

Evaluation Report

Inspection and Evaluation Division

Evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of African Union – United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in supporting transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with United Nations Country Team (UNCT)

31 December 2020

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INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

Function *“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organization. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organization;”* ([General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B](#)).

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I. Executive Summary

1. OIOS-IED conducted an evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in supporting transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in real-time from February 2019 to February 2020. This utilized a combination of semi-structured interviews, document review, electronic survey, direct observations, and case study in two phases.
2. The OIOS team engaged with all relevant stakeholders which included United Nations Headquarters, UNAMID, UNCT, the African Union, the Government of Sudan, local communities, and civil society organizations. An Advisory Memorandum was issued to transition managers in October 2019 after phase one of the evaluation, as a result of real-time evaluation, to aid timely recalibration and strengthening of transition planning, coordination, integration, and implementation. Although transition was repeatedly disrupted due to political upheavals, social disharmony, and security incidents, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic, UNAMID was able to steer the mandated activities efficiently within the constraints.
3. The results of the second phase of the evaluation indicate that UNAMID has made significant progress in transition implementation, drawdown, and preparation for exit, with its activities relevant and aligned with the mandate and directives. The political transition in Sudan presented both disruptions and opportunities for transition in Darfur. In the aftermath of the change in Government in Sudan, the strategic needs and priorities of key stakeholders which were initially divergent, converged around UNAMID exit, follow-on presence, and peacebuilding needs. However, limited availability of consolidated lessons learned and best practices from previous transitions impacted application at the operational and functional levels.
4. Several challenges emerged. UNAMID and UNCT struggled to streamline planning, coordination, and integration due to various factors. First, transition leadership appeared fragmented in a non-integrated, geographically dispersed decision-making setting compounded by shifting institutional priorities, lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities and limited ownership of transition objectives. Second, the joint planning and coordination mechanisms for the transition were not sufficiently effective due to late engagement with GoS, inadequate working-level linkages at the operational level, and the lack of formal structured coordination in the field. Lastly, the State Liaison Functions, envisaged as a joint UNAMID-UNCT vehicle for transition, progressed and generally met the stated objectives in the SLF concept.
5. To advance transition objectives, UNAMID secured African Union (AU) engagement and support at the strategic level but recognised the need for AU to play a larger role at the operational level. Similarly, in the aftermath of the political transition in Sudan, UNAMID also secured increased national engagement, commitment, and ownership for effective transition in Darfur, despite the limited capacity of GoS and the continued prevalence of political and security instability.
6. For the longer-term, UNAMID and UNCT endeavoured to address conflict drivers, but significant risk of relapse into conflict remained. This existed due to the unaddressed root causes of conflict, protracted humanitarian and protection needs, the destabilizing activities of paramilitary forces and armed groups, prevalence of a high number of illicit weapons among communities, and an unfinished peace process. While UNAMID identified and endeavoured to address reputational risks, the internal asset management, misutilization and misappropriation of team sites and assets handed over to GoS entities, the vulnerability of remaining team sites to looting and criminal

activities, the potential negative environmental fallout, and the risks related to serious misconduct including SEA remained major concerns.

7. Some key factors contributed to, or constrained, the effectiveness and efficiency of transition in Darfur. The peacebuilding aspect of the transition was inordinately delayed due to political uncertainties, prevalent security situation, lack of donor support, and internal eligibility processing issues. In addition, persisting systemic issues associated with leadership, integration, institutional silos, and others affected the transition planning and implementation. The acute human resources drawdown and the low morale of staff impacted transition planning, preparation, and implementation significantly. While the backstopping support provided by the United Nations Headquarters in terms of guidance, engagement, and surge support was found adequate, the support provided from United Nations Development Coordination Office to Resident Coordinator Office was found insufficient.
8. Thirteen (one critical and twelve important) recommendations were made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the transition in Darfur.

II. Introduction

1. The evaluation objective was to determine, as systematically and objectively as possible, the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in supporting transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). The evaluation focus emerged from a risk assessment and scoping exercise. The evaluation was conducted in conformity with norms and standards for evaluation in the UN System.¹
2. Comments from relevant Secretariat entities were sought on the draft report and considered in the final report. The formal management responses are attached as per **Annex V**.

