Audit of Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations

Though widely acknowledged as a valuable tool for field support, improvements to strategic planning, performance monitoring and dissemination of results would enhance the utilization and impact of the Capacity

13 November 2019
Assignment No. AP2018/600/01
Audit of the Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC), part of the Police Division within the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peace Operations (DPO). The objective of the audit was to examine the adequacy of the mechanisms for ensuring that SPC remains a source of timely, relevant and cost-effective start-up police capability for new operations, and of support to existing operations and other entities. The audit was conducted from February to April 2019 and covered the activities of SPC from January 2015 to February 2019.

SPC is widely acknowledged as a valuable tool for support to the field. However, improvements to strategic planning and assessment, performance monitoring and dissemination of results would enhance the utilization and impact of the expertise of the Capacity.

OIOS made seven recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, OROLSI, needed to:

- Clarify the formal role of SPC in the strategic planning process of the Police Division;
- Develop a formal catalogue of key results, recommendations and common challenges resulting from the activities of SPC for ready reference and use in strategic planning and prioritization of mission support needs;
- Clarify the role and positioning of SPC as a tool that provides support to the field, taking into account the changes that have taken place since SPC’s inception, particularly the ongoing Organizational reforms to the peace and security pillar;
- Develop and implement a formal action plan for fostering better integration of SPC into the work of the other parts of the Police Division in New York;
- Develop a broader suite of indicators to measure and assess SPC performance on timeliness and responsiveness to support requests and the quality, usefulness and sustainability of the products of its deployments and ancillary activities;
- Ensure that terms of reference for SPC deployments routinely include indicators for measuring SPC performance in individual deployments and specify the mechanisms by which information will be collected to inform these assessments; and
- Develop mechanisms for assessing the contribution and impact of SPC as a tool for supporting the field.

DPO accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement them.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. BACKGROUND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. AUDIT RESULTS</td>
<td>2-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Coordinated strategic planning and needs analysis</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Performance assessment and reporting</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Outreach and knowledge management</td>
<td>10-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX I Status of audit recommendations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I Management response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Audit of the Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC), part of the Police Division within the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peace Operations (DPO).

2. United Nations police contribute to the peacebuilding and conflict prevention goals of the Organization by helping to strengthen the capacities of their policing counterparts in host States. The tasks performed by United Nations police include executive policing, operational support, capacity-development, and the promotion of regional cooperation in policing and other law enforcement matters.

3. Established in 2007, the aim of SPC is to “make the police component of a new operation more effective at implementing its mandate sooner”. The core functions of SPC are:

   (a) Providing a coherent police and law enforcement start-up capability for new DPO-led operations and missions led by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA); and
   (b) Assisting DPO-led operations and DPPA-led missions by providing police and law enforcement advice and expertise. When appropriate, SPC may also conduct operational assessments and evaluations of police components.

4. For the financial year 2018/19, SPC was composed of 36 posts comprising 1 D1, 3 P5, 14 P4, 14 P3, 2 Field Service staff and 2 General Service staff. SPC is organized into three main teams: (i) Administration; (ii) In-Service Professional Development and Knowledge Management; and (iii) Institutional Capacity Building. In addition, SPC had access to financial resources amounting to $146,290.

5. Since the financial year 2009/10, although functionally reporting to the Police Division, SPC has been located at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi (UNLB) as a “tenant unit”.

6. Comments provided by DPO are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

7. The objective of the audit was to examine the adequacy of the mechanisms for ensuring that the SPC remains a source of timely, relevant and cost-effective start-up police capability for new operations, and for support to existing operations and other entities.

8. The audit was included in the 2018 risk-based work plan of OIOS as a result of the strategic importance of SPC as part of rule of law support in the context of the recent reforms taking place within the Organization, particularly with respect to the peace and security pillar. OIOS conducted this audit from February to April 2019. The audit covered the activities of SPC from January 2015 to February 2019. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risk areas related to: (a) coordinated strategic planning and needs analysis; (b) performance assessment and reporting; and (c) outreach and knowledge management.
9. The audit methodology included:

   a. More than 150 interviews with approximately 130 individuals covering staff of SPC, Police Division, OROLSI and DPO, selected senior staff in the field, including Heads of Missions, Heads of Police and Justice and Corrections components, as well as other United Nations System partners in the field and former officials within SPC and Police Division;
   b. A survey on the activities of SPC involving 32 senior staff within 17 peace operations and six United Nations System and international organizations with policing mandates;
   c. Reviews of relevant policies, procedures, guidelines, past reviews and other relevant documentation in the areas of rule of law, policing and conflict prevention;
   d. Analytical reviews of SPC performance and staffing data, including comprehensive testing of the SPC information management tools to ascertain their accuracy, reliability and limitations; and
   e. Reviews of past and ongoing support activities undertaken by SPC.

