61. Yet, these cases highlighted the acute challenges that the return of TechCCs pose to the FG process. The PCRS could help, but TechCCs’ information needs are highest after the strategic FG phase when they are considering a contribution to a specific mission context.

**Permanent Security Council Members had mixed perceptions of DPKO/DFS assessments**

62. MilAds from the five Permanent Members of the Security Council were split about the extent to which DPKO/DFS assessments met their expectations for FG-related information and support. While for some, DPKO/DFS assessments met all expectations, others expressed dissatisfaction. One noted the lack of an effective “feedback loop.”

63. There was concern that DPKO assessments of situations in Secretary-General Reports did not provide the Council with objective analyses and meaningful options for action—offering options only for small, medium and large forces, where the medium choice balanced the Council’s resource concerns with needs on the ground. Such assessments are critical because they inform the Council on future or existing peacekeeping operations and recommend potential courses of action.48

64. Some Permanent Security Council Member MilAds were concerned that DPKO/DFS assessments of current situations or events in the field were “sanitized” before reaching headquarters, stripped of the details that could reflect poorly on certain individuals or contingents and lacking information about cross-cutting issues related to FG, like conduct and performance. In this regard, the HIPPO Report noted that “the Security Council has not always received the frank assessments it needs to make better informed decisions,” reiterating the longstanding observation of the lack of full candour on the part of the Secretariat in briefing the Council.49 DPKO Guidelines on the preparation of Secretary-General Reports emphasize providing information and analysis, not opinions.

**B. There was progress toward the inclusion of conduct and performance as factors in TCC selection, as well as optimism toward the PCRS, but selection criteria remained unofficial, contributing to concerns about transparency and risking potential gains in effectiveness and relevance offered by current reforms**

65. All relevant stakeholders, including the Security Council, C-34, the Secretary-General and DPKO/DFS leadership, agreed that conduct and performance should be considered by the Secretariat when selecting TCCs.50

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48 See also, HIPPO Report, para 96. Initial planning for MINUSMA was overly ambitious with regard to planned mission tasks and underestimated the level of resources required, necessitating a subsequent mandate on the part of the Security Council to increase the amount of troops for the mission. See MINUSMA Draft Mission Concept, December 2015; S/RES/2295 (2016).

49 HIPPO Report, para 30; See also, para 73, para 96, para 105(b)(ii), para 179. See also, A/55/305 - S/2000/809. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi Report"), page x; See also para 64(d), Annex III(4)(d).

50 The Security Council has repeatedly emphasized that conduct and performance should factor into the Secretariat’s decision-making (S/PRST/2015/26, page 3-4); the C-34 encouraged the Secretariat to continue development of an integrated capabilities and performance
66. In the survey, four-fifths of respondents responded that TCCs’ prior conduct and performance in the field should always be considered by DPKO/DFS when selecting TCCs for peacekeeping operations (Figure 11). The remaining fifth replied that conduct and performance should only be considered sometimes.

Figure 11 Attitudes toward assessment of TCC conduct and performance

"Should DPKO/DFS consider TCCs' prior conduct and performance in the field when selecting TCCs for peacekeeping operations?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, always</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, never</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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DPKO/DFS are developing a performance framework to integrate with TCC selection

67. DPKO/DFS are making progress toward systematically tracking TCC conduct and performance. Since 2008, DFS has maintained a confidential Misconduct Tracking System, which systematically tracks all reports of serious misconduct by all categories of personnel, including military contingent members. More recent initiatives include a Policy on Operational Readiness Assurance, which broadly supports the FG process. In addition, a new Standard Operating Procedure on the Force and Sector Commander’s Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities in Peacekeeping Operations is aimed “to help Force and Sector Commanders identify and correct problems that affect subordinate unit performance…through a transparent process conducted in the spirit of cooperation and support.”

68. It is envisaged that this will be aggregated with other relevant information in a knowledge management system that is still in development and which will better inform the TCC selection process with a more accurate picture of TCCs’ prior conduct and performance. It will also complement the information obtained through the PCRS and AAV, providing a stronger ‘technical’ assessment of potential contributors than was previously available.

69. Among Permanent Members of the Security Council, however, there was some dissatisfaction with the extent to which DPKO officials addressed performance and conduct in their consultations, resulting in assessments of TCC performance based more on anecdotes than systematic analysis. While MilAds from Permanent Security Council framework (A/70/19, para 87); the HIPPO Report called for “a strengthened system for the review of cases of non-performance, particularly in the context of the protection of civilians mandate” (para 218 (f)); and the Secretary-General has laid an unequivocal emphasis on tracking conduct and performance, followed by specific assurances that he would consider repatriating personnel if they fail to follow orders or comply with United Nations standards of conduct (on conduct, see, SG HIPPO Response, paras 26, 119-125; on performance, see, SG HIPPO Response, paras 78, 85, 91-98).

