Audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Overall results relating to the effective management of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur were initially assessed as partially satisfactory. Implementation of seven important recommendations remains in progress.

FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY

9 May 2014
Assignment No. AP2013/634/08
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AUDIT REPORT

Audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

2. In accordance with its mandate, OIOS provides assurance and advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the United Nations internal control system, the primary objectives of which are to ensure: (a) efficient and effective operations; (b) accurate financial and operational reporting; (c) safeguarding of assets; and (d) compliance with mandates, regulations and rules.

3. Security Council resolution S/2007/307/Rev.1, dated 5 June 2007, mandated UNAMID to: (a) monitor through proactive patrolling the parties’ (to the Darfur Peace Agreement) policing activities in camps for internally displaced persons, demilitarized zones and areas of control; (b) support the establishment and training of community police in camps for internally displaced persons, capacity-building of the Government of the Sudan police in Darfur in accordance with international standards of human rights and accountability, and institutional development of the police of the armed movements; (c) support the efforts of the Government of the Sudan and of the police of the movements to maintain public order and build the capacity of Sudanese law enforcement through specialized training and joint operations; (d) support the parties in restructuring and building the capacity of the police service in Darfur, including through monitoring, training, mentoring, co-location and joint patrols; and (e) facilitate the provision of full humanitarian access and assistance to people in need.

4. UNAMID Police was headed by a Police Commissioner at the D-2 level, who reported to the UNAMID Joint Special Representative. The Commissioner was assisted by two deputies at the D-1 level who were each responsible for operations, and policy and planning. The headquarters was based in El Fasher. There were five sectors in the five states of Darfur, which were led by the Police Sector Commanders. UNAMID Police strength was 4,550 personnel comprising 2,310 individual police officers and 16 Formed Police Units1 each comprising 140 police officers as at the end of fiscal year 2012/13. The budgets for UNAMID Police in 2011/12 and 2012/13 were $239.9 million and $212.8 million, respectively.

5. Comments provided by UNAMID are incorporated in italics.

II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

6. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of UNAMID governance, risk management and control processes in providing reasonable assurance regarding the effective management of police operations in UNAMID.

1 Formed Police Units refer to cohesive mobile police units, providing support to United Nations operations and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and missions, primarily in public order management. Formed Police Units are deployed under a Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the police-contributing country within the contingent-owned equipment system. Individual police officers on the other hand are police or other law enforcement personnel assigned to serve with the United Nations on secondment by governments of Member States at the request of the Secretary-General.
7. The audit was included in the 2013 OIOS risk-based work plan due to the operational and reputational risks of not achieving the mandate of UNAMID Police.

8. The key control tested for the audit was risk management and strategic planning. For the purpose of this audit, OIOS defined this key control as the one that provides reasonable assurance that risks relating to UNAMID Police operations are identified and assessed, a strategic plan is developed and action is taken to mitigate or anticipate the risks.

9. The key control was assessed for the control objectives shown in Table 1. Certain control objectives (shown in Table 1 as “Not assessed”) were not relevant to the scope defined for this audit.

10. OIOS conducted the audit from September 2013 to January 2014. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2013.

11. OIOS conducted an activity-level risk assessment to identify and assess specific risk exposures, and to confirm the relevance of the selected key controls in mitigating associated risks. Through interviews, analytical reviews and tests of controls, OIOS assessed the existence and adequacy of internal controls and conducted necessary tests to determine their effectiveness.

12. The audit did not cover UNAMID Police activities relating to the capacity-building development programme of the Sudanese National Police as these were covered under a separate OIOS audit.

### III. AUDIT RESULTS

13. The UNAMID governance, risk management and control processes examined were initially assessed as **partially satisfactory** in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of police operations in UNAMID**. OIOS made seven recommendations to address the issues identified. The UNAMID Police, who were mandated to play a vital role in protecting civilians, did not fully achieve their patrolling targets. Therefore, UNAMID needed to: (a) increase the number of police officers deployed to patrol sites as well as address the underutilization of those individual police officers already deployed to patrol sites; and (b) address the low operational serviceability rates of major equipment of 3 of the 16 Formed Police Units. Recognizing the impact of the low serviceability rates of contingent-owned equipment on UNAMID Police patrolling activities, UNAMID had taken action to resolve this issue, including recommending the repatriation of the concerned contingents. UNAMID also needed to ensure that patrolling activities were planned according to the strategies and priorities of UNAMID Police, and the higher risk areas relating to their mandate to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance.

