

Evaluation of Protection of Civilians, Security and Human Rights in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

9 September 2025

IED-25-018



INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

Function *“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organization. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organization;”* ([General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B](#)).

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Summary

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) evaluated the relevance, effectiveness and coherence of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in the implementation of its Protection of Civilians (PoC), security and human rights mandates. The evaluation covered the period from 2017 to 2025 and used a mixed-method approach.

MINUSCA modalities of patrols, advocacy, good offices and capacity building were highly relevant to achieving the Mission's overall mandate in securing and protecting civilians. These modalities were well-targeted to high-risk areas and adaptable to the evolving security environment in the country and contributed to achieving the Mission's results.

The Mission effectively contributed to PoC by fostering local ownership of the peace process and promoting accountable subnational institutions. The Mission also successfully intervened to prevent violence in the majority of cases where it had early alerts; its patrols deterred violence in high-risk areas and contributed to a reduction in violence and also in areas where armed groups were active, while its advocacy helped counter disinformation and promote civic engagement. MINUSCA good offices facilitated political dialogue and played a critical role in responding to a surge in security incidents during 2024 and early 2025, helping to stabilize key areas. Its capacity building efforts strengthened national institutions and policies such as the development and adoption of the National Human Rights Policy. Furthermore, the Mission demonstrated strong internal coherence and effectively coordinated with other actors in implementing its PoC, security and human rights mandates, and adequately integrated gender, human rights and environmental considerations into its work.

Nevertheless, several internal operational gaps negatively affected the Mission's overall effectiveness. These included: the absence of a Mission advocacy strategy; shortcomings in internal guidance on early warning; weaknesses in the monitoring and assessment of capacity building work; lack of specific targets for PoC-related performance indicators; and the lack of a dedicated disability inclusion focal point.

OIOS makes five important recommendations to MINUSCA to:

- i) develop a comprehensive, Mission-wide advocacy strategy;
- ii) review and update the 2019 standard operating procedure on early warning;
- iii) enhance design and management of results of capacity-building interventions;
- iv) integrate PoC performance indicators and milestones into workplans; and
- v) appoint a dedicated focal point for disability inclusion.

Introduction and objective

1. The objective of this Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) evaluation was to assess, as systematically and objectively as possible, the relevance, effectiveness and coherence of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in the implementation of its protection of civilians (PoC), security and human rights mandates. The evaluation was conducted in conformity with the norms and standards for evaluation in the United Nations System.¹
2. The MINUSCA management response on the draft report is included in Annex I. OIOS wishes to acknowledge and thank the evaluation focal points who assisted with the conduct of the evaluation.

Background

Mandate and objectives

3. MINUSCA was established in 2014 by the Security Council in its resolution 2149 (2014) following significant instability and violence in the Central African Republic (CAR). The Mission's mandates have evolved since then in response to the changing security dynamics and peacebuilding needs in CAR. In line with its latest mandate,² the objective of MINUSCA is to advance a multi-year strategic vision to create the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to national reconciliation and durable peace; this is to be achieved through the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (APPR) and the elimination of the threats posed by armed groups.

4. The Mission's mandate emphasizes five priority functions and additional tasks as listed below:

Priority functions:

- i. PoC;
- ii. Support for the extension of State authority and territorial integrity;
- iii. Good offices and peace process support, including the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the APPR;
- iv. Facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- v. Protection of the United Nations

Additional tasks:

- vi. Promotion and protection of human rights;
- vii. Republican Dialogue and 2025/2026 elections;³
- viii. Security Sector Reform (SSR);
- ix. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR); and
- x. Support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law.

¹ <https://www.unevaluation.org/unevaluation/publications/unevaluation-norms-and-standards-evaluation-un-system>

² S/RES/2759 (2024).

³ Republican Dialogue refers to a national process launched by the CAR Government in 2022 to promote reconciliation and political reforms.

Key Mission modalities

5. MINUSCA implemented its PoC mandate through simultaneous and strategic efforts across the three tiers of PoC, which include protection measures through: dialogue and engagement; physical protection; and the establishment of a protective environment. The Mission's PoC, security and human rights mandate implementation is guided by several strategic and operational frameworks, including the Mission-wide PoC Strategy (2023), MINUSCA Political Strategy (2023-2028) and the Five-Year Mission Plan (2023-2028). According to these frameworks, MINUSCA used the four key modalities of capacity building, good offices, advocacy and patrols across the three tiers of its PoC efforts to implement its mandate as shown in Figure 1.⁴

Figure 1: MINUSCA modalities assessed across the three tiers of PoC

Tier 1: Protection through dialogue and engagement	Tier 2: Protection through physical protection	Tier 3: Establishment of a protective environment
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Capacity building• Good offices• Advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Patrols and operating bases	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Capacity building• Patrols and operating bases

6. Key activities under each modality included:


- i. **Capacity-building:** Mission activities undertaken as part of this modality focus on strengthening social cohesion and local peace processes by building the capacity of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), including women, youth and traditional actors such as religious and community leaders – through workshops and training on conflict resolution. Under Tier 3, Mission efforts are focused on enhancing national capacity through training and institution-building support through various programmes on human rights, rule of law, DDR, SSR, elections and humanitarian standards. The Mission also supports the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA) and the Internal Security Forces (FSI) through technical assistance, training and logistical support.
- ii. **Good offices:** The Mission uses its good offices to prevent violence, promote a coherent peace process linking local and national efforts and engage with authorities, armed groups and civil society to foster reconciliation, build trust and support sustainable peace.
- iii. **Advocacy:** The Mission promotes dialogue and engagement through advocacy, raising awareness of peace initiatives, encouraging participation and influencing reconciliation policies.
- iv. **Patrols and operating bases:** The Mission uses patrols and operating bases by its peacekeeping troops to ensure physical protection by maintaining a visible presence, deterring threats and swiftly responding to incidents. The Mission also uses joint patrols with FACA and FSI, engages communities and gathers security intelligence to create a protective environment.

⁴ While some modalities are applied across multiple PoC tiers, Figure 1 provides a framework for assessment of the modalities in this evaluation.

Scope and Methodology

7. The evaluation scope included an assessment of the Mission's contributions to three immediate outcomes corresponding to the three PoC tiers and one overarching intermediate outcome, as depicted in Figure 2. The evaluation also examined the Mission's overall programme design with regard to its mandate implementation given the fluid and volatile context within which it operates.

