



## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

### REPORT 2015/075

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Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Overall results relating to effective management of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti were initially assessed as partially satisfactory. Implementation of four important recommendations remains in progress

FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY

22 July 2015

Assignment No. AP2014/683/03

# CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
I. BACKGROUND	1
II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE	1-2
III. AUDIT RESULTS	2-8
A. Regulatory framework	3-7
B. Coordinated management	7-8
IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	8
ANNEX I     Status of audit recommendations	
APPENDIX I   Management response	

# AUDIT REPORT

## Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

### I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
2. In accordance with its mandate, OIOS provides assurance and advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the United Nations internal control system, the primary objectives of which are to ensure: (a) efficient and effective operations; (b) accurate financial and operational reporting; (c) safeguarding of assets; and (d) compliance with mandates, regulations and rules.
3. The Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) was responsible for receiving, assessing and referring allegations of misconduct to appropriate investigative bodies of the United Nations and Member States. CDT was also the principal advisor to the Head of Mission on addressing conduct and discipline issues and was responsible for providing: (a) policy guidance and technical advice; and (b) assistance in developing preventive strategies for responding to personnel misconduct; and (c) dissemination of United Nations guidelines, policies and procedures on conduct and discipline.
4. CDT was headed by a Chief at the P-5 level who reported to the Mission's Chief of Staff. The Team had seven approved positions including four international staff, one United Nations volunteer and two national staff. CDT also had one military officer assigned from the Office of the Chief of Military Personnel and a police officer from the United Nations Police to serve as focal points on conduct and discipline issues. CDT staff and operational costs for fiscal years 2012/13 and 2013/14 were about \$1.26 million for each year.
5. Comments provided by MINUSTAH are incorporated in italics.

### II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

6. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of MINUSTAH governance, risk management and control processes in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of the conduct and discipline function in MINUSTAH**.
7. The audit was included in the 2014 risk-based work plan of OIOS because of the risks relating to the management of conduct and discipline issues.
8. The key controls tested for the audit were: (a) regulatory framework; and (b) coordinated management. For the purpose of this audit, OIOS defined these key controls as follows:
  - (a) **Regulatory framework** - controls that provide reasonable assurance that policies and procedures: (i) exist to guide conduct and discipline activities in MINUSTAH; (ii) are complied with; and (iii) ensure the reliability and integrity of relevant financial and operational information.
  - (b) **Coordinated management** - controls that provide reasonable assurance that potential overlaps in the performance of conduct and discipline activities in MINUSTAH are identified,

discussed and mitigated, and adequate coordination is in place with United Nations partners related to the in-country network on the establishment of a sexual exploitation and abuse victim assistance mechanism.

9. The key controls were assessed for the control objectives shown in Table 1. Certain control objectives shown in Table 1 as “Not assessed” were not relevant to the scope defined for this audit.

10. OIOS conducted the audit from November 2014 to March 2015. The audit covered the period from 1 January 2013 to 30 September 2014. During this period, CDT recorded 304 allegations, of which 79 and 225 were classified as category I and category II cases, respectively. OIOS selected a sample of 18 of these 304 allegations to review processes related to how CDT recorded, reviewed, reported and followed up on the cases reported. OIOS also visited 7 of the 22 military camps and 3 of the 6 civilian premises to interview relevant staff and observe related activities being implemented.

11. OIOS conducted an activity-level risk assessment to identify and assess specific risk exposures, and to confirm the relevance of selected key controls in mitigating associated risks. Through interviews and analytical reviews, OIOS assessed the existence and adequacy of internal controls and conducted necessary tests to determine their effectiveness.

### III. AUDIT RESULTS

12. The MINUSTAH governance, risk management and control processes examined were initially assessed as **partially satisfactory**<sup>1</sup> in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of the conduct and discipline function in MINUSTAH**. OIOS made six recommendations to address the issues identified. MINUSTAH conducted annual risk assessments to identify risks and implement preventive measures, established a confidential and accessible complaint mechanism, used the Misconduct Tracking System to record and track misconduct cases, and participated in the United Nations Country Team’s sexual exploitation and abuse victim assistance mechanism. To improve operations, MINUSTAH needed to: (a) issue up-dated guidelines to staff on handling incidents of misconduct; (b) ensure that CDT adequately documented the review process of investigation reports; (c) take action to ensure information from investigative bodies were received in a timely manner; (d) implement a mechanism to follow up on cases; (e) implement a plan and monitoring mechanism to ensure Mission personnel received the required training; and (f) establish a public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse to improve outreach activities to the local population.

