OIOS
Office of Internal Oversight Services

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

REPORT 2015/136

Audit of the Office of Operations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Overall results relating to the effective development and provision of integrated strategic advice by the Office of Operations for Department of Peacekeeping Operations-led peacekeeping operations were initially assessed as partially satisfactory. Implementation of three important recommendations remains in progress

FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY

6 November 2015
Assignment No. AP2014/600/02

CONTENTS

AUDIT REPORT

Audit of the Office of Operations in the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

I.   BACKGROUND

1.   The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the Office of Operations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

2.   In accordance with its mandate, OIOS provides assurance and advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the United Nations internal control system, the primary objectives of which are to ensure (a) efficient and effective operations; (b) accurate financial and operational reporting; (c) safeguarding of assets; and (d) compliance with mandates, regulations and rules.

3.   The DPKO Office of Operations provides strategic, political, policy and operational guidance and support to peacekeeping operations through the coordination and integration of advice from within and outside the Department. The Office is responsible for: (a) advising the Under-Secretary-General on political, cross-cutting strategic, mission-specific and integrated operational issues; and (b) ensuring the development and effective implementation of overarching integrated strategies for DPKO-led operations and the provision of political direction and integrated operational support to those operations.

4.   The Office of Operations is headed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and is comprised of the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General and four Regional Divisions. Each Regional Division has Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs), consisting of political affairs officers joined by military, police and rule of law and security institutions specialist officers from within DPKO, and specialist support officers from the Department of Field Support (DFS). Key roles of IOTs include: (a) serving as an entry point for troop-/police-contributing countries, Member States and other United Nations partners in relation to the political, planning and operational issues under their purview; (b) leading the integrated planning process for new DPKO-led operations; (c) coordinating transitions and exit strategies in existing operations; and (d) conducting the integrated review of political and mission-related strategies in support of mandate implementation.

5.   IOTs are the main tool used for coordinated strategic planning within the Office of Operations. IOTs are structured according to one of three team models: (a) mission-specific teams; (b) teams that cover more than one mission; and (c) teams that cover multiple missions and share specialist officers with other teams in the same Regional Division. At the time of the audit, there were nine IOTs created across four Regional Divisions.

6.   In 2014/15, the Office of Operations had 76 posts at a cost of $12.6 million, budgeted predominantly from the Support Account. The approved budget for 2015/16 has 74 posts at a cost of $12.5 million.

7.   Comments provided by DPKO are incorporated in italics.

II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

8. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of DPKO governance, risk management and control processes in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective development and provision of integrated strategic advice by the Office of Operations for DPKO-led peacekeeping operations**.

9. The audit was included in the 2014 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the strategic, operational and reputational risks relating to the development and provision of advice by the Office of Operations for peacekeeping operations.

10. The key controls tested for the audit were: (a) risk assessment; and (b) programme management. For the purpose of this audit, OIOS defined these key controls as follows:

   (a) **Risk assessment** - controls that provide reasonable assurance that risks relating to the development and provision of integrated strategic advice for DPKO-led peacekeeping operations are identified and assessed, appropriate action is taken to mitigate or anticipate these risks, and strategic plans are developed to guide the process.

   (b) **Programme management** - controls that provide reasonable assurance that adequate financial and human resources, systems and methodologies exist to develop and provide integrated strategic advice for DPKO-led peacekeeping operations.

11. The key controls were assessed for the control objectives shown in Table 1. One control objective shown in Table 1 as "Not assessed" was not relevant to the scope defined for this audit.

12. OIOS conducted the audit from March to June 2015. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2013 to 31 May 2015. The audit examined the organizational structures, resources and procedures within the Regional Divisions of the Office of Operations at Headquarters, and documents relating to the process of providing integrated strategic analysis and advice on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). OIOS held interviews with DPKO staff involved in integrated planning, including IOT Team Leaders, the Integrated Assessment and Planning Unit, and staff from the Office of Military Affairs, the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, and the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division. OIOS also held discussions with relevant officers from DFS, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.