III. Background

3. Based upon an overall improvement in security in Darfur, the Security Council in its resolutions 2363 (2017) and 2429 (2018) endorsed a two-pronged and a whole-of-system approach for UNAMID that combined peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks to be implemented in collaboration with UNCT through State Liaison Functions (SLF) over a two-year time frame.² This resulted in a shift in focus as follows:

	Peacekeeping Concept	Transition Concept
Primary focus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political mediation ▪ Physical protection ▪ Clearance of explosive remnants of war ▪ Emergency relief 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reliance and livelihoods/durable solutions for the displaced population and host communities ▪ Rule of law: police, justice, corrections ▪ Human rights ▪ Immediate service delivery for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
Area of operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Headquarters in Central Darfur ▪ New areas of operations in 13 team sites ▪ Super Camp in El Fasher to become the main logistics hub ▪ Protection of civilians in whole of Darfur 	State Liaison Functions with key substantive UNAMID components and UNCT staff to be co-located as appropriate and within existing resources

4. In two directives³, the Secretary-General outlined an operational framework for a better transition in Darfur and across the system, including roles, responsibilities, coordination mechanisms, reporting and staffing. The Deputy Joint Special Representative (DJSR), on behalf of Joint Special Representative (JSR) and the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) were designated as the leads at the country level to plan and manage the transition.
5. Transition in Darfur happened in the backdrop of significant political upheavals from December 2018 to October 2019, which included the social unrest; ouster of the 30 years old former regime

¹ United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), 2005.

² S/RES/2429 (2018).

³ The Secretary-General's Planning Directive for the planning and preparation of UNAMID and repositioning of the UN AFPs to sustain in peace (7 February 2019). The Secretary-General's Planning Directive for the development of consistent and coherent UN Transition processes, in line with Executive Committee (EC) decision 201/38 (25 February 2019).

and take over by a Transitional Military Council; attacks and killings of civilians; the establishment of a Sovereign Council; and the ensued peace negotiations in Juba.

6. The political transition and security situation in the country slowed down and at times disrupted the transition process in Darfur (refer **Annex I** for major timeline of events and their impact on transition). During this period, the structured engagement with GoS at National and State levels in Darfur waned;⁴ implementation of SLF programmes was delayed; development of peacebuilding programmes and DDS-Refresher was hampered; UNCT focus shifted from transition in Darfur to Sudan-wide political transition;⁵ the drawdown of military and police peacekeepers was paused; the closure and handover of team sites was suspended; UNAMID exit was twice extended, and the need for a follow-on presence had become apparent. The technical rollover of UNAMID mandate in June and October 2019 as well as in April 2020 further complicated the transition planning and implementation to a large extent.⁶
7. On the other hand, the establishment of a civilian-led transitional Government heralded opportunities to advance the comprehensive and inclusive peace process and transition with a ‘whole of Sudan focus’. A significant improvement in relationship with and responsiveness of GoS was reported by UNAMID and UNCT. This included enhanced accessibility of UNAMID and UNCT leadership to the top leadership of the transitional Government; increased commitment and responsiveness of GoS State and local authorities to transition requirements; speedier customs clearances for incoming or outgoing UNAMID freight, etc. In addition, the ongoing peace negotiations in Juba envisaged addressing the root causes of conflict, especially in Darfur, providing a bridgehead for sustainable peace and development in Sudan.

IV. Methodology

8. This evaluation utilized four data collection methods (semi-structured interviews, document review, electronic survey, and direct observations) in two phases (refer **Annex II** including limitations). Its purpose was to provide continuous feedback and learning to the transition managers and foster organizational and operational change to increase the transition’s effectiveness. The evaluation covered the period from 2014 to 2020. The first round of data collection was undertaken between May-July 2019 and its findings shared in an advisory memo with the transition managers in October 2019. The second data collection phase occurred between December 2019-February 2020. Qualitative and quantitative data were analysed using appropriate software and triangulated with other sources of data to deepen the understanding of evaluation results.

V. Evaluation results

A. UNAMID activities in support of transition were relevant and aligned with the mandate and directives.

i. UNAMID made significant progress in transition implementation, drawdown, and preparation for exit.

⁴ 5+5 Joint Technical Committee Meetings were suspended for four months.