14. The initial overall rating was based on the assessment of the key control presented in Table 1 below. The final overall rating is **partially satisfactory** as implementation of seven important recommendations remains in progress.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business objective</th>
<th>Key controls</th>
<th>Control objectives</th>
<th>Compliance with mandates, regulations and rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective management of police operations in UNAMID</td>
<td>Risk management and strategic planning</td>
<td>Partially satisfactory</td>
<td>Partially satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY**

### Risk management and strategic planning

Performance targets for patrolling were not achieved

15. To protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance in areas of their control, UNAMID Police were required to conduct security patrols, i.e., long-range and medium-range patrols, farm and firewood collection patrols, and patrols at camps occupied by internally displaced persons.

16. The actual achievements against the planned targets reported in budget performance reports for fiscal years 2011/12 and 2012/13 averaged 43 per cent and 48 per cent respectively. Also, UNAMID did not adequately cover 21 of its 70 planned patrol sites. This was because UNAMID had not established permanent police patrol sites at these 21 locations, or developed and implemented plans to patrol these locations using either medium-range or long-range patrols from the nearest established patrol sites.

17. The reasons for the shortfalls in performance targets of police operations are explained in the succeeding paragraphs. As a result of this shortfall, protection of the civilian population through UNAMID mandated patrolling was not effective, and there were no significant changes in the crime rate as reported by the UNAMID Police for fiscal years 2011/12 and 2012/13.

(a) Non-deployment of all the planned Formed Police Units

18. In its work plans for fiscal years 2011/12 and 2012/13, UNAMID Police based its target performance on the anticipated full deployment of all the 19 Formed Police Units as per the Mission mandate. However, over these fiscal years, only 16 Formed Police Units were deployed, accounting for 84 per cent of the anticipated strength. This impacted on the achievement of targets both for the Formed Police Units and individual police officers whom the Formed Police Units supported operationally.

(b) Deployment of individual police officers to patrol sites below the requirement

19. The UNAMID approved budget for 2012/13 expected the deployment to patrol sites of 70 per cent of individual police officers available in the Mission to conduct daily operational duties. OIOS analysis indicated that only 46 per cent of the available individual police officers were deployed to patrol sites. More than half of the individual police officers were deployed at the UNAMID Police headquarters and sector and team sites headquarters, not conducting patrols but providing administrative and support services. There were no mechanisms in place to enforce the requirement to deploy 70 per cent of individual police officers for operational purposes and to monitor patrolling activities.
20. OIOS analysis of individual police officers’ utilization at 18 of the 49 patrol sites indicated that out of a total of 3,814 police person days available for operations at patrol sites for the selected periods, only 1,054 days, representing 28 per cent were involved in operational duties. The other 72 per cent could not be accounted for.

21. Each Formed Police Unit was required to achieve 35,040 operational days. Of the 16 units deployed, one unit achieved only 240 days (or 1 per cent of the required operational days); another achieved 11,702 days (or 33 per cent); and the third achieved 19,598 days (or 56 per cent). Overall, the UNAMID Police fell short of its overall annual performance target for Formed Police Units by 39 per cent. As a result, police operations were affected as individual police officers relied on the Formed Police Units to provide security while conducting their day-to-day mandated activities, contributing to the non-achievement of police operational targets by 64 per cent. To enable the police to carry out their planned activities, they were compelled to adjust their programmes to fit into the military patrols, which were not flexible.

22. On 28 October 2013, the Joint Special Representative recommended that DPKO headquarters repatriate immediately the concerned contingents or give them a period of six months to address the below minimum operational serviceability rates of major equipment deployed by three Formed Police Units. On 16 December 2013, DPKO approved the repatriation of one Formed Police Unit and allowed the remaining police-contributing countries to bring the operational serviceability rates of their equipment to the required levels within six months.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 1</th>
<th>UNAMID should take steps to achieve established performance targets for police patrolling, including by: (a) ensuring that 70 per cent of the available individual police officers are deployed for operational duties at patrol sites; and (b) monitoring the performance of operational units to ensure that all individual police officers deployed to patrol sites are engaged in operational activities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID accepted recommendation 1 and stated that a new police structure was developed resulting in 95 per cent of police officers at team sites being operationally deployed. Also, taking into consideration other mandated tasks, it was not possible for 70 per cent of officers to be in patrol sites; however, the new police structure ensures that 68.6 per cent of officers would be allocated to team sites. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the new police structure has enabled UNAMID to achieve its established performance targets for patrolling.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 2</th>
<th>UNAMID, in coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, should ensure that it follows up with the two Formed Police Units that had not maintained the required minimum operational serviceability of their equipment, and that appropriate action is taken for continued non-compliance.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID accepted recommendation 2 and stated that one Formed Police Unit One was repatriated and the administrative process for the second one was being finalized. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that appropriate action has been taken with regard to the Formed Police Units that did not have minimum operational serviceability of their requirement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Actual days reported in budget performance reports were not supported