13. The audit team conducted an activity-level risk assessment to identify and assess specific risk exposures, and to confirm the relevance of the selected key controls in mitigating associated risks. Through interviews and analytical reviews, OIOS assessed the existence and adequacy of internal controls and conducted necessary tests to determine their effectiveness.

III.   AUDIT RESULTS

14.   The DPKO governance, risk management and control processes examined were initially assessed **partially satisfactory**[1] in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective development and provision of integrated strategic advice by the Office of Operations for DPKO-led peacekeeping operations**. OIOS made four recommendations to address the issues identified. DPKO implemented mechanisms for guiding strategic planning for new and established missions, demonstrated flexibility in the use of IOT resources to respond to changing requirements and workload, and developed policies and procedures on integrated strategic planning. To improve operations, DPKO needed to: (a) provide additional guidance on practical implementation of policies, particularly on planning for new missions and missions in transition; and (b) refine and formalize the operation and working methods of IOTs to ensure consistency in the way they operate and to better facilitate coordination with partners within and outside of DPKO. In addition, although resources across IOTs were flexibly utilized, current approaches needed to be formalized to ensure more timely access to and sharing of expertise.

15.   The initial overall rating was based on the assessment of key controls presented in Table 1. The final overall rating is **partially satisfactory** as implementation of three important recommendations remains in progress.

Table 1: Assessment of key controls

Business objective	Key controls	Control objectives			
		Efficient and effective operations	**Accurate financial and operational reporting**	**Safeguarding of assets**	**Compliance with mandates, regulations and rules**
Effective development and provision of integrated strategic advice for DPKO-led peacekeeping operations	(a) Risk assessment	Partially satisfactory	Partially satisfactory	Not assessed	Partially satisfactory
	(b) Programme management	Partially satisfactory	Partially satisfactory	Not assessed	Partially satisfactory

A.   Risk assessment

<u>Practical guidance on implementation of policies and procedures on integrated strategic planning was needed</u>

16.   The Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Organization of DPKO outlines the functions of the Office of Operations including advising on developing and facilitating the implementation of key policies and technical guidance related to the integrated mission planning process, and identifying guidance and training priorities.

17.   A review of DPKO and other United Nations Secretariat policies and guidance noted that policies and procedures were in place to regulate the integrated strategic planning and advisory activities of the Office of Operations. These included: (a) the United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessments and Planning (IAP), which set mandatory minimum requirements and outlined the process for conducting

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[1] A rating of **"partially satisfactory"** means that important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies exist in governance, risk management or control process, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

strategic assessment and planning; and (b) the IAP Handbook that provides tools, methodologies and examples on the application of the IAP Policy. DPKO also issued guidance on aspects of the planning and assessment process including: (a) Mission Concept Guidelines (2014); and (b) the Policy on United Nations Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (2013). DPKO developed this guidance in consultation with other relevant Secretariat Departments and in response to lessons learned from mission start-ups and those transitioning.

18.   Interviews with DPKO staff, however, identified that while the IAP Policy addressed United Nations system-wide planning processes with a flexible approach, there was insufficient guidance on planning processes specific to peacekeeping missions particularly with respect to key steps, timelines, methods and structures necessary for ensuring coordinated, coherent, comprehensive and timely integrated strategic planning and advice. In this regard, DPKO and DFS management directed in October 2014: (a) the Office of Operations to lead the development of a new DPKO/DFS mission planning policy to clarify key requirements and steps in planning for peacekeeping missions; and (b) the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division to update the DPKO-DFS Mission Start-up Field Guide and develop additional guidance on force generation and re-hatting of non-United Nations troops and police to United Nations. The Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations also identified the need for such guidance on planning.

