



INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

REPORT 2017/074

Audit of the community stabilization programme in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNAMID needed to document its supervision of the disarmament exercise, engage with host government officials in ensuring that the Mission's mandate of supporting the arms control programme in Darfur is achieved and strengthen oversight of the implementation of projects

3 August 2017
Assignment No. AP2016/634/07

Audit of the community stabilization programme in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of governance, risk management and control processes over management of the community stabilization programme in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The audit covered the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2016 and included: monitoring the verification of disbandment of militia groups; support for the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission in demobilizing ex-combatants; and implementation of community-based, labour-intensive projects and community stabilization projects.

UNAMID established committees that reviewed and approved community-based, labour-intensive projects and community stabilization projects that directly benefited youth at risk and local communities. However, the Mission needed to document its oversight of the ex-combatants' disarmament process, engage with the host government to ensure the arms control programme in Darfur is achieved and strengthen oversight of the implementation of projects.

OIOS made seven recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, UNAMID needed to:

- Ensure that military staff officers attached to the Ceasefire Commission are instructed to retain documentary evidence of the verification and registration of ex-combatants, including persons associated with the armed forces and groups (if any) and surrendered weapons for the disarmament exercises that they monitor;
- Engage with the host government in ensuring that the Mission's mandate of supporting the small arms and light weapons control programme in Darfur is achieved;
- Expedite the establishment of an inter-agency community stability task force to better coordinate with the United Nations Country Team in implementing the community stabilization programme;
- Ensure competitive bidding by implementing partners for project implementation;
- Obtain approval from the Field Budget and Finance Division for projects that exceed \$100,000;
- Strengthen monitoring of project implementation; and
- Evaluate the impact of the projects and programme on the beneficiaries.

UNAMID accepted the recommendations and initiated action to implement them.

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Audit of the community stabilization programme in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the community stabilization programme in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The community stabilization programmes are based on priority activities suggested or identified by the local communities and developed through consultative and participatory planning process that build on existing local resources, communities' experience and lessons learned from previous community-based projects such as the UNAMID community-based, labour-intensive projects (CLIPs) and quick impact projects (QIPs).

2. Security Council resolutions 2173 (2014) and 2228 (2015) mandated UNAMID, in conjunction with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), to support the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission (DSAIC) and the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SDDRC) in: (a) reducing arms and armed actors through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants in accordance with the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; and (b) implementing measures aimed at addressing root causes of community conflict and instability.

3. The UNAMID Community Stabilization Section (CSS) is responsible for: addressing the needs of perennially unemployed youths who are easy target for recruitment into armed or criminal groups by developing their vocational skills and facilitating on-the-job training through community infrastructure rehabilitation and construction, thereby helping them move toward a more secure, financially stable life; reducing community violence and broader community stability through the implementation of CLIPs and community stabilization projects (CSPs). CSS is also responsible for providing technical and logistics assistance to demobilization exercises conducted by the DSAIC and the SDDRC. The demobilization involves the verification of ex-combatants against the list of disarmed ex-combatants, medical screening and counselling, debriefing and sensitization on the reintegration process, profiling and registration for individual reintegration packages. CSS supports ex-combatants to bridge the critical period from the completion of demobilization to the beginning of reintegration processes with the payment of transactional safety allowances.

4. The Ceasefire Commission¹ is responsible for monitoring and verifying the disarmament and disbandment of militia groups and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is responsible for social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life.

5. Between July 2014 and June 2016, UNAMID, through the CSS: provided technical assistance and logistics support to SDDRC in demobilizing 4,207 ex-combatants; provided reinsertion support through payment of transitional safety allowances amounting to \$1 million; and implemented 36 CLIPs in various areas such as construction, auto mechanic, basic computer skills and sewing, at a cost of \$3 million, which directly benefitted 2,842 youth at risk and community members.

6. The CSS is headed by a Chief at the D-1 level who reported to the Deputy Joint Special Representative-Protection and is supported by 16 staff. The CSS 2014/15 and 2015/16 budgets were \$2 million for each fiscal year.

¹ Comprises UNAMID military, parties to the peace process and a representative from the State of Qatar

7. Comments provided by UNAMID are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

8. The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of governance, risk management and control processes over management of the community stabilization programme in UNAMID.