⁵ UNAMID-UNCT joint update on the implementation of the Secretary-General’s planning directive for the planning and preparation of the UN transition in Darfur, dated 13 February 2020.

⁶ The COVID-19 pandemic caused further disruptions in the UNAMID exit and deployment of a follow-on mechanism.

9. UNAMID succeeded in aligning most of its structures and activities with the Council’s resolutions and planning directives. UNAMID and UNCT, in collaboration with key stakeholders, used several internal and joint mechanisms to plan, coordinate, and implement the transition-related substantive and support activities as follows:

Table 2. Coordination mechanisms used to plan and implement transition activities		
Entity	Strategic Level	Operational Level
Joint	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African Union (AU)-Government of Sudan (GoS)-UN Tripartite Mechanism (Joint Working Group) and Joint Task Force with AU • Joint Technical Coordination Committee (5+5 Committee) • UNAMID-UNCT Bimonthly Meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Transition Cell
UNAMID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNAMID Transition and Drawdown Steering Committee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrated Planning Team ○ Administrative Drawdown Team ○ Asset Downsizing Task Force ○ Mission HQ Negotiation Group ○ Sector Technical Committees ○ Advisory Group on Disposal of Assets by Gifting ○ Environmental Clearance Group
UNCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operations Management Team • Programme Management Team • United Nations Communications Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SLF Pillar Conveners • Peacebuilding Coordination • Darfur Development Strategy-Refresher Coordination

10. Coupled with effective internal communication, these mechanisms contributed to advancing a common understanding among managers and staff about the major aspects of transition (Figure 1), and roles and responsibilities at the working level (Figure 2). Periodic staff townhalls and broadcasts were held that 76 per cent the survey respondents found effective. Externally, the Mission organized community events to sensitize Darfur communities on transition timeline and activities.





Figure 2. Clarity and common understanding is achieved at the working level.



11. UNAMID effectively implemented major transition activities (Table 3). A review of UNAMID plans for drawdown, closure and liquidation indicated readiness for exit scheduled for 31 December 2020.

Table 3. Summary of UNAMID progress in transition implementation, drawdown and preparation for exit	
Main Transition Activities	Status of Implementation
a. Reconfiguration of a new mission structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JSR relocated to Khartoum • New Mission HQ established in Zalingei and DJSR relocated • A temporary operating base established in Golo • Reduced area of peacekeeping operation to Central Darfur
b. Establishment and implementation of SLF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SLF established in East, West, North and South Darfur • Up to 90 UNAMID civilian staff and individual police officers were deployed in 9 Agencies, Funds and Programmes or co-located with Sudanese Police Force • SLF 1 and 2 programmes being implemented
c. Human resources drawdown	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduction of approximately 59 per cent in military, 47 per cent in police, 72 per cent national and 57 per cent in international personnel during 2014-2019 • Drawdown plans for remaining uniformed and civilian staff prepared
d. Closure and liquidation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 team sites and 3 Sector HQs closed during 2017-2019 • Over USD 75 million worth of assets and USD 126 million worth of 28 operating bases handed over to GoS until 2019 • Plans for security and handover of remaining 14 team sites including mission HQ and logistics base prepared
e. Support to peace negotiations and start-up of follow-on presence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of logistical, technical and advisory support to the Juba peace process
f. Women, Peace and Security interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women mediation and protection networks established in IDP camps, return and affected areas • Darfur-wide open consultations to consolidate and represent women concerns in peace talks • The Sudan Network Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) Joint Framework for Action established

ii. Strategic needs and priorities of key stakeholders converged over time.

12. The relevance and progress of UNAMID transition activities in Darfur was impacted by the multiplicity and different viewpoints among key stakeholders. Initially the consensus among the Council members, AU and GoS on the timing, phasing and scope of the transition was not fully evident. Views on the correct timing of the transition were mixed, with 60 per cent of the UNAMID and UNCT survey respondents and 26 per cent of interviewees (mostly staff at functional level) believing that it was not the right time for transition in Darfur due to the lack of substantive progress towards accomplishment of benchmarks, unaddressed root causes of conflict, and perceived risk of relapse. This sentiment was also shared and emphasized by the internally displaced persons (IDP) representatives interviewed who demanded a rethinking of the transition decision due to protection and humanitarian concerns. Although, the conflict trends in Darfur supported the decision to move from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, the United Nations HQ (UNHQ) interviewees believed there was internal resistance to transition within UNAMID. UNHQ managers (29 per cent) asserted that the late internalization of the transition decision in the field delayed transition-specific planning, as evidenced in reconfiguration of the mission structure, endorsement of a transition concept and SLF establishment by February 2019.
13. However, in the aftermath of the political transition, and ensuing security and economic situation in the country, these differences in opinions were largely levelled and stakeholders converged around exit plans and the need for follow-on presence with a focus on peacebuilding activities.