19.   In addition, once the policy on planning is finalized, training and guidance to IOT staff on the implementation of the policy will need to be developed and delivered. As the development of this new policy is critical for the work of the Office of Operations and its implementation will require intensive training of staff members, the current resources dedicated for these tasks, namely two P-4 professional posts funded through the Support Account and temporary extrabudgetary funding, was insufficient.

> **(1) DPKO should allocate sufficient resources to: (a) finalize the development of the policy on planning in a timely manner; and (b) provide the training that will be required to ensure its implementation.**
>
> *DPKO accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the new policy on planning and review of peacekeeping operations would be finalized by the end of 2015. Extrabudgetary funding had been allocated for this purpose until February 2016. Training would be developed, piloted and delivered in 2016. DPKO would further explore additional funding to support the roll-out and implementation of the new policy with specific emphasis on training starting March 2016. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of a copy of the new policy on planning and review of peacekeeping operations and evidence that DPKO has allocated sufficient resources for training for its implementation.*

Additional practical guidance was required to ensure consistent, timely and effective strategic planning and advice across Integrated Operational Teams

20.   The Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Organization of DPKO specifies that IOTs are the principal structure for the coordination of political and integrated strategic planning and guidance in relation to peacekeeping. Functional areas such as the Office of Military Affairs, the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions and DFS that provide specialist staff to support IOTs are responsible for ensuring consistency in approach between IOTs with respect to the specialist areas.

21.   A review of DPKO policy and guidance materials indicated that DPKO developed guidance in 2007 that provided partial instructions on IOT working methods, such as terms of reference describing anticipated roles of different IOT members. However, DPKO had not elaborated on these instructions and had not issued additional guidance on IOT business processes, standard operating procedures and

decision-making responsibilities, including clarification of the roles and responsibilities of IOT staff and their relationships with specialist DPKO and DFS staff and their functional areas. For example, DPKO had not updated the guide for Office of Operations desk officers since it was issued in 2004 and it did not reflect the recent revision of the system-wide integrated assessment and planning framework. As a result, DPKO had gaps in its practical instructions and guidance for staff on integrated planning and assessment within DPKO, particularly with respect to the working methods of the IOTs.

22.   The gaps in practical instruction and guidance led to each IOT developing its own approach to coordinating and planning for mission start-ups or transitions. As a result, the effectiveness of coordination by IOTs was dependent on the incumbent performing the role, rather than on formally agreed, understood and communicated mechanisms. While IOTs did consult with relevant partners, in some cases this was only upon request by the respective partner or occurred with little time for discussion and response. For example, differences between IOTs in the nature of mechanisms supporting meetings of consultation structures, such as setting meeting agenda, whether minutes were kept and distributed and the content of such minutes, and lead-time given for scheduling of meetings, affected the effective participation of partners and thus the quality of consultation and coordination. Growth in cross-cutting thematic mandates and proliferation of support entities for each thematic area had also made consultation and coordination more complex.

23.   A review of the processes for the planning of MINUSMA and MINUSCA identified the benefits gained from expanded participation in IOTs of non-DPKO/DFS staff such as those from DPA. However, DPKO did not have formal guidance on when to include such partners and the mechanisms for doing so. As a result, issues were sometimes considered on an ad hoc basis using separately created structures and approaches. This exposed the operation of IOTs to disruption during absences or changes in staffing and undermined the predictability of interaction between the Office of Operations and its partners. For example, structures and practices for MINUSMA during the start-up phase, and methods for coordinating and consulting with relevant partners were developed in an ad hoc manner during the course of planning due to lack of clarity on the lead department. The current efforts to develop a new policy on mission planning and IOT processes would help to standardize practices between IOTs and make the nature and quality of consultation less reliant on the individuals occupying particular roles.

24.   Although consultations occasionally took place, as IOTs were also largely operating independently, opportunities were sometimes lost to learn from good practices and take advantage of accumulated expertise. There was also no formal forum or mechanism for regularly sharing experiences between IOTs, hindering the leveraging of expertise and good practice to minimize the likelihood of difficulties or delays in the development of integrated strategic advice.