9. This audit was included in the 2016 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to operational and financial risks related to management and implementation of the community stabilization programme in UNAMID.

10. OIOS conducted this audit from January to March 2017. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2016. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risk areas in managing community stabilization programmes, which included: monitoring the verification of disbandment of militia groups; support for the SDDRC in demobilizing ex-combatants; and implementation of CLIPs and CSPs.

11. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews of key personnel, (b) review of relevant documentation, (c) analytical review of data, and (d) visits to 15 project sites in sectors North and West.

III. OVERALL CONCLUSION

12. UNAMID established committees that reviewed and approved CLIPs and CSPs that directly benefited youth at risk and local communities. However, the Mission needed to document its oversight of the disarmament of ex-combatants, engage with the host government in ensuring that the arms control programme is implemented and strengthen oversight of the implementation of projects.

IV. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Support for disarmament and demobilization exercises

UNAMID needed to keep records of disarmament exercises

13. The UNAMID Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Support Plan, and the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur requires the Ceasefire Commission to monitor and verify the disarmament and disbandment of militia groups. UNAMID is also required to verify and register information such as the number of ex-combatants, number and type of weapons and vehicles surrendered at designated verification assembly areas submitted by signatory parties to the peace agreement.

14. The Ceasefire Commission advised that they monitored the disarmament exercises undertaken by the SDDRC/DSAIC (Sudanese government affiliated commissions), but did not maintain records/register of disarmed ex-combatants. The list of ex-combatants (4,207 in total) provided by the SDDRC was used by the CSS for the demobilization and payment of transitional allowances without further verification.

15. Because of the absence of the disarmament and disbandment records evidencing the Ceasefire Commission monitoring, the CSS was unable to ensure that only qualified persons were being assisted. Therefore, there was a risk of financial loss due to payments of transitional allowances and reintegration packages being provided to non-qualified individuals. The high rate of turnover of military personnel combined with inadequate handover and orientation of incoming Ceasefire Commission personnel could explain the deficiencies observed.

(1) UNAMID should take steps to ensure that military staff officers attached to the Ceasefire Commission are instructed to retain documentary evidence of the verification and registration of ex-combatants, including persons associated with the armed forces and groups (if any) and surrendered weapons for the disarmament exercises that they monitor.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the military staff officers attached to the Ceasefire Commission would be instructed to retain relevant documentary evidence of the verification and registration of ex-combatants, including persons associated with the armed forces and groups (if any) and surrendered weapons for the disarmament exercises. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence that UNAMID has issued instructions to the Ceasefire Commission staff on the need to complete and retain documents pertaining to the monitored disarmament exercises, and compliance with such instructions.

UNAMID provided technical and logistical support to SDDRC in demobilizing ex-combatants

16. The UNAMID DDR Support Plan and annual budget require CSS to support the SDDRC in: (a) establishing demobilization sites through provision of technical support and coordination of relevant logistics assistance, (b) planning and supervising the demobilization process including registration and profiling of ex-combatants, and (c) facilitating payment of transitional safety allowance to ex-combatants.

17. A review of correspondences between the SDDRC and UNAMID, transitional safety allowance payment sheets, funds requests and retirement documents, demobilization after-action reports for the four demobilization exercises conducted during the audit period indicated that a total of 4,207 ex-combatants were demobilized. The CSS:

- (a) Directed the planning of the demobilization exercises by convening the DDR Task Force coordination meetings with the SDDRC and UNCT;
- (b) Coordinated the logistical support of other UNAMID sections and members of the UNCT, such as transportation of ex-combatants to and from demobilization sites, erecting of tents, fixing of electrical work, provision of generators and furniture, and provision of three-month food rations to ex-combatants by the World Food Programme;
- (c) Obtained the Deputy Joint Special Representative (DJSR) and Director of Mission Support (DMS) approval to pay \$986,250 in transitional safety allowances to ex-combatants and paid \$38,000 for lunch provided during the exercises; and
- (d) Accurately and promptly accounted for the funds that were disbursed to the CSS staff for the exercises.

18. OIOS concluded that UNAMID adequately supported the demobilization exercises in accordance with the UNAMID DDR Support Plan.