10. This audit was conducted in conjunction with an audit of the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity in DPO (the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity (JCSC) report, i.e., Report No. 2019/063) and OROLSI’s response to recommendations addressing similar issues are reflected in this report.

11. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Coordinated strategic planning and needs analysis

Police Division needed to further develop mechanisms for strategic planning of SPC support

12. In the four years since 2015, SPC has provided start-up support to two peace operations and been involved in assessment missions for a number of other missions undergoing changes in configuration or transition. Since the number of start-up missions has been less than anticipated at the time of its creation, much of SPC’s work has been focused in recent years on its other assigned functions. The relatively small size of SPC compared with the original intention at its establishment and increased focus on non-start-up functions, underlines the importance for adequate planning, in coordination with the New York-based parts of Police Division, to ensure that SPC remains capable of responding to sudden requests for start-up support. For example, while SPC was able to deploy four of the six staff needed to support the implementation of the Hudaydah agreement in Yemen within 48 hours of the request, SPC did not have adequate mechanisms to appropriately handle unforeseen or competing requests for support. This led to differences between SPC and Police Division in New York as discussions took place and decisions were made on the composition of the team that was eventually deployed and on the arrangements for rotation of the deployed personnel.

13. Police Division also needed to ensure better coordination between SPC and the three New York-based sections in providing policing advice, expertise and capacity building support to the field. However, the view commonly raised in many interviews was that such coordination needed clarification and improvement. For example, although the Mission Management and Support Section (MMSS) has been engaged in a comprehensive exercise to develop mission-specific action plans of support needs, the involvement of SPC in this process had been minimal. Likewise, the Strategic Policy and Development Section (SPDS) has been engaged in a significant project to better plan for and map mission policing needs and to link this analysis to not only future recruitment activities by the Selection and Recruitment Section (SRS), but also to the development of targeted certification processes, to ensure that missions obtain
seconded personnel that possess the expertise and training required by the field in a timely manner. Whilst SPC has been involved in aspects of this process, there was a need to further clarify the contribution that SPC can make to strategic planning in New York.

14. Moreover, recent reforms to the United Nations Secretariat architecture aim to “prioritize the prevention of conflict and the sustaining of peace”. In this respect, the Secretary-General has noted that “both Headquarters and field-based entities can conduct joint planning, assessments, resource mobilization and programme implementation based on mandates and comparative advantages” to ensure that “delivery of United Nations rule of law assistance in conflict and post-conflict settings” draws on “the unique and distinct strength of its members” and combines “operational interventions with political analysis and cross-pillar integration”. The role of SPC with respect to the other parts of Police Division in this process also remains unclear. For example, SPC had developed working relationships with the heads of police components within missions that contribute to SPC’s knowledge of mission support needs and gaps in expertise. However, during interviews, many expressed the view that there was a lack of clarity over the extent to which such interactions should take place directly through SPC, or through other relevant sections (particularly MMSS) in New York.

15. Furthermore, the absence of clearly agreed formal mechanisms to catalogue the results of SPC’s work and incorporate them in planning within Police Division, has meant that the potential for SPC to transmit its experience in “identifying, implementing and promoting good practices in the field regarding policing and other law enforcement matters” remains untapped. Increased involvement of SPC in assisting missions with strategic planning of their policing activities was also a key area of potential benefit raised by police components in their responses to the OIOS survey and in the course of telephone interviews.

(1) OROLSI should clarify the formal role of the Standing Police Capacity in the strategic planning process of Police Division to include the knowledge and insights it gains during the course of its support to the field.

OROLSI accepted recommendation 1 and noted that while revising the policy on SPC, OROLSI would clarify the role of SPC in the strategic planning process of Police Division. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of the revised policy on SPC in which the role of SPC in Police Division strategic planning processes is clarified and formalized.

(2) OROLSI should develop a formal catalogue of key results, recommendations and common challenges resulting from the activities of the Standing Police Capacity for ready reference and use in strategic planning and prioritization of mission support needs.

OROLSI accepted recommendation 2 and noted that the recently established United Nations Police Knowledge Management Committee and associated Working Group both include representatives of SPC and have been tasked with working on the implementation of this recommendation. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of the catalogue of key results of SPC activities and evidence of its use in strategic planning and prioritization of mission support needs.