> **(2) DPKO should develop practical guidance for Integrated Operational Teams on minimum and mandatory steps, timelines, operating methods and consultation structures to ensure a consistent integrated strategic approach to mission planning and advice.**
>
> *DPKO accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the new policy on planning should provide practical guidance on planning and review of peacekeeping missions. DPKO would also explore ways to improve guidance in this area by developing new simple materials (such as a checklist) as part of the induction and training by the end of 2016.* Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of a copy of the new policy on planning that contains practical guidance for IOTs.

A framework for monitoring coordinated strategic planning by IOTs needed to be established

25.   The Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Organization of DPKO provides that a core function of the Office of Operations is to monitor the quality of its services to ensure proper compliance with integration and coordination requirements.

26.   The quality of strategic planning processes for the establishment and transition of peacekeeping operations was the subject of various reviews conducted by DPKO. For example, in 2014, the DPKO Policy, Evaluation and Training Division conducted an after-action review of the planning and start-up of MINUSMA. A joint DPKO/DFS team also conducted a related study of the use of critical enabling units in field missions, focused on mission start-up and the experience of MINUSMA. In 2014, a joint lessons-learned exercise led by DPKO but conducted in collaboration with a number of United Nations and external partners including the African Union examined the processes surrounding transitions from the African Union to MINUSMA and MINUSCA.

27.   These earlier studies identified that improvement was needed in areas related to ensuring the provision of timely and consistent strategic planning and advice, as follows:

- •   Absence of documented and authoritative strategic guidance issued at senior level within the United Nations on key questions of policy or doctrine to guide the subsequent discussions and strategic analysis by respective parts of DPKO and the Secretariat;

- •   The need for closer integration between DPKO and DFS throughout the planning processes, including using a single, authoritative, unified plan between DPKO and DFS for start-up and deployment, as well as adopting standardized structures and principles for an integrated DPKO/DFS planning team;

- •   The need for early establishment of planning capacity within the mission, through the establishment of a roster of staff with requisite planning experience as a way of facilitating rapid deployment; and

- •   The need for closer coordination on planning between DPKO and DFS in the deployment of uniformed personnel, particularly during force generation or re-hatting of non-United Nations personnel.

28.   In 2014, DPKO and DFS senior management approved the development of additional policies and guidance on planning to address these areas of weakness, including the setting out of the process, structures, coordination mechanisms, and decision points and sequencing of planning steps, as well as a process for gaining leadership guidance and endorsement and a methodology on building mission plans. DPKO instructed all heads of missions to undertake joint headquarters and field reviews of mandates and capabilities at least once every two years.

29.   However, while the various post-facto reviews of MINUSMA and MINUSCA in 2014 and UNMISS in 2013 provided useful insights into performance and weaknesses in the provision of integrated strategic advice, DPKO conducted little formal real-time monitoring and comparison of the performance of individual IOTs. Resource constraints had also limited the ability of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division to implement a formal framework of regular after-action review of mission start-up and other key strategic milestones within the different phases of DPKO-led peacekeeping operations.

(3) DPKO should establish an appropriately resourced framework for regular comparison and review of Integrated Operational Team performance, including regularly scheduled reviews and lessons learning exercises.

DPKO accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it would enhance the performance evaluation of IOTs by adding two sections on qualitative performance indicators for IOTs and reviews and lessons learned against those indicators in their annual Strategic Outlooks, starting in January 2016. The additional sections would help to align the priorities of IOTs with the strategic priorities of missions. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the proposed sections on qualitative performance indicators have been added to the annual Strategic Outlooks and that a framework for regular comparison and review of IOT performance has been established.

