Audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

The Mission needed to ensure that its business continuity framework is updated and the business continuity plan is regularly tested

20 December 2019
Assignment No. AP2019/633/02
Audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of business continuity management (BCM) in UNMISS to ensure continuity of critical business services following a disruptive event. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2017 to 31 August 2019 and included a review of: (a) the governance structure for BCM; (b) development and implementation of the business continuity plan (BCP); (c) the maintenance, exercise and review regime; and (d) reporting and retention of emergency response plans.

UNMISS had established an appropriate governance structure for crisis management, including BCM, and maintained relevant records of emergency response plans. However, there was a need to ensure that the Mission’s BCP framework is updated with relevant information on critical staff, vendors and information technology systems, and that the BCP is regularly tested.

OIOS made five recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, UNMISS needed to:

- Seek guidance from United Nations Headquarters to enable the Mission to define its critical business services and determine the applicable maximum tolerable periods of disruption of such services;
- Finalize arrangements with the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe regarding the business processes to be performed at its alternate site and logistical arrangements to be provided to the Mission in the event of a major disruption;
- Finalize the annexes to its BCP and implement the pending business continuity-related recommendations from past lessons learned exercises following disruptive events;
- Revise its list of critical staff, assess training needs and conduct training for heads of sections/units and critical staff on BCM to ensure they are familiar with the decision-making processes in the event of a major disruption; and
- Test the BCP regularly to ensure it is consistent with the Mission’s priorities.

UNMISS accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement them.
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ANNEX I Status of audit recommendations

APPENDIX I Management response
Audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).

2. Business continuity management (BCM) is a holistic management process intended to strengthen an organization’s ability to respond to risks and continue important and time-critical business processes following a disruptive event. The United Nations’ business continuity strategy is incorporated into its Policy on Organizational Resilience Management System (ORMS) which came into effect on 1 December 2014. The Policy on ORMS requires UNMISS to link actors and activities across preparedness, prevention, response and recovery to enhance resilience and continuously improve the management of operational risks that may arise from potential disruptive events. The Policy further requires UNMISS’ response in the event of a disruptive event to focus on: health, safety and security of personnel; maintenance of continuity of critical processes and capacity to implement mandates and programmes; and protection of assets.

3. The Chief of Staff has overall responsibility for BCM in UNMISS. Each of the Mission’s sections is responsible for developing mechanisms to ensure continuity of essential and time-critical business processes within its area of responsibility in the event of a major disruption. The Mission had appointed six ORMS Focal Points (ORFPs) in the Offices of the Chief of Staff and Deputy Director of Mission Support who are responsible for coordinating and facilitating the development and implementation of ORMS, including the business continuity processes, and for supporting the sections in the implementation of the business continuity plan (BCP). Also, the Mission has appointed Business Continuity Focal Points in each of its sections to assist ORFPs in updating the Mission’s BCP.

4. Comments provided by UNMISS are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

5. The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of business continuity management in UNMISS to ensure continuity of critical business services following a disruptive event.

6. This audit was included in the 2019 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the potential operational, financial and reputational risks associated with the Mission’s failure to ensure continuity of critical business services at defined levels and periods following a disruptive event.

7. OIOS conducted this audit from July to October 2019. The audit covered the period from July 2017 to August 2019. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risks areas in BCM which included: (a) the governance structure for BCM; (b) development and implementation of the BCP; (c) the maintenance, exercise and review regime; and (d) reporting and retention of emergency response plans.

8. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews with key personnel involved in business continuity activities; (b) review of relevant documentation; (c) analytical review of data; and (d) sample testing of critical business processes.

9. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Governance structure for business continuity management

An adequate governance structure for BCM was established

10. The Policy on ORMS requires UNMISS to establish an appropriate governance structure to implement BCM. This involves setting up a coordination structure for crisis management, chaired by senior management of the Mission, with participation of all relevant members of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). The coordination team should hold a minimum of two meetings per year.