13. The initial rating was based on the assessment of key controls presented in Table 1. The final overall rating is **partially satisfactory** as implementation of four important recommendations remains in progress.

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<sup>1</sup> A rating of “**partially satisfactory**” means that important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies exist in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

**Table 1: Assessment of key controls**

Business objective	Key controls	Control objectives			
		Efficient and effective operations	Accurate financial and operational reporting	Safeguarding of assets	Compliance with mandates, regulations and rules
<b>Effective management of the conduct and discipline function in MINUSTAH</b>	(a) Regulatory framework	Partially satisfactory	Partially satisfactory	Not assessed	Partially satisfactory
	(b) Coordinated management	Partially satisfactory	Partially satisfactory	Not assessed	Partially satisfactory
<b>FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY</b>					

### **A. Regulatory framework**

Up-to-date guidelines on handling incidents of misconduct were needed

14. The Department of Field Support (DFS) Advisory on Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions (DFS Advisory) and the CDT annual work plans required CDT to ensure Mission personnel were aware of all United Nations standards of conduct and its zero-tolerance policy towards misconduct. MINUSTAH developed and issued guidelines to Mission personnel on handling incidents of misconduct. A review of the guidelines; however indicated that they did not incorporate the requirements of the DFS Advisory issued in June 2013. For example, the guidelines did not include details on: (a) required preventive and enforcement measures; (b) roles and responsibilities of CDT and the assigned functions of CDT focal points appointed to regions; and (c) the Organization’s whistle-blower protection policy on protection against retaliation and for cooperating with authorized audits and investigations.

15. The above resulted, as Mission management and CDT had not allocated adequate resources for regular review and up-dating of its Mission-specific procedures and guidelines. As a result, there was an increased risk that Mission personnel were not fully aware of procedures on dealing with misconduct issues, as well as those related to preventive and enforcement measures and the whistle-blower policy.

**(1) MINUSTAH should allocate sufficient resources to update conduct and discipline guidelines on handling incidents of misconduct involving Mission personnel.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the updated guidelines for handling incidents of misconduct involving Mission personnel had been finalized and broadcast to all Mission personnel. Based on action taken by MINUSTAH, recommendation 1 has been closed.*

Adequate welfare and recreation activities were in place for mission personnel

16. Secretary-General’s report dated 24 January 2008 titled “comprehensive review of welfare and recreation needs of all categories of peacekeeping personnel” provides that welfare and recreational facilities for peacekeeping personnel needed to include equipment and amenities for a range of outdoor and indoor sports, as well as social and cultural activities as part of a strategy to prevent serious misconduct. Visits to 7 of the 22 military camps and 3 of the 6 civilian premises indicated that there were functional welfare and recreational equipment and amenities for a range of outdoor and indoor activities.

Interviews with contingent commanders and troop members also indicated that contingents regularly organized social activities to boost morale, reduce stress and help prevent occurrences of serious misconduct. OIOS concluded that adequate controls were in place to ensure sufficient welfare and recreational activities for peacekeeping personnel.

#### MINUSTAH assessed adequacy of preventive measures and took action to address emerging risks

17. The DFS Advisory required CDT to conduct regular assessments and monitor activities to identify risks of misconduct associated with different categories of United Nations personnel. The Advisory also required CDT to implement preventive measures aimed at reducing the occurrence of acts of misconduct.

18. CDT conducted an annual risk assessment and identified the following three main conduct and discipline risk factors in its August 2014 risk assessment: (a) social and cultural (extreme poverty); (b) prevailing political environment; and (c) the Mission profile (non-family duty station). MINUSTAH addressed these risks by implementing preventive and mitigating measures such as: increasing field visits by CDT to regions to conduct further awareness activities and to provide additional training; a curfew system; and the designation of high risk areas as off-limit to Mission personnel. CDT and regional focal points also held regular discussions with contingent commanders and staff to assess adequacy of ongoing prevention activities, and to identify potential issues that may lead to misconduct. Visits to 7 of the 22 military camps noted preventive measures were in place including: restriction of movement out of camps; requirement for troops to wear uniforms outside camps; and distribution of pocket cards with United Nations standards of conduct.

