Audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Joint mission analysis operations needed to be improved to effectively address the demanding information/intelligence needs of the Mission

14 December 2020
Assignment No. AP2019-672-02
Audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The objective of the audit was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations and management of JMAC in UNIFIL. The audit covered the period from January 2018 to March 2020 and included governance mechanisms for information collection and analysis, planning and implementation of JMAC activities, and sharing of information and analyses.

UNIFIL established an appropriate structure for JMAC and implemented a JMAC-led Information Community to coordinate the acquisition and analysis of information to meet the situational awareness needs of the Head of Mission/Force Commander (HoM/FC). In February 2020, UNIFIL also established the Mission Intelligence Coordination Mechanism to direct and oversee the peacekeeping intelligence cycle within the Mission. However, the Mission’s change management process was ineffective as it did not adopt emerging concepts, tools and methodologies on joint mission analysis in a timely manner. Also, JMAC’s staffing was not aligned to its operational requirements.

OIOS made seven recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, UNIFIL needed to:

- Implement a change management process to ensure new policies and initiatives on peacekeeping intelligence are successfully rolled out;
- Explore the possibilities of establishing formal, operational level arrangements for sharing intelligence information between the Mission and the United Nations Country Team;
- Align JMAC’s staffing to its operational requirements by actively engaging with the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) at United Nations Headquarters on its requirements for peacekeeping intelligence expertise, and assessing the continued suitability of uniformed personnel filling the position of the Deputy Chief in JMAC;
- Ensure that the Mission’s Priority Information Requirements are regularly reviewed and revised and JMAC work plans are timely updated to address changes in the Mission’s environment;
- Enhance the management of the analytical process in JMAC by providing adequate guidance to relevant staff on all stages of the intelligence cycle; streamlining the quality assurance process including the feedback mechanism; and leveraging tools used by other Mission components;
- Evaluate the quality, utility and relevance of JMAC products periodically to ensure that adequate analyses are provided for all the information requirements of the HoM/FC; and
- Improve JMAC’s information handling and storage capabilities to ensure the safe flow of information between JMAC and other Mission components.

UNIFIL accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement them.
CONTENTS

I. BACKGROUND 1

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 1-2

III. AUDIT RESULTS 2-10

A. Governance mechanisms 2-6

B. Planning and implementation of JMAC activities 6-9

C. Sharing of information and analyses 10

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 10

ANNEX I Status of audit recommendations

APPENDIX I Management response
Audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

2. UNIFIL conducts a wide range of mandated activities in a complex and demanding environment within the host country and region. Accordingly, it is essential that the Head of Mission/Force Commander (HoM/FC) and other members of the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) have available a robust capacity to analyze and assess key events, incidents, development patterns and trends concerning regional and organizational issues that may have implications for the implementation of the Mission’s mandate.

3. JMAC was established in UNIFIL in 2009 and has the core function to generate integrated analysis and predictive assessments, and provide the HoM/FC and MLT with an incisive understanding of issues, trends and threats and their implications for strategic and operational decisions that may impact mandate implementation and the security of United Nations personnel, assets and premises. JMAC’s work also supports strategic, operational and contingency planning and contributes to overall crisis management through the provision of integrated threat assessments and other analytical products and services. JMAC works in coordination with the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), which handles day-to-day situational awareness and crisis management.

4. JMAC is located within the Office of the Principal Coordination Officer. The Section is headed by a Chief at the P-5 level who reports to the HoM/FC through the Principal Coordinator at the D-1 level. The Chief of JMAC is supported by nine civilian and three uniformed personnel. Two General Temporary Assistance positions at the P-3 level were converted to regular posts while one vacant National Professional Officer position was abolished in 2019/20. One vacant civilian position at the P-3 level was loaned to the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System function within the Mission.

5. The approved budgets for 2018/19 and 2019/20 were $1.67 million and $1.53 million respectively as shown in Table 1. The official travel budget was mainly used to attend workshops and conferences and provide training to personnel to strengthen their capacity to undertake multi-source integrated analysis and predictive assessments.

Table 1
UNIFIL Joint Mission Analysis Centre budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost item</th>
<th>2018/19</th>
<th>2019/20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>$1 660 820</td>
<td>$1 519 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Travel</td>
<td>7 239</td>
<td>6 802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1 668 059</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1 526 402</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNIFIL approved costing sheets and funds distribution

6. Comments provided by UNIFIL are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

7. The objective of the audit was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations and management of JMAC in UNIFIL
8. This audit was included in the 2019 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the criticality of information gathering and analysis activities in supporting the leadership of the Mission in the area of planning and decision-making. Moreover, JMAC had not been audited previously by OIOS.