OROLSI needed to review and clarify the role of SPC as a tool in the delivery of policing support

16. Although the support that SPC provides has been highly valued by those that had received it, the nature of its support has evolved since its establishment. Originally envisaged to be deployed to mission areas in teams of 10 to 20, much of SPC’s work over recent years has involved more targeted deployments of smaller teams of two or three experts (and often a single individual). However, it was apparent from interviews with staff that uncertainties or misunderstandings between the support that SPC provides and
that provided through other Police Division mechanisms (such as specialized police teams and the newly proposed rosters of certified experts) have resulted in tensions between SPC and other parts of Police Division in New York. Staff have also suggested the need for further clarity and definition of working relationships and command and control where there was the potential for overlap in mission support responsibilities and functions, such as in strategic planning, interaction with mission police components, recruitment, and training. During interviews with staff in both New York and Brindisi, OIOS frequently noted that SPC was not viewed by all as an integrated part of Police Division.

17. Part of this could be explained by barriers created by the geographical separation of SPC that is located in Brindisi. This separation, and the reliance on tools such as emails and video and teleconferences for maintaining contact and communication between SPC and the other parts of Police Division, meant that the frequency and quality of interpersonal interactions was limited and contributed to a lack of awareness by the New York–based parts of Police Division of the work that SPC was performing, and vice versa, as well as a sense of misunderstanding that was evident through the interviews with Police Division staff. Such separation also exacerbated the difficulties in maintaining cohesion resulting from the frequent rotation of personnel within Police Division (a consequence of the relatively short duration of staff in Police Division, including SPC, most of whom were on secondments).

18. The decision to locate SPC in New York during its formative period of operations was based on the recognition that to be fully effective, SPC had to develop and maintain a “strategic and operational knowledge base” of United Nations peacekeeping and policing policies and doctrine, built upon an integrated link to the parts of Police Division involved in policy, planning, recruitment, budgeting, and capacity-building. This could only be achieved through the direct interface that co-location and physical contact with the other parts of Police Division could provide. However, whilst its movement to Brindisi has yielded some benefits, such as a better alignment of working hours with those of the missions SPC supports (as well as potential lower costs in terms of airfares, salary and support, compared to New York), it was widely raised in interviews that this has come at the expense of weaker integration with Police Division. As the context of United Nations policing has evolved since the creation of SPC, and as staff occupying the seconded posts have moved in and out of both SPC and Police Division, this lack of physical connectedness has made the difficulties associated with the lack of integration more acute. Moreover, the benefits of location nearer to the field may not have been offset by the disadvantages of physical separation, such as lack of direct connections to many mission locations from Brindisi, by the absence of consular presence of Member States in Brindisi (necessitating additional time required for obtaining visas and other formalities for SPC staff prior to deployment), and by the limited overlap in working hours with New York. It was widely observed during interviews that co-location of SPC with the other parts of Police Division would more readily allow the types of more frequent formal and informal interaction that would not only ensure that SPC maintained its strategic and operational knowledge base, but that could also help to resolve misunderstandings and to build the trust required for the various parts of Police Division to function more effectively.

19. Partially in order to address this problem, Police Division received approval in 2014/15 for the transfer of three posts to New York from Brindisi. Recognizing the need for additional Headquarters-based strategic, operational and liaison support to SPC, the intention was that the three transferred posts would act as “focal points of contact” between the Police Division in New York and the SPC in Brindisi, maintain “a continuous flow of information” between the two locations and provide “technical advice to the Police Adviser on increasing and measuring the effectiveness of the Standing Police Capacity to field missions”. It was further noted that “the redeployment of functions would strengthen the capacity within the Office of the Police Adviser to integrate SPC into all day-to-day issues and engage SPC at the early planning and rapid deployment stages and during the immediate start of operational activities undertaken to support field-based police components”. In addition to performing these liaison functions, the incumbents of the posts would “still fulfil their original duties to support the start-up of field operations and assist existing field
missions in their existing capacities as Training Adviser, Police Reform Officer and Investigations Officer, respectively”.

20. However, as was clear during interviews, these posts have not been utilized for these functions. As a result of the movement of seconded personnel out of and into the posts in the intervening years, some officers expressed that they were either not aware of the intended SPC liaison role of their current position or had rarely engaged or interacted with SPC as part of their duties.

21. In addition to geographic separation, difficulties in the relationship between SPC and the other parts of Police Division could also be partly explained by uncertainties over the roles and comparative standing of the senior leadership of SPC (the D-1 level Chief, as well as the P-5 level Team Leaders) and other parts of Police Division in New York. For example, the D-1 Chief of SPC, but not the P-5 SPC Team Leaders, participates (by video conference) in weekly Senior Management Team meetings of Police Division (involving the three P-5 Chiefs of the New York–based Police Division sections, as well as the Police Adviser and Deputy Police Adviser). This was exacerbated by the recent extended vacancies in the SPC Team Leader posts, as well as perhaps by the fact that all of the senior leaders of SPC are engaged on secondment meaning the opportunity to participate in the leadership activities of Police Division and to form longer-term professional relationships and understandings was inhibited by regular turnover of SPC senior leadership at the conclusion of their respective secondments.