19. OIOS concluded that MINUSTAH had implemented adequate controls to ensure: (a) regular risk assessments were conducted; and (b) where necessary, additional preventive measures aimed at reducing the occurrence of acts of misconduct were implemented.

#### The Conduct and Discipline Team needed to better document its review of investigation reports

20. The DFS Advisory required CDT to assist the Head of Mission in reviewing investigation reports prepared by MINUSTAH investigation bodies to confirm that the reports complied with applicable United Nations standards, including evidentiary standards and requirements of due process and fairness. The Advisory further required CDT to document its review of each investigation report in a prescribed template.

21. A review of CDT records for 45 of the 211 investigations closed during the audit period indicated that CDT did not document its review of investigation reports according to the prescribed template. CDT was documenting results of investigations in a memorandum format addressed either to the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or to the Office of the Director of Mission Support. The memorandum contained a brief background on the allegation, the investigation findings, whether CDT was in agreement with the findings and proposed follow-up actions. However, the memorandum did not indicate important details on whether the investigation report complied with applicable United Nations standards, including evidentiary standards and requirements of due process and fairness.

22. CDT advised that it was not using the template because it required additional resources and was duplicating information previously recorded in the Misconduct Tracking System. The lack of compliance with DFS procedures increased the risk that the CDT review was not sufficiently detailed and did not confirm that investigation reports complied with United Nations standards.

**(2) MINUSTAH should allocate resources and develop procedures to ensure that the Conduct and Discipline Team’s review of Mission investigation reports confirms that the concerned investigation complied with applicable United Nations evidentiary standards and requirements of due process and fairness.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 2 and stated that it would develop a checklist to ensure that the CDT review of investigation reports complied with applicable United Nations evidentiary standards and requirements of due process. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the CDT review of investigation reports follow the procedures required in the DFS Advisory related to confirming that the investigation complied with United Nations standards.*

Adequate controls were in place over recording, tracking and reporting of misconduct cases

23. The DFS Advisory required CDT to use the Misconduct Tracking System to record and track all allegations of misconduct and to generate data for analysis and monthly/quarterly reporting to DFS with copies to the Head of Mission and other senior Mission personnel.

24. A review of all 50 cases reported during the audit period to CDT by the Special Investigation Unit of the Security Section indicated that all cases, except those not assessed as misconduct, were duly recorded in the system. A review of one quarterly and five monthly reports prepared by CDT indicated that reports were prepared based on data recorded in the Misconduct Tracking System. CDT also adequately reported to DFS as required on its activities including case management, meetings held, awareness-raising and other preventive measures, and training.

25. OIOS concluded that MINUSTAH had implemented adequate controls over the recording and tracking of misconduct cases and was adequately reporting to DFS on all conduct and discipline related activities in a timely manner.

Procedures for receipt and closure of cases were adequate

26. The DFS Advisory required CDT to: establish an efficient, safe, confidential, transparent and accessible complaint mechanism. CDT established such a mechanism for receiving complaints from staff and the local population. This included: (a) telephone hotlines and a secure email address; (b) private meeting rooms to allow for confidential meetings; and (c) the appointment of 8 international and 13 national staff as regional CDT focal points for ten regional offices.

27. The DFS Advisory required CDT to close cases after it ensured all relevant information and supporting documentation had been entered into the Misconduct Tracking System and appropriate disciplinary or administrative action had been taken. A review of 45 of the 211 investigated and closed cases indicated that 11 unsubstantiated cases were closed and reported to DFS while 34 substantiated cases were closed in coordination with DFS upon confirmation that appropriate disciplinary or administrative actions had been taken. OIOS concluded that MINUSTAH had implemented adequate controls over the receipt and closure of cases.

MINUSTAH needed to improve procedures to ensure appropriate investigative bodies submit information in a timely manner

28. The DFS Advisory required CDT to: assess validity of complaints within seven days from the date of receipt; and notify the relevant investigation body of the allegation for their review and determination within three days once the assessment of the complaint was completed. A review of 18 of the 304 cases recorded from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2014 indicated that CDT assessed cases

based on clear criteria prescribed in the Advisory and sought sufficient information and referred cases to the appropriate investigative body within the prescribed timeline in 15 cases. However, in three cases CDT could not complete its review within the stipulated time as the required information was not received from relevant investigative body in a timely manner, and CDT did not follow up.