9. OIOS conducted this audit from February to August 2020. The audit covered the period from January 2018 to March 2020. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risks areas in JMAC operations, which included: (a) governance mechanisms for information collection and analysis; (b) planning and implementation of JMAC activities; and (c) sharing of information and analyses.

10. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews with key personnel involved in information gathering and analysis activities; (b) review of relevant documentation; (c) analytical review of key events, incidents, developments, patterns and trends concerning regional and organizational issues; and (d) sample testing of JMAC products using a random sampling approach.

11. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Governance mechanisms

Need to enhance governance mechanisms for joint mission analysis operations

12. The landscape and architecture of joint mission analysis operations has significantly evolved through cumulative updates and directives introduced in the 2010 and 2015 JMAC policies\(^1\) and guidelines, the 2017 UNIFIL strategic review, the 2018 JMAC field handbook, and the 2017 and 2019 peacekeeping intelligence policies from United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ). The JMAC policy and JMAC field handbook provide guidance on how JMACs can best support the implementation of mission mandates and complement mission-specific guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOPs). The handbook tasks the Chief of JMAC with the development and implementation of SOPs, relevant guidance documents and good practices for the whole of JMAC.

13. To effectively manage joint mission analysis operations, UNIFIL was required to timely and proactively adopt new and emerging concepts, tools and methodologies to implement the peacekeeping intelligence cycle to support comprehensive situational awareness, understanding and forecasting. The concept of peacekeeping intelligence cycle was introduced in the 2017 Department of Peace Operations (DPO) Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy to: (a) establish a framework that articulates a consistent and principled approach to peacekeeping intelligence; (b) ensure the most effective utilization of available resources; (c) establish a robust regime of oversight, accountability and continuous improvement; and (d) enact mechanisms to enable an effective, integrated and secure whole-of-mission approach. It comprises tasking/direction; information acquisition, collation, evaluation and analysis; and dissemination of analytical products.

14. Despite recent changes to relevant Organization-wide policies as outlined above, JMAC operations in UNIFIL were being guided principally by its 2009 SOPs, which were based on an outdated architecture of JMACs and their working methods. For example, the 2009 SOPs did not include: (a) the concept of managing an intelligence cycle, which is considered a more effective way of processing information and

\(^1\) The Department of Peace Operations released an updated JMAC policy in May 2020
turning it into relevant and actionable intelligence; (b) the consideration of analytical opportunities, beyond risks and threats that could be exploited by the HoM/FC and MLT in implementing the mandate; and (c) the underlying technology systems for information storage and retrieval, which had moved away from mission-specific shared drives to enterprise cloud-based services.

15. It was only in February 2020 that the Mission established the Mission Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM)\(^2\) as required by the 2017 DPO Peacekeeping Intelligence policy. The MICM comprises senior representatives of JMAC, JOC, Military Intelligence, the office of Force Commander Special Staff, the Division of Political and Civil Affairs (DPCA) as well as the Deputy Chief of Staff – Operations, and the Chief Security Officer and is responsible for directing the peacekeeping intelligence cycle.

16. Attempts by JMAC to implement the policy had stagnated for two years due to reservations by other analytical components on the functions and jurisdiction of the proposed coordination mechanism. JMAC had not received management support in its quest to address these reservations. Although the Mission had established the MICM, its terms of reference expressly precluded it from tasking, through its chair, other members of the mechanism as envisaged in the policy. The terms of reference also made it optional for pillars to share pillar-specific analysis with the chair of the MICM. This had the effect of substantially reducing the jurisdiction of the MICM in the management of peacekeeping intelligence and negated the objective of an integrated approach to peacekeeping intelligence. JMAC’s engagement with the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) at UNHQ for guidance to address the unique situation in the Mission did not resolve the impasse. In UNIFIL, both JMAC and the military intelligence unit, through the military Chief of Staff, reported directly to the Head of Mission who also serves as the Force Commander, a scenario that was not envisioned in the policy.

17. Additionally, the Mission was yet to implement the other three management tools of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle as required by the policy, i.e., the mission intelligence acquisition plan; the mission intelligence support plan; and the confidential document registry and access matrix. The Mission was therefore yet to translate the strategic direction of the HoM/FC and MLT into tangible intelligence requirements; define the boundaries within which the peacekeeping intelligence cycle would be executed; and develop a reference guide for the dissemination of peacekeeping intelligence.