51 SFGC Strategic Engagement Plan 2016-18.
Members agreed that the selection of TCCs for specific missions was ultimately the responsibility of DPKO/DFS, some noted they would still like to be kept informed of DPKO/DFS efforts to track and assess contingents’ conduct and performance. At the same time, there was recognition of the Secretary-General’s recent efforts toward improving and systematizing the assessment of conduct and performance.52

MilAds were optimistic about the PCRS and associated reforms, but some were concerned that politics and a lack of transparency could undermine the TCC selection process

70. Fourteen out of 23 MilAds expressed optimism about the potential of the PCRS and its associated processes to make TCC selection more effective and transparent.53

71. Notwithstanding this optimism, 11 out of 23 MilAds expressed doubts about the transparency of the TCC selection process and urged more clarity for the main criteria of selection. Four MilAds, including one Permanent Member of the Security Council, expressed explicit concern that the PCRS might be “bypassed” or “short-circuited” for political reasons. The decision-making process leading to the selection of TCCs, through which OO balanced ‘political’ with ‘technical’ considerations, was not considered transparent.

72. The survey confirmed these findings (Figure 12). The great majority of respondents described planning and TCC selection as both technical and political. And while virtually no one suggested the process was mostly technical, one-fourth of ‘active’ States and one-fifth of ‘other’ States responded that the process was mostly or entirely political. Because the PCRS is new, these impressions may have stemmed both from MilAds' assessments of the old system and from their uncertainties about the new system. DPKO/DFS staff responded that the TCC selection process will necessarily have a political component, but the PCRS will plausibly enable a more balanced ‘technical’-'political’ consideration than was previously possible.

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52 While the assessment of conduct and performance extends beyond SEA, several measures have been taken and are being envisaged in connection to information related to conduct of TCC personnel, particularly when related to SEA. These include: (a) providing data (both to the United Nations senior management and publicly) on the nationality of the TCC personnel associated with allegations of SEA and the status of actions taken by Member States in relation to those allegations; and (b) putting in place the procedures, following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2272 (2016), concerning decisions to repatriate or discontinue the deployment of troops from TCCs that fail to meet the expectations as stated in the resolution.

53 In the context of TCC selection, Member States in the C-34 have urged the Secretariat to “continue its implementation of the [PCRS] in consultation with all Member States.” A/70/19, para 100.
Despite its potential, the PCRS presented inherent uncertainties and limitations

73. Eight out of 23 MilAds highlighted issues they considered pertinent to the PCRS, including, the lack of assurances that TCCs would be called to deploy, despite the fact that their pledges were time-bound and required financial investment (5 MilAds); that TCCs may not present the equipment they intended to deploy during the Secretariat’s AAVs (3 MilAds); and, finally, not knowing the specific terrain to which they would be deployed (1 MilAd). These are inherent challenges to the new system, which DPKO/DFS will need to address through consultation with Member States.

74. While in its first year, the PCRS was used to generate 19 out of 20 units, it underwent its first real test following the Security Council mandating additional forces of 2,000 military personnel for MINUSMA and 4,000 for UNMISS.\textsuperscript{54} In the case of a regional protection force of UNMISS, host nation considerations limited these to Member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In this case, political factors took primacy over the more balanced political-technical assessment supported by the PCRS.\textsuperscript{55}

Criteria are listed in the Draft Force Generation Manual, but there was no DPKO/DFS Policy on TCC selection

75. DPKO selects TCCs according to various criteria, which, inter alia, include political acceptability, geographical proximity, regional balance, past TCC performance, host nation approval, and the state of readiness of the TCC.\textsuperscript{56} These are now listed in the Draft FG Manual, which provides a description for TCCs, but as yet are not set down in DPKO policy. Priority is given to Member States whose capabilities are already registered in the PCRS.\textsuperscript{57} Conduct is mentioned in the Manual, but not included in the list of examples of criteria used.

76. In response to Security Council Resolution 2272 (2016) on accountability for uniformed personnel implicated in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), the Secretariat developed Operational Guidance specifying factors to be used in determining

\textsuperscript{55} At the time of writing, no decision had yet been taken on which TCCs would contribute troops to the UNMISS regional protection force.
the deployment and/or pre-deployment of military contingents and formed police units. These include the history of reports of SEA; accountability standards; preventive measures such as training; and readiness standards of military contingents. The Operational Guidance will be implemented through a Standing Review Committee, which will provide advice to Member States on these matters.

77. With regard to the criteria of geographical proximity, the determination of whether to include neighbouring countries or not has been on a case-by-case basis, acknowledged by DPKO to be “a double-edged sword”.

The declaration of caveats were solicited from TCCs at two stages of the selection process, though unwritten caveats remained an issue

78. In registering their pledges in the PCRS, potential TCCs indicated general caveats or conditions. Examples provided in interviews included preference for particular theatres of operation or contingency of a pledge on domestic legislative approval. During the selection process for specific missions, TCCs indicated caveats to their contributions through official offers provided via Note Verbale.

79. However, unwritten caveats, which emerged only after deployment, posed an operational challenge to the implementation of mandates. For example, countries may, based on national restrictions, forbid their contingents from performing certain tasks ordered by the Force Commander. Current policy does not require caveats to be included in the SUR, MOU or Letter of Assist (LOA).