**(3) MINUSTAH should take action to ensure required information from relevant investigative authorities is received in a timely manner to enable the Conduct and Discipline Team to assess misconduct allegations within the stipulated time.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 3 and stated that CDT would: (a) meet with the relevant authorities to discuss the issue of timely referrals of complaints; and (b) identify the most appropriate means of reporting to ensure that information is received within the stipulated timeframe. Recommendation 3 remains open pending the receipt of evidence that action has been taken to ensure required information from relevant authorities is received by CDT within the stipulated timeframe.*

A mechanism was not in place to ensure regular follow up on long outstanding open allegations of misconduct in the database

29. The DFS Advisory required CDT to follow up on allegations under investigation and update the status in the Misconduct Tracking System. The Advisory prescribed the following frequency for follow-ups: (a) every three months for investigations conducted by investigative bodies of field missions; (b) every three months for investigations on sexual exploitation and abuse and every six months for investigations on other types of allegations conducted by the Investigations Division of OIOS; and (c) every six months for investigations conducted by Member States through DFS.

30. An analysis of 177 open allegations in the Misconduct Tracking System as of 31 December 2014 indicated that 138 allegations were older than one year. These cases included 59 that had been outstanding for two to three years, 33 for three to four years, 12 for four to five years and 34 for more than five years. A review of 93 of the 177 open cases indicated that action was pending with: (a) troop-contributing countries in 22 cases; (b) police-contributing countries in 16 cases; (c) DFS in 16 cases; (d) the Office of Human Resources Management in 13 cases; (e) the OIOS Investigations Division in 13 cases; and (f) various Mission offices in 13 cases.

31. Delays in completed investigations were partly due to a lack of follow up by CDT, as they did not put in place a mechanism to systematically follow up on cases pending with different investigation entities. CDT advised that it faced difficulties in obtaining appropriate information on the progress of investigations done by military contingents, for example. It was noted; however, that the Conduct and Discipline Unit in DFS was following up with different stakeholders including troop contributing countries/police contributing countries every three months in the form of *note verbales*.

32. Delays in resolving allegations of misconduct increased the risk of cases not being properly investigated, evidence being tampered with and also resulting in a perception of impunity for wrongdoing.

**(4) MINUSTAH should establish a mechanism to regularly follow up with appropriate investigative bodies to expedite the completion of cases of alleged misconduct under investigation.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it would establish a mechanism to regularly follow up on cases with the appropriate investigative and other bodies within the Mission. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence that a mechanism has been established*

to regularly follow up with investigative bodies on alleged misconduct cases under investigation.

Need for a mechanism and plan for monitoring compliance with mandatory training requirements

33. The DFS Advisory required Mission personnel to receive induction training and refresher courses on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. The 2013/14 CDT work plan provided for the development of a training strategy for implementation of a tailored training programme on conduct and discipline issues.

34. MINUSTAH training records for the period from January 2013 to September 2014 indicated that mandatory induction training including on sexual exploitation and abuse for new Mission personnel was given to 117 of 133 civilian staff, 3,811 of 8,883 military personnel and all the 802 United Nations police officers. The refresher training on conduct and discipline issues was provided to 1,998 civilian, United Nations police and military personnel. CDT also provided related training to Mission personnel located in regional offices.

35. As referred above, only 3,811 of the new 8,883 military personnel were provided with mandatory induction training on sexual exploitation and abuse. This was because military trainers were expected to train the remaining 5,072 military personnel. CDT; however, did not put a mechanism in place to follow up and ensure that these training sessions were conducted. CDT had also not developed a plan to ensure all Mission personnel had attended the necessary training.

36. MINUSTAH attributed the lack of a monitoring mechanism and plan to: resource constraints, competing priorities; and difficulties in obtaining information on rotation schedules of military and formed police units. As a result of inadequate training, there was an increased risk that Mission personnel were not fully conversant with the required standards of conduct and measures to be implemented for prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse.