Figure 2: MINUSCA immediate and intermediate PoC outcomes assessed in the evaluation



8. The evaluation covered the period from January 2017 to March 2025. It used a mixed-method approach incorporating the following data sources shown in Table 1:

Table 1: Evaluation data sources

Document review	Review of key internal and external documents including Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General's reports, Mission plans, concept notes, PoC strategy, budget documents, workplans, strategic reviews, Daily Situation Reports (DSR) and code cables.
Interviews with staff and external stakeholders	125 semi-structured interviews with MINUSCA staff (67) and external stakeholders (58). Approximately 65 per cent of the interviews involved participants based in field offices and local communities. Women represented 36 per cent of all interviewees.
MINUSCA staff survey	The online survey was distributed in English and French to 1,063 individuals. A total of 469 responses were received, representing a 44 per cent response rate. Women constituted 28 per cent of respondents. Staff survey data are segregated in the analysis where needed by excluding responses from administrative staff.
External stakeholders survey	The online survey was distributed in English and French to 93 individuals. A total of 23 responses were received, representing a 24 per cent response rate. Women made up 40 per cent of respondents.
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)	A total of 27 FGDs were conducted in CAR, including 16 with community members, 5 with CLAs and 6 with members of the Local Peace and Reconciliation Committees (CLPR).
Field Mission	Visit to MINUSCA headquarters in Bangui and five field offices including Bria, Kaga Bandoro, Bangassou, Berberati and Bouar.

9. Additionally, the evaluation used the following analytical approaches:

Table 2: Data analysis methods

Trend analysis	Analysis of data patterns over time, identifying trends in violence reduction, administrative capacity and community engagement.
Structured content analysis	Review of Mission documents to assess their alignment with implemented strategies and consistency in strategic and operational execution.
Comparative analysis	Comparison of capacity-building, advocacy and good offices activities focusing on 2020-2021 elections and 2025 local elections, identifying strategic linkages and relevance.
Secondary data analysis	Analysis of data from the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) and the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE)
Geospatial analysis	Geospatial analyses of incident mapping and patrol deployments using Geographic Information System (GIS) tools.
Case studies	Two case studies assessing: (i) adaptations in capacity-building during elections; and (ii) responses to misinformation and disinformation.

Evaluation Results


A. Key MINUSCA modalities of patrols, advocacy, good offices and capacity building were well-targeted and adaptable to the evolving security environment in CAR

Patrols were highly relevant as they targeted high-risk areas and adapted to the evolving security environment in CAR

10. MINUSCA patrols appropriately targeted high-risk areas, including areas prone to violence and key transhumance corridors. The transhumance corridors are the migratory routes used by cattle herders from both within and neighboring countries, which are often flashpoints for conflict between crop farmers and the migratory herders, particularly when livestock stray into farms and damage crops. As illustrated in Figure 3, the spatial distribution of patrols closely aligned with the areas with a high volume of violence cases. Overall, the deployment of patrols to high-risk areas was reported by staff and external stakeholders interviewed in four out of the six MINUSCA field locations visited. Mission staff and external stakeholders further corroborated the targeting of patrols to high-risk zones as an intentional use of the modality. For example, the Mission:

- i. deployed patrols in areas vulnerable to armed attacks in Bria, Berberati, Bangassou, Kaga Bandoro, Bouar and Bangui in combination with peace sensitization campaigns;
- ii. carried out regular patrols along the Rafai axis—an area previously affected by attacks on civilians; and
- iii. deployed patrols in Berberati in the areas where armed elements were threatening schoolchildren, leading to the restoration of safe access to schools for the children.


Figure 3: Geographic targeting of MINUSCA patrols in high-risk areas



Source: MINUSCA SAGE Datasets

11. Patrol deployment also adapted to the evolving security needs in the country. Both Mission staff and several key external stakeholders interviewed consistently identified security threats as the primary challenge that affected the 2020–2021 presidential elections. An analysis of patrol patterns ahead of the 2025 local elections showed patrols broadly covering areas surrounding National Elections Authority (ANE) offices. This was an improvement compared to the 2020–2021 electoral period, whereby patrols were largely concentrated in the western regions and did not comprehensively cover the electoral offices, as shown in Figure 4. This suggests that the Mission had applied lessons from past experiences to inform its patrol strategy. Key Mission staff interviewed who are involved in security also confirmed that MINUSCA intensified the pre-positioning of forces in known electoral hotspots to serve as a visible deterrent against potential threats. In preparation for the 2025 local elections, the Mission significantly increased its troop presence in high-risk areas including Zangba, Bouar, Dembia, Zemio, Rafai and Obo. This was complemented by rotational deployments conducted jointly with FACA in six additional volatile zones.

Figure 4: Spatial distribution of MINUSCA patrols across two key election periods




Source: MINUSCA SAGE and CPAS datasets

Despite challenges, MINUSCA advocacy strategies in local communities were generally well focused- and engaged the right actors

12. The Mission employed a wide range of advocacy initiatives to promote peace, including community outreach, radio broadcasts, participation in Committees for Prefectural Implementation (CMOP) meetings,⁵ media engagements and security briefings. These advocacy initiatives to promote peace were primarily undertaken in or near areas affected by insecurity, demonstrating that the Mission effectively targeted locations most in need of advocacy, as shown in Figure 5. Community outreach, in particular, provided a platform for direct, in-person engagement on peace promotion, advocacy and sensitization against misinformation and disinformation. These efforts were supported by multiple Mission components beyond the Strategic Communications and Public Information (SCIP) branch. Additionally, the Mission involved other actors involved in its peace initiatives, such as CSOs, local authorities, local journalists, traditional and community leaders, religious figures and the general population.⁶ The engagement with these relevant actors, who were capable of influencing peace processes and public opinion, demonstrated the Mission's effectiveness in engaging the right stakeholders in its advocacy efforts.

Figure 5: Spatial spread of advocacy, peace initiatives and violence hotspots




Source: MINUSCA SAGE and CPAS datasets

13. Furthermore, most staff and stakeholder survey respondents positively assessed the relevance of the Mission's advocacy efforts in addressing insecurity in key hotspot areas, as shown in Figure 6.

