Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security

Improved governance arrangements and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes would enhance management of security training functions and increase visibility of the impact of training activities

5 February 2021
Assignment No. AP2019-500-01
Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system (UNSMS) by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). The objective of the audit was to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of DSS implementation of the UNSMS training mechanism to achieve its strategic objectives. The audit covered the period from January 2017 to September 2019 and included: (a) governance arrangements; (b) planning and implementation of training activities; and (c) monitoring and evaluation.

The importance of training on security matters was universally recognized by United Nations entities and the General Assembly. However, as the security management system evolved over the years, DSS was challenged to keep up with security training demands. Improved governance arrangements and management processes for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of training activities would help to mitigate these challenges and make the impact of training more visible within UNSMS and the Department.

OIOS made 11 recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, DSS needed to:

- Establish, in coordination with Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), a governance and prioritization mechanism to develop and adopt a security training guideline and a global learning and development strategy;
- Review, in coordination with IASMN, the terms of reference of the Security Training Working Group;
- Coordinate the identification and prioritization of the Department’s training needs and track and align expenditures with those needs to ensure accountability;
- Ensure complementarity in the use of different funding sources in budgeting for and implementing prioritized training activities;
- Review the recruitment process for close protection officers, including training and certification prerequisites for applicant eligibility;
- In consultation with the heads of peace operations, review the implementation of the authority of the Department over security personnel and assets of peacekeeping and special political missions granted under the Secretary-General’s memorandum of 28 December 2016 and propose changes that may be required to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General;
- Fill vacant positions to effectively deliver its training mandate;
- Implement a consolidated safety and security training database management system;
- Establish tools to monitor and report on training activities and the related costs;
- Reinstate the annual comprehensive report on safety and security training to IASMN; and
- Develop a safety and security training evaluation framework for UNSMS.

DSS accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement them.
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Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system (UNSMS) by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS).

2. DSS was established in 2005 under General Assembly resolution 59/276 to strengthen and unify the security management system of the United Nations system and to provide leadership, operational support and oversight of UNSMS. DSS comprises three divisions: (a) the Division of Regional Operations (DRO); (b) the Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services (DHQSSS); and (c) the Division of Specialized Operational Support (DSOS).

3. DSS has the overall mandate to, among others, lead and support cooperation and collaboration among UNSMS entities in planning and implementing measures aimed at improving staff security, training and awareness. The Training and Development Section (TDS) in DSOS has the overall responsibility for managing the UNSMS security training programme. The Threat and Risk Assessment Unit in DRO trains security analysts in the field, while the Training and Development Unit (TDU) in DHQSSS provides specialized training for uniformed security personnel.

4. The United Nations security management governance mechanism includes the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), which supports the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) in its comprehensive review of policies and resource-related issues pertaining to UNSMS. IASMN is composed of senior managers who have managerial oversight of the security function within each UNSMS organization. The USG for DSS chairs IASMN, which meets twice a year. A Security Training Working Group (STWG) was established within IASMN to coordinate UNSMS training activities.

5. The objectives of safety and security training are to mitigate risks to United Nations personnel, premises and assets by raising awareness, promoting security culture and consciousness, improving security preparedness and creating the capacity to respond effectively to emerging threats toward the United Nations. The overall principles emphasize timeliness, cost-effectiveness, most appropriate means of delivery with sustainable, coherent, targeted, harmonized and regulated content, and provision of training to all security personnel that is relevant to their functions. The three main target groups for UNSMS training are: managers with security responsibilities, security personnel and United Nations personnel at large.

6. The 2020 proposed programme budget for DSS amounted to $243.5 million from four funding sources: (a) regular budget - $88.1 million; (b) jointly funded activities (JFA) - $137.6 million; (c) other assessed budgets - $3.8 million; and (d) extrabudgetary funding - $14.0 million. Thirty-five posts were allocated to the training functions from the first three of these funding sources: 24 to TDS and 11 to TDU. In addition, locally cost-shared security budgets, which are not managed by DSS directly, cover training requirements not funded through other means.

7. Comments provided by DSS are incorporated in italics.

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1 UNSMS includes all member organizations of the United Nations System Chief Executive Board, and three other organizations (the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Criminal Court) that have a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations. The goal of UNSMS is to enable the conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the safety, security and well-being of personnel and the security of United Nations premises and assets.
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

8. The objective of the audit was to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of DSS implementation of the UNSMS training mechanism to achieve its strategic objectives.