23. The reporting of operational days required the maintenance of adequate supporting documentation of actual performance. In reporting its actual performance, UNAMID used formulae to compute the operational days achieved for all the reported segments. For example, for the budget period 2012/13, the 408,800 formed police operational days reported were computed as follows: “70 personnel per Formed Police Unit for 16 units for 365 days” and the 250,390 operational days to protect internally displaced persons were computed as “7 police personnel per shift for 2 shifts per community policing center for 49 centers for 365 days”. There was no documentation showing the details of the actual patrol days achieved that were reported in the budget performance reports and there was no framework in place to aggregate the actual statistics relating to operational days as part of the periodic reporting process.

(3) UNAMID should establish mechanisms to capture, monitor and report actual operational days for police activities.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 3 and stated that a mechanism had been implemented to report, calculate and monitor on a daily basis actual operational days for patrols. It was also planned that statistics would be reported monthly, quarterly and annually. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence that an appropriate system is in place to capture, monitor and report on the number of operational days for police activities.

Targets for specific types of patrol were not set for each patrol site

24. UNAMID Police were required to conduct security patrols, i.e., long-range and medium-range patrols, farm and firewood collection patrols, and patrols at camps occupied by internally displaced persons.

25. A review of the UNAMID Police work plan indicated that patrolling targets were not allocated to sectors, team sites and patrol sites. There was also no prioritization of which type of patrol the UNAMID Police should focus on to ensure that resources were targeted on the strategic goals of the Police and on the higher risk areas. An analysis of 525 out of 61,158 patrols conducted between 1 July 2012 and 30 June 2013 showed that most patrols were focused on camps for internally displaced persons, but without a clear indication of the UNAMID Police patrolling priorities and targets. There was a risk that police activities were not effective and focused on identified higher risk areas.

(4) UNAMID should plan their patrolling activities according to the strategies and priorities of the UNAMID Police, and the higher risk areas relating to their mandate to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance, and ensure that patrolling activities are allocated appropriately to the various sectors, team sites and patrol sites.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 4 and stated that all activities had been planned and coordinated towards achieving the Mission’s strategies and priorities. The interdependence of the police on military for execution of its mandate was an essential aspect that was being reviewed, and standard operating procedures on joint military and police operations were being developed. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of a copy of the standard operating procedures on joint military and police operations.

Individual police officers were deployed despite failing mission service tests

26. The DPKO standard operating procedures on the assessment of individual police officers for service in DPKO and special political missions stated that candidates failing any part of the assessment
could not request for a second opportunity to be assessed in the same deployment except for driving tests, where three attempts were allowed. These procedures also stated that candidates that failed driving, firearms handling and shooting skills tests could be deployed if the Head of the Police Component was of the view that they possessed specific skills that were in demand in the Mission. The Head of the Police Component was required to make a written recommendation to the Selection and Recruitment Section of DPKO. The DPKO Police Adviser would then make the final decision on whether or not to approve the recommendation.

27. The Police Commissioner did not request the DPKO Police Adviser’s approval for the deployment of 35 police officers that failed mission service tests and 416 police officers that failed mandatory driving tests conducted by the Mission.

28. UNAMID Police management stated that repatriating 416 police officers that failed the driving tests would have had a large impact on police operations. Consequently, UNAMID Police deployed them to perform duties that did not require them to drive. Nevertheless, UNAMID Police needed to refer these cases to the DPKO Police Adviser for approval to comply with standard operating procedures.

(5) UNAMID should implement procedures to ensure that only those individual police officers that pass the mission service tests are deployed and that approval of the DPKO Police Adviser is obtained for deploying those that do not qualify.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 5 and stated that UNAMID Police and the Police Division, DPKO were developing new skill set profiles for the implementation of the new police structure. Problems were experienced with police-contributing countries to enforce pre-deployment selection assistance and assessment team clearance and selection and this had been referred to the Police Division/DPKO. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of evidence that adequate procedures are in place to ensure only those police officers that pass mission service tests are deployed, and exceptions are approved by DPKO.

Semi-annual performance appraisals were not conducted for all individual police officers

29. Semi-annual and final performance appraisals of individual police officers were not conducted as required by the DPKO Directive to the UNAMID Police Commissioner and the DPKO standard operating procedures on performance appraisals for individual police officers. The Officer-in-Charge of UNAMID Police Personnel Unit advised that performance appraisals were only completed when an extension of the tour of duty was requested or required by the DPKO Police Component Desk Officer. Also, completed performance appraisal forms had not been forwarded to the Recruitment Officer at DPKO. As a result, there was a risk that DPKO may rehire police officers with unsatisfactory performance.