11. OIOS’ review of UNMISS’ crisis management structure showed that the Mission had established a Crisis Management Team (CMT) chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and consisting of relevant senior managers of the Mission and members of UNCT in South Sudan as standing members. CMT was responsible for decision-making on crisis management, issuance of crisis response strategic directives to Mission components, coordination with UNCT, and liaison with relevant external partners. As Chair of CMT, the SRSG was responsible for activation of the BCP in the event of a crisis. CMT was supported by a Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG) chaired by the Chief of Staff and consisting of relevant Mission components. CMWG was responsible for coordinating the operations and monitoring the implementation of CMT decisions and directives in the event of a crisis. Both CMT and CMWG met whenever the need arose as per their terms of reference. OIOS’ review of the minutes of the seven CMT meetings held during the audit period showed that it covered strategic guidance, policy decisions and direction on issues affecting the Mission’s continuity and implementation of its mandate.

12. The roles and responsibilities of CMT and CMWG had been clearly laid out. The two groups met regularly to deliberate on crisis management issues, including business continuity, especially following every incident that had the potential to disrupt operations. Minutes of these meetings were maintained, and decisions and recommendations were implemented. Appropriate arrangements were also in place for information sharing on crisis incidents between the Mission management team and CMWG.

13. To integrate and coordinate contingency planning and enhance the Mission’s preparedness for potential crisis events, the Mission had also established a Technical Working Group (TWG) chaired by the Chief of Staff and comprising of relevant Mission components. TWG met on a weekly basis, in line with its terms of reference. OIOS’ review of the minutes of all 47 TWG meetings held between March 2018 and June 2019 showed that it discussed BCM and the status of implementation of ORMS in the Mission.

14. OIOS concluded that UNMISS had established an adequate governance structure for crisis management, including BCM.

Need to seek guidance to enable the Mission to define its critical business services

15. The Annex to the Secretary-General’s report on ORMS (A/67/266) requires UNMISS to develop appropriate mitigation strategies and determine their respective recovery time objectives (RTOs)\(^1\) to ensure continuity of critical functions under all circumstances. To ensure continuity of critical functions, the BCM

\(^1\) The period of time within which minimum levels of service and/or products and supporting systems, applications or functions must be recovered after a disruption has occurred.
template developed by the erstwhile Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) requires senior management of UNMISS to: (a) establish strategic objectives for BCM, define essential and time-critical business services and determine their applicable maximum tolerable periods of disruption (MTPD)\(^2\); (b) identify its critical business processes, develop appropriate mitigation strategies and determine their respective RTOs; and (c) identify recovery point objectives (RPOs)\(^3\) for processes supported by information and communications technology (ICT) systems.

16. In August 2017, UNMISS established its business continuity priorities and objectives, and delegated the identification of critical business processes to heads of sections of the various Mission components. In line with its priorities, the Mission identified 54 critical business processes and assigned their respective RTOs. The Mission also assessed the impact of disruption and established associated mitigation strategies. Also, the Geospatial Information and Telecommunications Technologies Section (GITTS) determined RPOs for critical ICT systems and applications such as Umoja and COSMOS. However, OIOS’ review of the list of critical business processes and instructions sent to heads of sections in May 2018 indicated that:

- The Mission had not defined its essential and time-critical business services and their MTPDs as it deemed the alignment of its identified critical business processes to its core mandated priorities to be adequate. In the opinion of UNMISS senior management, critical business services and critical business processes overlap, and more clarity was needed from the Business Transformation and Accountability Division in the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance on the distinction between them and on how critical business services assist with the identification and implementation of critical business processes.

- UNMISS had not finalized discussions with the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe (RSCE) regarding the business processes to be performed at RSCE and the logistical arrangements to be provided to the Mission in the event its primary location in Juba was affected by a major disruptive event. While OIOS acknowledges that UNMISS had identified business processes to be carried out in RSCE and developed the framework for logistical support by RSCE, it was necessary to finalize the arrangements with RSCE to ensure effective implementation should the need arise.