9. This audit was included in the 2019 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the importance of security training for UNSMS.

10. OIOS conducted this audit from October 2019 to March 2020. The audit covered the period from January 2017 to September 2019. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risks areas in the safety and security training for the UNSMS by DSS, which included: (a) governance arrangements; (b) planning and implementation of training activities; and (c) monitoring and evaluation.

11. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews with key personnel; (b) review of relevant documentation; and (c) analytical review of data. In addition, a survey was administered to 47 members of IASMN and 22 members responded.

12. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Governance arrangements for security training

Need for UNSMS security training guideline and adoption of the global learning and development strategy at IASMN

13. UNSMS involves a wide range of stakeholders and their expectations of security training vary according to their individual circumstances and priorities. As demand for UNSMS security training grew over time, the size and complexity of managing the security training programme also evolved. In the process, UNSMS stakeholders have collectively developed good practices and solutions to the many challenges of managing the programme. However, there is no overall security training guideline or a governance and prioritization mechanism to ensure that the system-wide security training programme and management processes meet the safety and security training objectives and operationalize the security training principles. The current UNSMS policy on training and certification only specifies the role of DSS in developing training materials and delivering training programmes, but does not identify specific roles and responsibilities of participating UNSMS organizations. The DSS Learning and Development Strategy for the Integrated Security Workforce (ISW) expects each UNSMS entity to take responsibility to train its personnel with support from DSS.

14. In 2005, STWG identified the need for a single integrated global security training strategy. TDS and STWG share the responsibility to define and develop such as strategy. Their responsibilities are outlined in ST/SGB/2013/5 on the organization of DSS, and forms part of the UNSMS Security Policy Manual. However, OIOS was informed that because of divergent opinions in STWG on the direction that DSS was proposing for the strategy, the global training strategy for UNSMS has never been adopted.

15. Going forward, however, a security training management guideline would help STWG to promote a single integrated security training strategy to foster coordination, collaboration and common understanding on the management of security training arrangements by different stakeholders. It would also
serve as a baseline for future reviews, analyses and improvements in training guidance and management practices. This needed to be developed in coordination with IASMN, which is mandated to establish and review security guidance for the UNSMS under the auspices of HLCM. It is also important that the DSS Learning and Development Strategy for ISW and the global security training strategy align and complement each other for system-wide coherence and complementarity.

(1) **DSS should, in conjunction with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, establish a governance and prioritization mechanism to develop and adopt:**

- A United Nations security management system (UNSMS) training guideline to: (a) operationalize the principles of UNSMS security training; and (b) clarify DSS roles and responsibilities on security training with those of different UNSMS organizations; and
- A global UNSMS learning and development strategy to direct the work on UNSMS training for system-wide coherence and complementarity.

*DSS accepted recommendation 1.* Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence of the formal establishment of the governance and prioritization mechanism for UNSMS security training and the development and adoption of the UNSMS training guideline and global learning and development strategy.

The terms of reference of STWG required review

16. In its security training coordination role within IASMN, STWG provided a platform for training managers and focal points to contribute to identifying training needs and sharing challenges, solutions, initiatives, opportunities, best practices, guidelines, and operations and field perspectives. The platform allows training management to keep abreast of progress and updates of current and future training activities, and make proposals to ensure UNSMS training programme remains fit for purpose.

17. IASMN approved the current terms of reference (TOR) of STWG at its 26th session in June 2017, but these did not define membership composition, quorum for decisions and frequency of meetings, and although STWG informed that monthly meetings were held, no minutes were maintained. The TOR also did not provide for specific functions of the secretariat and co-chairs for STWG. While sub-working groups were specified in the TOR as a working method, the workplans of sub-working groups had not been documented. Further, many of the deliverables in the TOR relate to routine activities with some of them mirroring those of IASMN such as being a forum for deliberation and making recommendations related to training. There was no timeframe for STWG’s deliverables in its TOR, despite queries in this regard from IASMN in 2017 and 2018.