22. The review of DPO and Police Division policies and procedures (including the SPC policy), provides an opportunity to clarify the role and positioning of SPC as a tool for DPO and Police Division in providing support to field. Other ways in which better integration between Police Division staff in New York and Brindisi could be fostered include:

- Clarifying and formalizing mechanisms for consultation and coordination between the various parts of Police Division (including SPC), particularly in areas where complementarities exist or where the work of SPC can provide relevant input to, or would be affected by, the work of other parts of Police Division;
- Exploring opportunities for greater physical contact between members of SPC and New York–based staff, such as through temporary posting or exchanges within Police Division, the potential for newly-engaged SPC personnel to spend some induction time remotely working in Police Division in New York prior to commencing duties in Brindisi, or better utilizing the three SPC posts that were transferred to New York to perform the originally envisaged liaison roles; and
- Ensuring frequent presence of the Chief of SPC in New York to facilitate the closer involvement and integration in the senior management discussions and deliberations that occur within Police Division in New York.

(3) OROLSI should clarify the role and positioning of the Standing Police Capacity as a tool for OROLSI and Police Division to provide support to the field, taking into account the changes that have taken place since the Capacity’s inception, particularly the ongoing Organizational reforms to the peace and security pillar.

OROLSI accepted recommendation 3 and noted that work had already commenced on a revised draft of the SPC policy. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of the revised SPC policy, in which the role and positioning of SPC is clarified.
(4) OROLSI should develop and implement a formal action plan to foster better integration of the Standing Police Capacity into the work of the other parts of Police Division in New York.

OROLSI accepted recommendation 4 and noted that OROLSI would, in the revision of the SPC policy, include a matrix setting out the integration of SPC into the working processes of Police Division across all sections. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence that an action plan to integrate SPC into other of Police Division New York has been developed and is being implemented, including through the revised SPC policy.

OROLSI was discussing sustainable funding mechanisms for rule of law activities

23. Funding for non-staff costs for field-based assistance by SPC has been decreasing. They are generally borne by the requesting entity or in exceptional cases, by SPC to enable deployments to occur. However, in 2018/19, SPC received $146,290 against its original proposal of $233,050, for travel and training costs related to its support activities, more than a one-third reduction in the amount it had received for similar expenses in 2014/15.

24. Although missions have been instructed to make provision in their budgets for the costs of necessary SPC support, declining resources for peacekeeping, coupled with competition for scarce operational resources, has meant that missions often do not have the resources available to cover the costs of SPC deployments. Indeed, less than half (47 per cent) of respondents that indicated a need for policing support in their responses to our survey had made provision in their budgets to cover the costs of such support.

25. SPC has explored a number of options for financing its deployment costs to the field, including providing more detailed guides to missions on the indicative costs of the different types of deployments (to facilitate mission budgeting), as well as exploring cost-sharing models, where travel might be covered by the SPC operational budget and staff entitlement costs (such as daily subsistence allowance) by the missions. However, such detailed guides have yet to be produced, and the limited and decreasing size of the SPC operational budget makes the latter option only a partial solution. The options to use vacant mission posts or unused United Nations police rotation budgets to deploy SPC staff were considered to be administratively cumbersome and not supported by all missions.

26. Nevertheless, expansion of the approach whereby OROLSI deploys staff to the field for shorter periods (hence reducing subsistence and other benefits) offset by increased remote support from Brindisi, could be a way to use limited resources more efficiently and economically. OROLSI also concluded an agreement with a donor in February 2019 to provide extrabudgetary funds in the amount of approximately $2.2 million over two years to support the activities of SPC and JCSC, although uncertainty over the continuation of such extrabudgetary resources poses risks to the sustainability of SPC (and JCSC) support activities.

27. Guidelines issued in 2017 by (the then) Department of Peacekeeping Operations address the use of “peacekeeping assessed budgets to fund mandated programmatic activities as a tool to more effectively pursue political progress and wider mandate delivery” either by a mission, or through implementing partners. The Guidelines note that mandated programmatic activities should be implemented by the entity with a comparative advantage and that programmatic funding can be used for a range of programmatic activities, including capacity-building, temporary consultancies and technical expertise not available in a mission. OROLSI should work with DMSPC to increase missions’ awareness and implementation of these guidelines.
28. OROLSI stated in the response to the JCSC report that it was in discussions with partners related to the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice, and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations (GFP) on a sustainable rule of law funding mechanism. In response to the present report, OROLSI further noted that the Police Adviser would also be jointly responsible for implementation of recommendation 3 of the JCSC report. Additionally, Police Division was already in discussions with GFP partners on sustainable rule of law funding, and SPC had initiated outreach to donors with respect to funding for SPC.