⁵ CMOPs were established at the prefecture level to oversee and facilitate the implementation of peace agreements and related initiatives.

⁶ Based on analysis of MINUSCA Daily Situation Reports (DSRs) from Bria, Bangassou, Bangui, Berberati, Bouar and Kaga Bandoro from October 2023 to November 2024.

Figure 6: Relevance of MINUSCA advocacy efforts as assessed by staff and stakeholders



n= 469 staff and 23 stakeholders

Source: OIOS survey of staff and stakeholders

14. Nonetheless, Mission staff interviewed identified several challenges impacting the effectiveness of the Mission's advocacy efforts at the community level. These included:

- i. **Absence of a documented advocacy strategy:** The lack of a Mission advocacy strategy to guide its advocacy interventions contributed to ambiguity in the roles and responsibilities of different Mission sections involved in advocacy efforts, a lack of guidance on advocacy goals for field offices and inconsistencies and fragmentation in advocacy approaches.
- ii. **Restricted access to information from the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC):** Challenges in accessing or freely utilizing outputs from JMAC constrained the ability of SCIPI to formulate timely advocacy responses. It also affected the work of other mission components, including the PoC and Human Rights Division (HRD).
- iii. **Understaffed communications teams:** Understaffing within SCIPI hampered its capacity to adequately coordinate and execute advocacy efforts in the field offices

The Mission's use of good offices to promote political dialogue and foster consensus was adapted to the changing security context

15. The MINUSCA use of good offices modality to promote political dialogue and foster consensus was appropriately adapted to the evolving political and security dynamics in CAR. Stakeholder interviews and documents reviewed highlighted several initiatives that reflected on this adaptability. For example, the Mission undertook several initiatives in response to the unique political and security challenges during 2024 when CAR experienced a notable rise in violence cases,⁷ including:

- i. Facilitation of high-level political dialogue to foster greater participation of opposition parties in the elections processes in response to political tensions surrounding electoral inclusiveness in the lead-up to the 2025 elections;
- ii. Organization of both national and local dialogue forums to address intercommunal tensions linked to transhumance; and

⁷ 2024 was selected due to a notable rise in violence cases despite an upward trend in patrols during the same period as presented in Figure 11.

- iii. Support to cross-border commissions and bilateral engagement to improve regional security cooperation in response to cross-border armed movements.

16. More specifically, there were many examples of relevant good offices efforts by the Mission which were tailored to specific security and political situations in 2024, as outlined in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Examples of tailored good offices initiatives to political and security situations in 2024

Political and security situation	Good offices initiative by the Mission
Political tensions related to electoral inclusiveness	Facilitated political dialogue between the Government and opposition groups to foster participation in the 2025 elections and promote civic engagement (October to December 2024).
Intercommunal tensions linked to transhumance	Supported a National High-Level Conference on Transhumance (May 2024) and organized local dialogue conferences in all 20 prefectures to promote peaceful transhumance.
Border insecurity and cross-border armed movements	Supported cross-border commissions (e.g., with Chad and Cameroon) and bilateral dialogues to strengthen border management and security cooperation (August 2024).
Armed group fragmentation (e.g., Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) and CPC-F)	Engaged in good offices with splinter factions (e.g., emissaries of Ali Darassa) to encourage ceasefires and reintegration into the peace process (July to mid-August 2024).
Refugee influx and displacement due to Sudanese conflict	Supported community-level mediation and dialogue to address resource-related tensions in Vakaga and Haut-Mbomou (from June 2024 onwards).
Rising hate speech and misinformation fuelling violence	Promoted community radio broadcasts, supported civil society campaigns against hate speech and established early warning networks (throughout 2024).
Child recruitment and child protection issues	Engaged in dialogue with armed groups such as Azande Ani Kpi Gbe, securing the release of 73 children and signing a handover protocol with the Government (mid-2024).
Armed group activity in newly retaken areas in Lim-Pendé Prefecture	Deployed TOBs alongside community engagement and dialogue to stabilize recaptured areas (2024 onwards).
Tensions around land disputes, chieftaincy and returnees	Strengthened local peace and reconciliation committees to mediate land and community tensions towards returnees, achieving a 40 per cent reduction in community violence (efforts ongoing since 2021, with intensified activities during 2024).
Internal fragmentation among political and armed actors	Sustained prefectural-level dialogues through implementing mechanisms to promote mediation, political dialogue and reconciliation (continuous from 2021 through 2024).
Persistent human rights challenges	Carried out continuous dialogue and advocacy on human rights issues with the Government counterparts and stakeholders.

Source: OIOS review of Secretary-General's reports, DSRs and external documents.

17. Staff and stakeholder survey respondents further affirmed the high relevance of the Mission's good offices efforts, as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Relevance of MINUSCA good offices as assessed by staff and stakeholders



n= 131 MINUSCA non-administrative staff and 23 stakeholders

Source: OIOS survey of staff and stakeholders

18. Mission staff and stakeholders interviewed assessed MINUSCA support to local dialogue structures, particularly the Local Peace and Reconciliation Committees (CLPR) and the Committees for Prefectural Implementation (CMOP), as highly relevant. The Mission's support involved the relevant actors and addressed the operational and contextual challenges affecting the committees. For example:

- i. Committees in Berberati, Bouar, Bangui, Bangassou and Bria reported that they faced difficulties in reaching remote areas to organize reconciliation forums, mediation sessions and awareness-raising activities, especially in conflict-affected areas. MINUSCA provided logistical and transportation support to address this and the committee members interviewed viewed this support as highly relevant;
- ii. CLPR members interviewed also reported that as tensions rose in communities due to the return of internally displaced persons, MINUSCA organized inclusive dialogue that involved women, youth, religious leaders and civil society – key stakeholders in local peace promotion efforts;
- iii. In addition, the Mission played a key role in implementing the APPR agreement through structured dialogue with armed groups, local authorities and opposition actors – stakeholders who were critical to advancing political dialogue and promoting peace.

Despite gaps in its design, the Mission's capacity-building efforts were tailored to support the extension of state authority and SSR

19. MINUSCA capacity-building efforts were adapted to address the governance and institutional challenges facing the country. For example, given that there was limited state presence outside Bangui prior to 2021, the Mission tailored its capacity-building support to facilitate staff deployments, providing training and supporting security sector reforms. Interviewed staff and stakeholders emphasized that these were context-sensitive interventions that were essential in promoting the extension of state authority and advancing the protection of civilians and security. Capacity

development initiatives were also tailored to address the needs of specific target groups in support of extension of state authority, as the examples in Table 4 below show.