18. Respondents to OIOS survey indicated that UNSMS organizations valued STWG’s role in inter-agency coordination and collaboration. Nevertheless, feedback included the need for STWG to have: (a) clearer deliverables; (b) a strategic approach for all of UNSMS and less focus on granular tasks; and (c) a clear roadmap of implementing a training strategy. Survey respondents suggested: reviewing and reevaluating the current TOR and modality to make STWG more effective and efficient in decision making and delivering outputs, revisiting the respective responsibilities of the chair and the STWG secretariat, and inviting parties with specialist knowledge, such as DRO, to address specific concerns and challenges in STWG sessions. DSS agreed that STWG objectives needed to be transformed so that it serves as a forum to: (a) determine modalities of cooperation; (b) achieve consensus among non-DSS members of the IASMN on training issues; and (c) identify representatives to speak on behalf of non-DSS entities regarding training priorities and needs in the governance mechanism to be established.
DSS should, in conjunction with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, review the terms of reference of the Security Training Working Group to define its membership and working methods and specify more tangible and time-bound deliverables.

DSS accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the TOR of STWG was under review for discussion in the January 2021 session of IASMN. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of the approved TOR of STWG.

B. Planning and implementation of training activities

DSS needed to develop its programme and budget for training activities within the Department and for UNSMS.

19. DSS conducted a training needs assessment in 2017, developed the Human Resources Strategy for 2017-2022 and the Learning and Development Strategy for ISW for 2018-2023. However, the training needs were not fully documented, prioritized and consolidated into a security training programme, as training activities were dispersed between the three divisions of DSS, with each one implementing training activities independently. There was also no mechanism to coordinate security training functions of the three divisions to ensure complementarity. There was no consolidated visibility of the overall resources received from the three funding sources: regular budget, JFA and peacekeeping support account. As illustrated in Table 1, DSS had 35 authorized training posts funded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position grade</th>
<th>TDS/DSOS</th>
<th>TDU/DHQSSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JFA</td>
<td>Regular budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Umoja Zomreport: Organizational management report, February 2020

20. The allocation of posts was not supported by a consolidated security training programme, and there was no information on the authorization of non-post security training resources from the three funding sources and therefore, no proper oversight by the Office of the Under-Secretary-General on the implementation of the training programme and from the Executive Office to track expenditures. In this regard, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) observed in its report A/62/7 that the quantum of resources programmed for training of staff was not included in the proposed budget, and recommended DSS to identify areas of training, the number of personnel to be trained and associated costs to indicate the magnitude of resources programmed for training and its optimal use in its budget submissions. Due to the lack of this, DSS risked missing out on potential efficiency gains in use of funds from different sources to complement each in delivering its security training mandate.
21. While DSS informed that it faced challenges to keep up with security training demands from its own personnel and participating UNSMS organizations, it had still to demonstrate the gaps between its overall training needs and the training budget per funding source. The planned actions by DSS to link training data to workforce planning and to continuously assess and update training needs to inform programming and budgeting for UNSMS training could help to better plan security training.

(3) DSS should establish a mechanism to coordinate its three substantive divisions as well as the Executive Office and the Office of the Under-Secretary-General to: (a) identify and prioritize security training needs; and (b) track and align expenditures with those needs to ensure accountability.

DSS accepted recommendation 3 and stated two meetings were held in November 2020 to identify training priorities, and further work on the budgeting and tracking of expenditures for security training was underway. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of documentation on the mechanism institutionalized to coordinate the identification and prioritization of security training needs and to track and align related expenditures within DSS.

(4) DSS should identify in its annual training programme of work prioritized training activities and related costs to be delivered from different funding sources to ensure complementarity in the use of resources and for inclusion in budget proposals.

DSS accepted recommendation 4. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of the first annual security training programme of work identifying prioritized training activities and the related cost estimates by different funding sources, and confirmation of their inclusion in DSS budget proposals.

Current arrangements for security training in peacekeeping and special political missions needed review

22. By his 28 December 2016 memorandum to all heads of departments, the Secretary-General established the authority of DSS over security personnel and assets of peacekeeping and special political missions (SPMs). According to paragraph 3(d) of this memorandum, “At the global level, DSS shall be responsible for establishing the training and development standards for the safety and security workforce of the Secretariat, and will coordinate with the affected Departments on the implementation of the required training programmes. At the Mission level, the most senior DSS representative present shall be responsible for establishing the training and associated budget requirements for the Mission's safety and security workforce”. On 8 May 2017, DSS issued a code cable to all heads of peacekeeping and SPMs on the promulgation of inter-departmental guidelines on security integration in peacekeeping operations and SPMs.