(6) UNAMID should establish procedures to ensure that performance appraisals for individual police officers are completed and copies forwarded to the Recruitment Officer of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations every six months.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 6 and stated that the performance appraisal system was being reviewed, and six monthly performance appraisals would be implemented based on job specific requirements. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the performance appraisal process is completed as required.
There was a need to establish the Internal Evaluation Unit

30. The DPKO Directive to the UNAMID Police Commissioner required the establishment of an Internal Evaluation Unit for planning and evaluating police programmes. The Mission had not established this Unit. As a result, since its inception, UNAMID had not adequately reported on the UNAMID Police achievements in Darfur. The UNAMID Police relied on the results-based budgeting framework to report on progress made. This framework was focused on internal processes such as personnel, operational days and number of security patrols. Outcome indicators such as the reduction in number of criminal and banditry cases and general improvement of security in areas of operations were not included as indicators of achievement in the 2012/13 results-based budgeting framework.

31. UNAMID Police explained that the Internal Evaluation Unit was not established because of the lack of qualified personnel to undertake a comprehensive programme performance evaluation.

(7) UNAMID should seek the assistance of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in getting the required expertise so that UNAMID can establish the Internal Evaluation Unit to assess the impact of the UNAMID Police programme in Darfur.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 7 and stated that the Internal Evaluation Unit had been established since inception of the Mission and its capacity would be further enhanced in the implementation of the new police structure. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the UNAMID Police programme has been evaluated.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

32. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the Management and staff of UNAMID for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) David Kanja
Assistant Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services
## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recom. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical/Important</th>
<th>C/O</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNAMID should take steps to achieve established performance targets for police patrolling, including by: (a) ensuring that 70 per cent of the available individual police officers are deployed for operational duties at patrol sites; and (b) monitoring the performance of operational units to ensure that all individual police officers deployed to patrol sites are engaged in operational activities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that the new police structure has enabled UNAMID to achieve its established performance targets for patrolling.</td>
<td>31 December 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNAMID, in coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, should ensure that it follows up with the two Formed Police Units that had not maintained the required minimum operational serviceability of their equipment, and that appropriate action is taken for continued non-compliance.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that appropriate action has been taken with regard to Formed Police Units that did not have minimum operational serviceability of their requirement.</td>
<td>30 June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNAMID should establish mechanisms to capture, monitor and report actual operational days for police activities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that an appropriate system is in place to capture, monitor and report on the number of operational days for police activities.</td>
<td>30 May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNAMID should plan their patrolling activities according to the strategies and priorities of the UNAMID Police, and the higher risk areas relating to their mandate to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance, and ensure that patrolling activities are allocated appropriately to the various sectors, team sites and patrol sites.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of a copy of the standard operating procedures on joint military and police operations.</td>
<td>30 June 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Critical recommendations address significant and/or pervasive deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

3 Important recommendations address important deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

4 C = closed, O = open

5 Date provided by UNAMID
## ANNEX I

### STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

<table>
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<th>Recom. no</th>
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<th>Critical(^6)/ Important(^7)</th>
<th>C/ O(^8)</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date(^9)</th>
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<td>5</td>
<td>UNAMID should implement procedures to ensure that only those individual police officers that pass the mission service tests are deployed and that approval of the DPKO Police Adviser is obtained for deploying those that do not qualify.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that adequate procedures are in place to ensure only those police officers that pass mission service tests are deployed, and exceptions are approved by DPKO.</td>
<td>31 December 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UNAMID should establish procedures to ensure that performance appraisals for individual police officers are completed and copies forwarded to the Recruitment Officer of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations every six months.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that the performance appraisal process is completed as required.</td>
<td>30 June 2014</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>UNAMID should seek the assistance of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in getting the required expertise so that UNAMID can establish the Internal Evaluation Unit to assess the impact of the UNAMID Police programme in Darfur.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence that the UNAMID Police programmes has been evaluated.</td>
<td>30 May 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^6\) Critical recommendations address significant and/or pervasive deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

\(^7\) Important recommendations address important deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

\(^8\) C = closed, O = open

\(^9\) Date provided by UNAMID
APPENDIX I

Management Response
To: Ms. Eleanor T. Burns  
Chief, Peacekeeping Audit Service  
Internal Audit Division, OIOS

From: Mohamed Ibn Chambas  
Special Joint Representative  
UNAMID

Subject: Draft Report on an audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Assignment No. AP2013/634/08)

1. With reference to your memorandum of 13 April 2014, on the captioned-subject matter, please find attached UNAMID’s response (Appendix I) to the draft report for your consideration and records.