**OROLSI agreed to clarify its participation in GFP**

29. GFP was established in 2012 to improve the coherence and quality of the United Nations rule of law support to crisis- and conflict-affected countries. As part of the arrangement, both DPO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assume joint responsibility and accountability for responding to country-level requests with timely and quality police, justice and corrections assistance. The GFP arrangement covers peace operations and special political missions, as well as non-mission conflict-affected countries.

30. The Chiefs of SPDS and JCS formally represent OROLSI on the GFP management team. In addition, Police Division staff (including mission support/desk officers and SPC) interact with GFP partners on mission and country specific issues, as required. Previous reviews of the GFP arrangement have identified a number of challenges to its effectiveness. In particular, the 2018 review noted that whilst the GFP had thus far relied on personal and informal relationships among desk officers in New York, more structure was needed to deepen the collaboration. The review also observed the lack of clear working methods with SPC, since there were no clearly established procedures for their participation. This was especially an issue because SPC directly receives many requests for assistance.

31. The review made a number of recommendations to clarify roles, responsibilities and working methods that provide opportunities for closer collaboration by OROLSI in fulfilling its increasing mandate as a system-wide provider of rule of law support. In particular, the review recommended greater involvement of the Assistant Secretaries-General of OROLSI and UNDP, particularly given the ultimate role of the former in approving requests for support by both SPC and JCSC and the need (already identified by OROLSI) to potentially broaden the scope of support to include expertise in security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

32. Discussions have recently taken place between OROLSI and GFP partners for more formal and direct participation of SPC in GFP processes and internal convening structures. The continued dedication of time and resources for the participation of the relevant parts of OROLSI in discussions on the implementation of the recommendations arising from the previous GFP reviews will ensure that any changes to the GFP arrangement facilitate the more coordinated and coherent provision of rule of law assistance by SPC (and JCSC) to non-mission settings. It will be important that any such changes are also reflected in adjustments to the practices within Police Division for coordination and consultation between SPC and the New York–based sections on interactions relevant to the GFP.

33. OROLSI agreed to clarify the participation of its standing capacities in the GFP arrangement in the JCSC report and, in its comments on the present report, emphasised that such participation should not compromise the flexible and rapidly responsive nature of either SPC or JCSC.
B. Performance assessment and reporting

SPC is widely acknowledged as an invaluable tool, providing high quality support to the field

34. Since 2015, SPC has performed around 200 distinct deployment and ancillary support activities to 39 different missions, countries, and organizations. For those activities involving the delivery of support in the field, SPC conducted 119 deployments, with the median duration being 89 days (with the longest deployment lasting 183 days, and the shortest 7 days). Eighty-three of these deployments (or 70 per cent) totalling around 6,000 days, were to peace operations, with the remaining 36 (or 30 per cent) totalling around 3,000 days, being to other United Nations system entities or partners such as UNDP. Entities receiving the highest number of deployments included the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (22), UNDP Sierra Leone (17), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti/United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (14), and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (10). Over that period, SPC also delivered 179 presentations to various police-related and other courses.

35. OIOS surveyed 32 senior mission staff on the activities of SPC (of whom 29, or 94 per cent, responded). Of those respondents that had previously received SPC support, more than 90 per cent were either satisfied or very satisfied with the support that they had received across almost all areas surveyed, including in terms of the quality of SPC’s work, the knowledge and expertise of the SPC individual(s) involved, the professionalism and approach to the work, and the relevance/usefulness of any end results/products. In only one area, the time taken to complete the agreed work, were there two respondents that indicated dissatisfaction. All respondents, however, indicated that, based on their experience working with SPC, they would use them again if needed in the future.

36. During interviews with current and former senior staff of police components and heads of mission in the field, as well as with Police Division and other United Nations partners in New York, there was general agreement that SPC was a useful tool for support to the field. Some of the top issues commonly raised in the course of interviews with representatives from the field (as well as in responses to the OIOS survey) on potential areas in which SPC support could be improved included:

- Increased involvement of SPC in, or advice on, mission planning activities;
- Greater sharing of lessons learned or good practices from other similar deployments;
- Increased remotely-provided support;
- Increased duration of deployments;
- Providing more detailed information on the skills and competencies of individual members of the SPC team;
- Improved communication of the areas in which it can provide assistance;
- Expansion of the areas of expertise that SPC can offer; and
- Simplifying the process for requesting/arranging SPC support.

37. These issues are covered in more detail throughout the report.

Improved qualitative and quantitative reporting on SPC activities is key to a comprehensive assessment of its performance

38. Indicators of achievement presented within the results-based-budgeting framework for SPC have previously focused on inputs and outputs, rather than on measures of quality of support. In the 2018/19 programme budget, indicators of achievement listed for SPC under “Expected accomplishment 1.3: Policing, rule of law and training support provided by the tenant units to peacekeeping missions and other field operations”, were:
1.3.1 Prompt processing of requests for deployment within seven days of their receipt;
1.3.2 Rapid deployment of staff members/teams of SPC within 21 days of approval; and
1.3.4 Satisfactory accomplishment of agreed terms of reference for deployments.