23. The guidelines provided that "training and development standards will be developed by DSS Field Support Service (FSS/TDS) in collaboration with DSS DRO, EO and DHSSS". The cover to the guidelines stated that the Secretary-General’s “memorandum established the primary management authority of the Under-Secretary-General for DSS to oversee all Secretariat safety and security personnel, as well as to establish benchmarks for security-related budgets, human resources, mobility, and procurement/supply in peacekeeping and SPMs, in coordination and consultation with Missions and relevant Departments”.

24. DSS provided to OIOS an overview of the challenges encountered with mission-based funding modalities, which has led to the Department to consistently fail in meeting mandatory requirements within a defined timeline. According to the overview, DSS:

(a) Identified that several IASMN standards relating to close protection operations had not been fully met since 2015.
(b) Tasked the Protection Coordination Unit in 2017 to achieve within four years, 100 per cent compliance of mandatory certification requirements for security personnel outlined by IASMN and the Chief Executive Board decision in 2011.

(c) Field missions had been unwilling or unable to release close protection personnel for the Revised Close Protection Officer Certification (RCPOC) training.

25. Close protection officials are required to be recertified every three years and obtain the RCPOC. According to DSS and as illustrated in Chart 1, 222 out of 344 close protection officers were currently in need of RCPOC training and certification or recertification.

Chart 1: Status of CPOC/RCPOC Global Certification, March 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RCPOC Certified</th>
<th>CPOC Expired certification (2010 - 2016)</th>
<th>Uncertified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security and Safety Services (DSS)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Political Missions (DPPA)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations (DPO)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Valid - 122 (35.47 per cent); Expired - 67 (19.48 per cent); Uncertified - 155 (45.05 per cent)

26. The overview also highlighted potential adverse impact that future RCPOC training may have on the employment status of unsuccessful participants. Therefore, there was a need to review the recruitment process for close protection officers to ensure their profiles match operational requirements and meet training and certification prerequisites as criteria for applicant eligibility.

27. DSS identified both budgetary and non-budgetary reasons that prevented the full compliance with RCPOC certification requirement. The non-budgetary reasons included operational demands, poor planning for training with costing projections, and unwillingness of personnel to travel to a family duty station for the 16-day training, for fear of losing emoluments associated with hardship and danger duty stations and the interruption of rest and recuperation cycles. Moreover, the provision of RCPOC training cycles is predicated on the availability of the protection and guard service facilities of a Member State which is an implementing partner, and availability of United Nations trainers. Lack of compliance by all close protection officers with RCPOC certification requirements exposed senior United Nations personnel to high security risks.

28. DRO also reviews local cost-shared security budgets that fund country-specific security risk management measures, such as the Safe and Secured Approaches to Field Environment (SSAFE), the Emergency Trauma Bag and the Individual First Aid Kit training. Going forward, DSS needed to extend these reviews to include security budgets of SPMs to identify potential gaps in funding security training and consult with concerned officials responsible for budget and finance. The experience gained and lessons learned in the review of budgets of all field missions could be used to assess the effectiveness of
implementing the authority granted under the Secretary-General’s 28 December 2016 memorandum and related guidelines and propose any changes that may be required to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.

(5) DSS should review the recruitment process for close protection officers, including the training and certification prerequisites for applicant eligibility.

DSS accepted recommendation 5 and stated that a detailed review of recruitment and training for close protection officers was underway. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of the formal requirements for recruitment of close protection officers.

(6) DSS should, in consultation with the heads of peacekeeping and special political missions (SPMs), review implementation of the authority of the Department over security personnel and assets of peacekeeping and SPMs granted under the Secretary-General’s memorandum of 28 December 2016 and related guidelines and propose any changes that may be required to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.

DSS accepted recommendation 6. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of the outcome of the consultative review of the implementation of the Secretary-General’s memorandum on the authority of DSS over security personnel and assets of field missions.

DSS needed to fill vacant positions authorized for its security training mandate

29. Seven of DSS’ 35 authorized training posts were vacant at the time of the audit, including 5 posts in TDS/DSOS and 2 posts in TDU/DHQSSS. Four of the vacant posts were blocked for staff members who have a lien on them and one post in TDS was loaned outside of DSOS. The vacancy status in TDS had raised concerns in IASMN. With the current vacancy rate, DSS was not fully utilizing its training resources.