C. Insufficient coordination between DPKO and DFS hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of planning during the FG process

80. The effectiveness of the FG process depends on the successful coordination of both DPKO and DFS, as the former manages the military elements while the latter manages logistics and finance. To this end, DPKO and DFS commit to “work in an integrated and cohesive way through joint departmental decision-making bodies and shared resources under a unified vision, direction and set of guiding principles.”

DFS was insufficiently involved early on in DPKO planning discussions with TCCs regarding the SUR

81. The lack of fully effective coordination between DPKO and DFS during the FG process was most evident in early planning discussions between DPKO and TCCs about their potential contributions. During such discussions, DPKO often agreed to deviations from generic SURs without sufficient input from DFS, accepting TCC alternative capabilities when these countries did not possess or were unable or unwilling to procure the specific capabilities called for.

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58 For example, history of repeated listing in the annual reports of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence and/or of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict and investigative capacities of National Investigative Officers for military contingent investigations.

59 For example, assessing whether the unit possesses provisions to take care of the welfare, physical and mental well-being of contingent members during the deployment.

60 DPKO/DFS Proposed Strategic Framework 14-15 (A/67/6 (Prog. 4)), para 4.5.
82. A recent policy is for the USGs of DPKO and DFS to sign off on all mission-wide strategic planning documents. Current practice is also for DFS/LSD to be consulted during the drafting of SURs before they are submitted to DPKO/OMA leadership. Despite this, when DFS had not been meaningfully included in these initial SUR discussions, the same agreements had to be renegotiated, slowing the process. In at least two instances, the two departments gave TCCs contradictory messages. In one case, the result was that equipment remained in the field unused for a significant period of time because DFS did not agree with the decisions on equipment originally condoned by DPKO.

83. Insufficient coordination between DPKO and DFS also hindered the effective management of financial outcomes of the FG process. Where DFS was insufficiently implicated early on in SUR negotiations, the ability of the two Departments to effectively and efficiently balance military and financial prerogatives was challenged. An example included the decision-making process regarding procurement of military or commercial air assets.

**DPKO and DFS did not engage effectively when deciding whether to procure air assets through commercial means or from Member States**

84. The early planning process includes a determination as to whether air assets called for in the force requirements will be commercial, provided through a competitive bidding process, or military, provided by a TCC. In the latter case, TCCs sign a LOA, detailing a reimbursement rate determined through negotiations with the Procurement Division (PD) in the Department of Management.  

85. Staff from DPKO, DFS and PD suggested that the Departments were not coordinating effectively to assess the full costs and benefits of acquiring military versus commercial assets, with DFS staff feeling insufficiently involved in the decision-making process and noting the trend toward increased military procurement (Figure 13). Within DFS, this was strongly felt to be an issue of economy and compliance with organizational rules requiring cost-saving as a primary consideration. In contrast, for DPKO, primary consideration should not be cost saving but rather safety and ability to perform the mandated tasks, such as tactical airlift of troops for combat operations. Some TCCs expressed similar points of view. Such trends would benefit from further evaluation.

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Steps are underway to improve coordination on SUR-related matters

86. In response to the abovementioned inefficiencies, DPKO/DFS have taken or proposed a number of steps. They have proposed to include the SUR as an annex in the MOU, as suggested by the HIPPO Report and agreed to by the Secretary-General in his response,62 and have already started to track and jointly sign off on any condoned changes to the SUR requested by TCCs. Policies on the development of the SUR and related discussions with TCCs, including about LOAs and military/commercial air assets, are currently being discussed.

Member States’ perceptions of DPKO/DFS coordination were mixed overall, but more negative among ‘active’ contributors than ‘other’ contributors

87. Around one-third of MilAds from ‘active’ States responded in the survey that the coordination between DPKO and DFS was mostly not or not at all effective (Figure 14). Thirteen out of 23 MilAds interviewed also expressed negative views about their coordination. Among MilAds from Permanent Members of the Security Council the assessment of DPKO/DFS coordination was also largely negative.

Figure 14 Effectiveness of DPKO-DFS coordination

"In your opinion, to what extent do DPKO and DFS effectively work together in planning the operational and logistical elements of peacekeeping operations?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly/Completely</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly not/Not at all</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 HIPPO Report, para 218(c); SG HIPPO Response, para 62.
V. Conclusion

88. With some peacekeeping missions deployed in theatres requiring responses more akin to peace enforcement, force generation is a critical upstream process long-critiqued for being overly numbers-based.

89. Yet, DPKO and DFS have made significant improvements to the FG process. Member States’ initiatives have helped broaden the potential base of Member States contributing to United Nations peacekeeping. DPKO/DFS have progressed toward establishing a FG process that is faster, more transparent and rooted in earlier and more sustained engagement with potential and current TCCs. Both the SFGC and PCRS, and related Draft FG Manual and Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations, appear to be moving in the right direction. The new policies and procedures related to assessing the conduct and performance of military units are signs of progress, as are ongoing efforts to establish a more systematic knowledge management system into which these will ultimately feed.

90. Despite significant progress, challenges remain to the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the FG process, which pose risks to ongoing reforms. Specifically, FG is still insufficiently transparent, consultative, coordinated and performance-oriented.