18. The above occurred because UNIFIL did not have an effective change management mechanism to ensure initiatives rolled out by Headquarters are successfully implemented as envisaged and sustained. As a result, guidance for JMAC’s operations had not evolved to effectively handle the complex demands of the Mission’s situational awareness needs. Additionally, JMAC had not proactively incorporated best practices into its operations in a timely manner to best support the implementation of the Mission’s mandate. After the audit, UNIFIL approved a Mission Intelligence Support Plan and a Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan. It also issued a revised SOP on JMAC.

| 1 | UNIFIL should implement a change management process to ensure new policies and initiatives instituted by DPO on peacekeeping intelligence are successfully rolled out. This should include aligning Mission-specific guidance, structures and documentation with current requirements and consulting with DPO on resolving any challenges. |

\(^2\) MICM is a management tool of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle. Its purpose is to operationalize the central control and direction of the mission's peacekeeping-intelligence system by ensuring a close connection between the acquisition and analysis activities of all participating mission entities and the requirements of senior mission leadership. It also operationalizes appropriate oversight and accountability of the mission's peacekeeping-intelligence management processes.
UNIFIL accepted recommendation 1 and stated UNIFIL specific policies had been updated in line with the latest revised DPO policy on JMAC received in May 2020. A change management process had been instigated in this new policy by assigning responsibility and accountability to ensure that policy revisions are included in annual JMAC workplans and performance documents of the Chief of JMAC. As the new Mission-specific guidance was only issued effective 1 October 2020, there was insufficient evidence to evaluate implementation of the change management process and recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence of such implementation.

Information coordination needed to be enhanced

19. To enhance the operations of JMAC towards achieving comprehensive situational awareness and understanding, the Mission established a JMAC-coordinated Information Community comprising personnel from the military, security, political and civil affairs pillars, with regular membership from seven other mission entities. The Information Community provided a framework within which the multi-disciplinary analytical entities shared information with each other and had, as its main implementation mechanisms, the Situational Awareness Cell (SAC) and Threat Assessment Group (TAG).

20. The other core members of the Information Community seconded their representatives to SAC and TAG and granted JMAC complimentary access to their information databases, with technical support from the Geographic Information Systems Unit (GIS). The members also shared relevant reports and code cables with JMAC. Over the audit period, members of the Information Community met regularly and contributed to the generation of JMAC products. JMAC also participated in meetings that were led by other members of the Information Community, such as the bi-weekly information sharing committee, the military information officers meeting, the reporting working group, and the inter-agency meeting for sharing operational information with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). At an operational level, JMAC established daily information sharing meetings where its personnel exchanged information with representatives from the core members of the Information Community.

21. However, OIOS observed the following shortcomings in the coordination of information:

- Similar to JMAC, the Information Community had yet to adopt the peacekeeping intelligence cycle approach as the SOP on Information Community had not been updated to incorporate best practices and lessons learned since 2010. Also, the SOP did not specify the seniority levels of the representatives assigned to the community to ensure that they have the substantive capacity to represent their entities and be of value to the community.

- The daily information sharing meetings between JMAC staff and representatives from other entities were informal and the attendees did not debrief their individual units on information shared in such meetings. Additionally, some representatives did not possess the required language skills and JMAC staff spent more time on guiding them to understand its intelligence needs before they are able to contribute effectively. Although JMAC had established protocols for sharing information with other Mission components, collaboration between JMAC personnel and staff in those components was driven by personal relations rather than established institutional protocols.

3 The core members of the UNIFIL Information Community were JMAC, Military Intelligence - J2, Security Information and Operations Centre (SIOC) and DPCA
4 The regular members of the Information Community were JOC, Civil Military Coordination, Chief Liaison Officer, Force Provost Marshal, Observer Group Lebanon, Mission Support Centre and the Military Community Outreach Unit
JMAC staff liaised informally with counterparts in four\(^5\) organizations of the United Nations country team (UNCT) and two\(^6\) other external organizations although no formal protocols had been established for sharing information between them.

22. The above occurred because the Mission had not aligned its information coordination systems with the actual requirements that had been identified in the purpose, scope and rationale of the Information Community SOP, and in the 2017 UNIFIL strategic review to ensure their effectiveness. For example, JMAC and JOC jointly handled the full spectrum of situational awareness but maintained separate reporting lines to the Head of Mission despite the desired objective to provide "one (information) picture by one single interlocutor focused on force protection". Members of the Information Community deployed disparate information systems despite the objective to use one common secure electronic communication system and develop one common data storage and retrieval system. Moreover, Mission management was of the view that the informal engagement between DPCA and members of the UNCT was sufficient for the Mission’s intelligence needs. The Mission had not yet explored possibilities to establish formal, operational level arrangements for sharing information with UNCT.