There was a need to engage with the host government in ensuring that the small arms and light weapons control programme is implemented

19. In the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the support of UNAMID is requested in developing a strategy and plans for the implementation of a voluntary civilian arms control programme. In October 2014, UNAMID developed a strategy (2014-2016) for small arms and light weapons (SALW) control activities in consultation with all sections, UNCT and external actors like SDDRC, Darfur Government, Sudan police

and local non-governmental organizations. This strategy was organized into three pillars: policy and institutions; hard interventions; and soft interventions. The CSS led the policy and institutions pillar, which consisted of technical support to the Government of Sudan to develop policy and institutions. However, the responsibility for formulating policies and programmes for arms control in Darfur rested with the host government.

20. The CSS work plan for 2015/2016 listed a number of activities to be performed by the Section and the expected outputs, and included support to the Government of Sudan in the following areas: (a) development of policy and institutional framework for civilian arms control in Darfur; (b) arms registration and marking activities through provision of technical and logistical assistance; (c) awareness raising and public information on SALW; and (d) coordination of support from other UNAMID sections for the implementation of the Government of Sudan's work plan on SALW control programmes. For the same period, the CSS budget performance described ongoing activities with no indication of any measure of progress toward the goal or direct correlation with initial activities listed in the work plan. Examples of achievements were: substantial input and logistical support was provided for demobilization of 4,950 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur signatories and affiliated armed movements across all five regions, or six collaborative meetings were facilitated for the joint working group for SALW control under the Government of Sudan-led community security and arms control programme for Darfur while relevant support (including logistics and transport) was provided for arms registration and marking workshops.

21. In April 2016, the affiliated national counterparts held a workshop to establish a road map including policies and programmes to address arms control in Darfur. However, no policy or programme was issued by the Government. OIOS review of the functioning of the SALW working group consisting of personnel from SDDRC and UNAMID indicated that only 4 out of 24 planned meetings were convened during the audit period. Consequently, the UNAMID SALW steering group that was constituted to support SDDRC in implementing the SALW programme did not meet quarterly and report to the DJSR on the progress of implementation of the UNAMID SALW strategy, as required. A review of security daily situation reports between April 2016 and February 2017 indicated that a total of 283 crimes reported involved use of firearms and resulted in 241 deaths and 260 injuries to civilians across Darfur.

22. It was widely perceived that the prevalence of weapons among the population was seriously contributing to large-scale violence, including intercommunal violence and criminality and was undermining the establishment of the rule of law. Without proactive actions from UNAMID to support the efforts of the Government of Sudan towards an arms control approach, the Mission's mandate of ensuring the protection of civilians against armed violence through reduction of arms and armed actors by supporting the host government in developing policy and institutions to implement the voluntary civilian arms control programme would not be easily achieved.

(2) UNAMID should take steps to proactively engage with the host government in ensuring that the Mission's mandate of supporting the small arms and light weapons control programme in Darfur is achieved.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 2 and stated that UNAMID was poised to support national policies and action plan for the control of small arms and light weapons and that it would take steps to continue proactive engagement with the host government in this regard. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that senior UNAMID management has proactively engaged with the host government in pushing for progress in implementing the SALW programme.

B. Implementation of community stabilization projects

UNAMID appropriately constituted project approval committees

23. The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) policy on reinsertion projects and UNAMID standard operating procedures (SOP) on CLIPS/CSPs require UNAMID to constitute sector-based technical review committees (TRCs) chaired by a CSS team leader, consisting of representatives from Civil Affairs Section, Protection of Civilians Section, UNDP DDR, SDDRC, and the Mission Support Division to review and recommend project proposals for approval by the Project Approval Committee (PAC). The SOP requires the PAC to be chaired by the DJSR and include the following members with responsibility to approve projects submitted by TRCs: the Police Commissioner, Chief Rule of Law, Chief of Civil Affairs Section, Chief of Protection of Civilians Section, a representative of the Director of Mission Support and a representative from UNDP. Subsequent to approval of projects by the PAC, the DMS is required to sign a memorandum of understanding with the implementing partner.

24. UNAMID appropriately constituted the sector-based TRCs and PAC in line with the DPKO/DFS guidelines and the Mission's SOP. A review of the minutes of meetings of the PAC and TRCs indicated that the PAC convened four times and approved 43 projects recommended by the sector-based TRCs of which 36 were implemented. Seven projects were not implemented due to budgetary constraints. Based on PAC approvals, the DMS signed the memoranda of understanding with implementing partners for all projects.