**(5) MINUSTAH should allocate resources to develop a conduct and discipline monitoring and training plan, and monitoring mechanism.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 5 and stated that it had developed a draft training strategy which was under review. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of a copy of the conduct and discipline training plan for the Mission personnel.*

**B. Coordinated management**

Need for a documented public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse

37. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) public information guidelines required MINUSTAH to develop a public information strategy to guide the creation of public information products for the host population related to sexual exploitation and abuse.

38. MINUSTAH developed work plans that incorporated elements of its planned public information activities such as campaigns against sexual exploitation and abuse among the host population. However, MINUSTAH did not have a documented and comprehensive strategy to guide the development of focused activities on raising awareness on sexual exploitation and abuse among the host population. As a result, MINUSTAH public information products and campaigns did not always reach the targeted population at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. For example, a review of various public information broadcasts on MINUSTAH radio, Haiti local radio and television stations indicated that messages were focused on how

to report cases of sexual exploitation and abuse; but these messages did not adequately provide guidance to the local population on how to prevent such cases. Additionally, MINUSTAH posters on preventing and reporting sexual exploitation and abuse were only available internally within Mission locations and not externally in town and village centres to create awareness among vulnerable groups who may have limited access to radios and television.

39. The absence of a comprehensive public information strategy was attributed to MINUSTAH having other operational priorities and a lack of resources. Consequently, a lack of a public information strategy to cater to vulnerable groups through suitable public information materials impacted on the Missions wider outreach activities to the local population to raise awareness on the Mission's activities to prevent misconduct and sexual exploitation and abuse.

**(6) MINUSTAH should allocate resources to establish a public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 6 and stated that it had developed a public information strategy to guide the creation of public information products related to sexual exploitation and abuse for the host population. Based on action taken by MINUSTAH, recommendation 6 has been closed.*

The Conduct & Discipline Team participated in the mapping of remedial services for the implementation of the sexual exploitation and abuse victim assistance mechanism

40. The DFS Advisory required CDT to participate in the in-country network of the United Nations Country Team on the establishment of a sexual exploitation and abuse victim assistance mechanism to help persons victimized by sexual exploitation and abuse by staff members of United Nations/non-governmental organizations/international governmental organizations. The Advisory also required CDT to: (a) map basic medical, legal, psychological and social support services available for victims, in consultation with other United Nations entities, and international and local partners; and (b) provide training to focal points of participating United Nations entities.

41. MINUSTAH and the United Nations Country Team in Haiti established in 2014 a sexual exploitation and abuse victim assistance in-country network. The activities of the network were led by a representative of the United Nations Women in Haiti. CDT participated in the network by providing training to focal points and by mapping assistance and support services available for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse in Haiti. However, a recent OIOS inspection and evaluation report (IED-15-001), dated 12 June 2015 highlighted that there was no information to support consultations undertaken by CDT in the mapping of services, and only 6 of 98 victims recorded by the Mission had been referred to mapped services. To deal with this systemic issue, OIOS/IED recommended that DPKO/DFS propose a funded comprehensive strategy to provide appropriate assistance and support to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. Based on this, no recommendation was made in this report.

#### **IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

42. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MINUSTAH for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) David Kanja  
Assistant Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

## Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>2</sup> / Important <sup>3</sup>	C/ O <sup>4</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>5</sup>
1	MINUSTAH should allocate sufficient resources to update conduct and discipline guidelines on handling incidents of misconduct involving Mission personnel.	Important	C	Action taken	Implemented
2	MINUSTAH should allocate resources and develop procedures to ensure that the Conduct and Discipline Team's review of Mission investigation reports confirms that the concerned investigation complied with applicable United Nations evidentiary standards and requirements of due process and fairness.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that the CDT review of investigation reports follow the procedures required in the DFS Advisory related to confirming that the investigation complied with United Nations standards.	1 August 2015
3	MINUSTAH should take action to ensure required information from relevant investigative authorities is received in a timely manner to enable Conduct and Discipline Team to assess misconduct allegations within the stipulated time.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that action has been taken to ensure required information from relevant authorities is received by CDT within the stipulated timeframe.	30 November 2015
4	MINUSTAH should establish a mechanism to regularly follow up with appropriate investigative bodies to expedite the completion of cases of alleged misconduct under investigation.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that a mechanism has been established to regularly follow up with investigative bodies on alleged misconduct cases under investigation	15 November 2015
5	MINUSTAH should allocate resources to develop a conduct and discipline monitoring and training plan and monitoring mechanism.	Important	O	Receipt of a copy of the conduct and discipline training plan for the Mission personnel	31 August 2015
6	MINUSTAH should allocate resources to establish a public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse.	Important	C	Action taken	Implemented