Table 4: Capacity building efforts were tailored to support the extension of state authority and SSR


Target group	Capacity building support
Local authorities	- Governance training: trained 26,552 local authority officials on local governance to strengthen administrative capacities at the local level.
Government institutions	- Civil service deployment: supported the nationwide deployment of over 5,000 civil servants and provided technical assistance to key ministries. - Security sector reform: assisted in the development of a strategic security sector reform framework, including support for the re-operationalization of the FACA and internal security forces.
Judicial actors	- Training: trained 3,807 judicial actors, including judges, prosecutors and court clerks. - Special Criminal Court (SCC): supported the filing of 120 war crimes cases at the SCC and facilitated 300 mobile court hearings, resulting in 98 prosecutions. - Forensic training: provided forensic training for 100 officers to improve crime scene investigations.
Security forces	- Election security training: trained 500 FACA and internal security personnel on election security. - Police training: Over 2,000 police officers trained in gender-based violence prevention and human rights. - Judicial support: supported the doubling of operational courts to 24 and increased the number of prisons to 15, enhancing the judicial infrastructure.

Source: OIOS documents review of Secretary-General's reports, DSRs and CPAS data

20. Survey respondents considered the MINUSCA modality of capacity building as highly relevant, with the most positive assessment in the areas of national security sector reform support, as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Relevance of MINUSCA capacity-building efforts as assessed by staff and stakeholders





n= 131 MINUSCA non-administrative staff and 23 stakeholders

Source: OIOS survey of staff and stakeholders

21. However, staff interviewed noted that the Mission’s capacity building initiatives had some gaps in design such as the absence of a strategic framework for capacity building, resulting in fragmented efforts in capacity building that were not embedded within a broader strategic plan. Additionally, the lack of clearly defined learning outcomes prior to training delivery made it difficult to assess achievement of long-term objectives. Furthermore, the limited application of pre- and post-training assessments hindered the ability to measure short-term knowledge gains.

B. Despite limitations in its preventive efforts, MINUSCA effectively contributed to protection of civilians through peace processes

The Mission was effective in strengthening local ownership of peace processes

22. The Mission was effective in strengthening local ownership of peace processes by supporting community involvement in the planning, design and monitoring of local peace initiatives while ensuring the active participation of local authorities. The Mission carried out specific activities to promote local ownership of the peace process, as shown in the examples listed in Table 5. This community engagement improved the effectiveness of local peacebuilding efforts and increased the likelihood of their long-term sustainability.


Table 5: Examples of MINUSCA support to promote local ownership of the peace processes

Ownership aspect	Support by the Mission
Community involvement in peace planning	Mission supported CLPR efforts to engage community in planning of peace processes. For example, in Bouar and Bangassou, the Mission supported the CLPRs to assess local needs and coordinate activities with communities and partners.
Community-led monitoring of peace initiatives	MINUSCA offered training to CLPRs in Berberati to verify threats and track returnees. In Bangui, a CVR Monitoring Committee included diverse community members including women and youth. Through the collaboration with the Mission, CLPR in Bouar was able to send direct alerts via text to aid violence prevention efforts. In Bria and Bangassou, traditional leaders mediated disputes and relayed community concerns to the Mission.
Community-led peace initiatives	In Berberati, CLPRs engaged with armed groups and facilitated dialogues on agro-pastoral conflicts. In Bria, they mediated disputes and countered misinformation through sensitization in religious spaces. Village Chiefs and elders played a central role in dispute resolution, with a notable case of ethnic mediation near Bria supported by MINUSCA.
Participation of local authorities	MINUSCA supported locally grounded partnerships across regions. In Kaga Bandoro and Bria, Prefects actively participated in conflict resolution. In Bangassou, traditional leaders were integrated into CMOPs to enhance legitimacy. CLPRs in Berberati and Bouar coordinated with sub-prefects and security actors, though municipal support was inconsistent—especially in Bangui and Berberati. MINUSCA logistical and technical support helped reinforce these coordination efforts.

Source: Stakeholder interviews

23. The majority of mission staff and external stakeholders surveyed assessed MINUSCA to be effective in supporting local ownership of peace processes, as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Perceptions of MINUSCA support for local ownership of peace processes



n= 131 MINUSCA non-administrative staff and 23 stakeholders

Source: OIOS survey of staff and stakeholders

MINUSCA supported national policies and promoted accountable subnational institutions in the areas of PoC and human rights

24. At the national level, the Mission's HRD provided technical support and continuously engaged with the national authorities to protect and promote human rights, contributing to the development and adoption of the National Human Rights Policy (PNHD) in 2023.⁸ The Mission further supported the operationalization of the PNHD, including the funding and implementation of 25 out of the 268 activities in its action plan and organization of four national forums to mobilize partners. At the subnational level, the Mission worked with the Prefect and Sub-Prefect offices on dialogue, peace promotion, PoC and human rights. Stakeholders interviewed and community members in the FGDs assessed these institutions to be generally accountable to the community members as measured through the following indicators for accountability:

- a) The existence of channels for community participation and feedback mechanisms, such as community outreach sessions and CMOP meetings;
- b) accessibility to the offices by the local population; and
- c) improved community perceptions regarding the quality and responsiveness of service delivery since 2017.

25. MINUSCA-supported outreach activities, in which the Prefects and Sub-Prefects actively participated, facilitated two-way communication between communities and local authorities, fostering transparency and accountability. These outreach efforts were particularly effective in engaging remote communities. Additionally, Prefect and Sub-Prefect offices were reported to always be accessible, allowing regular interaction with community members. Widespread acknowledgment of improved service delivery since 2017 by community members interviewed was seen as further evidence of the accountability of these administrative offices.