25. OIOS concluded that UNAMID appropriately constituted the project approval committees, which reviewed and approved projects before implementation.

There was a need to constitute an inter-agency community stabilization task force

26. The 2015/16 budget requires CSS to constitute and chair an inter-agency community stabilization task force to coordinate activities undertaken by the UNCT and other partners aimed at stabilizing target communities in Darfur. The UNAMID SOP on CLIPs/CSPs also requires CSS to collaborate with UNDP, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and SDDRC in identifying the needs of communities to ensure sustainability of projects and in evaluating implementing partners' project proposals.

27. CSS did not constitute and chair an inter-agency community stabilization task force to coordinate community stabilization activities of the UNCT as planned. Additionally, a review of files for all 36 approved CLIPs/CSPs showed that: (a) no field needs assessment was conducted for 9 projects implemented, and (b) of the 27 projects where field needs assessments were done, 24 were done by CSS staff only, two were done by CSS with the UNAMID Child Protection and Civil Affairs Sections while only one was done by CSS together with a member of the UNCT.

28. Not having an established inter-community stabilization task force to ensure consistency in conducting needs assessments before implementing CLIPs/CSPs resulted in: (a) lack of specific baselines and targets that could be used to evaluate the impact of the project on the beneficiaries; and (b) possibility of duplication or lack of complementarity of efforts between UNAMID and the initiatives of UNCT. For instance, a slaughter house infrastructure project implemented at a cost of \$106,128 and completed on 7 December 2015 was not being used as at 31 March 2017 due to lack of running tap water, electricity and defective building specifications. The situation could have been averted with the help of other UNCT

partners during the conduct of a needs assessment; for instance, other UNCT could have been called upon to fund water and electricity to the building.

(3) UNAMID should take steps to expedite the establishment of an inter-agency community stabilization task force to better coordinate joint needs assessments and project implementation, and to ensure sustainability of community stabilization projects.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it would take steps to expedite the establishment of the inter-agency community stabilization task force. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the inter-agency community stabilization task force has been established and working according to its terms of references.

Need to ensure there was competitive bidding by implementing partners for project implementation

29. The UNAMID SOP on CLIPs/CSPs requires the sector-based TRCs to evaluate and keep records of all submitted project proposals on the basis of CSP evaluation matrix, prioritize proposed project proposals based on substance and quality, and in-depth capacity assessment of implementing partners. The SOP also requires that the Mission, in coordination with United Nations agencies operating in the country and other mission components, maintain a list of pre-assessed implementing partners.

30. A review of 36 project files and minutes of TRC meetings showed that only one project proposal was considered per project from the partner selected to implement the project. Consequently, there was no competitive evaluation of bid proposals and in-depth capacity assessment for 35 out of 36 projects with costs above the \$40,000 threshold. In addition, UNAMID did not maintain a comprehensive list of pre-assessed implementing partners collated in liaison with Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP and the Civil Affairs Section as required by UNAMID SOP on CLIPs/CSPs.

31. CSS staff attributed the non-solicitation of bids from implementing partners and the consequent non-evaluation of bids to the limited pool of implementing partners operating in Darfur. However, an OIOS review of all 36 projects implemented indicated that 18 projects involved skills training through construction and 9 projects involved vocational skills training such as metal work, auto mechanic, welding, plumbing and computer skills; as such, the implementing partners could have been competitively evaluated against each other.

32. The above resulted in: (a) an unmitigated risk of financial loss to the Mission due to uncompetitive prices charged by implementing partners, and (b) payment of \$22,075 on 12 July 2016 to an implementing partner that had no capacity to drill a borehole and construct a water yard in Um Baru within the agreed four months. The implementing partner had not commenced the works eight months after receiving payment.

(4) UNAMID should: (a) develop a list of pre-assessed community stabilization project implementing partners in liaison with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme and the Civil Affairs Section; and (b) enforce its procedures requiring the soliciting of competitive bids from implementing partners for all projects or document the justification why competitive evaluation cannot be done.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it was in the process of: (a) collating and developing the list of pre-assessed community stabilization project implementing partners with relevant stakeholders; and (b) reviewing its SOP to incorporate relevant actions relating to bidding processes and justifications to waive a bidding process where necessary.

Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of: (a) a copy of the list of pre-assessed community stabilization project implementing partners and evidence that it is being used to competitively select implementing partners to the extent possible, and (b) amended procedures giving guidance to staff on the necessary waiver approval process for cases where competitive bidding is not possible.

UNAMID needed to obtain United Nations Headquarters' approval for projects that exceed \$100,000

33. The DPKO/DFS policy on reinsertion programme requires the Chief CSS to justify and get approval from the Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD) in the Department of Field Support through the Head of Mission and the DMS for initiating projects that exceed \$100,000.

34. The Chief CSS overlooked the need to justify and obtain FBFD approval for 8 out of 36 projects that exceeded the \$100,000 limit per project. Consequently, oversight of high-value projects was not functioning as intended posing the risk of mismanagement and the Mission entering into projects that in the view of DFS they should not be implementing.

(5) UNAMID should put measures in place to ensure that the Community Stabilization Section justifies and obtains approval of the Field Budget and Finance Division in the Department of Field Support for any project that exceeds \$100,000.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 5 and stated that it had started enforcing the requirement that all projects remain within the DPKO/DFS established fund ceiling and that it would amend its SOP to include a requirement for maximum cost per project. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of amended procedures requiring costs per project not exceed \$100,000 and evidence of compliance therewith.

Monitoring of project implementation was inadequate

35. The UNAMID SOP on CLIPs/CSP requires CSS, in conjunction with its counterparts: SDDRC, UNDP, UNICEF, UNAMID military and police, other substantive sections and an engineer for infrastructure projects, to carry out monthly monitoring visits to project sites throughout the project cycle. The SOP also requires implementing partners to submit monthly project implementation progress reports and a further progress report when requesting for second and third instalment using prescribed forms.

36. A review of all the 36 project files indicated that CSS and its counterparts: (a) did not undertake any on-site monitoring visits to 7 of the 36 projects implemented; and (b) undertook a total of 14 out of 56 expected on-site visits to seven project sites. Implementing partners consistently submitted progress reports at the time of requesting for second and third fund disbursements, but did not submit routine monthly project implementation progress reports. CSS attributed the inadequate on-site project visits and the lack of follow-up on routine monthly progress reports with implementing partners to staffing constraints and limited availability of UNAMID flights to project locations. However, OIOS is of the view that CSS did not efficiently and effectively deploy its staff to monitor the 2015/16 projects.

37. Inadequate monitoring visits to project sites by CSS: (a) precluded management from getting independent assurances that implementing partners were delivering vocational skills training to youth at risk during project implementation as a required objective of the programme, and (b) contributed to delays, averaging 3.5 months, in completing 27 out of 36 projects. Moreover, the absence of an engineer during infrastructure project monitoring resulted in unmitigated financial and reputation risk to the Mission because the implementing partners could erect defective or substandard infrastructure.

(6) UNAMID should take steps to reallocate staff resources so that ongoing projects are closely monitored giving due regard to their complexity and cost.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 6 and stated that CSS in collaboration with Mission components and other stakeholders would continue to monitor ongoing projects in accordance with the visit plan as enshrined in the procedures. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence that ongoing projects are closely monitored in accordance with the visit plan included in the CSS SOPs.

There was a need for projects/programme evaluation

38. The DPKO/DFS guidelines on reinsertion programmes require the Chief of CSS to ensure that a yearly overall evaluation of the reinsertion programme is conducted by external consultants to: assess the impact of the reinsertion projects; help in planning and budgeting; inform resource mobilization for the complementary reintegration programme for the sustainability of the reinsertion projects; and recommend possible adjustments to improve project implementation. The UNAMID SOP on CLIPs/CSPs requires CSS to undertake project evaluation three months after formal handover of the projects to determine the relevance of objectives, effectiveness of design and implementation, efficiency of use of resources, impact on the beneficiaries and sustainability of the results.

39. CSS had engaged a national consultant to undertake programme evaluation in November 2015. However, the scope of the evaluation was limited and the evaluation report was never finalized. Moreover, CSS did not evaluate 18 completed projects costing \$1.6 million three months after the projects were handed over to the beneficiaries. OIOS also noted that CSS clustered 12 out of 15 projects implemented in the 2015/16 fiscal year in two localities (five in Um Baru and seven in Thadelti) as opposed to an approach used in 2014/15 of implementing projects in all Darfur states. CSS advised that this approach was adopted because, with their limited resources, it was difficult to manage projects in all states.