Thank you.

cc: Mr. Joseph Mutaboba, Deputy Joint Special Representative (Principal), UNAMID  
Ms. Hester Paneras, Police Commissioner, UNAMID  
Mr. Milan Trojanović, Director of Mission Support, UNAMID  
Mr. Syed Imam, Deputy Police Commissioner, Operations, UNAMID  
Mr. Mutasem Almajali, Deputy Police Commissioner, Police and Planning, UNAMID  
Mr. Prances Sooza, Chief, Resident Auditor, OIOS/UNAMID  
Mr. Velayutham Gopal, Audit Focal Point, UNAMID  
Ms. Anna Halasan, Professional Practices Section, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
APPENDIX I

Management Response

Audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical(^{10})/ Important(^{11})</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNAMID should take steps to achieve established performance targets for police patrolling, including by: (a) ensuring that 70 per cent of the available individual police officers are deployed for operational duties at patrol sites; and (b) monitoring the performance of operational units to ensure that all individual police officers deployed to patrol sites are engaged in operational activities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>31 December 2014</td>
<td>Since 2010, UNAMID Police Deployment of Individual Police Officers (IPOs) has been covering 70% deep field. Within the framework of the Mission Review a new Police Structure was developed. Within this, the structure for Team Sites was streamlined to have between one and three people responsible for administration. Although the numbers of Team Sites were significantly cut the new structure will in effect lead to 95% of these officers being operationally deployed. Take note: During the Review of Uniform Personnel (RUP) process the previous CPCs (so called patrol sites) became obsolete and were integrated into 36 Team Sites. See paragraph 18 of Audit Report which is reflecting incorrect figures. The 70% of officers to be in patrol sites cannot be fully agreed with.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{10}\) Critical recommendations address significant and/or pervasive deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

\(^{11}\) Important recommendations address important deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.
### Management Response

Audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNAMID, in coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, should ensure that it follows up with the two Formed Police Units that had not maintained the required minimum operational serviceability of their equipment, and that appropriate action is taken for continued non-compliance.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit (FPU) Coordinator</td>
<td>30 June 2014</td>
<td>Taking into consideration that Mandated tasks related to project management and development of Sudanese Police has to be done from Sector level. This is also considered as operational activities. It is not always possible to have 70% deployment in Team Sites. However in the new structure 68.6% has been allocated to Team Sites. One FPU was repatriated and for the second one to be repatriated the administrative process will be finalized shortly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNAMID should establish mechanisms to capture, monitor and report actual operational days for police activities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Policy and Planning Coordinator</td>
<td>30 May 2014</td>
<td>A mechanism was put in place where in the operational environment at the different levels the actual operational days for patrols are reported, calculated and monitored on a daily basis. This in turn will be calculated on monthly, quarterly and annual basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNAMID should plan their patrolling activities according to the strategies and priorities of the UNAMID Police, and the higher risk areas relating to their mandate to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance, and ensure that</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>30 June 2014</td>
<td>The whole of UNAMID can not only plan in accordance with UNAMID Police priorities. However, all activities have to be coordinated towards achieving the Mission strategies and priorities. The</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Management Response

Audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

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<td>5</td>
<td>UNAMID should implement procedures to ensure that only those individual police officers that pass the mission service tests are deployed and that approval of the DPKO Police Adviser is obtained for deploying those that do not qualify.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>31 December 2014</td>
<td>This is already being implemented between UNAMID Police and Police Division/DPKO. New Skill Sets Profiles are also being developed for the implementation of the new structure. Currently problems are still experienced with Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) to enforce pre-deployment Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT) clearance and selection. This has been taken up with Police Division to render the necessary assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UNAMID should establish procedures to ensure that performance appraisals for individual police officers are completed and copies forwarded to the Recruitment Officer of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations every six months.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Legal / Oversight Officer</td>
<td>30 June 2014</td>
<td>In the past, performance appraisals of Individual Police Officers (IPOs) were done at the same time of application for extension of Tour of Duty (ToD). This process is in review and six monthly performance appraisals will be implemented based on job specific requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>UNAMID should seek the assistance of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in getting the required expertise so that UNAMID can establish</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Legal / Oversight Officer</td>
<td>30 May 2014</td>
<td>The Internal Evaluation Unit has been established since the inception of the Mission and is still existing. Within the framework of the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Management Response

Audit of police operations in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical/Important</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Internal Evaluation Unit to assess the impact of the UNAMID Police programme in Darfur.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>comments on recommendations number 1 and 5, the capacity of this unit will be further enhanced.</td>
</tr>
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