39. Programme performance reports of SPC generally described the activities performed and the outputs that had been delivered. As a tenant unit of UNLB, and hence reporting in the UNLB budget and performance documents, there had been only limited scope for more comprehensive reporting of SPC performance in terms of the timeliness, quality, and results of its activities. Only two short paragraphs in the 36-page budget performance report for 2017/18 dealt with SPC performance, and this mostly described the outputs that had been delivered. Moreover, performance and results of SPC’s activities were only briefly mentioned in the budget performance report for the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2017/18 as part of the performance of Police Division and OROLSI. Although some SPC activities and results were reported through other means, such as the last 2017 newsletters prepared by SPC, the United Nations police Internet website (last updated in 2017), as well as through intermittent updates on Police Division and OROLSI social media channels, there remains an absence of formal mechanisms by which Member States and others can assess the efficiency and effectiveness (including the quality, timeliness and impact) of SPC’s work.

40. To date, one of the primary measures that has been used to internally assess SPC’s performance has been its “deployment rate”—that is, the proportion of staff time spent in the field compared with that spent on other activities. However, the deployment rate provides only a partial insight into the performance of SPC in performing its support functions. For example, it provides little insight into the responsiveness, timeliness and quality of SPC’s deployments, or recognition of the other activities (such as remote support, dissemination of knowledge, training, or contributions to strategic planning and lessons learning) that SPC undertakes. These types of activities for lessons learning, knowledge sharing, and planning, were also identified in the survey of the field as areas where increased activity would be of benefit to missions. A singular focus on deployment rate can also create distorting incentives that prioritize time spent in the field, at the expense of necessary ancillary support activities that cannot be ascribed to a particular field deployment.

41. SPC has begun to undertake some efforts aimed at more comprehensively assessing its performance such as by conducting post-deployment surveys of satisfaction, along with engaging in informal discussions between the Chief of SPC and the mission during deployments. Although current terms of reference agreed for each assignment list in broad terms the aims of the deployment and the work to be done, only in rare instances were any attempts made to identify criteria or indicators for measuring the timeliness, quality and impact of the assignment. Nor do terms of reference routinely specify the steps to be taken or the sources of data for informing any such assessment. Whilst SPC has developed systems for comprehensively recording and tracking the time spent on various activities, no similar systems exist for assessing the performance or results of its activities, or for cataloguing the results of its work.

42. Improved monitoring and reporting of the results of individual deployments, as well as of the performance of SPC as a whole, would also be consistent with the recent calls of Member States, and of the Secretary-General, for an improved focus on performance and results. In introducing the new comprehensive performance assessment system, the Secretary-General noted that “data collection and analysis is an integral element of performance assessment”, the aim of which is “to promote better-informed decisions by senior leadership to refocus efforts and take corrective action [and] direct resources towards areas where missions can make the biggest difference”. Such a system would also facilitate discussions on resource mobilization, demonstrating the need for, and results of, extrabudgetary resources that support

1 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/73/480, para. 92
SPC’s work. The current review by SPC of its time tracking systems provides an opportunity to not only improve these systems so that they are more tailored to the internal monitoring needs of SPC, but also so that they are able to be better used to report on, and demonstrate the results of, SPC’s work.

(5) OROLSI should develop a broader suite of indicators to measure and assess the performance of the Standing Police Capacity on the timeliness and responsiveness to support requests and the quality, usefulness and sustainability of the products of its deployments and ancillary activities.

OROLSI accepted recommendation 5 and noted that SPC would develop a broader suite of indicators to measure and assess its performance. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of documentation on the indicators developed.

(6) OROLSI should ensure that terms of reference for deployment of the Standing Police Capacity routinely include indicators for measuring and specify the mechanisms by which information will be collected to inform these assessments.

OROLSI accepted recommendation 6 and noted that the revised SPC policy would specify the need for indicators on the timeliness and responsiveness of support requests, and that terms of reference of forthcoming SPC deployments would include such indicators. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence that terms of reference for SPC deployments include the recommended indicators and assessment mechanisms.

(7) OROLSI should develop mechanisms for assessing the contribution and impact of the Standing Police Capacity as a tool for supporting the field.

OROLSI accepted recommendation 7 and noted that SPC would establish a mechanism for assessing the impact of the SPC operations based on the indicators in the terms of reference for SPC deployments, as well as other measures such as an annual survey of Heads of Police Components and Resident Coordinators in peace operations and country teams to which SPC deploys. The mechanism would be developed in line with the approach used in the comprehensive performance assessment system. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of evidence of the development and implementation of the mechanism for assessing the impact of SPC’s operations.