17. The above gaps had the potential to impede the Mission’s ability to resume priority business services in a timely manner in the event of a disruption. Defining the essential and time-critical business services and associated MTPD helps to minimize potential harm to UNMISS and facilitates prioritization of relevant supporting business processes.

| (1) UNMISS should seek guidance from the Business Transformation and Accountability Division at United Nations Headquarters to enable it to define its critical business services and determine their applicable maximum tolerable periods of disruption in order to ensure effective recovery of critical business services in the event of a major disruption. |

UNMISS accepted recommendation 1 and stated that on 27 November 2019, it sought guidance from the Business Transformation and Accountability Division on defining its critical business processes and determine their applicable MTPD. Nevertheless, the Mission did not receive sufficient clarification and guidance on the conceptual and practical difference between critical business services and critical business processes. UNMISS developed its critical business processes based on the SRSG’s priorities for contingency planning in the implementation of UNMISS’ mandate. The UNMISS BCP framework defines the priorities that should be maintained/restored within the first 24 hours.

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\(^2\) The time-period senior management considered acceptable to operate without the specified service.

\(^3\) The point in time at which data must be recovered after a disruption has occurred.
hours following a major disruptive event. It is the Mission’s view that these priorities serve as the critical business services which guide the development of critical business processes. OIOS verified that subsequent to the audit, UNMISS had updated its BCP to include priorities/critical business services required to be restored within 24 hours. Based on the actions taken, recommendation 1 has been closed.

(2) UNMISS should expedite discussions with the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe to finalize arrangements regarding the business processes to be performed at its alternate site and logistical arrangements to be provided to the Mission in the event of a major disruption.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 2 and stated that with regard to logistical arrangements, it had developed with RSCE a checklist providing for required support in case of evacuation of staff to Entebbe. The scale of RSCE’s actual support to UNMISS can only be determined during an actual event depending on the scope of relocation. On critical business processes to be performed at RSCE, UNMISS will define them as part of the BCP framework. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that critical business processes to be performed at the alternate site and the associated logistical arrangements have been finalized.

B. Development and implementation of the business continuity plan

The Mission needed to finalize the annexes to its BCP and implement related recommendations from past lessons learned exercises.

18. The Policy on ORMS requires UNMISS to develop, implement, exercise and maintain a BCP based on its overarching core mandate and critical business services.

19. UNMISS had used the lessons learned from previous crises that occurred in December 2013 and July 2016 to revise its BCP, which was initially developed in 2012. For example, it considered in its assumptions: the impact of restrictions of access and movement of staff, contractors and vendors during times of crisis; the evacuation of non-critical staff to alternate locations; and the devolution of some core functions to be performed at RSCE. The Mission finalized its BCP on 19 October 2019.

20. However, OIOS’ review of the BCP showed that it did not include key elements required by the DPKO/DFS BCP template, such as: (a) description of the Mission’s essential and time-critical business services to enable the Mission to prioritize its resources towards the resumption of only the most critical services; and (b) a list of equipment and materials required by critical staff to effectively carry out their functions. The Mission indicated that it had deviated from the standard BCP template and customized it to its own operational needs based on lessons learned from the previous crises.

21. Also, annexes to the BCP had not yet been finalized. These included the lists of critical vendors and vital UNMISS records, and their storage locations. Furthermore, the Mission had not implemented a recommendation to conduct quarterly reviews of the critical business processes raised in the lessons learned exercise following the July 2016 crisis. As a result, there was a high risk that the deficiencies noted could recur in the event of another crisis.

22. The delay in finalizing the BCP occurred because senior management was of the view that the DPKO/DFS BCP template was not easy to implement in the Mission’s complex and high-tempo environment and that the Mission needed more time to customize it by adding elements to enhance its practical use in South Sudan following a disruptive event.
(3) UNMISS should finalize the annexes to its business continuity plan and implement the pending business continuity related recommendations from its past lessons learned exercises.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 3 and stated that the revised BCP framework and critical business processes were finalized in October 2019. The list of critical staff, vendors and information technology systems would subsequently be updated. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of a copy of finalized annexes and evidence that relevant recommendations from past lessons learned exercises have been implemented.