40. CSS staff stated that no internal project evaluation was done because the position of a monitoring and evaluation officer was abolished on 27 August 2014. However, in September 2016, UNAMID engaged an individual consultant who was evaluating the impact of completed projects at the time of this audit.

41. Due to inadequate evaluation of CLIPs/CSPs project activities, CSS management was unable to adequately determine the impact of projects implemented and whether they were achieving the intended objectives or have current useful information to update its strategy for future projects.

(7) UNAMID should take steps to: (a) ensure that funds are allocated to engage the services of an external consultant to evaluate the community stabilization programme annually; and (b) ensure that the ongoing internal evaluation of projects is expeditiously concluded.

UNAMID accepted recommendation 7 and stated that: (a) it submitted a budget proposal for the services of an external consultant to evaluate all the Mission's substantive programmes including the community stabilization programme for financial year 2017/18, although this request could be negatively impacted by the ongoing restructuring; and (b) the internal evaluation of community stabilization projects had been concluded. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the community stabilization programme has been evaluated and a copy of the final report on the internal evaluation of projects.

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

42. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of UNAMID for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the community stabilization programme in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	C/ O ³	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁴
1	UNAMID should take steps to ensure that military staff officers attached to the Ceasefire Commission are instructed to retain documentary evidence of the verification and registration of ex-combatants, including persons associated with the armed forces and groups (if any) and surrendered weapons for the disarmament exercises that they monitor.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that UNAMID has issued instructions to the Ceasefire Commission staff on the need to complete and retain documents pertaining to the monitored disarmament exercises, and compliance with such instructions.	30 September 2017
2	UNAMID should take steps to proactively engage with the host government in ensuring that the Mission's mandate of supporting the small arms and light weapons control programme in Darfur is achieved.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that senior UNAMID management has proactively engaged with the host government in pushing for progress in implementing the small arms and light weapons programme.	31 December 2017
3	UNAMID should take steps to expedite the establishment of an inter-agency community stabilization task force to better coordinate the joint need assessments, projects implementation and subsequently ensure sustainability of community stabilization projects.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that inter-agency community stabilization task force is established and working according to its terms of reference.	31 December 2017
4	UNAMID should: (a) develop a list of pre-assessed community stabilization project implementing partners in liaison with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme and the Civil Affairs Section; and (b) enforce its procedures requiring the soliciting of competitive bids from implementing partners for all projects or document	Important	O	Receipt of: (a) a copy of the list of pre-assessed community stabilization project implementing partners and evidence that it is being used to competitively select implementing partners to the extent possible; and (b) amended procedures giving guidance to staff on the necessary waiver approval process for cases where competitive bidding is not possible.	31 December 2017

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

³ C = closed, O = open

⁴ Date provided by UNAMID in response to recommendations.

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the community stabilization programme in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	C/ O ³	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁴
	the justification why competitive evaluation cannot be done.				
5	UNAMID should put measures in place to ensure that the Community Stabilization Section justifies and obtains approval of the Field Budget and Finance Division in the Department of Field Support for any project that exceeds \$100,000.	Important	O	Receipt of amended procedures requiring costs per project not exceed \$100,000 and evidence of compliance therewith.	31 December 2017
6	UNAMID should take steps to reallocate staff resources so that ongoing projects are closely monitored giving due regard to their complexity and cost.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that ongoing projects are closely monitored in accordance with the visit plan as enshrined in the CSS standard operating procedures	31 December 2017
7	UNAMID should take steps to: (a) ensure that funds are allocated to engage the services of an external consultant to evaluate the community stabilization programme annually, and (b) ensure that the on-going internal evaluation of projects is expeditiously concluded.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that the community stabilization programme has been evaluated and a copy of the final report on the internal evaluation of projects.	31 December 2017

APPENDIX I

Management Response

AFRICAN UNION
الإتحاد الأفريقي



UNAMID



UNITED NATIONS
الأمم المتحدة

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Office of the Joint Special Representative

20 July 2017

To: Mr. Bolton Tarleh Nyema, Chief
Peacekeeping Audit Service
Internal Audit Division, OIOS

From: Jeremiah Mamabolo, Joint Special Representative
UNAMID

Subject: **Draft report on an audit of community stabilization programmes in the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur**

1. With reference to your memorandum dated 6 July 2017 on the abovementioned draft audit report, please find attached UNAMID's response (Appendix 1 to the draft report) for your consideration.
2. I further confirm the factual accuracy of the report.

