Audit of the implementation of recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Improvements were needed to ensure actions taken to address recommendations of the strategic review are yielding the envisaged efficiencies and effectiveness in mandate implementation

18 December 2019
Assignment No. AP2019/654/01
Audit of the implementation of recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the implementation of recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The objective of the audit was to review the status of implementation and to assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms put in place by the Mission to implement the recommendations. The audit covered implementation and monitoring activities from 1 December 2017 to 30 June 2019 and included a review of: (a) management oversight of implementation of the strategic review recommendations; and (b) activities undertaken to implement the recommendations by the civilian, military and police components, and Force coordination and support.

UNFICYP substantially implemented the recommendations, which included reduction in military strength, redeployment of police and civilian personnel to the sectors, strengthening the Mission’s capacity to liaise and engage with relevant authorities and communities, establishment of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre and relocation of Sector 2 military personnel. However, improvements were needed to ensure actions taken to address the recommendations were yielding the envisaged efficiencies and effectiveness in mandate implementation.

OIOS made seven recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, UNFICYP needed to:

- Assess whether the actions taken to implement the recommendations of the strategic review were yielding the envisaged operational and financial efficiencies in the most effective manner;
- Improve the functioning of its coordination groups;
- Reformulate the sectoral patrol plans to ensure that they do not follow a fixed pattern which makes the patrols predictable;
- Enhance its mechanism for scoping and identifying activities and target groups to increase impact of intercommunal initiatives;
- Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of civilian heads of the Sector Civilian Activity Integrated Offices;
- Develop and implement an action plan with associated milestones to establish a fully integrated Joint Operations Centre; and
- Deploy a full time Deputy Chief of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre to enhance operations.

UNFICYP accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement.
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ANNEX I Status of audit recommendations

APPENDIX I Management response
Audit of the implementation of recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the implementation of recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

2. UNFICYP was established by Security Council resolution 186 (1964), with a mandate to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. While the mandate of the Force remains the same, its responsibilities evolved, following the hostilities of 1974, to include supervising ceasefire lines, maintaining a buffer zone between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces in the north and the Greek Cypriot forces in the south and facilitating intercommunal contacts between both sides. The UNFICYP mandate was enhanced by Security Council resolution 2453 in January 2019, which calls for mechanisms to alleviate tensions and address island-wide concerns and for the United Nations to demonstrate how its presence helps achieve political progress.

3. In order to enhance effective discharge of the mandate and based on a request of the Security Council, an external expert appointed by the Secretary-General conducted a strategic review of UNFICYP. The review focused on how UNFICYP should be optimally configured to implement its existing mandate more effectively and efficiently to ensure comprehensive intercommunal settlement. The report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review was issued on 28 November 2017.

4. UNFICYP operates in three sectors comprising 57 mission sites along the buffer zone. The Head of Mission also serves as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Cyprus. In undertaking the above functions, she is assisted by three components namely civilian (political, civil affairs and mission support), military and United Nations Police (UNPOL). These components comprise 40 international staff, 121 national staff, 860 military personnel (including 53 staff officers and 807 troops) and 69 police officers. The approved UNFICYP budgets for the fiscal years 2017/18 to 2019/20 are as shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost item</th>
<th>FY2017/18</th>
<th>FY 2018/19</th>
<th>FY 2019/20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military and police personnel</td>
<td>23,485.8</td>
<td>22,107.6</td>
<td>21,926.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian personnel</td>
<td>15,036.2</td>
<td>15,365.3</td>
<td>15,231.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational costs</td>
<td>15,455.8</td>
<td>15,466.0</td>
<td>14,253.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53,977.8</td>
<td>52,938.9</td>
<td>51,410.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNFICYP approved budget

5. Comments provided by UNFICYP are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

6. The objective of the audit was to review the status of implementation and to assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms put in place by the Mission to implement the recommendations of the strategic review of UNFICYP. The mechanisms included enhancing: (i) facilitation role of the technical committees between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, (ii) operations of the cross component coordination groups at both UNFICYP headquarters and sectors; (iii) coordination and the flow of information across Mission components; and (iv) attainment of strategic outcomes through streamlining among others, the annual work planning processes.
7. The audit was included in the 2019 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the critical contribution of the strategic review to the implementation of the UNFICYP’s mandate.