iii. Limited availability of consolidated lessons learned, and best practices from previous transitions impacted application.

14. The application of lessons learned and best practices from previous transitions was confined to the strategic level, despite the expectation from the EC to create a culture of organizational learning and improve transition processes for the entire United Nations system at all levels.⁷ UNHQ had not systematically collated, reviewed, documented, and disseminated transition lessons and best practices to be applied by UNAMID. The review of the policy on United Nations transitions (2013) was long outstanding. The Department of Peace Operations (DPO)-Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)- and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Joint Transition Project shared some specific lessons only with the transition leadership, which did not permeate through the functional level effectively.⁸ UNAMID also reached out to the leadership team that handled transition in Liberia in order to obtain insights on their experiences. However, seventy per cent of the survey respondents (mostly staff at the working level) did not believe, nor were aware, of any lessons learned or best practices being applied to the case of Darfur. This suggested an insufficient transmission of lessons learnt and best practices to the field level.

B. UNAMID and UNCT did not fully achieve coherent and streamlined planning, coordination, and integration.

15. UNAMID and UNCT struggled to achieve full coherence while jointly planning and implementing the transition priorities, including with key actors (GoS and AU) due to several factors.

⁷ EC Decision No. 2017/15: Transitions between UN configurations (27 January 2017) and EC Update Paper on Mission Transitions – Recurring Challenges and Opportunities (20 July 2018).

⁸ OIOS team reviewed the best practices and lessons learned from past transitions in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, and Timor Leste.

i. Transition leadership within and among UNAMID and UNCT was fragmented.

16. The transition leadership within and across UNAMID and UNCT appeared divided in their roles and responsibilities, failing to form and sustain unity and cohesion around transition. Staff and managers interviewed (72 per cent) pointed to three layers of fragmentation.
17. First, fragmentation among UNAMID top leadership was attributed to two factors. The primary one was the lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities for transition management among the JSR, DJSR and other senior mission leadership because reporting lines among substantive and support functions were not properly aligned with the responsibilities outlined in Secretary-General's directive.⁹ Another factor was the geographical reconfiguration of the mission structure under resolution 2363 (2017) and Special Report (S/2017/437),¹⁰ which delineated the peacekeeping and peacebuilding areas in Darfur necessitating UNAMID focus on Greater Jebel Marra area. With JSR, DJSR, and mission support division (MSD) scattered across Khartoum, Zalingei and El Fasher respectively, effective, and timely communications and coordination among key actors was believed to be compromised.¹¹ Aside from costing an estimated \$7.5 million,¹² reconfiguration increased travel time and costs across sites, complicating scheduling of important conversations around transition. OIOS noted that if shifting of the Mission Headquarters as part of geographical reconfiguration is considered essential during the closure of the mission and transition process, this should only be done as an exception and after ensuring that the benefits in terms of increased effectiveness far outweigh any possible drawbacks.
18. The second layer of fragmentation was within the UNCT that was assessed by more than half of the stakeholders to have not fully owned the transition objectives. The Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) and UNCT interviewees (64 per cent) expressed confusion about the rationale for UNCT-only presence in Darfur and confirmed their initial reservations about collaborating with UNAMID. UNAMID managers (87 per cent) acknowledged the difficulty in changing UNCT mindset necessary to adapt to transition requirements and attributed their lack of buy-in to an increasing emphasis on Sudan-wide political transition over transition in Darfur.¹³ AFPs (8 out of 10 participating agencies) believed the time and effort dedicated to transition planning in Darfur was disproportionate to their Sudan-wide programmes, whereas UNAMID interviewees believed the success of Sudan-wide transition depended on that of the Darfur transition.
19. The RCO's lack of effectiveness in unifying AFPs around transition objectives was considered to widen this fragmentation and attributed to the United Nations Development Reform which altered management, oversight and accountability lines and responsibilities within UNCT country operations. The responsibility to jointly manage the transition with DJSR during this reform limited RC/HC's capacity to effectively coordinate AFPs. Some RCO posts¹⁴ were not filled in a timely manner to cohere transition activities related to SLF and peacebuilding programmes since the resources and clarity of the process were not made available until half-way through the year in 2019. RCO work on transition was supported by a UNAMID-loaned staff and a transition specialist provided by the Transition Project.