Although alert reporting through the early warning mechanism was low, MINUSCA successfully intervened to prevent violence in the majority of alerts that were reported

26. Between January 2024 to March 2025, only 11 per cent of the total incident reports captured in SAGE (246 alerts out of 2,235 reports) by the six MINUSCA field offices were based on alerts and early warnings, indicating limited use of alerts in identifying incidents. Nonetheless, the Mission prevented violence from occurring in majority of the cases where it had early warning. For example, among the 246 cases where the Mission had prior alerts, no incidents of violence were reported within two weeks in 144 of these cases (59 per cent of the total) as shown in Figure 10. Notably, in Bouar, 88

⁸ Presidential Decree No. 23.198-W.

per cent of such cases were prevented. Mission staff interviewed in Bangassou, Berberati and Bouar shared several examples of early warning system enabling the Mission to proactively deploy patrols and take preemptive measures to prevent violence, thwart impending attacks on civilians, restrict movement of armed groups, establish temporary safe zones, escort civilian convoys and reinforce security presence in high-risk areas.

Figure 10: When available, early warnings helped MINUSCA to prevent violence from occurring



Source: MINUSCA SAGE datasets


27. The low use of the early warning system to capture alerts was due to several operational and structural challenges. These included delayed responses to alerts raised by the Community Alert Networks (CAN) and lack of feedback on how those alerts were addressed, thus discouraging continued reporting by CAN members. The CANs also experienced a lack of mobile phones and airtime, which limited timely information sharing. Weak linkages between CAN members and Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) were also noted by some interviewees. Additionally, alerts often reported incidents after violence had already occurred, thereby limiting their utility for prevention efforts. A review of the Mission's 2019 Standard Operating Procedure on Early Warning and Rapid Response revealed that while it included the structure, roles and procedures for a whole-of-mission approach to early warning and alert reporting, several gaps were identified. These included the lack of: (i) a feedback mechanism to the CANs; (ii) alternative reporting channel for CANs in case of absence of CLAs; and (iii) training and capacity-building for CANs and CLAs to adapt to the evolving threat dynamics in the country.

While seasonal weather variations influenced violence patterns, an increase in MINUSCA patrols generally corresponded to a reduction in incidents of violence from 2019 to 2023

28. Between 2019 and 2023, incidents of violence generally declined while the number of MINUSCA patrols steadily increased; an analysis of MINUSCA patrols and violence data during 2019-2023 indicated an inverse relationship between patrol volumes and violence, as shown in Figure 11. Seasonal weather effects were also observed with violence tending to rise during the dry season and decline during other periods, which was also confirmed by Mission staff interviewed. These staff also noted that rainfall patterns affected armed groups activities, especially by impeding their mobility

during the rainy season, which may have additionally contributed to reduced levels of violence. The year 2024 was an exception, as the country faced unique and emerging security challenges, including tensions related to the 2024 elections, intercommunal conflicts linked to transhumance and spillover of violence from the conflict in Sudan.

Figure 11: Except for 2024, MINUSCA patrol volumes generally corresponded to a reduction in violence




Source: MINUSCA SAGE datasets and incidents data from JMAC

The area of action of armed groups decreased over time, partly due to MINUSCA patrol efforts

29. An increase in the area covered by patrols was associated with a reduction in the armed groups area of action; however, beyond a certain threshold as presented in Figure 12, further increases in patrols did not necessarily lead to additional decreases in armed group area of action. This pattern is evident in the period between 2019 and 2021, when patrol density rose modestly from 2.2 to 10.8 patrols per 100 square kilometers, coinciding with a sharp drop in armed group activity from 85.8 per cent to 50.2 per cent. However, this downward trend did not continue despite a substantial rise in patrol volume. By 2024, patrol density had surged to 165 per 100 square kilometers, yet the area that had some action from armed group increased slightly to 54.4 per cent.

Figure 12: Trends in MINUSCA patrol density and armed group area of action



Source: MINUSCA SAGE datasets and incidents data from JMAC

30. Nevertheless, while several factors influenced the reduction in the presence and activities of armed groups across the country, staff and stakeholders interviewed consistently identified patrols as a key contributor to this reduction. Interviewees further identified the following factors driving the decline in armed group influence.

Table 6: Main factors contributing to decreased armed groups' presence in CAR

Factor	Likely impact
MINUSCA patrols	Patrols served as a visible deterrent, restricting the mobility and operational freedom of armed groups.
MINUSCA DDR and CVR programmes	DDR and Community Violence Reduction (CVR) initiatives provided non-violent alternatives and facilitated the reintegration of former combatants.
Bilateral forces and Other Security Personnel (OSP)	Operations conducted by the Rwandan Bilateral Forces and Wagner Group disrupted the activities and territorial control of rebel groups.
FACA Deployment	Strengthened national security presence in high-risk areas, limiting armed groups' operational space and influence.
Political stability and the APPR	The APPR established a framework for the peaceful reintegration of armed groups into political processes.
Extended state presence and authority	The expansion of state authorities into previously ungoverned areas reduced the influence and territorial reach of armed groups.

Source: Stakeholder interviews

Despite the contributions of patrols noted above, their overall effectiveness was impeded by several operational and structural challenges

31. Despite the positive contributions of the patrols modality as discussed above, its overall effectiveness was constrained by several operational and structural challenges. Mission staff and

external stakeholders interviewed cited factors such as limited geographic coverage due to poor infrastructure, predictable patrol routes, the absence of aerial surveillance, among other factors as summarized in Table 7.

Table 7: Operational and structural challenges affecting patrols

Challenge	Description
Limited mobility due to poor infrastructure, especially during rainy seasons	Poor infrastructure, especially during the rainy season, prevented patrols from reaching many high-risk zones. For example, moving a convoy for just 200 kilometers could sometimes take several months which adversely affected responsiveness of patrols.
Predictable patrol patterns	By monitoring the predictable MINUSCA routine patrol schedules, armed groups often timed their movements to avoid known patrol patterns and launch attacks on civilians.
Road-bound limitations	Patrols were mostly restricted to road networks, while armed groups operated in surrounding bush areas, making armed group activities detection and monitoring difficult without aerial surveillance tools such as drones.
Lack of aerial surveillance tools	Absence of drones and other aerial technologies limited situational awareness in off-road or forested areas as the Mission lacked Government approval to operate aerial surveillance.
Limited night patrols	Few patrols operated at night, leaving critical hours unmonitored and communities vulnerable.
Delayed responsiveness	Centralized decision-making and rigid protocols reduced patrols' ability to quickly respond to local security threats.
Static deployment model	Earlier reliance on many Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs) tied down forces, limiting flexibility and mobile patrols.
Insufficient coordination with national forces	In some areas, especially where the Other Security Personnel (OSP) were active, patrol efforts were weakened due to lack of coordinated presence with FACA and other national actors.
Unexploded ordinances	Unexploded ordinances impaired the Force's ability to patrol in contaminated areas.