C. Outreach and knowledge management

OROLSI was planning to revise its draft outreach strategy

43. SPC has a number of formal and informal mechanisms in place for engaging with its stakeholders and partners to ensure that they are aware of the services it provides and the benefit from the results of its work. For example, SPC has utilized both Police Division’s and OROLSI’s social media accounts to highlight some of its activities. OROLSI’s analysis of its social media metrics has shown that content related to the work of SPC are amongst the most popular content published. However, OIOS noted that the processes for developing, submitting and posting SPC content to these social media accounts was cumbersome and unclear, with no formal guidance or standards on the use of the accounts, and the timeliness and processing of SPC submissions.

44. A number of areas for improvement identified in the OIOS survey of field components related to increased communication. Both Headquarters and field personnel noted that more could be done to provide information not only on the range of technical areas that SPC could offer support, but also on the particular
experience and previous support activities of the individual experts on the SPC staff. Although SPC had prepared a document listing the professional and biographical information on each SPC staff member, awareness of this document amongst field staff was not high (and biographical information on SPC experts was not made available on the SPC or Police Division Internet website). SPC had also previously prepared regular newsletters and annual reports; however, the last SPC newsletter was published in 2017 (and the last annual report in 2015), although SPC is looking to re-activate its use of such tools and is currently preparing an annual report of its activities for 2018. Although SPC has had good informal engagement with some actors across the wider United Nations system, for example through the GFP arrangement, there was a lack of clarity over the extent to which SPC had authority to directly engage mission and non-mission partners to promote improved awareness of the services that it could provide.

45. OROLSI stated in the JCSC report that it would revise its draft outreach strategy.

SPC was developing standardized approaches to cataloguing and sharing information on its work

46. At the conclusion of each deployment, SPC produces an end of mission report, that contains a summary of the work performed and, in many instances, valuable information on recommendations for further action, as well as challenges and lessons learnt. These reports are shared by email with SPC colleagues in New York, and the Chief of SPC sometimes present a summary of recent assignments at SPC meetings. SPC experts may also share their insights with responsible Police Division mission support/desk officers, as required. However, many New York–based Police Division staff noted that they were not routinely provided with copies of SPC end of mission reports and did not otherwise have ready access to them.

47. Although these reports are also stored on the SPC’s Brindisi-accessible network shared drive, they are not routinely catalogued or otherwise made available through formal DPO knowledge management systems, such as the Policy and Practice Database or the Peacekeeping Resource Hub. Thus, the ability for relevant users, especially users in missions or beyond, to readily access these materials and to benefit from the lessons learned and guidance that they provide is limited.

48. SPC recently established a working group to develop standardized approaches to the cataloguing and sharing of information resulting from its work. A timeline of its activities is currently being developed, and one aim of the group is to prepare standard operating procedures for document and information management. It is important for the knowledge management system to be developed in consultation with other key interlocutors (including the wider OROLSI and DPO partners) and also meet the information needs of the field. Recommendation 2 addresses this issue.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

49. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of SPC, Police Division and OROLSI for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services
## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical(^2)</th>
<th>C/ O(^4)</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date(^5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>OROLSI should clarify the formal role of the Standing Police Capacity in the strategic planning process of Police Division to include the knowledge and insights it gains during the course of its support to the field.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of the revised policy on SPC in which the role of SPC in Police Division strategic planning processes is clarified and formalized.</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>OROLSI should develop a formal catalogue of key results, recommendations and common challenges resulting from the activities of the Standing Police Capacity for ready reference and use in strategic planning and prioritization of mission support needs.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of the catalogue of key results of SPC activities and evidence of its use in strategic planning and prioritization of mission support needs.</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>OROLSI should clarify the role and positioning of the Standing Police Capacity as a tool for OROLSI and Police Division to provide support to the field, taking into account the changes that have taken place since the Capacity’s inception, particularly the ongoing Organizational reforms to the peace and security pillar.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of the revised SPC policy, in which the role and positioning of SPC is clarified.</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>OROLSI should develop and implement a formal action plan to foster better integration of the Standing Police Capacity into the work of the other parts of Police Division in New York.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that an action plan to integrate SPC into other of Police Division New York has been developed and is being implemented, including through the revised SPC policy.</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