23. As a result, the activities of the Information Community were not effectively coordinated to achieve the whole-of-mission approach to peacekeeping intelligence that makes full use of all resources available to the Mission in accordance to their comparative advantages. After the audit, the Mission revised the SOP on JMAC, which clarified the requirement to nominate participants with appropriate seniority and/or substance matter expertise within the Information Community. The SOP also embedded the concepts of the newly developed Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan and Mission Intelligence Support Plan and provided a coordinated approach to the Mission’s intelligence requirements. UNIFIL, however, still needed to establish formal arrangements for sharing information with UNCT.

(2) UNIFIL should explore the possibilities of establishing formal, operational level arrangements for sharing intelligence information between the Mission and the United Nations country team.

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the Mission would establish formal arrangements for sharing information with UNCT at the operational level. Recommendation 2 remains open pending the establishment of formal arrangements for sharing intelligence information between the Mission and UNCT.

The Mission needed to align JMAC staffing to information analysis requirements

24. UNIFIL deployed an appropriate structure for JMAC comprising nine civilian and three uniformed personnel, which was sufficient for its size and mandate. JMAC also identified suitable external training programmes to which it enrolled its civilian personnel, on a rotating basis, to strengthen their capacity to undertake multi-source integrated analysis and predictive assessments. All its civilian personnel had duly completed the mandatory training in the pertinent courses, but the uniformed personnel had not received formal training on information security awareness and information sensitivity in peacekeeping operations since these courses were only available for civilian staff members. The uniformed personnel were provided access and undertook the courses after the audit.

25. As a general practice, the post of Deputy Chief, JMAC is filled by a civilian staff although the JMAC policy and field handbook note some exception as in the case of UNIFIL where the position is filled

\(^5\) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)

\(^6\) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
by a military officer as decided by Mission leadership in consultation with UNOCC and the relevant Integrated Operation Team in DPO. The military officers assigned to the role were being rotated every six months and did not always have experience or expertise in peacekeeping intelligence or the Mission’s area of operation. As a result, JMAC was constantly inducting and training incoming personnel, who were rotated out as they were becoming familiar with the operations. This created extra workload for the team and impacted on JMAC operational efficiency. UNIFIL had yet to provide feedback to the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) at UNHQ, which is responsible for recruiting military officers, on its requirements for the Deputy Chief, JMAC position, or to reassess the continued need to have the position filled by a military officer since it took the decision in 2009.

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**Recommendation 3**

UNIFIL should take action to align the Joint Mission Analysis Centre’s (JMAC) staffing to its operational requirements by: (a) actively engaging with the Office of Military Affairs at United Nations Headquarters to ensure that it considers the exceptional requirements of peacekeeping intelligence expertise in engaging uniformed personnel for the Mission; and (b) assessing the continued suitability of uniformed personnel filling the position of the Deputy Chief in JMAC.

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it would send an official request to the Military Advisor in OMA requesting assurance that he would consider the Mission’s requirements for peacekeeping intelligence expertise when engaging uniformed personnel for positions within UNIFIL. JMAC. UNIFIL would also undertake an assessment of the continued suitability of utilizing uniformed personnel in the role of Deputy Chief, JMAC and advise OMA accordingly. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of the communication with OMA on UNIFIL requirements for peacekeeping intelligence expertise and evidence of an assessment of the continued suitability of uniformed personnel filling the position of the Deputy Chief, JMAC.

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**B. Planning and implementation of JMAC activities**

Tasking of JMAC’s work needed to be improved

26. The Mission had identified 19 Priority Information Requirements (PIRs)\(^7\) for the HoM/FC, which were maintained as an annex to the Mission’s Operational Order\(^8\). To supplement this, the HoM/FC provided additional direction and guidance with more granularity to the Chief of JMAC in the course of their regular interactions. JMAC had also developed workplans that were based on the PIRs and provided terms of reference to its personnel.

27. However, the Mission’s PIRs had not been updated since 2016 and did not include timelines and a dissemination matrix. Their effectiveness was therefore limited as a management tool for defining and prioritizing JMAC’s analytical objectives; outlining the scope of their work, types of analyses and products and delivery dates; and recipients of final products. Moreover, the PIRs were not comprehensive enough to direct collection of information and analysis on additional mandate areas such as the protection of civilians, or on emerging issues such as the financial and socioeconomic crisis in the host country, which JMAC found pertinent to mandate implementation. JMAC had also not developed an information acquisition plan as required by the JMAC policy to guide the information collection effort.