Source: Mission staff and stakeholders interviews

MINUSCA good office efforts throughout 2024 and early 2025 contributed to addressing the higher level of security incidents that took place in 2024

32. MINUSCA good offices efforts played a critical role in reducing security incidents in the first quarter of 2025 following a sustained rise in violence throughout 2024. A review of DSRs and interviews with key Mission staff involved in PoC confirmed that the Mission's facilitation of dialogue among conflicting parties and support for community-based mediation initiatives helped de-escalate tensions in several hotspot areas. For instance, as the return of Central African refugees disrupted social cohesion and sparked renewed tensions, MINUSCA facilitated dialogue between returnees and host communities to support reintegration and prevent violence. Similarly, in response to the spillover effects of the Sudanese conflict—particularly the influx of Azande armed elements—the Mission supported targeted dialogue mechanisms to contain possible violence escalations. Additionally, the surge in transhumance-related conflicts prompted MINUSCA to convene a national conference on transhumance in May 2024 and facilitate local dialogue forums across all 20 prefectures to promote peaceful transhumance and reduce intercommunal tensions.

33. Key Mission staff involved in PoC reported that a decline in violence was realized in the first quarter of 2025, which was largely attributable to MINUSCA good offices efforts. An analysis of changes in incidents of violence between the fourth quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 showed that there was a decline in violence during the first quarter of 2025, from 329 to 293 cases. This occurred despite a reduction in patrol activity, from 20,562 to 16,992 patrols during the corresponding times, and during a dry season, conditions that are typically associated with increased level of incidents. Mission interviewees cited the Mission's good offices efforts as key contributing factors to this reduction in violence.

MINUSCA PoC and human rights efforts faced challenges, notably from the Other Security Personnel (OSP)

34. Operating under bilateral agreement with the government of CAR, the OSP (the Wagner Group) continued to pose challenges to MINUSCA PoC, human rights and DDR efforts. While some Mission staff and external stakeholders interviewed credited OSP with reducing armed group activity, their parallel DDR initiatives led to ex-combatants being ineligible for MINUSCA DDR programmes. Furthermore, OSP sometimes restricted MINUSCA access to conflict zones, complicating the Mission's PoC efforts. The Mission's HRD also regularly reported on human rights violations committed by the OSP, which included extrajudicial killings that incited retaliatory violence. Additionally, their activities such as patrols near MINUSCA operations often caused confusion among communities and weakened trust in the Mission. Despite these challenges, there was no direct communication between MINUSCA and OSP to address these issues, with communication routed through FACA.

35. Mission staff and senior leaders interviewed also acknowledged that OSP activities significantly affected the implementation of the Mission's mandate and perceived that there was a lack of clear guidance within the Mission on how to respond to the presence and actions of the OSP. An analysis of 15 code cables indicated that the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) headquarters issued multiple code cables since 2021 with detailed directives on how to address the challenges posed by the OSP. The DPO guidance advised the Mission to: recalibrate its posture in response to OSP presence; enforce the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP); maintain strategic distancing from the OSP; and strengthen political engagement and communications to reinforce the Mission's mandate. The disconnect between staff perceptions of a lack of guidance and the existence of headquarters-issued guidance, some of which were issued several years ago, suggested a gap in the awareness among relevant staff of prior confidential directives within the Mission.

While MINUSCA reported having achieved the strategic objectives of its PoC strategy, the absence of measurable indicators and targets made their assessment difficult

36. The Mission pursued the two strategic objectives outlined in its PoC Strategy: Protection through Presence; and Prevention of Violence. However, the indicators associated with these objectives lacked clearly defined targets in both CPAS and the Mission's workplans. Moreover, the indicators were not formulated according to the SMART criteria (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound), undermining their utility for monitoring and evaluation. For example, under Strategic Objective 1 (Protection through Presence), indicators such as "the threat or outbreak of violence," "the option to engage in dialogue and conduct good offices," and "the option to provide physical protection through Mission presence" were not specific to guide performance measurement. Similarly, Strategic Objective 2 (Prevention of Violence) repeated elements from Objective 1, therefore not distinguishing between the two strategic intents. The lack of specific indicators with clearly defined targets negatively affected the Mission's ability to systematically track progress, assess effectiveness and ensure accountability.

C. MINUSCA demonstrated strong internal coherence and coordinated effectively with other actors in implementing PoC, security and human rights

MINUSCA implemented PoC through close coordination between multiple Mission components, strengthening its comprehensive and unified response

37. MINUSCA implemented comprehensive internal coordination mechanisms to ensure a unified Mission-wide approach to its PoC, security and human rights mandate implementation, as summarized in Table 8 below. Together, the structures listed in Table 9 promoted an integrated, Mission-wide PoC effort.


Table 9: MINUSCA coordination of PoC at different levels

Level	Coordination
Strategic coordination	Led by the Senior Management Group on Protection (SMGP) and supported by the Mission leadership
Operational coordination	Managed through the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and the Protection Working Group, enabling joint planning and real-time information sharing
Technical and thematic coordination	Involved specialized sections—such as human rights, civil affairs and gender—collaborating through dedicated working groups
Field level	CLAs played a key role in relaying community feedback, enhancing early warning and adaptive response

Source: Mission staff interviews

38. Staff survey respondents perceived overall coordination among Mission components to be strong, as shown in Figure 13. Majority of respondents rated key Mission sections coordinating with other sections for PoC positively, with Civil Affairs receiving the highest score, followed by Human Rights. Similarly, internal coherence among Mission activities across the three PoC tiers was also rated highly, with over 80 per cent of respondents indicating strong or very strong coherence. This internal alignment was a cornerstone in fostering effective collaboration between civil, political, military, human rights and gender components within the Mission.

Figure 13: Staff perception of coordination among Mission components for PoC




Source: OIOS survey of staff

39. Nevertheless, staff interviewed in one field office noted several challenges constraining internal coordination objectives, namely, weak follow-up on action points, fragmented communication chains causing slow planning and limited data-sharing among key sections (JOC, human rights and SCIPI) impeding timely decision-making, and reduced overall effectiveness of joint interventions.