\(^3\) Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

\(^4\) C = closed, O = open

\(^5\) Date provided by OIOS for recommendation 2 and by DPO in response to the remaining recommendations.
### STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical/ Important¹</th>
<th>C/ O²</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>OROLSI should develop a broader suite of indicators to measure and assess the performance of the Standing Police Capacity on the timeliness and responsiveness to support requests and the quality, usefulness and sustainability of the products of its deployments and ancillary activities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of documentation on the indicators developed.</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>OROLSI should ensure that terms of reference for deployment of the Standing Police Capacity routinely include indicators for measuring and specify the mechanisms by which information will be collected to inform these assessments.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that terms of reference for SPC deployments include the recommended indicators and assessment mechanisms.</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>OROLSI should develop mechanisms for assessing the contribution and impact of the Standing Police Capacity as a tool for supporting the field.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of the development and implementation of the mechanism for assessing the impact of SPC’s operations.</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I

Management Response
TO: Ms. Muriette Lawrence-Hume, Chief, New York Audit Services
A: Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

THROUGH: S/C DE:

FROM: Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peace Operations

SUBJECT: Draft report on an audit of the Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations (Assignment No. AP2018/600/01)

1. I refer to your memorandum dated 20 September regarding the above-mentioned audit. Please find attached, as Annex I and Appendix I, feedback on the findings and recommendations contained in the draft report.

2. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. We stand ready to provide any further information or assistance that may be required.

CC: Mr. Luís Carrilho, Police Adviser, Police Division, OROLSI, DPO
Mr. Christoph Buik, Chief, Standing Police Capacity, Police Division, OROLSI, DPO
Mr. Benoît Le Chartier, Legal Officer, Police Division, OROLSI, DPO
Mr. Frédéric Renoux, Programme Officer, Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services, DPO and DPPA
Mr. Tilchan Charya, Chief, Peacekeeping Headquarters Audit Section, IAD, OIOS
Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo, Professional Practices Section, IAD, OIOS
## Management Response

### Audit of the Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical1/Important2</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>OROLSI should clarify the formal role of the Standing Police Capacity in the strategic planning process of Police Division to include the knowledge and insights it gains during the course of its support to the field.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PolAd</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
<td>OROLSI shall, when revising the Policy on the Standing Police Capacity (SPC), clarify the role of the SPC in the strategic planning process of Police Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>OROLSI should develop a formal catalogue of key results, recommendations and common challenges resulting from the activities of the Standing Police Capacity for ready reference and use in strategic planning and prioritization of mission support needs.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PolAd / Chief SPC</td>
<td>Ongoing from Wednesday, 2 October 2019</td>
<td>This is part of the work and functions of the UN Police Knowledge Management Committee / Working Group established by decision of the Police Division Senior Management Team on 26 September 2019. The Committee includes the CSPC, and the Working Group (WG) includes two staff from SPC. The first meeting of the WG took place on 2 October 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>OROLSI should clarify the role and positioning of the Standing Police Capacity as a tool for OROLSI and Police Division to provide support to the field, taking into account the changes that have taken place since the Capacity’s inception, particularly the ongoing Organizational reforms to the peace and security pillar.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PolAd</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
<td>The clarification will be made when revising the Policy on the SPC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

2 Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.
## Management Response

### Audit of the Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical1/ Important2</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>OROLSI should develop and implement a formal action plan to foster better integration of the Standing Police Capacity into the work of the other parts of Police Division in New York.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PolAd</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
<td>OROLSI shall, in the revision to the Policy on SPC, include a matrix setting out the integration of SPC into the working processes of Police Division across all sections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>OROLSI should develop a broader suite of indicators to measure and assess the performance of the Standing Police Capacity on the timeliness and responsiveness to support requests and the quality, usefulness and sustainability of the products of its deployments and ancillary activities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PolAd / Chief SPC</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>SPC will develop a broader suite of indicators to measure and assess its performance and introduce the need for indicators on the timeliness and responsiveness to support requests in the revised draft Policy on SPC. We note this recommendation and our comments should be read in conjunction with recommendation 7 and the associated client comments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 6        | OROLSI should ensure that terms of reference for deployment of the Standing Police Capacity routinely include indicators for measuring and specify the mechanisms by which information will be collected to inform these assessments. | Important | Yes | 1 / PolAd  
2 / Chief SPC | 1 / 30 September 2020  
2 / Next SPC deployment | SPC will:  
1 / Introduce the need for such indicators in the revised draft Policy on SPC, and  
2 / Gradually include indicators in TORs for forthcoming SPC deployments. |
### Management Response

#### Audit of the Standing Police Capacity in the Department of Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical(^1/) Important(^2)</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>OROLSI should develop mechanisms for assessing the contribution and impact of the Standing Police Capacity as a tool for supporting the field.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief SPC</td>
<td>30 September 2020</td>
<td>SPC proposes to establish a mechanism for assessing the impact of the SPC operations based on the indicators in the Terms of References for SPC deployments and other measures, including an annual survey of Heads of Police Components (HOPCs) and Resident Coordinators (RCs) in peace operations and country teams, respectively, to which SPC deployed. The mechanism shall be developed in line with the approach used in the comprehensive performance assessment system (CPAS).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>