8. OIOS conducted this audit from June to August 2019. The audit covered implementation and monitoring activities from 1 December 2017 to 30 June 2019. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risk areas including a review of: (a) management oversight of implementation of the strategic review recommendations; and (b) activities undertaken to implement the recommendations by the civilian, military and police components, and Force coordination and support.

9. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews of key personnel; (b) analytical reviews; (c) review of documents; and (d) visits to sampled positions.

10. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Management oversight

Need to assess the impact of actions taken by UNFICYP to implement the recommendations

11. The Security Council approved 17 recommendations from the strategic review. In June 2019, the Mission reported that all the recommendations had been implemented, including the reduction in military strength, redeployment of police and civilian personnel to the sectors, strengthening of the Mission’s liaison and engagement capacity with relevant authorities and groups, strengthening of the Sector Civilian Activity Integrated Offices (SCAIOS), establishment of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre and relocation of Sector 2 military personnel from the Ledra Palace Hotel (LPH).

12. OIOS review indicated that UNFICYP had substantially implemented the recommendations. While the Mission had not yet attained 15 per cent participation of women in the military component as at June 2019, participation had improved to 10 per cent from 6 per cent at the time of the review. Following implementation of the recommendations however, UNFICYP was yet to assess the extent to which the actions it had taken had strengthened the Mission’s capacity to liaise and engage the affected population and achieve operational and financial efficiency gains. UNFICYP stated that it had embarked on a review of the operations of the SCAIOs in its three sectors and would extend the review to all other operational areas impacted by the recommendations. UNFICYP, however, had not provided a documented comprehensive programme for the review.

13. In addition, UNFICYP components and units had not reviewed their workplans to reflect changes in the Mission’s strategic focus. For instance, the Civil Affairs component continued to measure the strategic objective “return to normal conditions” by the old definition which was centered around buffer zone management, when the Mission had redefined this concept after the strategic review to include the broader aspects of interest to the two communities inside and outside the buffer zone. As a result, UNFICYP was not able to comprehensively measure and report on its accomplishments against the relevant targets and indicators.

(1) UNFICYP should assess whether the actions taken to implement the recommendations of the strategic review were yielding the envisaged operational and financial efficiencies in the most effective manner and ensure its units revise their workplans to incorporate changes in the Mission’s strategic focus.
UNFICYP accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the Office of Peacekeeping and Strategic Partnership (OPSP) in the Department of Peace Operations conducted, in September 2019, a review of military, police and civilian components on integration, liaison and engagement and operations in the buffer zone. The outcome of the review would help in the implementation of the recommendation. The draft report of the review was shared with the Mission on 15 November 2019. Recommendation 1 remains open pending evidence of implementation of recommendations in the assessment report and receipt of the revised work plans of relevant units.

Need to improve the functioning of UNFICYP coordination groups

14. The strategic review indicated that there was a need to improve coordination of UNFICYP activities, including the flow of information across all components within the sectors and at Force headquarters. In this regard, UNFICYP established a senior Cross Component Coordination Group (CCCG+) at Force headquarters, which among others, makes recommendations on complex buffer zone issues that require strategic direction and coordination. The CCCG+ is complemented by a Sector Cross Component Coordination Group (SCCG1) in all three sectors to operationalize cross component integration and further ensure exchange of information and joint planning of mandate activities.

15. A review of the functioning of these coordination committees indicated that CCCG+ was responsible for resolving complex buffer zone issues with the SCCCGs such as incidents on the ceasefire line, patrol effectiveness and approval of construction projects in the buffer zone. However, it did not maintain formal records of its deliberations and decisions and did not provide comprehensive or timely feedback to the SCCCGs. For example, action points related to changes in patrol planning brought to the attention of CCCG+ were delayed. Also, the lines of communication between Force headquarters and the sectors were erratic and the flow of information was inefficient. As a result, the SCCCGs were predominantly focused on routine operational matters since they could not monitor the outcome of strategic matters escalated to the CCCG+.