MINUSCA actively coordinated with key external stakeholders and members of the United Nations Country Team, fostering collaboration that strengthened PoC, security and human rights efforts

40. Staff survey respondents positively rated the Mission’s coordination with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and external stakeholders, as shown in Figure 14. However, some external stakeholders interviewed noted gaps regarding mandate clarity with humanitarian partners, leading to occasional duplication or inaction, particularly around the protection of displaced persons and returnees. MINUSCA external coordination was anchored in consistent engagement with national and international stakeholders through joint meetings, thematic task forces, direct communication, joint programming and logistical support to government counterparts and UNCTs. Interviewees from UNCT entities consistently appreciated MINUSCA logistical and political support in enabling the expansion of their work across the country, especially outside Bangui.

Figure 14: MINUSCA coordination with key external stakeholders and UNCT members in support of PoC as assessed by staff



n= 131 MINUSCA non-administrative staff


Source: OIOS survey of staff

D. MINUSCA effectively integrated gender, human rights and environmental considerations into its PoC work, but progress on disability inclusion was limited

41. MINUSCA made significant progress in integrating gender into its PoC and security-related programming through partnerships, awareness efforts and operational adaptations. Since 2018, the Mission has improved gender-based violence response mechanisms through collaboration between relevant Mission components and key external actors and UNCT members and by enhancing community outreach in high-risk areas. These outreach efforts primarily consisted of community sensitization campaigns, engaging 6,574 local leaders—3,796 of them women—on women’s political participation, promoting inclusive local governance. Gender considerations were also integrated into the Mission’s police recruitment and vetting processes and through training of national security personnel (police, gendarmerie and internal security forces) on gender-based violence, women’s rights and child protection to ensure a rights-based and gender-sensitive approach to law enforcement. The Mission’s efforts to empower women included support for their participation in civil

society and local governance as well as integrating gender-based violence awareness into community outreach activities. Additionally, targeted campaigns, such as a CVR awareness initiative, reached over 100 adolescent girls in conflict-affected communities.⁹ A majority of staff survey respondents perceived gender to be integrated into the Mission’s design and implementation of activities, as shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15: Staff perceptions of MINUSCA integration of gender in activity design and implementation




Source: OIOS staff survey

42. MINUSCA also embedded human rights within its protection, rule of law and governance efforts, including through capacity-building of national human rights and security institutions and CSOs, field monitoring and reporting on human rights situation, legal reforms and survivor-centered assistance. At the institutional level, the Mission strengthened accountability by training the national police, FACA and internal security forces on international human rights standards and individual criminal responsibility. The Mission also incorporated human rights into local dialogue and conflict resolution activities and maintained regular engagement with civil society, youth and traditional and religious leaders on rights-based peacebuilding. The Mission emphasized child protection by addressing sexual violence, recruitment and other violations in collaboration with schools and security actors, guided by international legal frameworks. These initiatives strengthened social cohesion and fostered more inclusive protection responses. The Mission also routinely reported on the human rights situation in the country and led inter-agency reporting to ensure data informed policy and operational responses. A majority of surveyed Mission staff (79 per cent) agreed that human rights was well integrated into Mission activities, as shown in Figure 16.

⁹ Internal MINUSCA Records on Police Recruitment and Vetting


Figure 16: Staff perceptions of MINUSCA integration of human rights in activity design and implementation



Source: OIOS staff survey

43. Since 2017, MINUSCA has made progress in mainstreaming environmental considerations into its operations, aligning these efforts with its protection, security and human rights mandate. The Mission implemented over 49 environmentally focused infrastructure projects, including incinerators, wastewater treatment systems, composting and solar lighting across key locations. These initiatives aimed to reduce environmental impact, improve safety and mitigate health risks for both personnel and host communities; for example, the solar lighting projects in Bria and Bangassou enhanced night-time security, while the Mission's staff supported the installation and maintenance of wastewater systems in Bangui and Kaga Bandoro helping in ensuring compliance with technical standards and proper operation of the systems. Additional Mission environmental efforts included waste segregation and incineration in areas lacking formal waste management. Community-level activities supported by the Mission such as school tree planting, hygiene sensitization and youth-led sanitation campaigns further promoted environmental awareness and improved public health in displacement-affected areas. Among staff survey respondents, 61 per cent agreed that the Mission incorporated environmental considerations into activity design and implementation, as shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Staff perceptions of MINUSCA integration of environmental considerations in activity design and implementation




Source: OIOS staff survey

44. Although MINUSCA operated under the framework of the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy (UNDIS), its integration of disability inclusion into Mission-wide planning, programming and implementation was limited.¹⁰ There was no evidence available on how disability inclusion was operationalized within the Mission's work on PoC, security and human rights. Staff survey respondents also reported limited disability inclusion in the Mission's activities, with only 46 per cent of staff

¹⁰ A/RES/78/195, <https://www.un.org/disabilitystrategy>

agreeing that some form of disability inclusion was present as illustrated in Figure 18. Mission staff interviewed in all six field offices visited also echoed this limitation in disability inclusion, citing a lack of specific expertise, programmes, strategies or institutional discussions on disability. Furthermore, the Mission had not appointed a designated focal point on disability and there was a lack of publicly available data on disability-specific outcomes.

Figure 18: Staff perceptions of MINUSCA integration of disability inclusion in activity design and implementation



Source: OIOS staff survey

Conclusion

45. Having made notable progress in advancing its PoC and human rights mandates, MINUSCA is now well-positioned to enter a new phase centered on peace consolidation. The Mission's continued relevance and effectiveness in the future will depend on its ability to strategically continue aligning its core implementation modalities such as patrols, good offices, advocacy and capacity building with evolving national development priorities while remaining aware and proactively taking steps to mitigate contextual risks, like the presence of the OSP, that could affect the achievement of its PoC and human rights objectives. The continued presence of the United Nations in the country for nearly three decades, through successive peacekeeping and political missions, underscores the deep-rooted nature of instability and the complexity of achieving durable peace. To foster sustainable peace, future Mission activities must be closely integrated into the Government's long-term planning, while ensuring the inclusion of vulnerable and marginalized populations. Such an approach will strengthen national ownership, enhance institutional resilience and help lay the foundation for a more stable Central African Republic.