⁹ The Secretary-General's Planning Directive for the planning and preparation of UNAMID and repositioning of the UN AFPs to sustain in peace (7 February 2019).

¹⁰ The Special Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 18 May 2017 (S/2017/437).

¹¹ During the looting of the former sector west HQ in El Geneina in May of 2019, inadequate unity of command among senior leadership was also observed in a UNAMID internal report.

¹² UNAMID MSD data.

¹³ UNAMID communication about UNCT's shifting focus and decreasing engagement in transition planning and management in Darfur.

¹⁴ Chief of the RCO and Durable Solutions Adviser remained vacant.

20. The last layer of fragmentation occurred between the two transition managers at UNAMID and UNCT due to shifting institutional priorities generated by the overall political context and the potential for a Sudan-wide UN follow-on mechanism. As a result, UNCT engagement in transition in Darfur reportedly decreased.¹⁵ The impact of fragmentation between UNAMID and UNCT was evident in the suspension of bi-monthly UNAMID-UNCT coordination meetings from October 2019 to March 2020.

ii. Established joint planning and coordination mechanisms for the transition in Darfur were not optimal.

21. The gaps prevailing in joint planning and coordination mechanisms contributed to limited coherence in transition implementation.
22. **Strategic level:** Coordination with GoS at the strategic level was uneven including due to the fluid political environment and changes in leadership at the Federal and State levels. UNAMID and UNCT established 5+5 committee¹⁶ to review, monitor, and discuss resource allocation to SLF programmes. A review of seven meeting minutes and interviews with GoS indicated that GoS priorities and needs (such as balancing of capacity building and infrastructure projects, reintegration of ex-combatants, resources for herders and opening of migratory routes) were not fully reflected in SLF 1 and 2 programmes partly due to late engagement with the government and the mismatch between GoS needs with SLF goals. The first committee meeting was organized after SLF 1 programmes were already approved. GoS needs were reflected more in SLF 2 programmes as illustrated by the creation of an immediate service delivery pillar. Additionally, UNAMID managers reported that the SLF programmes were identified in consultation with the State Governors and local communities.
23. **Operational level:** JTC¹⁷, a primary transition coordination mechanism between UNAMID and UNCT, was not sufficiently effective in cohering joint activities. The Cell was mandated to provide oversight and monitoring for JTAP by facilitating and coordinating the implementation of joint transition priorities. Staff and managers (48 per cent) welcomed its establishment, albeit late in September of 2019¹⁸ during SLF 2 programme implementation. They noted that the Cell provided an entry point to all transition activities and streamlined communication between entities. However, several staff and managers (65 per cent) cited factors against the Cell's limited effectiveness: underrepresentation of UNCT staff due to inability to provide fulltime staff; lack of clear working linkages with UNCT coordination mechanisms such as PMT; and lack of field coordination among AFPs in Darfur.
24. **Tactical level:** Coordination between UNAMID and UNCT HQ and SLF locations in each Darfur State as well as coordination among SLF locations within each State were not formalized and structured. Moreover, each SLF staff was asked to report on their individual activities to the JTC while AFPs inconsistently reported their accomplishments against benchmarks. In the absence of a coordinated approach to implementation, SLF staff (59 per cent) feared efforts were duplicated and comparative advantages were not utilized.

¹⁵ UNHQ Communication.

¹⁶ The committee comprised five members each from UNAMID-UNCT and five members of the GoS.

¹⁷ As a precursor to the JTC, an interim transition team was deployed to Khartoum to provide coordination and liaison services, which supported the planning, and implementation of SLF1, and developed a roadmap for SLF 2.