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\(^7\) Information requirements are a management tool that outlines the scope of work for JMAC and the types of analysis products required, their production deadline and dissemination. Information requirements inform the development of the JMAC Collection Plan and are classified by order of priority.

\(^8\) UNIFIL’s current Operational Order is ‘Op-Order 6’
28. The above occurred because UNIFIL was not systematically reviewing the PIRs and revising them as necessary, and reviewing and updating the JMAC work plan based on changes in the Mission environment. UNIFIL had also not implemented the prescribed mechanism for turning proposals from JMAC into information requirements and relied more on ad-hoc tasking of JMAC by the HoM/FC.

29. As a result, JMAC’s operations were not sufficiently guided and there was a risk that its analytical products may not provide the necessary information in a timely manner.

(4) UNIFIL should implement a monitoring mechanism to ensure that: (i) the Mission’s Priority Information Requirements are regularly reviewed and revised; and (ii) the work plans of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre are timely updated to address any changes in the Mission’s environment.

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the Mission’s PIRs were systematically reviewed and revised on a regular basis and the JMAC workplans were systematically updated regularly as elaborated in the new UNIFIL policy on JMAC. As the policy was only issued effective 1 October 2020, recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of the updated PIRs and JMAC workplan.

Management of the analytical process needed to be streamlined

30. To guide personnel in their work, JMAC developed internal procedures for topical analytical projects as well as projects under the Information Community framework such as the integrated assessments for the HoM/FC and SMT and the SAC and TAG reports. JMAC had also trained its personnel in analytic techniques. However, OIOS observed the following regarding the management of the analytical process:

• Whilst the internal procedures provided direction and guidance to personnel on the analysis stage of the intelligence cycle, JMAC had not instituted formal guidance for the preceding stages (acquisition, examination and collation), or for the ensuing stage (dissemination). JMAC personnel were therefore not adequately guided through the full spectrum of the intelligence cycle. Furthermore, JMAC had not instituted guidance for the preparation of the weekly and integrated assessments;

• The internal procedures for analytical projects did not include substantive guidelines on peer review standards and feedback mechanisms, and therefore left reviewers to use their own subjective professional judgement when reviewing other analysts’ work. The quality assurance process for JMACs products was therefore incomplete;

• There was not a mechanism to determine whether other analytical components in the Mission were handling similar projects to avoid duplication of efforts. For example, JMAC and DCPA had a similar focus on local and regional geo-political, socioeconomic and popular movements. JMAC and J2 also monitored non-state actors, violations and military engagements within the area of operation; and

• JMAC personnel used traditional methods for media monitoring such as a social media dashboard application and following persons-of-interest using dummy social media accounts, despite other Mission components such as the Strategic Communications and Public Information Section (SCPI) having automated tools for such activities. JMAC staff were also subjected to websense restrictions on the Mission’s internet network though the JMAC policy categorically exempts them from such restrictions.
31. The above occurred because JMAC had not prioritized the management of all stages of the intelligence cycle or standardized its peer review mechanism to ensure the consistent quality of its products. It had also not made deliberate efforts to leverage existing mission resources for acquiring and analyzing information. As a result, the quality assurance process for JMAC’s products was subjective, media monitoring was labour-intensive, and JMAC personnel did not always receive feedback on analytical projects from their Chief to inform their subsequent analyses.

(5) UNIFIL should enhance the management of the analytical process in the Joint Mission Analysis Centre by: (a) providing adequate guidance to relevant staff on all stages of the intelligence cycle; (b) streamlining the quality assurance process including the feedback mechanism; and (c) leveraging tools used by other Mission components according to their comparative advantages.

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the Mission would release an internal document to guide staff on all stages of the intelligence cycle, as well as on peer review standards and feedback mechanisms for analytical projects. JMAC had begun leveraging the tools of GIS and working with SCPI to share information and identify and utilize monitoring tools that add value to its work and products. Recommendation 5 remains open pending the release of the internal guidance and evidence of JMAC leveraging of tools used by other Mission components for acquiring and analyzing information.