91. To increase the relevance of FG, DPKO/DFS will need to continue and take further steps to meet Member States’ expectations for timely and meaningful consultation and transparency. To improve efficiency, DPKO/DFS must address shortcomings in providing TCCs with timely notice about FG consultations, while also improving the internal coordination between the two Departments. To make FG more effective, DPKO/DFS should become more proactive in providing information to prospective TCCs, particularly new or recently returned TCCs, while at the same time more clearly articulate the links between TCC selection and performance/conduct assessment. Finally, the risk posed by unwritten caveats also needs to be dealt with forthrightly and transparently.

92. The Security Council requires comprehensive and frank assessments of situations to make the decisions that set FG parameters and goals. In this respect, DPKO/DFS leadership have an important role to play, both as models and by encouraging their staff to inform the Security Council of inconvenient truths. Encouragement from the Security Council for such objectivity can also greatly contribute to lessening the Secretariat’s hesitations in fulfilling this obligation.

93. Furthermore, the survey results indicated marked differences between MilAds according to the level and kind of involvement of their countries in United Nations peacekeeping. This suggests that DPKO/DFS would be well served by engaging in more targeted dialogue with particular groups of Member States according to their specific strengths and capabilities. The SFGC and PCRS offer a valuable opportunity to do so while still fulfilling Member States’ expectations for greater transparency. At the same time, Member States have a corresponding obligation to ensure they have sufficiently empowered and knowledgeable representatives present as the FG process unfolds.

94. The increasing number of pledges and other reforms to the FG process will likely result in an increased workload for DPKO/DFS. As the base of potential TCCs increases,
so will the diversity of Member State experiences, expectations, understandings and needs to which the Secretariat will necessarily have to respond and adapt.

VI. Recommendations

Recommendation 1

To improve the timeliness of notice to TCCs about upcoming meetings, and to help Military Advisers better consult with their capitals and field personnel, DPKO/DFS should establish a timeline for providing notice, agendas, and relevant documents to Member States prior to formal and informal meetings. (Paragraph 29-37)

Indicator(s) of Implementation

- Establishment of timeline for providing notice, agenda, and documents prior to upcoming meetings with Member States.

Recommendation 2

To further strengthen the Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/DFS should request Member States to explore the possibility for respective contingents deployed in missions where the Security Council is considering a significant mandate change to contribute their field experiences and perspectives prior to mandate renewal and take these into account in recommendations to the Security Council. (Paragraph 38-45)

Indicator(s) of Implementation

- Establishment of policy or procedure to request Member States to explore the possibility for respective contingents deployed in missions to contribute their field experience and perspectives prior to mandate renewal.

Recommendation 3

DPKO/DFS should duly reference in the relevant Secretary-General report(s) to the Security Council that appropriate consultations with TCCs have taken place prior to the establishment of a new mission or during the strategic review of an existing mission. (Paragraph 45)

Indicator(s) of Implementation

- Number and percentage of relevant Secretary-General reports to the Security Council that make explicit mention of appropriate TCC consultations prior to the establishment of a new mission or during the strategic review of an existing mission.

Recommendation 4

DPKO/DFS should adopt a more proactive approach to information sharing by establishing a single document ‘package’ or online ‘hub’ where potential and current
TCCs can access the most up-to-date, mission-specific documents. (Paragraph 46-50)

*Indicator(s) of Implementation*

- Establishment of single document package or online hub containing essential, mission-specific documents for interested TCCs.

**Recommendation 5**

DPKO/DFS should facilitate Member States’ pledges when they wish to offer capabilities through rotation systems and when the rotation proposal is in line with the mission’s operational requirements. (Paragraph 56-57)

*Indicator(s) of Implementation*

- Percentage of pledges of capabilities offered through rotation systems that are accepted by DPKO/DFS.

**Recommendation 6**

DPKO/DFS should further develop TCC selection policies and procedures with a view to clarifying the criteria used, drawing on the description provided in the Draft Force Generation Manual and including TCCs’ prior conduct and performance. (Paragraph 65-77)

*Indicator(s) of Implementation*

- Establishment of policies and procedures clarifying criteria used for TCC selection.

**Recommendation 7**

DPKO/DFS should ensure that all caveats, if any, stating operational deviations from what is requested in the statement of unit requirements (SUR) are recorded in a standardised document. The template for this document should be made available to all troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) for their information. This document, recording the T/PCCs’ caveats as above, shall be filed together with the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and statement of unit requirements (SUR) at the end of the negotiation process. The Draft Force Generation Manual should be appropriately updated to describe this new process. Furthermore, the legal status of this document should be clarified with the Office of Legal Affairs with a view to ensuring the integrity, robustness and effectiveness of the command and control arrangements of the United Nations. (Paragraph 78-79)

*Indicator(s) of Implementation*

- Establishment of standardised document template to record caveats.
- Inclusion of caveats, if any, in standardised document filed together with the MOU and SUR at the end of the negotiation process with T/PCCs.
Recommendation 8