30. Additionally, TDS had identified the need for additional skills set to implement new learning methodologies such as remote and online delivery of training but consensus had not been reached within DSS on their effectiveness. The current vacancies afforded DSS the opportunity to recruit the necessary new skills. In the meantime, due to vacancies in TDS, DRO has taken over an instructor-led training programme on Hostage Incident Management. Building security training capacity in DSS should be driven by the nature and volume of work necessary to deliver security training in coordination with DSS operational divisions and other UNSMS organizations.

(7) DSS should fully utilize its authorized training capacity to effectively deliver the training mandate over the United Nations security management system and the Department.

DSS accepted recommendation 7 and stated that training posts were being reclassified in line with the DSS Learning and Development Strategy and TDS blueprint and recruitments were in progress. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of documentation on the approach to fully utilize the authorized DSS training capacity to deliver the training mandate, and an update on the recruitment status.

DSS and IASMN implemented efficiency and cost-saving measures for security training

31. Due to the vast geographical spread of UNSMS personnel, travel for face-to-face training has been the major cost driver in DSS security training activities. Over time, DSS and IASMN have made arrangements to reduce the need for travel as shown in the following examples:
(i) Adopting blended learning in which electronic, online media and self-study preparatory work are incorporated into the training programme to shorten the period required for face-to-face training sessions;
(ii) Organizing training courses at the closest location of the majority of participants, considering security risks and availability of logistics arrangements; and
(iii) Removing the global requirement for refresher training of SSAFE and making SSAFE certification compatible across all locations.

32. DSS was also consolidating good practices developed by different training managers to address quality and consistency of training content and improve development and delivery of individual training courses. For further efficiencies, DSS could enhance the joint venture trainer arrangements by identifying qualified trainers in other UNSMS organizations to lead security training in their localities and regions, with the necessary quality assurance arrangements in place. The concept of joint venture training was approved by IASMN in 2013, noting that course developers maintain ownership responsibility for the courses. OIOS identified other opportunities to achieve cost savings within the existing security training arrangements. However, as DSS is in the process of implementing the Learning and Development Strategy, OIOS did not make a recommendation at this time.

DSS needed to implement a consolidated safety and security training data management system

33. DSS highlighted, in its 2020 budget submission, the need for a data-driven approach to security management through better data analysis and provision of security training courses to staff of UNSMS. UNSMS participating organizations are currently responsible for managing their own training data, and DSS keeps records on the number of UNSMS personnel (but no details) of those who have successfully completed security training. In 2011, a draft UNSMS policy on training and certification proposed that all UNSMS organizations share data on their security training with DSS to provide an accurate system-wide picture of the state of security training. The requirement was not incorporated in the current UNSMS policy on security training and certification, but DSS is exploring and planning for a long term data warehouse solution, including options for integrating human resources information for better use of training data strategically across UNSMS.

34. Within DSS, training data is collected and stored in different database formats and locations. For example, TDU/DHQSSS recently started developing a database to record and digitalize the training records of the Division’s personnel in New York, with the possibility to connect it with the Division’s administrative database. Other headquarters locations, peacekeeping and SPMs were also setting up security training record systems, electronically or otherwise based on local needs. Training data provided by TDS is either updated in the United Nations System Staff College platform, in DSS’ current learning management system or in Excel spreadsheets with various levels of detail. Some training data are also posted on United Nations Security Managers Information Network (UNSMIN) website. The existing systems could not yet systematically and accurately link training information to expenditures and work force planning to enable monitoring of training compliance and data analysis for decision making.

(8) DSS should: (a) implement, based on the availability of resources, a consolidated safety and security training database management system that links training activities with training expenditures; and (b) explore linking training data with workforce planning, and with training information from United Nations security management system organizations.

DSS accepted recommendation 8 and stated that its implementation was contingent on the launch of the new learning management system scheduled for deployment in April 2021. Recommendation 8 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation of the consolidated safety and security training database management system and linkage of training data with other relevant information.
C. Monitoring and evaluation

DSS needed to develop tools to monitor and report on training activities and the related costs

35. In its report A/60/7, ACABQ had expressed an expectation for DSS to monitor training-related expenditures and carefully plan training activities to ensure they are cost-effective. In report A67/624, ACABQ considered the importance of transparency and coherence in the presentation of the JFA security budget, and requested future budget proposals to disclose the functions and related requirements to be through the JFA budget as well as those of participating organizations that are expected to complement DSS activities in the field. DSS did not yet have the tools to monitor training budgets and related expenditures, although in the Secretariat, Umoja has presented an opportunity to provide the relevant information. When configured properly, Umoja could record and report on training expenditures at various levels of details, such as sources of funding, target groups, training programmes, trainers and trainees, and against the strategic drivers of security training such as security risk management and workforce planning.