16. The above occurred because the terms of reference of the CCCG+ did not require them to keep records of deliberations. Additionally, UNFICYP management did not take adequate measures to establish a formal feedback mechanism that would facilitate the sharing of information among members of the different committees. As a result, participants were keeping their own notes for follow-up actions based on their interpretation of decisions taken. Moreover, substantive members of the SCCCG did not regularly attend the meetings. For example, Sector 4 convened only 31 per cent of the required meetings, while Sectors 1 and 4 did not have full representation of substantive members in over 30 per cent of the meetings convened.

(2) UNFICYP should: (i) require the Cross Component Coordination Group to retain formal records of its deliberations for enhanced accountability and to develop a formal feedback mechanism to the sectors to enhance strategic direction and coordination; and (ii) take adequate measures to ensure that members of the Sector Cross Component Coordination Group attend its meetings regularly to address issues under its purview.

UNFICYP accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the terms of reference of CCCG+, which incorporate arrangements for effective coordination, were being finalized for endorsement of the Senior Adviser. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of the revised terms of reference of CCCG+ and minutes of meetings of SCCCG showing that its members were attending meetings regularly.

1 The SCCCG in each sector is made up of sector commanders for the military, UNPOL and the international Civil Affairs Officer.
B. Military and police components

Military and police components were restructured in line with the strategic review.

17. UNFICYP reduced its deployed military strength to 802² troops, with an authorized military strength of 860, and reconfigured its military structure including a reduction in contingent-owned equipment in line with the review recommendations. Two platoons of the Mobile Force Reserve now operate with personnel from a single troop-contributing country, while the third was dedicated to conducting security tasks in the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA). Two contingents also have night vision capabilities and the Mission had allocated funds to acquire other technologies.

18. In addition, six police officers (two in each sector) were reassigned to the SCAIOS as Police Liaison Officers from UNFICYP headquarters to enhance patrolling and liaison. At time of audit, 69 police officers were deployed, of which 10 were at Force headquarters and the remaining at seven locations in the buffer zone. Eighteen police officers were deployed in Sector 1, 14 in Sector 2 and 27 in Sector 4.

19. OIOS concluded that the military and police components had been restructured in line with the strategic review.

Patrol planning needed to improve

20. Patrol units are the first responders to many civilian issues in the buffer zone and provide ‘early warning’ of emerging issues and violations of the military status quo along the ceasefire lines. During the period under review, UNFICYP carried out approximately 87,500 patrols, of which 3,800 or 4 per cent were joint patrols with the military and UNPOL, as illustrated in Table 2. Despite the number of patrols, approximately 9,500 violations of the buffer zone were recorded with the highest recorded in Sector 1. Overall, monthly trend of both military and civilian violations was increasing. UNFICYP encountered challenges in addressing this trend largely due to the non-acceptance by the two sides of a 2018 aide-memoire, contestation of the ceasefire lines, and challenges to the status quo and the authority of UNFICYP’s mandate, especially in the buffer zone.

Table 2: Patrols and violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Military patrols</th>
<th>UNPOL patrols</th>
<th>Total patrols</th>
<th>Joint patrols</th>
<th>Violations recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector 1</td>
<td>26,002</td>
<td>15,705</td>
<td>41,707</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>5,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 2</td>
<td>12,433</td>
<td>4,689</td>
<td>17,122</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 4</td>
<td>20,873</td>
<td>7,807</td>
<td>28,680</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>3,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59,308</td>
<td>28,201</td>
<td>87,509</td>
<td>3,804</td>
<td>9,513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNFICYP Military and UNPOL Reports

21. Nevertheless, a review of patrol plans from two sectors revealed that the patrols were not sufficiently unpredictable, which eliminated their surprise element and efficacy in preventing violations.

22. Out of 107 vehicles assigned to the sectors, only 53 per cent were fitted with a Global Positioning System (GPS) to track their movements and determine their location. The vehicles without trackers and used on patrols were not automatically monitored by the sectors on the ERBONet System to enhance visibility and security of the patrol teams. Therefore, it was difficult to independently verify that the patrol plans were executed as intended since the teams could only confirm their locations via radio and indicated

² As at July 2019, 796 troops were deployed and awaiting replacement of six additional troops.
their execution of the planned patrol route via a manual declaration upon return to base. UNPOL has requested the installation of GPS trackers in every vehicle for security and safety reasons.