To improve coordination between the two Departments, DPKO/DFS should (a) ensure that DFS fully participates in the forthcoming knowledge management system so that DPKO and DFS data on TCC conduct and performance are effectively and efficiently integrated, and (b) enhance coordination in statement of unit requirements (SUR)-related discussions, ensuring that DFS and, where relevant, the Procurement Division (PD), are sufficiently represented in the earlier stages of force generation with a view to all departments arriving at a common and unified position in negotiations with Member States. (Paragraph 68, 80-87)

Indicator(s) of Implementation

- (a) Establishment of policies and procedures clarifying roles and inputs of DFS and other relevant stakeholders in the knowledge management system;
  
- (b) Establishment of policies and procedures clarifying roles and inputs of DFS, PD, and other relevant stakeholders in SUR drafting and post-drafting processes.
Annex 1: Comments by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support

Mr. Yee Woo Gun, Director
Inspection and Evaluation Division, OIOS

Date: FEB 22 2017

Lisa Dutenheim, Assistant Secretary-General
for Field Support

SUBJECT: Final draft report on the programme evaluation of DPKO/DPFS
Planning during the force generation process and related engagement with the Security Council and Troop-Contributing Countries

1. I refer to your communication, dated 30 January 2017, regarding the above-mentioned report. Please find attached our comments on the findings and recommendations in Annex 1, as well as the recommended action plan.

2. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. We stand ready to provide any further information that may be required.

cc: Herwe Ladenss
Heidi Mendes
David Kanji
Byung-Kan Min
Eleuter Lassem
Rafid Sheh
Peter Dixon
Cynthia Lampet
Annex I

Evaluation of Planning during Force Generation Process and Related Engagement with the Security Council and Troop-Contributing Countries

Paragraph 39

1. With regards to OIOS’ statement that some military advisors were disappointed “with the extent to which they were consulted by DPKO/DFS staff when planning new missions or mandate changes”, DPKO/DFS wish to clarify that, while military planners provide inputs for the mandates, they do remain quintessentially political documents that are ultimately approved by the Security Council. “Tensions” between military and political aspects of a mandate and, therefore, the level of satisfaction of MiIs (who are not necessarily planners) cannot be automatically attributable to DPKO/DFS. These could be inherent to political/military cleavages within Member States themselves (for instance, between Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence). When approaching Member States on force generation, it is not uncommon to see different degrees of willingness to contribute between military and civilian representatives. However regrettable, such cleavages do exist, and it is unfair to expect DPKO/DFS to overcome and resolve them through the planning process.

Paragraph 42

2. OIOS stated in paragraph 42 that “...the SUR forms the basis of DPKO/DFS interaction with prospective TCCs, in part to negotiate gaps between the required capabilities and their eventual contribution. This is one phase of the planning process where TCC consultation could be strengthened and TCCs’ expectations better met,... which called for SURs to be the ‘basis of the FG dialogue’.” DPKO/DFS wish to clarify that the Statements of Unit Requirements (SURs) are demand driven documents, which show what is needed, and are supposed to be generic requirements, not Troop-Contributing Country (TCC) specific. However, where a TCC is the only country pledging a specialised unit, DPKO consults the TCC during the drafting of the SUR (for example, a Regional Quick Reaction Force). Moreover, TCCs always have the opportunity to negotiate capabilities outlined in the SUR and what they could provide during Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiations. What is important is the ability to perform the mandated tasks.

Paragraphs 47 and 52

3. DPKO/DFS believe that OIOS’ statements in paragraphs 47 and 52 are unreconciled with statements in other parts of the report suggesting the military advisors’ dissatisfaction with the overall level of information available about the planning process.

Paragraph 55

4. With regards to OIOS’ statement related to providing information about TCCs, DPKO clarifies that it will be difficult to furnish information on TCCs providing specific enablers at the planning stage of a mission, since it takes time for TCCs to make such contributions. With regard to established missions, this information is provided as part of the Annex to the Secretary-General reports, including the detailed deployment of the force.
Paragraph 71

5. With regards to OIOS' statements relating to the transparency of the TCC selection process, DPKO/DFS wish to reiterate that peacekeeping is and will remain a political undertaking rather than a purely military enterprise. Its ultimate success lies in the political arena and requires political means. Besides technical, there will inevitably be a political consideration in the selection of TCCs based on geography, history, linguistic affinity, and other factors. It is difficult indeed to capture such qualitative considerations into a selection process that is perceived as totally objective.

Paragraph 73

6. As stated in the first sentence of paragraph 73, some MilAds raised the issue concerning "the lack of assurances that TCCs would be called to deploy, despite the fact that their pledges were time-bound and required financial investment". Indeed, there is no guarantee when units pledged by TCCs in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System will be called to deploy. TCCs should, however, bear in mind that having pledges of units aligned to the types required in the Capability Requirements Paper, at the highest levels of readiness and free of political/operational/logistic caveats may increase the chances of deployment of those units.