B.   Programme management

<u>Flexible use of resources across the Office needed to be enhanced through more formal arrangements for sharing of expertise</u>

30.   In its report (A/61/937) endorsing the creation of IOTs, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions noted that the effectiveness of the integrated approach would be enhanced by ensuring that resources are flexibly assigned to participate in teams as required, responding to the evolving needs of different peacekeeping operations and the efficient use of resources. The Office of Operations, to facilitate efficiency and maximize its resources, was flexible in assigning resources to IOTs to respond to changing requirements and workload. For example, to address the increased demands for strategic planning advice at the start-up of MINUSMA and MINUSCA in 2013 and 2014, the Office of Operations temporarily reassigned staff from other IOTs prior to approval of general temporary assistance linked to these missions.

31.   However, despite the arguable increase in complexity and volatility in the operational environment facing DPKO-led missions over recent years, the Office kept the staffing of IOTs relatively steady, with a small decline in total posts dedicated to IOTs over the past five years (from 111 to 100), while also remaining responsive to emerging developments affecting its workload. For example, the Office recently merged the Asia and Middle East Division and the Europe and Latin America Division, resulting in the abolition of a D-2 Director position. The Office of Operations stated that these changes were necessary to adequately reflect the level and complexity of peacekeeping operations, taking into account the volatility of most peacekeeping environments and based on departmental strategic assumptions for future operations, and to ensure the complexity of work and responsibilities of the proposed merged divisions paralleled those of the other two regional divisions and represented an equal distribution of work.

32.   The assignment of resources to individual IOTs rather than within a formal pool arrangement (or in the case of specialists, within their respective areas) continued to pose a risk of inconsistencies in processes and practices between IOTs. In addition, it hindered the application to other IOTs of lessons learned and expertise gained by IOT members when dealing with the unique requirements of different phases of the mission life cycle. The Office of Operations addressed these risks in response to changing requirements across IOTs. For example, to ensure the continuation of expertise and knowledge, the Office transferred a Political Affairs Officer initially redeployed to support early planning in the West Africa IOT in 2013/14 to the Mali IOT upon the latter's subsequent establishment. However, there was no formal framework in place to identify potentially available staff with the expertise necessary for rapid deployment in times of urgent need. DPKO indicated that the General Assembly (and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) was increasingly requesting very specific

justification for each post and all posts were tied to a specific mission, which significantly limited their ability to move staff between IOTs. However, OIOS noted that there was scope for staff to work on other matters to improve efficiency, without formal reallocation.

33.   The development of further guidance on planning and IOT processes would help standardize the current ad hoc practice. In addition, the establishment of formal mechanisms for more regular training and information sharing across IOTs would facilitate more efficient and effective use of IOT resources.

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(4) DPKO should establish mechanisms for the sharing of expertise and resources across Integrated Operational Teams.

DPKO accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it had included a review of the allocation of IOT resources as a standing agenda for the regular Directors' meeting of the Office of Operations. These regular reviews enable DPKO to continue to explore opportunities to assign staff to work on other matters to address surge needs, share expertise and improve efficiency. Based on the action taken and the information received from DPKO, recommendation 4 has been closed.

IV.   ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

34.   OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of the DPKO for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(*Signed*) David Kanja
Assistant Secretary-General, Acting Head
Office of Internal Oversight Services

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the Office of Operations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Critical[1]/ Important[2]	C/ O[3]	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date[4]
1	DPKO should allocate sufficient resources to: (a) finalize the development of the policy on planning in a timely manner; and (b) provide the training that will be required to ensure its implementation.	Important	O	Receipt of a copy of the new policy on planning and review of peacekeeping operations and evidence that DPKO has allocated sufficient resources for training on its implementation.	Second quarter of 2016
2	DPKO should develop practical guidance for Integrated Operational Teams on minimum and mandatory steps, timelines, operating methods and consultation structures to ensure a consistent integrated strategic approach to mission planning and advice.	Important	O	Receipt of a copy of the new policy on planning that contains practical guidance for IOTs.	First quarter of 2016
3	DPKO should establish and appropriately resource a framework for regular comparison and review of Integrated Operational Team performance, including regularly scheduled reviews and lessons learning exercises.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that the proposed sections on qualitative performance indicators have been added to the annual Strategic Outlooks and that a framework for regular comparison and review of IOT performance has been established.	First quarter of 2016
4	DPKO should establish mechanisms for the sharing of expertise and resources across Integrated Operational Teams.	Important	C	Action taken	Implemented