36. Until 2011, DSS had provided IASMN with an annual report on the work of TDS that included a comprehensive update on the implementation of security training activities together with training plans and its strategy for the future. HLCM also welcomed the increased transparency in security-related expenditures vis-a-vis the results achieved for each cost-shared, field security arrangement, and had encouraged DSS to continue to provide such detailed and timely information; however, DSS did not continue with this process.

37. Conversely, other UNSMS participating organizations reported security training activities to their governing bodies although not necessarily at the field level and in a manner that would allow DSS to get a consolidated picture of all security expenditures. TDS recently conducted a pilot project to collect and report on security training data from other UNSMS organizations but it was still too early to determine if it would be feasible to collect and report on all UNSMS training data.

38. Analysis of Umoja-generated training expenditures together with operational training data collected outside Umoja would be a powerful tool to manage, monitor and report on the security training programme. As required by ACABQ and HLCM, DSS needs to improve management of security training for UNSMS and the Department by monitoring and reporting on security training expenditures to enhance transparency, visibility and stakeholders’ participation in the implementation of the training programme.

| (9) | DSS should customize the available tools in Umoja to monitor security training expenditures against the resources authorized for implementing its security training programme covering all sources of funding. |
| DSS accepted recommendation 9 and stated that the Umoja Work Breakdown Structure Elements would be tailored to budget and track training programme expenses to the extent possible. Recommendation 9 remains open pending receipt of evidence of monitoring of security training expenditures against authorized resources. |

| (10) | DSS should reinstate the annual comprehensive report on safety and security training to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network to enhance transparency, visibility and stakeholders’ participation in managing training for the United Nations security management system. |
| DSS accepted recommendation 10 and stated that the first report in January 2021 would aim to provide data on 2018-2019 as a more typical baseline, in addition to providing information on 2020. |
DSS needed to develop an evaluation framework for the UNSMS safety and security training programme

39. DSS’ Learning and Development Strategy for ISW and the IASMN Steering Committee had recommended further discussion on a global training strategy, but a normative framework for the evaluation of safety and security training has not been developed. In its resolution, 59/296, the General Assembly had highlighted the need for both a strategy and an evaluation framework for training.

40. DSS informed OIOS that it conducted surveys of UNSMS organizations to gauge their overall level of satisfaction on its training activities and to identify areas of improvement but results of these surveys were not available. As part of the audit, OIOS administered a survey to 47 UNSMS organizations and received 22 responses. While respondents were generally satisfied with the level of support received from DSS as shown in Table 2, 50 per cent of respondents indicated a need for better administration of training courses, including: (a) advance communication of training dates to facilitate participation; (b) increased number of slots for agencies, funds and programmes to obviate the need for them to develop their own training courses without the leadership and quality control of DSS; and (c) more train-the-trainer courses to enable them to deliver requisite training at the field level. Respondents also indicated the need to align training courses to the context within which agencies, funds and programmes operate, and to update the contents of training courses regularly in line with changes in DSS policies and evolving security considerations.

Table 2: Summary of the level of satisfaction with DSS training support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In meeting the needs of the Organization</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In meeting the needs of the UN SMS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41. An evaluation framework for safety and security training would help to identify the information and data requirements to assess the performance and impact of security training, and to inform the development of appropriate tools and procedures to collect and analyze them on a timely basis. A well-informed evaluation exercise would also facilitate discussions in IASMN and within DSS on planning, implementation and improvement in the scope and content of individual training courses. Although participants’ feedback are obtained from individual security training courses, more formal impact assessment and evaluation would allow information from other sources to be used to assess the impact of training activities. For example, periodic surveys, security incident reports or after action reviews might highlight or suggest training needs to enhance staff capacity. The need for performance and impact assessment for safety and security training had been identified by TDS as part of its role in managing the development and implementation of a knowledge transfer and learning strategy for the UNSMS.

(11) DSS should develop a security training evaluation framework for adoption by the governance and prioritization mechanism with clear requirements for data needs and procedures to collect and analyze data and information and performance measures to evaluate the impact of the United Nations security management system training activities.