(3) UNFICYP should reformulate the sectoral patrol plans to ensure that they do not follow a fixed pattern which makes the patrols predictable, thereby undermining their effectiveness.

UNFICYP accepted recommendation 3 and stated that the UNPOL component had commenced training on drafting of patrol plans to ensure that patrol plans do not follow a fixed pattern. The military component would also regularly update and review the patrol plans. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of both military and UNPOL patrol plans that do not show a fixed pattern of patrols, and receipt of evidence of training of personnel on preparation of patrol plans.

Military personnel were relocated from LPH to an alternative location

23. In consultation with the Mission, the review team identified UNPA as the preferred site for the relocation of the accommodation for the military personnel in Sector 2 from LPH. This offered opportunities to repatriate 22 military support personnel. However, the personnel were moved to an alternative location instead of the UNPA. Mission management advised that in implementing the recommendation, it reconsidered all available options in light of new political developments and other operational, financial and environmental concerns. As a result, the Senior Management Group decided to move the troops to a new site located near the LPH that was being used as transit camp to facilitate troop rotations. This location had the advantage of retaining troops in their main area of operations and ensuring security and bi-communal use of the LPH. Mission management further stated that relocation to a “green-field” site within the UNPA would have required additional investment in new accommodation, water and waste infrastructure. Since the Mission was facing a risk of potential reduction in the Force size, it was preferable to make better use of existing assets rather than increasing the Mission’s real estate holdings. Based on the explanations provided by Mission management, OIOS does not make a recommendation regarding the relocation of military personnel from the LPH.

C. Civilian component

The effectiveness of technical committees was being enhanced

24. As part of overall effort to promote greater interaction and understanding between the two communities, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders established technical committees in 2008 to enable the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to address issues of mutual concern such as crime and criminal matters, cultural heritage, crisis prevention, health and the environment. These technical committees were jointly facilitated by UNFICYP and the United Nations Mission of Good Offices, whose main task is to provide in-house expertise and facilitate the negotiation process. At the end of June 2019, there were 12 technical committees.

25. While some technical committees were effective at resolving issues related to cultural heritage, crossing points between the two communities, economic and criminal matters, others had not made significant progress at addressing issues under their purview including gender and health matters. For example, during the audit period, six technical committees met at least once in 2019, eight met at least once in 2018, while four had not met for up to two years. Two of the technical committees did not have documented terms of reference and none of them had documented annual workplans. The lack of progress in the work of the technical committees was largely attributed to lack of political progress between the two communities. Nevertheless, UNFICYP had initiated a stock-taking exercise on the activities and modus
operandi of the technical committees to identify potential areas of improvement and ways to strengthen and streamline their work. Therefore, OIOS does not make a recommendation.

Need for a mechanism to increase impact of intercommunal initiatives

26. SCAIOs initiated several meetings with mukhtars as part of community liaisons activities. For instance, Sector 4, which houses the only bi-communal village of Pyla, conducted over 300 community liaison meetings with the local community and civic leaders. UNFICYP headquarters also convened several high-level meetings with the two leaders, Greek Cypriot National Guards, Turkish Cypriots Forces and other high-ranking officials on both sides.

27. In addition, UNFICYP, in collaboration with the United Nations Mission of Good Offices, expanded the scope of its intercommunal activities to engage in a more sustained manner with new constituencies such as young entrepreneurs, children, young people, women’s groups and environment-focused organizations. The Mission undertook 384 intercommunal activities, including religious services, commemorations, pilgrimages, cultural and sports events, of which 59 per cent took place in Nicosia. Despite some improvements, the number of activities undertaken outside Nicosia was still low as illustrated in Table 3. The Mission expected that to improve, having strengthened the SCAIOs to expand into locations away from Nicosia. However, in Sector 1 for instance, positions for the two SCAIO national professional officers (NPOs) responsible for designing and spearheading intercommunal activities had not yet been filled as they were only approved in July 2019.

Table 3: Intercommunal activities, meetings and number of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>No. of events</th>
<th>% of events</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deryneia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>8,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyla</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>7,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>384</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,308</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNFICYP Civil Affairs Office

28. Other reasons for the low level of activities outside Nicosia included the lack of a formal mechanism to scope and identify activities and target groups, and to obtain feedback on the effectiveness of intercommunal programmes. Efforts toward greater trust and confidence-building between the two communities had also been hampered by a breakdown of the political talks in July 2017 as well as other factors. With the help of a special envoy appointed by the Secretary-General, the two sides were discussing the development of terms of reference that would constitute a consensus starting point for resumed talks.