[1] Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

[2] Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

[3] C = closed, O = open

[4] Date provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in response to recommendations.

APPENDIX I

Management Response

United Nations ⬥ **Nations Unies**

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM · MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Ms. Eleanor T. Burns, Director
A: Internal Audit Division, OIOS

DATE: **NOV 0 6 2015**

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

REFERENCE: UNHQ-AR-BOI-Memo-2-2015-6172

FROM: Anthony Banbury, Assistant Secretary-General
DE: for Field Support

SUBJECT: **Draft report on an audit of the Office of Operations in the**
OBJET: **Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Assignment No.
AP2014/600/02)**

1. In reference to your memorandum dated 5 October 2015 (IAD: 15-00625) regarding the subject audit, we note that OIOS has taken into account our comments provided on 14 September 2015, and therefore we do not have any further comments on the findings and recommendations in the report. We, however, have updated Appendix I, including to reflect the individual responsible for the implementation of the recommendation with the deadline.

2. We appreciate your overall assessment and acknowledgement that the Office of Operations implemented mechanisms for guiding strategic planning for new and established missions, demonstrated flexibility in the use of IOT resources to respond to changing requirements and workload, and developed policies and procedures on integrated strategic planning. In this regard, we have accepted all the recommendations made in your report, which will certainly assist us in improving our operations.

3. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. We stand ready to provide any further information that may be required.

Cc: Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Mr. David Haeri, Acting Chief of Staff, DPKO and DFS
Mr. Seth Adza, Chief, Audit Response and Board of Inquiry Team, DPKO and DFS
Mr. Laud Botchwey, Chief, Peacekeeping Headquarters Audit Section, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo, Professional Practices Section, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
Mr. David Nyskohus, Auditor-in-charge, Internal Audit Division, OIOS

Management Response

Audit of the Office of Operations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical[1]/ Important[2]	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	DPKO should allocate sufficient resources to: (a) finalize the development of the policy on planning in a timely manner; and (b) provide the training that will be required to ensure its implementation.	Important	Yes	Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Integrated Planning Officers	Second quarter of 2016	DPKO's comments are reflected in the report.
2	DPKO should develop practical guidance for Integrated Operational Teams on minimum and mandatory steps, timelines, operating methods and consultation structures to ensure a consistent integrated strategic approach to mission planning and advice.	Important	Yes	Integrated Planning Officers	First quarter of 2016	DPKO's comments are reflected in the report.

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[1] Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

[2] Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

Management Response

Audit of the Office of Operations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical[1]/ Important[2]	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
3	DPKO should establish and appropriately resource a framework for regular comparison and review of Integrated Operational Team performance, including regularly scheduled reviews and lessons learning exercises.	Important	Yes	Directors of the Regional Divisions

Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations | First quarter of 2016 | DPKO's comments are reflected in the report. |
| 4 | DPKO should establish mechanisms for the sharing of expertise and resources across Integrated Operational Teams. | Important | Yes | Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations | Completed | DPKO has included the review of the allocation of IOT resources as a standing agenda for the regular Directors' meeting of the Office of Operations. Through this regular review, DPKO will continue to explore opportunities to temporarily assign staff to work on other matters to address surge needs, share expertise and improve efficiency. DPKO also intends to make full use of the existing fora to share experience, good practices and lessons learned, such as the Office of Operations brown bag lunches and the monthly meeting of Directors and Team Leaders. |