DSS accepted recommendation 11 and stated that the governance mechanism involving DSS and IASMN would consider the evaluation elements of security training in 2021 for discussion in a 2022 IASMN session. Recommendation 11 remains open pending receipt of the outcome of the discussion and decision on the security training evaluation framework by IASMN.
IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

42. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of DSS for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services
# STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical$^2$/ Important$^3$</th>
<th>C/ O$^4$</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date$^5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1        | DSS should, in conjunction with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, establish a governance and prioritization mechanism to develop and adopt:  
  - A United Nations security management system (UNSMS) training guideline to: (a) operationalize the principles of UNSMS security training; and (b) clarify DSS roles and responsibilities on security training with those of different UNSMS organizations; and  
  - A global UNSMS learning and development strategy to direct the work on UNSMS training for system-wide coherence and complementarity. | Important                    | O       | Submission of evidence of the formal establishment of the governance and prioritization mechanism for UNSMS security training and the development and adoption of the UNSMS training guideline and global learning and development strategy. | 31 December 2021       |
| 2        | DSS should, in conjunction with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, review the terms of reference of the Security Training Working Group to define its membership and working methods and specify more tangible and time-bound deliverables. | Important                    | O       | Submission of the approved TOR of STWG.                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 31 December 2021       |
| 3        | DSS should establish a mechanism to coordinate its three substantive divisions as well as the Executive office and the Office of the Under Secretary-General to: (a) identify and prioritize security training needs; and (b) track and align expenditures with those needs to ensure accountability. | Important                    | O       | Submission of documentation on the mechanism institutionalized to coordinate the identification and prioritization of security training needs and to track and align related expenditures within DSS.                                                                 | 31 December 2021       |

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2 Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.

3 Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.

4 Please note the value C denotes closed recommendations, whereas O refers to open recommendations.

5 Date provided by DSS in response to recommendations.
## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical¹</th>
<th>Important²</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DSS should identify in its annual training programme of work prioritized training activities and related costs to be delivered from different sources to ensure complementarity in the use of resources and for inclusion in budget proposals.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the first annual security training programme of work identifying prioritized training activities and their related cost estimates by different funding sources, and confirmation of their inclusion in DSS budget proposals.</td>
<td>31 December 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DSS should review the recruitment process for close protection officers, including the training and certification prerequisites for applicant eligibility.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the formal requirements for the recruitment of close protection officers.</td>
<td>31 December 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DSS should, in consultation with the heads of peacekeeping and special political missions (SPMs), review implementation of the authority of the Department over security personnel and assets of peacekeeping and SPMs granted under the Secretary-General’s memorandum of 28 December 2016 and related guidelines and propose any changes that may be required to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the outcome of the consultative review of the implementation of the Secretary-General’s memorandum on the authority of DSS over security personnel and assets of field missions.</td>
<td>31 December 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DSS should fully utilize its authorized training capacity to effectively deliver the training mandate over the United Nations security management system and the Department.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of documentation on the approach to fully utilize the authorized DSS training capacity to deliver the training mandate, and an update on the recruitment status.</td>
<td>31 December 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DSS should: (a) implement, based on the availability of resources, a consolidated safety and security training database management system that links training activities with training expenditures; and (b) explore linking training data with workforce planning, and with training information from United Nations security management system organizations.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of evidence of implementation of the consolidated safety and security training database management system and linkage of training data with other relevant information.</td>
<td>31 December 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>DSS should customize the available tools in Umoja to monitor security training expenditures against the resources authorized for implementing its security training programme covering all sources of funding.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of evidence of monitoring of security training expenditures against authorized resources.</td>
<td>31 January 2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

*Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security*

<table>
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<th>C/O</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>DSS should reinstate the annual comprehensive report on safety and security training to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network to enhance transparency, visibility and stakeholders’ participation in managing training for the United Nations security management system.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the first annual comprehensive report on security training and confirmation of its submission to IASMN.</td>
<td>31 January 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>DSS should develop a security training evaluation framework for adoption by the governance and prioritization mechanism with clear requirements for data needs and procedures to collect and analyze data and information and performance measures to evaluate the impact of the United Nations security management system training activities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Submission of the outcome of the discussion and decision on the security training evaluation framework by IASMN.</td>
<td>31 December 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I