The Mission needed to evaluate the quality, utility and relevance of JMAC’s analytical products

32. JMAC regularly generated various analytical products spread across six major categories (as shown in Table 2) for the consumption of the HoM/FC, MLT and other Mission analytical components. During the audit period, JMAC was solely responsible for generating topical analytical reports as its flagship product, as well as weekly assessments. Occasionally, it also generated miscellaneous and ad hoc reports. Collaboratively with other Mission components of the Information Community, JMAC generated integrated assessments for the HoM/FC’s monthly briefing, integrated assessments for the SMT, SAC reports, and TAG reports as per Table 2.

Table 2
UNIFIL Joint Mission Analysis Centre regular products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Category/Name</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual reports of JMAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topical Analytical Report (flagship product)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Assessment</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative reports of the Information Community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Assessment for the HoM/FC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Assessment for the SMT</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC reports</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG reports</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>104</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JMAC repository on the UNIFIL COSMOS site

*The reports reviewed for the year 2020 were up to 31 March

33. A review of 53 out of 236 products indicated that they were the result of multi-source information and focused on analysis and assessment. However, OIOS observed the following:

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9 Renamed Weekly Situational Outlook in April 2020
• Though the Chief, JMAC provided the HoM/FC with regular oral briefings, analytical reports covering two of the three significant incidents that occurred during the audit period. These were issued between 11 and 13 days after the onset of those incidents and were therefore not timely for Mission decision-making and crisis management;

• JMAC had identified important geographic, organizational and thematic areas of interest and assigned them to different personnel for analytical coverage. However, analytical products for refugee camps, an area of interest and deemed important to mandate implementation and specifically identified as a PIR\(^\text{10}\) for the HoM/FC, had not been covered since January 2019 when the responsible person went on extended leave;

• JMAC had not updated, for more than three years, the profiles of persons who could have significant influence on the implementation of the Mission’s mandate and had not developed a suitable alternative product;

• Threat Warning Messages\(^\text{11}\) required validation and update at least every six weeks (or more frequently as needed) as per the established procedures of the Threat Assessment Group. However, 11 out of 15 validation exercises over the audit period were carried out after longer cycles of two months resulting in many lapses of the validity of the previous assessments; and

• Four weekly assessments\(^\text{12}\) between January and March 2020 were replicative of each other and covered events and incidents that were out of scope. During the audit, JMAC redesigned the form and content of this product to provide a snapshot of the immediate past, current and potential future events, incidents, developments, threats and trends that could affect mandate implementation.

34. The above occurred because JMAC did not evaluate the quality and utility of its analytical products and their relevance to the situational awareness needs of Mission management in the face of competing information interests. As a result, adequate analytical coverage was not provided for the Mission’s intelligence needs and Mission management was not effectively apprised of opportunities in a timely manner in order to inform their decision-making.

| (6) UNIFIL should evaluate the quality, utility and relevance of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre’s analytical products periodically to ensure that adequate analyses are provided for the information requirements of the Head of Mission/Force Commander. |

**UNIFIL** accepted recommendation 6 and stated that the HoM/FC and/or MLT provided feedback on the Information Community’s products, which were discussed and adjusted within MICM, and lessons learned/best practices identified. This had been formalized in policy in the new UNIFIL SOP on JMAC. As the policy was only issued effective 1 October 2020, recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of the first formal evaluation of the quality, utility and relevance of JMAC’s products.

\(^{10}\) PIR no. 6

\(^{11}\) Threat Warning Messages is an integrated threat assessment for threats or potential threats against the Mission and its mandate. A collaborative product of the Information Community.

\(^{12}\) Weekly assessments were designed as a snapshot that draws Mission management’s attention to the immediate past, current and potential future events, incidents, developments, trends and patterns that could affect mandate implementation, and their implication.
C. Sharing of information and analyses

Storage and handling of information needed to be improved

35. To store and disseminate intelligence information, JMAC utilized emails, code cables, shared drives and a repository on the Mission’s secure intranet site where it published its products and shared them with other Mission components with privileged access. The shared drive and intranet repositories were adequately designed to provide three levels of access to different users according to their functional privileges. As at May 2020, JMAC had granted access to the intranet repository based on the “need to know” and “need to share” concepts to 117 personnel (37 civilian and 80 uniformed) across three missions.

36. However, JMAC had not established an access matrix to control the flow of materials it generated, nor a registry to record incoming and outgoing products. This was contrary to the JMAC field handbook, which required the Mission to establish an appropriate registry and access matrix to document the safe flow and circulation of information within JMAC, and between JMAC and other Mission components as well as entities outside the Mission. Further, the products in the repository were not secured with information rights management features and could be downloaded and easily shared by those who had access to the site. This was especially the case for four of the six regular product lines outlined in Table 2, which had not been classified although they contained sensitive information.