(4) UNFICYP should implement measures to increase the impact of intercommunal initiatives including: (i) enhancing its mechanism for scoping and identifying activities and target groups; (ii) conducting periodic surveys or other assessments to determine their effectiveness and identify areas of improvement; and (iii) expediting the recruitment of the national professional officers in Sector 1.

UNFICYP accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the next scoping exercise would be conducted before the introduction of the new NPOs in Sector 1. The Civil Affairs Section continued its informal community liaison and understanding of local perceptions, which would help facilitate impact assessments. UNFICYP had also initiated the recruitment of two NPO posts and the job openings would be posted in December 2019. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence of the
D. Force coordination and support

Need to strengthen integration of SCIAOs

29. The strategic review indicated that civilian activity in the buffer zone had increased considerably over the years, leading to a rise in civilian disputes that had the potential to cause tensions. The main tasks for UNFICYP within the buffer zone were twofold: (i) to maintain calm and stability, including preservation of the military status quo along the ceasefire lines (military role), and (ii) to allow for/facilitate “innocent civilian activities and the exercise of property rights” between the two ceasefire lines (civilian role), as long as such activities were not assessed as compromising security or the future disposition of the buffer zone.

30. Considering the critical roles UNFICYP played in liaising and engaging with local counterparts to resolve actual and emerging conflicts, international Civil Affairs Officers were transferred from Force headquarters to the sectors to head the SCAIOs in line with the strategic review. However, the civilian heads had not established effective mechanisms to coordinate military, police and civilian activities and harmonize efforts toward a common objective. For example, there was a lot of duplication of functions and tasks at the SCAIOs since both the military and police components had their own planning and reporting mechanisms. The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) was not fully integrated and operated more like a military operations centre. There was no civilian representation in the JOC, and UNPOL only had one liaison officer without any operational role. Moreover, incidents were reported along each component’s chain of command and each component maintained separate figures and had a different approach to recording information in the relevant database\(^3\). As a result, the information maintained by UNPOL and the military was in most cases conflicting. For instance, the number of joint patrols reported by UNPOL was 3,804, while the military reported 4,447. Also, the Mission reported 222 military violations in the 2017/18 budget performance while reports from the military indicated 303 violations over the same period.

31. The above occurred because the roles and responsibilities of civilian heads as coordination leads were not clearly defined. Therefore, each component insisted on reporting along its own chain of command thereby undoing the expected benefits of integration. This was further hampered at Sectors 1 and 4 where the three components were not co-located, which rendered coordination much more difficult.

\(5\) UNFICYP should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of civilian heads at the Sector Civilian Activity Integrated Offices to enable them to lead and coordinate the activities of the offices in an efficient and effective manner.

\(UNFICYP\) accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the report on the OPSP would help in the implementation of the recommendation. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of evidence of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of civilian heads of SCAIOs.

\(6\) UNFICYP should develop and implement an action plan with associated milestones to establish a fully integrated Joint Operations Centre and establish measures to enhance the accuracy of data on patrols and violations at the sectors.

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\(^3\) Military components focused on reporting incidents in the system, while UNPOL, in addition to incidents, recorded all other activities, which contributed to difficulties in analyzing activities.
UNFICYP accepted recommendation 6 and stated that the outcome of the OPSP review would help in implementing the recommendation. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence of the full establishment of JOC.

Need to enhance the operations of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre

32. UNFICYP established a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) in November 2018, headed by a Chief at P-5 level who is a member of the Senior Management Group and other senior committees. Since then, JMAC outputs have included fortnightly media trends, bi-monthly trends analysis, semi-annual Secretary-General’s report on UNFICYP and several ad hoc assessment reports. The structure stipulates that, in addition to the Chief of JMAC, the Centre would be staffed with one full time member from the Military Analyst Cell (Deputy Chief of JMAC) and two national staff shared on a part time basis with Public Information Office.