Paragraph 80

7. In the ultimate sentence of paragraph 80, OIOS stated that "DPKO often agreed to deviations from generic SURs without sufficient input from DFS, accepting TCC alternative capabilities..." DPKO/DFS wish to clarify that this happens only as a last resort when no alternative TCCs are available. For example, for more than one year, no TCC was able to meet the SUR standard for the combat convoy battalion to be deployed in Mali. Eventually, DPKO had to revise the SUR for two TCCs to provide a company each. Even after reducing the SUR to a company level, the two TCCs, which agreed to deploy the companies, could not provide all the equipment required. In another case, MINUSMA has been waiting for three years to find a TCC, which could deploy attack helicopters in Sector North (Kidal). As shown by the above examples, DPKO/DFS are often faced with a dilemma of either waiting for the right TCC with all the equipment in the SUR or accepting a TCC with about 70 to 80 per cent of the requirements met.

Recommendation 1: To improve the timeliness of notice to TCCs about upcoming meetings, and to help MilAds better consult with their capitals and field personnel, DPKO/DFS should establish a timeline for providing notice, agendas, and relevant documents to Member States prior to formal and informal meetings.

8. DPKO/DFS concur with recommendation 1 and will take action to implement it.

Recommendation 2: To further strengthen the Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/DFS should request Member States to explore the possibility for respective contingents deployed in missions where the Security Council is considering a significant mandate change, to contribute their field experiences and perspectives prior to mandate renewal and take these into account in recommendations to the Security Council.

9. DPKO/DFS concur with recommendation 2. The military planning process takes into account the field perspectives of military component leadership. This encompasses not only
lessons learned from a concerned mission, but also from other United Nations operations. Perspectives of military contingents may also be conveyed through Permanent Missions during TCC or other meetings. It should be taken into account, however, that contingents on the ground often do not have the full strategic/operational picture, and that TCCs' advice sometimes is more inspired by national interests rather than by operational imperatives of the missions concerned. Moreover, in the early stages of planning for new missions, TCCs have yet to be selected, which complicates consultations.

10. In addition, DPKO/DFS wish to advise that while consultations with Member States on mandate changes are key issues, there should also be an understanding that it is not always possible to accommodate all (over 30) views. Furthermore, military planning is not a democratic, consensus driven process. Based on the mandate and political guidance, it requires sound and objective assessments and analysis, resulting in the best courses of action, to be reflected in the Concept of Operations, the Statement of Unit Requirements and the Rules of Engagement.

11. With regards to the indicator of implementation in the first bullet to recommendation 2, DPKO/DFS wish to advise that the Secretary-General's reports are originated from the missions. Therefore, the missions could include the perspectives of contingent commanders during the drafting of the report. It should also be noted that DPKO/DFS can convey to Member States (TCCs) the issue concerning the possibility for their respective contingents to contribute field experience and perspectives, not "to request Member States' contingents in missions", as it would be inconsistent with the command and control policy in the field. DPKO will request TCCs to address the issue with their respective contingents and explore the possibility of contributing their field experiences and perspectives prior to mandate renewal.

**Recommendation 3:** DPKO/DFS should duly reference the relevant Secretary-General's report(s) to the Security Council that appropriate consultations with TCCs have taken place prior to the establishment of a new mission or during the strategic review of an existing mission.

12. While DPKO/DFS concur with recommendation 3, it should be noted that the Secretariat is not the only one responsible for consultations. TCCs expect a consultative attitude from the Security Council as well. Therefore, the prerogative to define the mechanism of consultations with TCCs rests with the Security Council.

**Recommendation 4:** DPKO/DFS should adopt a more proactive approach to information sharing by establishing a single document 'package' or online 'hub' where potential and current TCCs can access the most up-to-date, mission-specific documents.

13. DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation. The Departments have developed the United Nations Force Link webpage, which assists Member States in preparing for deployment. The TCC-PCC Deployment Planning Resource (https://cc.unlb.org/default.aspx) provides online access to key United Nations documents and guidance, which are essential for national planning staff to prepare their units for deployment. Registered users have access to the Mission Specific Guidelines providing details on the United Nations missions, as well as to the Current Deployments timeline management tool. This tool enables Troop/Police-Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) to monitor progress with the units' deployment and upload electronic copies of all cargo load lists. DPKO commented, however, that there is a need to resolve technical, confidentiality related issues in order to fully implement the recommendation. For the missions' Concept of Operations, a confidential
document, sharing with TCCs will be discussed, if required. In principle, operational
guidance for each unit will be incorporated to the SUR and will be sufficient for the
preparation of the unit.

Recommendation 5: DPKO/DFS should facilitate Member States’ pledges when they wish to offer
capabilities through rotation systems and when the rotation proposal is in line with the mission’s
operational requirements.

14. DPKO/DFS concur with recommendation 5. A pilot project for MINUSMA has
already started and its roll-out is in progress. A helicopter rotation concept has been also
developed and presented to potential TCCs. It should be noted, however, that this approach
would not be supported by all TCCs, as some of them may prefer a longer term commitment.
Another difficulty is that, though the capabilities are the same, the composition of the unit,
equipment, modus operandi and other issues are often different. Therefore, during every
rotation a mission is confronted with a deployment of a new unit.

Recommendation 6: DPKO/DFS should further develop TCC selection policies and procedures with a
view to clarifying the criteria used, drawing on the description provided in the Draft Force Generation
Manual, and including TCCs’ prior conduct and performance.