37. The above occurred because JMAC had not duly considered the safe flow of information between JMAC and other Mission components and for the information security for its published outputs. As a result, JMAC’s mechanism for receipt and dissemination of information was not systematically guided and the security and confidentiality of sensitive information was not effectively managed.

(7) UNIFIL should enhance the information handling and storage capabilities of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre by: (a) establishing an appropriate registry and access matrix to guide the receipt and dissemination of information process; and (b) instituting information storage measures that ensure information security is maintained.

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 7 and stated that the Unite Workspace project, led by the Office of Information and Communication Technology (OICT), was being implemented in the Mission and would allow efficient storage and sharing of items and facilitate information sharing between various UNIFIL sections with authorized access. The project would ensure security classification of confidential information (off-premises) and strictly confidential information (on-premises). Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of evidence of full implementation of the OICT Unite Workspace Project in UNIFIL.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

38. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of UNIFIL for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

13 UNIFIL, UNDOF and UNTSO
### STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in UNIFIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical(^{14}/) Important(^{15})</th>
<th>C/ O(^{16})</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date(^{17})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNIFIL should implement a change management process to ensure new policies and initiatives instituted by DPO on peacekeeping intelligence are successfully rolled out. This should include aligning Mission-specific guidance, structures and documentation with current requirements and consulting with DPO on resolving any challenges.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of evidence of the change management process implemented to roll out DPO policies and initiatives on peacekeeping intelligence</td>
<td>1 April 2021</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNIFIL should explore the possibilities of establishing formal, operational level arrangements for sharing intelligence information between the Mission and the United Nations country team.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of evidence that formal arrangements have been established for sharing intelligence information between UNIFIL and UNCT at the operational level.</td>
<td>1 July 2021</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>UNIFIL should take action to align the Joint Mission Analysis Centre’s (JMAC) staffing to its operational requirements by: (a) actively engaging with the Office of Military Affairs at United Nations Headquarters to ensure that it considers the exceptional requirements of peacekeeping intelligence expertise in engaging uniformed personnel for the Mission; and (b) assessing the continued suitability of uniformed personnel filling the position of the Deputy Chief in JMAC.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the communication with OMA on UNIFIL requirements for peacekeeping intelligence expertise and evidence of an assessment of the continued suitability of uniformed personnel filling the position of the Deputy Chief, JMAC.</td>
<td>1 July 2021</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>UNIFIL should implement a monitoring mechanism to ensure that: (i) the Mission’s Priority Information Requirements are regularly reviewed and revised; and (ii) the work plans of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre are timely updated to address any changes in the Mission’s environment.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the updated PIRs and JMAC workplan.</td>
<td>1 July 2021</td>
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\(^{14}\) Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.

\(^{15}\) Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.

\(^{16}\) Please note the value C denotes closed recommendations whereas O refers to open recommendations.

\(^{17}\) Date provided by UNIFIL in response to recommendations.
### STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in UNIFIL

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<td>5</td>
<td>UNIFIL should enhance the management of the analytical process in the Joint Mission Analysis Centre by: (a) providing adequate guidance to relevant staff on all stages of the intelligence cycle; (b) streamlining the quality assurance process including the feedback mechanism; and (c) leveraging tools used by other Mission components according to their comparative advantages.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the internal guidance on all stages of the intelligence cycle and evidence of JMAC leveraging of tools used by other Mission components for acquiring and analyzing information.</td>
<td>1 April 2021</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UNIFIL should evaluate the quality, utility and relevance of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre’s analytical products periodically to ensure that adequate analyses are provided for the information requirements of the Head of Mission/Force Commander.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the first formal evaluation of the quality, utility and relevance of JMAC’s products.</td>
<td>1 July 2021</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>UNIFIL should enhance the information handling and storage capabilities of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre by: (a) establishing an appropriate registry and access matrix to guide the receipt and dissemination of information process; and (b) instituting information storage measures that ensure information security is maintained.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of evidence of full implementation of the OICT Unite Workspace Project in UNIFIL</td>
<td>1 July 2021</td>
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APPENDIX I

Management Response
To: Ms. Eleanor T. Burns, Director  
Internal Audit Division, OIOS  

From: Major-General Stefano Del Col, Head of Mission and Force Commander, UNIFIL  

Subject: Draft report on an audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Center in UNIFIL  
(Assignment No. AP2019/672/02)  

1. We refer to your memorandum on the above subject, reference No. OIOS-2020-O1707 dated 17 November 2020. Please find attached, UNIFIL’s response to the recommendations contained in the subject Draft Report.  