33. The two national information analysts were assigned to JMAC on a part-time basis as required. However, the Deputy Chief of JMAC was deployed on part-time basis contrary to the directive issued. As a result, the Centre has had limited capacity to conduct comprehensive analyses, produce forward looking assessments and at times had to delay some regular products to meet other urgent requirements. For instance, JMAC did not produce its March-April bi-monthly report in May 2019 and instead produced a report covering April to June in July 2019. This practice undermines the timelines within which JMAC’s predictive assessments should be produced to facilitate prompt Mission action and preparedness.

(7) UNFICYP should consider the deployment of a full time Deputy Chief of Joint Mission Analysis Centre to enable the Centre to facilitate decision making and situational awareness by conducting multisource, integrated and predictive assessments in a timely manner.

UNFICYP accepted recommendation 7 and stated that arrangements were being concluded for the deployment of a full time Deputy Chief JMAC. Recommendation 7 remains open pending the deployment of a full time Deputy Chief JMAC.

UNFICYP strengthened liaison and engagement at headquarters and sectors

34. In line with the recommendations of the strategic review, which required strengthening the liaison and engagement capability across all Mission components by devoting more human resources and redeploying resources from Force headquarters to the sectors, the Mission reassigned 14 staff from headquarters to the sectors. These included six police officers who were deployed to enhance patrols, three international civil affairs officers and five Cypriot national staff.

35. In addition, UNFICYP enhanced its military Engagement Branch and created 10 additional liaison officer posts. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Engagement (Chief Liaison Officer) was recruited in July 2018 with a minimum rotation period of two years, while the nine continuity military liaison officers had a minimum rotation period of one year. The nine officers were shared equally among the three sectors. At the time of the audit, the Engagement Branch had an establishment of 46 officers as authorized. The comprehensive assessment recommended in recommendation 1 should also determine whether the strengthening of the Engagement Branch has had the desired impact on the Mission’s effectiveness and efficiency.

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4 As per the SRSG’s directive on the establishment and functioning of the JMAC.
5 An administrative assistant was also shared with Gender Office.
IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

36. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of UNFICYP for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services
### STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the implementation of recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical/ Important</th>
<th>C/ O</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNFICYP should assess whether the actions taken to implement the recommendations of the strategic review were yielding the envisaged operational and financial efficiencies in the most effective manner and ensure its units revise their workplans to incorporate changes in the Mission’s strategic focus.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of implementation of recommendations in the OPSP assessment report and receipt of revised work plans of relevant units.</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNFICYP should: (i) require the Cross Component Coordination Group to retain formal records of its deliberations for enhanced accountability and to develop a formal feedback mechanism to the sectors to enhance strategic direction and coordination; and (ii) take adequate measures to ensure that members of the Sector Cross Component Coordination Group attend its meetings regularly to address issues under its purview.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of the revised terms of reference of the CCCG+ and minutes of meetings of the SCCCG showing that its members were attending meetings regularly.</td>
<td>31 December 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNFICYP should reformulate the sectoral patrol plans to ensure that they do not follow a fixed pattern which makes the patrols predictable, thereby undermining their effectiveness.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of both military and UNPOL patrol plans that do not show a fixed pattern of patrols, and receipt of evidence of training of personnel on preparation of patrol plans.</td>
<td>31 December 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNFICYP should implement measures to increase the impact of intercommunal initiatives including: (i) enhancing its mechanism for scoping and identifying activities and target groups; (ii) conducting periodic surveys or other assessments to determine their effectiveness and identify areas of improvement; and (iii) expediting the recruitment of the national professional officers in Sector 1.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of enhanced mechanism for scoping and identifying activities and target groups, and recruitment of the NPO staff in Sector 1.</td>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

7 Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

8 C = closed, O = open

9 Date provided by UNFICYP in response to recommendations.
### STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the implementation of recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical⁴/ Important⁵</th>
<th>C/ O⁶</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date⁹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UNFICYP should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of civilian heads at the Sector Civilian Activity Integrated Offices to enable them to lead and coordinate the activities of the offices in an efficient and effective manner.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of civilian heads SCAIOs.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>UNFICYP should develop and implement an action plan with associated milestones to establish a fully integrated Joint Operations Centre and establish measures to enhance the accuracy of data on patrols and violations at the Sectors.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of the full establishment of JOC.</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>UNFICYP should consider the deployment of a full time Deputy Chief of Joint Mission Analysis Centre to enable the Centre to facilitate decision making and situational awareness by conducting multisource, integrated and predictive assessments in a timely manner.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of deployment of a full time Deputy Chief JMAC.</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX I