Best Regards.

cc: Ms. Bintou Keita, Deputy Joint Special Representative, UNAMID
Maj. Gen. Fida Hussain Malik, Acting Force Commander, UNAMID
Mr. Aderemi Adekoya, Chief, Community Stabilization Section, UNAMID
Ms. Dorothy Choto, Audit Focal Point, UNAMID
Mr. Alexandre Etocke, Chief Resident Auditor, UNAMID, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo, Professional Practices Section, Internal Audit Division, OIOS

Management Response

Audit of community stabilization programmes in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	UNAMID should take steps to ensure that military staff officers attached to the Ceasefire Commission are instructed to retain documentary evidence of the verification and registration of ex-combatants, including persons associated with the armed forces and groups (if any) and surrendered weapons for the disarmament exercises that they monitor	Important	Yes	Chief CSS and CSS Team Leaders	30 September 2017	UNAMID will ensure that the military staff officers attached to the Ceasefire Commission are instructed to retain relevant documentary evidence of the verification and registration of ex-combatants and surrendered weapons for the disarmament exercises, including persons associated with the armed forces and groups (if any).
2	UNAMID should take steps to proactively engage with the host government in ensuring that the Mission's mandate of supporting the small arms and light weapons control programme in Darfur is achieved.	Important	Yes	Chief CSS,	31 December 2017	UNAMID is poised to support national policies and action plan for the control of small arms and light weapons and will take steps to continue proactive engagement with the host government in this regard.
3	UNAMID should take steps to expedite the establishment of an inter-agency community stability taskforce to better coordinate the joint need assessments, projects implementation and subsequently ensure sustainability of community stabilization projects.	Important	Yes	Chief CSS,	31 December 2017	UNAMID will take steps to expedite the establishment of the inter-agency community stability task force for better coordination of joint needs assessment, project implementation and subsequently to ensure sustainability of community stabilization projects.
4	UNAMID should: (a) develop a list of pre-assessed community stabilization project implementing partners in liaison with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations	Important	Yes	Chief CSS,	31 December 2017	a. UNAMID is in the process of collating and developing the list of pre-assessed community stabilization project implementing partners with relevant stakeholders. This will be

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

Management Response

Audit of community stabilization programmes in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
	Development Programme and the Civil Affairs Section, and (b) enforce its procedures requiring the soliciting of competitive bids from implementing partners for all projects or document the justification why competitive evaluation cannot be done.					finalized before the next phase of community stabilization projects implementation. b. The community stabilization projects standard operating procedure is in the process of review to incorporate relevant actions relating to bidding processes and justifications to waive a bidding process where necessary.
5	UNAMID should put measures in place to ensure that the Community Stabilization Section justifies and obtains approval of the Field Budget and Finance Division in the Department of Field Support for all projects that exceed the maximum limit of \$100,000 as required.	Important	Yes	Chief CSS	31 December 2017	From the 2016-17 fiscal year it is now being enforced that all projects remain within the DPKO/DFS established fund ceiling. This requirement will also be clearly indicated in the community stabilization projects standard operating procedure that is currently being reviewed.
6	UNAMID should take steps to reallocate staff resources so that ongoing projects are closely monitored giving due regard to their complexity and cost.	Important	Yes	Chief CSS,	31 December 2017	Further reallocation of staff resources cannot be undertaken due to the ongoing restructuring in UNAMID. However, CSS in collaboration with mission components and other stakeholders will continue to monitor its ongoing project in accordance with the visit plan as enshrined in the CSP SOP as effective, realistic and practicable.
7	UNAMID should take steps to: (a) ensure that funds are allocated to engage the services of an external consultant to evaluate the community stabilization programme annually, and (b) ensure that	Important	Yes	Chief CSS	31 December 2017	a. UNAMID submitted a budget proposal for the services of an external consultant to evaluate all the mission's substantive programmes including community stabilization programme

Management Response

Audit of community stabilization programmes in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
	the on-going internal evaluation of projects is expeditiously concluded.					in the 2017/18 fiscal year. However, this request may be negatively impacted by the ongoing restructuring. b. The internal evaluation of community stabilization projects has been concluded.