Recommendations

46. OIOS makes five important recommendations to MINUSCA, all of which were accepted.

Recommendation 1: (Results A and B)

47. **MINUSCA should develop a comprehensive, Mission-wide advocacy strategy.** This may include the following steps:

- Core advocacy themes defined by SCIP in consultation with relevant sections such as human rights, civil affairs and political affairs;
- Development of a unified advocacy framework outlining strategic objectives, expected outcomes and key messages that align with Mission priorities; and

- c. Coordination and information-sharing mechanisms across Mission components at both national and local levels strengthened to ensure consistent messaging and advocacy efforts.

Indicator of implementation: Advocacy strategy developed.

Expected change(s): Improved coordination of the different Mission sections involved in advocacy resulting in coherence and effectiveness of Mission-wide advocacy efforts.

Recommendation 2: (Results A and B)

48. MINUSCA should review and update the 2019 Standard Operating Procedure on Early Warning and Rapid Response to enhance the coordination and operational capacity of the Community Alert Network (CAN) and Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) by addressing the identified gaps. This may include the following:

- a. Clear procedures for providing feedback to CANs on how their alerts were addressed, to foster accountability, trust and continued engagement;
- b. Contingency mechanisms for reporting by CANs when CLAs are unavailable, including direct communication protocols with relevant Mission structures, e.g., the Early Warning Cell or JOC; and
- c. Guidance on the type, frequency and content of training and capacity-building activities for CANs and CLAs on evolving security threats;

Indicator of implementation: Updated Standard Operating Procedure on Early Warning and Rapid Response.

Expected change(s): Improved frequency and accuracy of alert reporting.

Recommendation 3: (Results A and B)

49. MINUSCA should ensure all capacity building interventions are guided by clearly defined learning outcomes and performance metrics prior to rollout. This may include the following:

- a. Ensure all training modules across human rights, SSR, CVR and civil affairs are aligned with context-specific learning objectives that are directly linked to Mission results;
- b. Develop and systematically apply pre- and post-training assessments to evaluate participants' knowledge gains;
- c. Establish a centralized repository to store training materials, assessment tools and evaluation reports, thereby promoting consistency, institutional memory and replication of best practices; and
- d. Conduct regular analysis of assessment data to identify training gaps, adapt content as needed and inform decisions related to resource allocation and follow-up support.

Indicator of implementation: All training to include expected learning outcomes and pre/post assessment tools, with Mission-wide monitoring of performance based on assessment results.

Expected change(s): Improved quality, relevance and accountability of capacity-building initiatives, leading to more effective institutional strengthening and sustained behavioral change among national counterparts.

Recommendations 4: (Result B)

50. MINUSCA should integrate its PoC performance indicators and milestones into the Mission workplans and CPAS framework. This may include:

- a. Establishing clear and measurable quantitative and qualitative targets for each objective, outcome and output related to PoC and human rights interventions; and
- b. Clearly assigned responsibility for the implementation and tracking of these indicators in the substantive sections.

Indicator of implementation: Updated and integrated CPAS indicators with defined quantitative and qualitative targets and regular monitoring and reporting against those targets.

Expected change(s): Enhanced ability of the Mission to measure progress, demonstrate results and ensure accountability for PoC and human rights interventions.

Recommendation 5: (Result D)

51. MINUSCA should appoint a dedicated disability inclusion focal point with a clear term of reference to lead the systematic integration of disability inclusion perspectives across Mission components and activities. This function would:



- a. Serve as the institutional lead for mainstreaming disability inclusion across PoC, human rights, CVR, SSR and other relevant workstreams, with clear terms of reference aligned to UNDIS benchmarks;
- b. Facilitate structured engagement with organizations of persons with disabilities at national and local levels;
- c. Support the development and use of disability-sensitive indicators and disaggregation of data by disability status and regular reporting on disability inclusion.

Indicator of implementation: Disability inclusion focal point appointed with clear terms of reference.

Expected change(s): Enhanced visibility, accountability and impact of disability inclusion across Mission workstreams.

Annex I: MINUSCA management response

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 64/263, the MINUSCA management response is presented below. The memorandum refers to the Mission's recommendation action plan as MINUSCA comments, which showed the Mission's acceptance of the five recommendations and planned actions and timelines for their implementation. The recommendation action plan is not published, but used for monitoring of the implementation of the recommendations.

United Nations <small>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</small>	 MINUSCA	Nations Unies <small>Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies Pour la Stabilisation en République centrafricaine</small>
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM		MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR
TO: Mr. Demetra Arapakos, Director A: Inspection and Evaluation Division, OIOS		DATE: 29 August 2025
		REFERENCE: MINUSCA/OSRSG/181/2025
FROM:  DE: SRSR and Head of MINUSCA		
SUBJECT: <u>MINUSCA comments on the Draft Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the</u> OBJET: <u>Evaluation of Protection of Civilians, Security and Human Rights (Evaluation No. IED-25-018)</u>		
<p>1. With reference to your interoffice memorandum dated 8 August 2025 on the above captioned subject, kindly find attached MINUSCA comments on the Draft Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of Protection of Civilians, Security and Human Rights in MINUSCA.</p> <p>2. I take this opportunity to thank your team for the findings and recommendations issued in this evaluation as well as for the many constructive and timely discussions held with concerned sections.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Annex: – MINUSCA comments on the Draft Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of Protection of Civilians, Security and Human Rights in MINUSCA</u></p> <p>cc: Ms Fatoumata Ndiaye, OIOS Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, DPO Ms. Catherine Pollard, DMSPC Mr. Atul Khare, DOS Mr. Uren Pillay, JIU Mr. Sejong Lee, BOA Ms. Andrea Cook, EOSG Mr. Moses Bamuwanye, IAAC Mr. Kevin Summersgill, DMSPC Mr. Zachary Ikiara, DMSPC Mr. Henri Fourie, DOS Mr. Mohamed Ag Ayoya, MINUSCA Mr. Ebrima Ceesay, MINUSCA Mr. Renner Onana, MINUSCA Mr. Richard Glass, MINUSCA Ms. Tiphaine Dickson, MINUSCA Mr. Koffi Wogomebou, MINUSCA Mr. Landio Zalla, MINUSCA Ms. Hanan Talbi, MINUSCA Mr. Frederic Renoux, DPPA-DPO-SS</p>		