<sup>2</sup> Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>3</sup> Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>4</sup> C = closed, O = open

<sup>5</sup> Date provided by MINUSTAH in response to recommendations

# **APPENDIX I**

## **Management Response**



TELEFAX TRANSMISSION

Outgoing fax msg no:		Page 1 of 3	
To:	Ms. Eleanor T. Burns Chief, Peacekeeping Audit Service, IAD, OIOS, UNHQ, NY	From:	Sandra Honoré Special Representative of the Secretary-General MINUSTAH
Fax no:	3-3388 (via email)	Fax no:	7-9080
Info:	Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo IAD, OIOS, UNHQ, NY Mr. Henri Fourie Chief, Audit Response Unit Department of Field Support UNHQ, NY Mr. Iswari Bhattarai Chief Resident Auditor OIOS MINUSTAH ( <a href="mailto:ibhattarai2@un.org">ibhattarai2@un.org</a> )	Date:	10 July 2015
Subject:	Assignment No AP2014/683/03 -- Audit of the Conduct and Discipline Function in MINUSTAH		
		Ref:	IAD: AP2014/683/03

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 26 June 2015 on the above mentioned subject, under cover of which you forwarded the OIOS Draft Report relating to the effective management of the conduct and discipline function in MINUSTAH.
2. Please find attached MINUSTAH's comments on the recommendations as requested.

Best regards.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
K. Zillner, Audit Response Focal Point	L. Duchesne, COS

## Management Response

## Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>6</sup> / Important <sup>7</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	MINUSTAH should allocate sufficient resources to update conduct and discipline guidelines on handling incidents of misconduct involving Mission personnel.	Important	Yes	Chief Conduct and Discipline Team	July 10 2015	The guidelines for handling incidents of misconduct involving Mission personnel has been finalized and broadcast to all Mission personnel. It has been updated to include clarifications recommended by the Auditors. A copy of the guidelines has been provided to the Auditors.
2	MINUSTAH should allocate resources and develop procedures to ensure that the Conduct and Discipline Team's review of Mission investigation reports confirms that the concerned investigations complied with applicable United Nations evidentiary standards and requirements of due process and fairness.	Important	Yes	Chief Conduct and Discipline Team	August 01 2015	A checklist will be developed to ensure that the review of the investigation reports comply with United Nations evidentiary standards and requirements of due process and fairness. In the meantime MINUSTAH has started including a certification in the reporting memoranda confirming compliance.
3	MINUSTAH should strengthen its procedures to pursue and receive information from relevant authorities in a timely manner to enable CDT to assess the misconduct allegations within the stipulated time.	Important	Yes	Chief Conduct and Discipline Team	November 30 2015	MINUSTAH's Conduct and Discipline Team will meet with the relevant authorities to discuss the issue of timely referrals of complaints with a view to identifying the most appropriate means of reporting in order to ensure that information is received within the prescribed three month timeframe as stipulated in the Department of Field Support Advisory.

<sup>6</sup> Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>7</sup> Important recommendations address important deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

## Management Response

## Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>8</sup> / Important <sup>9</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
4	MINUSTAH should establish a mechanism to regularly follow up with appropriate investigative bodies to expedite the completion of cases of alleged misconduct under investigation.	Important	Yes	Chief Conduct and Discipline Team	November 15 2015	MINUSTAH will establish a mechanism to regularly follow up with the appropriate investigative and other bodies within the Mission to expedite the completion of cases of alleged misconduct under investigation in a timely manner.
5	MINUSTAH should allocate resources to develop a conduct and discipline monitoring and training plan.	Important	Yes	Chief Conduct and Discipline Team	August 31 2015	MINUSTAH has developed a draft training strategy document which is currently under review by the relevant mission components.
6	MINUSTAH should allocate resources to establish a public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse.	Important	Yes	Chief Public Information Office	July 06 2015	The public information strategy to guide the creation of public information products related to sexual exploitation and abuse for the host population has been finalized and a copy provided to the Auditors.

<sup>8</sup> Critical recommendations address significant and/or pervasive deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>9</sup> Important recommendations address important deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.