The Mission sections/units needed to revise/update the list of critical staff

23. To ensure continuity of critical business services following a disruptive event, UNMISS is required by the standard BCP template to: identify critical staff to perform critical functions and train them on their emergency management responsibilities; keep the number of such staff to a minimum; and review and update the list of critical staff regularly to keep it current.

24. The BCP included 512 international civilian staff as critical staff. However, UNMISS sections and units had not consistently applied the criteria for identification of critical staff that was in line with the UNMISS BCP assumptions and results of the Programme Criticality Assessment for South Sudan, which categorized the mandated UNMISS activities to be undertaken during a crisis. This approach resulted in some sections listing several staff as critical whilst others perceived critical staff as only those holding key positions. For example, 139 (or 56 per cent) of the 249 staff of the Engineering Section, 65 (or 35 per cent) of the 185 staff of the Transport Section, and 79 (or 66 per cent) of the 119 staff of GITTS were listed as critical staff. The Mission also included 30 contractor personnel and 115 staff who were no longer in the Mission in the list of critical staff. In addition, the list did not include emergency contact information for more than one third of the critical staff from substantive and security sections. Furthermore, the Mission had not assessed the training needs of its critical staff and hence none of them had received training to familiarize them with decision-making processes in the event of a disruptive event.

25. The above resulted because the heads of sections/units: (a) did not regularly review and update the list of critical staff to reflect the arrival and departure of staff; and (b) had inadequate understanding of the criteria for the identification of critical staff in line with the Mission’s BCP assumptions. The Mission also indicated that it lacked clarity on the linkage between the BCP and the Programme Criticality Assessment. Consequently, there was a high risk that UNMISS might be unable to effectively ensure continuity of critical business processes during a crisis, thereby impeding the Mission’s recovery process.

(4) UNMISS should: (a) revise the list of critical staff in line with its business continuity planning assumptions; and (b) assess the training needs and conduct training for heads of sections/units and critical staff on business continuity management to ensure they are familiar with the decision-making processes in the event of a major disruption.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the list of critical staff will be updated. The Mission will continue to undertake training of heads of sections/units and critical staff during its regular testing and exercises of the BCP. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the list of critical staff has been revised and section/unit heads and critical staff have been trained on BCM.
C. Maintenance, exercise and review regime

The Mission needed to regularly test its BCP

26. The Policy on ORMS requires UNMISS to test its BCP and other emergency response plans in order to validate the policies, procedures, and systems against established standards, and to update these plans to reflect lessons learned. The BCP testing should include: (i) annual simulation exercises; (ii) bi-annual telecommuting exercises and staff meetings using peer-to-peer technology; (iii) an annual exercise of devolution arrangements; and (iv) annual fail-over tests.

27. The Mission had developed and approved emergency response plans which included: (a) a crisis communications operating plan; (b) an Information Technology Disaster Recovery Plan (ITDRP); (c) Mass Casualty Incident Plans and Area Security Plans for all 10 field offices, including Juba; and (d) pre- and post-crisis situation checklists on support to staff, survivors and families. Also, the Mission had developed and approved emergency management related guidance documents, which included: the SRSG’s Priorities and Mission Contingency Planning Guidance; Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) on Crisis Management and on Casualty and Medical Evacuation; and the Key Leadership Engagement Strategy.

28. The emergency plans were appropriately referenced and linked with each other. Further, as noted earlier in this report, the Mission used the weekly TWG meetings to coordinate the integration and testing of all emergency and contingency plans. GITTS had conducted disaster recovery validation exercises in August 2017 and November 2018 to test the availability of ICT files and telephone services. Lessons learned from these exercises were used to update the ITDRP approved in March 2019.