15. While DPKO/DFS concur, in principal, with recommendation 6, the Departments
wish to clarify that the force generation process is still a “demand driven market”. Once the
intended effect of strategic force generation efforts is in place, including the availability of
sufficient TCCs at the Rapid Deployment Level, the recommendation can be fully
implemented.

Recommendation 7: DPKO/DFS should ensure that all caveats, if any, stating operational deviations
from what is requested in the statement of unit requirements are recorded in a standardised document.
The template for this document should be made available to all T/PCCs for their information. This
document, recording the T/PCCs’ caveats as above, shall be filed together with the MOU and SUR at the
end of the negotiation process. The Draft Force Generation Manual should be appropriately updated to
describe this new process. Furthermore, the legal status of this document should be clarified with the
Office of Legal Affairs with a view to ensuring the integrity, robustness and effectiveness of the command
and control arrangements of the United Nations.

16. DPKO/DFS concur with recommendation 7. The Departments advise that while the
recommended measure will help to a certain extent, it will not completely solve the issue of
hidden caveats. The 2017 COE Working Group recommended the inclusion of SURs
defining the operational capabilities to be provided by a unit and the tasks that it will
undertake to be included as an annexure to the MOU for that unit. The MOU would therefore
constitute an agreement that the personnel, equipment and self-sustainment provided by the
T/PCC are sufficient to deliver the capabilities specified by the SUR at the required standards
and to perform the expected tasks. Deviations in personnel, equipment and self-sustainment
that may impact (or not) the operational capabilities of that particular unit will be registered
in a separate document to be created by DFS. Member States did not agree to list the refusal
of a TCC to execute a particular task in this document. DPKO/DFS believe that
caveats/absence thereof could be recorded in a separate formal exchange of Notes Verbale or
included in the cover letter sent to the Permanent Representative with the MOU to be signed.
DPKO/DFS agree that the recommended action/options should be reviewed by the
Departments in consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs.
**Recommendation 8:** To improve coordination between the two Departments, DPKO/DFS should (a) ensure that DFS fully participates in the forthcoming knowledge management system so that DPKO and DFS data on TCC conduct and performance are effectively and efficiently integrated, and (b) enhance coordination in SUR-related discussions, ensuring that DFS and, where relevant, PD, are sufficiently represented in the earlier stages of FG with a view to all departments arriving at a common and unified position in negotiations with Member States.

17. DPKO/DFS concur with recommendation 8. The Departments wish to clarify that DFS’ personnel attend the Office of Military Affairs’ (OMA) working group meetings and participate in all discussions, involving TCCs and the missions. The SUR drafts are coordinated with DFS desk officers prior to their submission to the OMA front office for signature. DPKO is of the view, however, that there is still a need to revitalise the Departments’ efforts to come to clearer, sharper formulated procedures. Additional consultation between DPKO and DFS is required to further streamline various planning and force generation procedures, such as drafting a SOP on the SUR.

18. In addition, DFS believes that there is a need to appraise and involve the Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD) of DFS in the early stages of force generation and, especially, during the development of the SUR. This is necessary in order to: (a) compare and validate the type and number of equipment with other similar Units in various missions; (b) incorporate the financial implications and substantial justification of deviations from the SUR; and (c) ensure proper application of the COE manual in terms of classification and reimbursement of equipment either under major equipment or self-sustainment, which may be misconstrued under the current SUR.
**Recommendation Action Plan**