2. In following the usual procedure, copies of any supporting documents will only be provided to MERAO based at UNIFIL HQ and will not be transmitted to you with this Mission’s response.  

Best regards.  

Cc: Mr. Effendi Syukur, Audit Focal Point, UNIFIL  
Mr. Ibrahim Bah, Chief, MERAO, Internal Audit Division, OIOS  
Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo, Professional Practices Section, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
### Management Response

**Audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical¹/ Important²</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNIFIL should implement a change management process to ensure new policies and initiatives instituted by DPO on peacekeeping intelligence are successfully rolled out. This should include aligning Mission-specific guidance, structures and documentation with current requirements and consulting with DPO on resolving any challenges.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief JMAC</td>
<td>01 April 2021</td>
<td>Since receiving the revised DPO Policy on JMAC (Ref 2020.06, 01 May 2020), the UNIFIL specific policies have been revised in accordance with this policy and released as new Mission-specific guidance HOM-POL-20-16. A change management process has been instigated in HOM-POL-20-16 by assigning responsibility and accountability and ensuring that such revisions of policy are included in annual JMAC work plans and the personal (ePAS) work plan of the Chief JMAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNIFIL should explore the possibilities of establishing formal, operational level arrangements for sharing intelligence information between the Mission and the United Nations country team.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief JMAC</td>
<td>01 July 2021</td>
<td>UNIFIL will establish formal arrangements for sharing information between the Mission and UNCT at the operational level.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>UNIFIL should take action to align the Joint Mission Analysis Centre’s (JMAC) staffing to its operational requirements by: (a) actively engaging with the Office of Military Affairs at United Nations Headquarters to ensure that it considers the</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief JMAC</td>
<td>01 July 2021</td>
<td>a) UNIFIL will formally engage OMA and send an official request to the MILAD requesting assurance to consider the requirements of peacekeeping intelligence expertise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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¹ Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.

² Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.
## Management Response

**Audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

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<td>4</td>
<td>UNIFIL should implement a monitoring mechanism to ensure that: (i) the Mission’s Priority Information Requirements are regularly reviewed and revised; and (ii) the work plans of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre are timely updated to address any changes in the Mission’s environment.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief JMAC</td>
<td>01 July 2021</td>
<td>(i) The Mission’s PIRs are systematically reviewed and revised on a regular basis, and (ii) JMAC workplans are systematically updated regularly as elaborated in guidance HOM-POL-20-16 of 01 October 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UNIFIL should enhance the management of the analytical process in the Joint Mission Analysis Centre by: (a) providing adequate guidance to relevant staff on all stages of the intelligence cycle; (b) streamlining the quality assurance process including the feedback mechanism; and (c) leveraging tools used by other Mission components according to their comparative advantages.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief JMAC</td>
<td>01 April 2021</td>
<td>(a) UNIFIL will release an internal guidance document which will provide guidance to staff on the acquisition, examination, collation and dissemination stages of the intelligence cycle. (b) Further, substantive guidelines on peer review standards and feedback mechanisms will be incorporated for analytical projects. (c) JMAC is currently leveraging the technological tools of GIS and working with the SCPI Section to share information and identify and utilize monitoring tools that add value to the work and products of JMAC.</td>
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### APPENDIX I

**Management Response**

**Audit of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

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<td>6</td>
<td>UNIFIL should evaluate the quality, utility and relevance of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre’s analytical products periodically to ensure that adequate analyses are provided for the information requirements of the Head of Mission/Force Commander.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief JMAC</td>
<td>01 July 2021</td>
<td>The HoM/FC and/or the MLT provide feedback on information community’s products, which are discussed and adjusted within the MICM, and lessons learned/best practices are identified. This has been formalized in policy HOM-POL-20-16 and an evaluation is currently underway.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>UNIFIL should enhance the information handling and storage capabilities of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre by: (a) establishing an appropriate registry and access matrix to guide the receipt and dissemination of information process; and (b) instituting information storage measures that ensure information security is maintained.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chief JMAC</td>
<td>01 April 2021</td>
<td>(a) The OICT Unite Workspace project – composed of MS Teams, SharePoint and One Drive - is currently being implemented in UNIFIL. This will allow efficient storage and sharing of items and facilitate information sharing between various UNIFIL sections which have been authorized to access the platform. (b) The OICT Unite project ensures security classification of confidential (off-premises) and strictly confidential (on-premises – UNGSC).</td>
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