29. However, OIOS’ review of the tests of emergency response plans and after-action review reports of exercises conducted, and interviews with relevant personnel, indicated the following shortcomings:

- The Mission had not conducted annual functional tests of the BCP to validate its effectiveness against established standards and systems and the performance of Mission components in undertaking critical business processes;

- The Mission had not conducted a full fail-over test of its back-up servers or an annual exercise of devolution arrangements; and

- Although the Mission included telecommuting of critical staff as a mitigation strategy for some critical business processes, it had not conducted exercises to test its telecommuting capabilities and ensure that staff in the Tomping compound in Juba could perform their critical business processes while working remotely in the event of a disruptive event.

30. The above resulted because senior management had not ensured that business continuity response plans were appropriately tested in order to validate them, identify gaps and weaknesses, and use lessons learned to update them. Lack of testing of the Mission’s BCP and its capabilities could result in ineffective response to disruptive events.

(5) UNMISS should regularly test its business continuity plan to ensure it is consistent with and relevant to the Mission’s priorities.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 5 and stated that mechanisms for testing contingency plans are in place and coordinated through TWG. The Mission arranged for a business continuity exercise to
The Mission agreed to incorporate more awareness building on BCM within the context of other awareness-raising programmes.

31. UNMISS is required to raise awareness on BCM and emergency response plans and observe a staff emergency day. The Mission, through TWG, raised awareness of its emergency response plans and procedures through various means. For example, in the November 2018 TWG meeting, the Chief of Staff and owners of emergency response plans provided an overview and updates on the status of implementation of ORMS emergency plans in the Mission. In addition, in July 2019, ORFPs and the Office of the Chief of Staff provided two briefings to owners of emergency response plans and Business Continuity Focal Points on ORMS implementation, including the BCM process. Also, the Mission used tabletop exercises to raise staff awareness of its emergency response plans.

32. However, OIOS’ review showed that the Mission had not: (a) conducted annual campaigns related to business continuity and general emergency preparedness procedures; and (b) observed any staff emergency days. This resulted in lack of understanding and buy-in of staff of the BCM process. Since the Mission agreed to incorporate awareness-building on BCM within the context of other awareness raising programmes, OIOS did not make a recommendation.

D. Reporting and retention of emergency response plans

Copies of emergency plans were retained and status of ORMS implementation was reported.

33. UNMISS is required to: maintain copies of its emergency response plans to ensure that relevant staff can perform their emergency management responsibilities; prepare and maintain a crisis management quick reference guide; and provide an annual status update on the implementation of the key performance indicators (KPIs) on ORMS.

34. The Mission maintained the SOP on crisis management on its intranet which was accessible to all staff. The Office of the Chief of Staff centrally maintained copies of the Mission’s emergency plans and related documents in the SharePoint database. Although the database was not accessible by all staff, the Office shared these plans with participants of TWG meetings and on a need-to-know basis. Also, in March 2017 and September 2018, the Mission provided status updates to DPKO on the implementation of ORMS, including the extent to which the KPIs had been achieved. The areas covered by these reports included the key ORMS elements of policy, governance, risk management, maintenance, exercise and review, and planning.

35. OIOS therefore concluded that UNMISS had implemented adequate controls to ensure retention of its emergency plans and periodic reporting on the status of ORMS implementation.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

36. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of UNMISS for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services
## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical(^4)/Important(^5)</th>
<th>C/ O(^6)</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date(^7)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNMISS should seek guidance from the Business Transformation and Accountability Division at United Nations Headquarters to enable it to define its critical business services and determine their applicable maximum tolerable periods of disruption in order to ensure effective recovery of critical business services in the event of a major disruption.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Action taken.</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNMISS should expedite discussions with the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe to finalize arrangements regarding the business processes to be performed at its alternate site and logistical arrangements to be provided to the Mission in the event of a major disruption.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that critical business processes to be performed at the alternate site and the associated logistical arrangements have been finalized.</td>
<td>29 February 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNMISS should finalize the annexes to its business continuity plan and implement the pending business continuity related recommendations from its past lessons learned exercises.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of a copy of finalized annexes and evidence that relevant recommendations from past lessons learned exercises have been implemented.</td>
<td>31 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNMISS should: (a) revise the list of critical staff in line with its business continuity planning assumptions; and (b) assess the training needs and conduct training for heads of sections/units and critical staff on business continuity management to ensure they are familiar with the decision-making processes in the event of a major disruption.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that the list of critical staff has been revised and section/unit heads have been trained on business continuity management.</td>
<td>31 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UNMISS should regularly test its business continuity plan to ensure it is consistent with and relevant to the Mission’s priorities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that the BCP is regularly tested.</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
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\(^4\) Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