**Evaluation of DPKO/DFS Planning during the Force Generation Process and Related Engagement with the Security Council and Troop-Contributing Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IED Recommendation</th>
<th>Anticipated Actions</th>
<th>Responsible Entity(ies)</th>
<th>Target date for completion</th>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 1:</strong> To improve the timeliness of notice to TCCs about upcoming meetings, and to help MiLads better consult with their capitals and field personnel, DPKO/DFS should establish a timeline for providing notice, agendas, and relevant documents to Member States prior to formal and informal meetings. (Paragraph 29-37)</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation and will take action to implement it.</td>
<td>DPKO/OO DPKO/OMA</td>
<td>Second quarter of 2017</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 2:</strong> To further strengthen the Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/DFS should request Member States to explore the possibility for respective contingents deployed in missions where the Security Council is considering a significant mandate change, to contribute their field experiences and perspectives prior to mandate renewal and take these into account in recommendations to the Security Council. (Paragraph 38-45)</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation. The military planning process takes into account the field perspectives of military component leadership. This encompasses not only lessons learned from a concerned mission, but also from other United Nations operations. Perspectives of military contingents may also be conveyed through Permanent Missions during TCC or other meetings. In addition, as the Secretary-General’s reports are originated from the field, the missions could include the perspectives of contingent commanders during the drafting of the report. DPKO will request TCCs to address the issue with their respective contingents and explore the possibility of contributing their field</td>
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<td>experiences and perspectives prior to mandate renewal. It should be taken into account, however, that contingents on the ground often do not have the full strategic/operational picture, and that TCCs' advice sometimes is more inspired by national interests rather than by operational imperatives of the missions concerned. Moreover, in the early stages of planning for new missions, TCCs have yet to be selected, which complicates consultations.</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation and will take action to implement it.</td>
<td>DPKO/OMA</td>
<td>Second quarter of 2017</td>
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<td>Recommendation 3: DPKO/DFS should duly reference in the relevant Secretary-General's report(s) to the Security Council that appropriate consultations with TCCs have taken place prior to the establishment of a new mission or during the strategic review of an existing mission. (Paragraph 45)</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation. DPKO/DFS developed the United Nations Force Link webpage, which assists the Member States in preparing for deployment. The TCC-PCC Deployment Planning Resource (<a href="https://cc.unilb.org/default.aspx">https://cc.unilb.org/default.aspx</a>) provides online access to key United Nations documents and guidance, which are essential for national planning staff to prepare their units for deployment. Registered users have access to the Mission Specific Guidelines providing details on the United Nations missions, as well as to the Current DPKO/DFS DFS</td>
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<td>Deployments timeline management tool. This tool enables TCCs/PCCs to monitor progress with the units' deployment and upload electronic copies of all cargo load lists. It should be noted, however, that the Force Link webpage does not include important mission specific documents such as the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR). The challenge hereby is that only T/PCCs to a particular mission are entitled to the corresponding CONOPS and SUR, and these documents cannot be included in the Force Link webpage, which is widely accessible. Therefore, there is a need to resolve technical, confidentiality related issues in order to fully implement the recommendation. DPKO, in coordination with DFS, will explore the possibility to resolve these issues.</td>
<td>DPKO/OMA</td>
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<td>Recommendation 5: DPKO/DFS should facilitate Member States’ pledges when they wish to offer capabilities through rotation systems and when the rotation proposal is in line with the mission’s operational requirements. (Paragraph 56-57)</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation. A pilot project for MINUSMA has already started and its roll-out is in progress. A helicopter rotation concept has been also developed and presented to potential TCCs. It should be noted, however, that this approach would not be supported by all TCCs, as some of them may prefer a longer term commitment. Another difficulty is that, though the capabilities are the same, the composition of the unit, equipment, modus operandi and other issues are often different. Therefore, during</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 6:</strong> DPKO/DFS should further develop TCC selection policies and procedures with a view to clarifying the criteria used, drawing on the description provided in the Draft Force Generation Manual, and including TCCs' prior conduct and performance. (Paragraph 65-77)</td>
<td>every rotation a mission is confronted with a deployment of a new unit.</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation and will take action to implement it.</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 7:</strong> DPKO/DFS should ensure that all caveats, if any, stating operational deviations from what is requested in the statement of unit requirements are recorded in a standardised document. The template for this document should be made available to all T/PCCs for their information. This document, recording the T/PCCs' caveats as above, shall be filed together with the MOU and SUR at the end of the negotiation process. The Draft Force Generation Manual should be appropriately updated to describe this new process. Furthermore, the legal status of this document should be clarified with the Office of Legal Affairs with a view to ensuring the integrity, robustness and effectiveness of the command and control arrangements of the United Nations. (Paragraph 78-79)</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation. The Departments advise that while the recommended measure will help to a certain extent, it will not completely solve the issue of hidden caveats. The 2017 COE Working Group recommended the inclusion of SURs defining the operational capabilities to be provided by a unit and the tasks that it will undertake to be included as an annexure to the MOU for that unit. The MOU would therefore constitute an agreement that the personnel, equipment and self-sustainment provided by the T/PCC are sufficient to deliver the capabilities specified by the SUR at the required standards and to perform the expected tasks. Deviations in personnel, equipment and self-sustainment that may impact (or not) the operational capabilities of that particular unit will be registered in a separate document to be created by DFS. Member States did not agree to list the refusal of a TCC to execute a particular task in this document. DPKO/DFS believe that caveats/absence</td>
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| **Recommendation 8:**  
To improve coordination between the two Departments, DPKO/DFS should  
a) ensure that DFS fully participates in the forthcoming knowledge management system so that DPKO and DFS data on TCC conduct and performance are effectively and efficiently integrated, and  
b) enhance coordination in SUR-related discussions, ensuring that DFS and, where relevant, PD, are sufficiently represented in the earlier stages of FG with a view to all departments arriving at a common and unified position in negotiations with Member States. (Paragraph 68, 81-87) | thereof could be recorded in a separate formal exchange of Notes Verbale or included in the cover letter sent to the Permanent Representative with the MOU to be signed. DPKO/DFS agree that the recommended action/options should be reviewed by the Departments in consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs.  
DPKO/DFS concur with the recommendation.  
DFS’ personnel attend the Office of Military Affairs’ (OMA) working group meetings and participate in all discussions, involving TCCs and the missions. The SUR drafts are coordinated with DFS desk officers prior to their submission to the OMA front office for signature. The Departments’ efforts will be further revitalised to come to clearer, sharper formulated procedures. Additional consultation between DPKO and DFS will be held to further streamline various planning and force generation procedures, such as drafting a SOP on the SUR. | DPKO/OMA  
DFS | Third quarter of 2017 |