Management Response
DATE: 27 November 2019

To: Ms. Muriette Lawrence-Hume, Chief, New York Audit Service, Internal Audit Division, OIOS

From: Elizabeth Spehar, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Subject: Draft report on an audit of the implementation of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (assignment No. Ap2019/654/01)

1. Reference is made to your interoffice memorandum, reference # OIOS-2019-MO1001, dated 12 November 2019 on the above-mentioned report. Please find attached UNFICYP comments in the attached Appendix I.

Best regards,
## Management Response

Audit of the implementation of recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical/ Important</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNFICYP should assess whether the actions taken to implement the recommendations of the strategic review were yielding the envisaged operational and financial efficiencies in the most effective manner and ensure its units revise their workplans to incorporate changes in the Mission’s strategic focus.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Senior Adviser</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>The Office of Peacekeeping and Strategic Partnership conducted a review in September 2019 of military, police and civilian components on integration, liaison and engagement and operations in BZ. The outcome of the review will help in the implementation of the recommendation. The draft report was shared with the Mission on 15 November 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNFICYP should: (i) require the Cross Component Coordination Group to retain formal records of its deliberations for enhanced accountability and to develop a formal feedback mechanism to the sectors to enhance strategic direction and coordination; and (ii) take adequate measures to ensure that members of the Sector Cross Component Coordination Group attend its meetings regularly to address issues under its purview.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Senior Adviser</td>
<td>30 December 2019</td>
<td>The terms of reference the Cross Component Coordination Group which will incorporate the recommendation for effective coordination arrangements is being finalized for endorsement of the Senior Adviser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNFICYP should reformulate the sectoral patrol plans to ensure that they do not follow a fixed pattern which makes the patrols predictable, thereby undermining their effectiveness.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Force Commander and Senior Police Adviser</td>
<td>1 December 2019</td>
<td>UNPOL component has commenced training of drafting patrol plans effective from 1 December 2019, UNPOL patrol plans will not follow a fixed pattern. The military component also completed and will regularly update and review the patrol plans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

2 Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.
### Management Response

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<td>UNFICYP should implement measures to increase the impact of intercommunal initiatives including: (i) enhancing its mechanism for scoping and identifying activities and target groups; (ii) conducting periodic surveys or other assessments to determine their effectiveness and identify areas of improvement; and (iii) expediting the recruitment of the national professional officers in Sector 1.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Chief Civil Affairs Officer</td>
<td>28 February 2020</td>
<td>(i) The next scoping exercise will be conducted before the introduction of the new NPOs in Sector 1. (ii) CAS continues its informal community liaison and understanding of local perceptions. This will help facilitate the assessment. (iii) The recruitment process has been initiated. Classification of the two NPO posts (Umoja) 31031185 and 31031186 with Job description JD/CP062NPO in the Civil Affairs Section were approved in November 2019, with the Job Openings for both positions to be posted early December.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>UNFICYP should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of civilian heads at the Sector Civilian Activity Integrated Offices to enable them to lead and coordinate the activities of the offices in an efficient and effective manner.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Senior Adviser</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>The Office of Peacekeeping and Strategic Partnership conducted a review in September 2019 of military, police and civilian components on integration, liaison and engagement and operations in BZ. The outcome of the review will help in the implementation of the recommendation. The draft</td>
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Management Response

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<td>6</td>
<td>UNFICYP should develop and implement an action plan with associated milestones to establish a fully integrated Joint Operations Centre and establish measures to enhance the accuracy of data on patrols and violations at the Sectors.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Senior Adviser</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>UNFICYP should consider the deployment of a full time Deputy Chief of Joint Mission Analysis Centre to enable the Centre to facilitate decision making and situational awareness by conducting multisource, integrated and predictive assessments in a timely manner.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Senior Adviser</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>There is an existing D/CJMAC. Arrangements are being concluded for the deployment of full time D/JMAC</td>
</tr>
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