\(^5\) Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

\(^6\) C = closed, O = open

\(^7\) Date provided by UNMISS in response to recommendations. Date indicated in italics is provided by OIOS for monitoring and reporting of implementation.
APPENDIX I

Management Response
# Management Response

Audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical¹ Important²</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNMISS should seek guidance from the Business Transformation and Accountability Division at United Nations Headquarters to enable it to define its critical business services and determine their applicable maximum tolerable periods of disruption in order to ensure the effective recovery of critical business services in the event of a major disruption.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Implemented (27 November 2019)</td>
<td>On 27 November 2019, the Mission sought guidance from the Business Transformation and Accountability Division on defining its critical business processes and determine their applicable maximum tolerable periods of disruption. Nevertheless, the Mission did not receive sufficient clarification and guidance on the conceptual and practical difference between critical business services and critical business processes. UNMISS developed its critical business processes based on the SRSG’s priorities for contingency planning in the implementation of UNMISS mandate, issued in August 2017. Paragraph 5.2 (ii) of the UNMISS BCP framework defines the priorities that should be maintained/restored within the first 24 hours following the major disruptive event (the maximum tolerable period of disruption). It is the Mission’s view that these priorities serve as the critical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

2. Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.
## Management Response

### Audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical¹/ Important²</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNMISS should expedite discussions with the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe to finalize arrangements regarding the business processes to be performed at its alternate site and logistical arrangements to be provided to the Mission in the event of a major disruption.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>29 February 2020</td>
<td>With regard to the logistical arrangements, UNMISS developed with the RSCE a checklist providing for required support in case of evacuation of staff to Entebbe at a no cost basis and based on availability of resources at the RSCE. The scale of the RSCE actual support to UNMISS can only be determined during an actual event depending on the scope of relocation required. On the critical business processes to be performed at the RSCE, UNMISS will define them as part of the BCP framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNMISS should finalize the annexes to its business continuity plan and implement the pending business continuity related recommendations from its past lessons learned exercises.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>31 January 2020</td>
<td>The revised UNMISS BCP framework was approved in October 2019. The critical business processes have also been finalized in October 2019. The list of critical staff, critical vendors and critical IT systems will subsequently be updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNMISS should: (a) revise the list of critical staff in line with its business continuity planning assumptions; and (b) assess the training needs and conduct training for heads of sections/units and</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>31 January 2020</td>
<td>(a) As mentioned above, the critical staff list will be updated. (b) Further to the awareness programs that have been conducted</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## APPENDIX I

Management Response

Audit of business continuity in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>critical staff on business continuity management to ensure they are familiar with the decision-making processes in the event of a major disruption.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(as mentioned in the Draft Audit report, including briefings on and dissemination of UNMISS BCP framework and broader guidance on ORMS), the Mission will continue to undertake training of heads of sections/units and critical staff during its regular testing and exercises of the BCP (see recommendation 5 below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UNMISS should regularly test its business continuity plan to ensure it is consistent with and relevant to the Mission’s priorities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Implemented (5 December 2019)</td>
<td>Mechanisms for testing and exercising UNMISS contingency plans are in place and coordinated through the Technical Working Group (TWG). The revised BCP framework also provides for this provision. UNMISS arranged for a business continuity specific exercise to test its BCP on 5 December 2019. Similar exercises will be conducted on the regular intervals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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