Management Response
## Management Response

**Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical(^1)/ Important(^2)</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1        | DSS should, in conjunction with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, establish a governance and prioritization mechanism to develop and adopt:  
  - A United Nations security management system (UNSMS) training guideline to: (a) operationalize the principles of UNSMS security training; and (b) clarify DSS roles and responsibilities on security training with those of different UNSMS organizations.  
  - A global UNSMS learning and development strategy to direct the work on UNSMS training for system-wide coherence and complementarity. | Important | Yes | ASG or USG as Chairs of IASMN and Governance Mechanism | 2021 | |
| 2        | DSS should, in conjunction with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, review the terms of reference of the Security Training Working Group to define its membership and working methods and specify more tangible and time-bound deliverables. | Important | Yes | ASG or USG as Chairs of IASMN and Governance Mechanism | Review initiated and revised ToR to be discussed at Jan. 2021 IASMN | |
| 3        | DSS should establish a mechanism to coordinate its three substantive divisions as | Important | Yes | ASG and EO | Ongoing. | First two meetings of coordination mechanism chaired by ASG in Nov. |

\(^1\) Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

\(^2\) Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.
Management Response

Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical¹/Important²</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>well as the Executive office and the Office of the Under Secretary-General to: (a) identify and prioritize security training needs; and (b) track and align expenditures with needs to ensure accountability.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EO and TDS</td>
<td>2020 to determine priorities. Further work on budget and expenditures ongoing. Element (b) is duplicated within recommendation #9. The mechanism to track and align expenditures of the training programs will be implemented by recommendation #9.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DSS should identify in its annual training programme of work those prioritized training activities and related costs to be delivered from different sources to ensure complementarity in the use of resources and for inclusion in budget proposals.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EO and TDS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DSS should review the recruitment process for close protection officers, including the training and certification pre-requisites for applicant eligibility.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>DSOS/PCU</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>As part of DSS’ Strategic Objective 5 - Review of Protective Services, a detailed analysis of current CPO recruitment and training requirements is being undertaken. It is expected that the review will develop comprehensive proposals to address requirements in this regard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DSS should, in consultation with the heads of peacekeeping and special political missions (SPMs), review implementation of the authority of the Department over security personnel and assets of peacekeeping and SPMs granted under the Secretary-General’s memorandum of 28 December 2016 and related guidelines and propose any changes that may be required to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>DSOS and DRO</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹° Important: The recommendation is critical to the overall implementation of the training mechanism.
²° Important: Critical importance in the implementation of the training mechanism.
### Management Response

**Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DSS should fully utilize its authorized training capacity to effectively deliver the training mandate over the United Nations security management system and the Department.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EO and OUSG</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Reclassification of training posts in line with the UNDSS Learning and Development Strategy and TDS Blueprint and recruitments are in progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DSS should: (a) implement, based on the availability of resources, a consolidated safety and security training database management system that links training activities with training expenditures; and (b) explore linking training data with workforce planning, and with training information from United Nations security management system organizations.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>DSOS/TDS</td>
<td>Dec. 2021</td>
<td>This is contingent on the launch of the new Learning Management System (LMS) scheduled to be launched in April 2021 and for use across UNDSS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>DSS should customize the available tools in Umoja to monitor security training expenditures against the resources authorized for implementing its security training programme covering all sources of funding.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EO Finance and Budget Officer</td>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>The Umoja WBSE structure will be developed to budget and track training programme expenses. Due to the limitation in WBSE system, however, there might be some cases in which the expenses cannot be captured in the training WBSE. DSS will try to minimize those cases as much as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>DSS should reinstate the annual comprehensive report on safety and security training to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network to enhance transparency, visibility and stakeholders’ participation in managing training for the United Nations security management system.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>DSOS/TDS</td>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>The first report in January 2021 will aim to provide data on 2018-19 as a more typical baseline, in addition to providing information on 2020.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Management Response

**Audit of implementation of the training mechanism for the United Nations security management system by the Department of Safety and Security**

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<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>DSS should develop a security training evaluation framework for adoption by the governance and prioritization mechanism with clear requirements for data needs and procedures to collect and analyze data and information and performance measures to evaluate the impact of the United Nations security management system training activities.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>USG as Chair of Governance Mechanism with technical support from DSOS/TDS</td>
<td>2021-2022</td>
<td>The Governance Mechanism, with UNDSS and the IASMN, has prioritized its focus on recommendations 1-4, and will consider the evaluation elements subsequently in late 2021. With the IASMN schedule, discussion in that body will likely take place in 2022.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>