¹⁸ Terms of Reference (TOR) for JTC was not finalized until August 2019 and the first progress report was not collated until late October 2019.

iii. UNAMID recognized the successful role of AU at the strategic level and the need for AU to play a larger role at the operational level.

25. The Security Council resolution 2429 (2018) assigned AU only a strategic role which AU representatives believed was successfully fulfilled through the work of tripartite mechanism, Strategic Assessment Mission (SAM) consultations and other diplomatic endeavours. For example, AU played a critical role in managing the political transition by suspending Sudan from its activities until a civilian government was formed. One AU representative shared that AU had warned about the risk of UNAMID rapid withdrawal¹⁹ in anticipation of this political change. Similarly, AU reportedly played a direct role in having the Transitional Military Council's Decree 102, which required UNAMID to hand over all team sites to Rapid Support Forces (RSF), rescinded. Overall, AU expressed satisfaction with their contribution to the strategic decisions and regarded their partnership with United Nations as constructive and positive.
26. In addition to this mandated role, UNHQ and UNAMID managers (32 per cent) envisaged an enhanced operational role from AU for the transition to succeed. When asked, AU representatives shared that UNAMID did not articulate a strategy or specify requirements for operational support. AU maintained that the operational-level transition planning and implementation was best left to the United Nations entities to avoid duplication of management and focused on its strategic assistance.

iv. The Mission secured increased national engagement and commitment to effective transition in Darfur, but risks remained.

27. Seventy-two per cent of all interviewees agreed that the change in GoS had been a catalyst for securing broad national ownership at a sufficiently high level to support effective transition in Darfur. Formerly, UNAMID engagement with GoS was confined to the working-level due to the low priority given to the Mission by the previous regime. GoS increasing commitment was evident in membership and engagement levels in 5+5 committee meetings and clear articulation of Sudan's national priorities and needs from a potential United Nations follow-on presence.²⁰
28. UNAMID, UNCT and UNHQ interviewees alike (almost 60 per cent), however, pointed to the volatility of this engagement due to two main factors. First, a majority of the survey participants (68 per cent) and of interviewees (52 per cent) believed the GoS required further assistance post-UNAMID to sustain the peace. Second, despite a change in political establishment in Khartoum, the State apparatus in Darfur remained largely intact, and some military governors appointed by the Transitional Military Council continued to be in power. Adding to these concerns were reported participation of some people affiliated with the State authority and security forces in the looting of UNAMID premises and about the continued dominance of some military actors in the GoS, and the perceived lack of impartiality in resource allocation.

v. State Liaison Function activities progressed and generally met the stated objectives in the SLF concept.

29. A primary result of joint transition planning and coordination between UNAMID and UNCT was the establishment of SLF which was a joint analysis, planning and delivery mechanism towards common achievements and stabilization to avoid relapse into conflict in Darfur. SLFs were

¹⁹ AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM.(DCCCXL)] dated 15 April 2019.

²⁰ Letter from the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Sudan to the Secretary-General (27 January 2020) Available at <https://undocs.org/en/S/2020/77>

designed to facilitate seamless transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding by focusing on shared priorities in the four areas of livelihood/durable solutions, rule of law, human rights, and immediate service delivery.²¹ SLF programmes were implemented in six-month long periods in two phases between January – December 2019.²² SLF 1 and SLF 2 programmes were financed by a total of \$32.2 million assessed budget distributed across 10 AFPs over the four areas (Figures 3 and 4). SLF programmes were implemented with collocated UNAMID and UNCT personnel. As per Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on SLF between UNAMID and Agencies, UNAMID was to assign up to 90 international and national civilian staff as well as individual police officers (IPOs) to the agencies, albeit there were different arrangements across agencies.




Figure 3. Distribution of assessed budget across 10 AFPs in Darfur for SLF 1 and 2




Figure 4. Approximate distribution of assessed budget across priority areas for SLF 1 and 2

30. At time of writing, SLF 3 programmes were being designed with an allocation of \$9.1 million to be implemented during January – March 2020.²³ Reportedly, seven AFPs participated in the SLF 3 programmes, less WFP, IOM and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

²¹ Final SLF Concept Note dated 1 May 2019.

²² UNAMID ROL Section rolled out the component-specific operational transition plan as early as 2015 in close collaboration with UNCT (primarily UNDP and also UN-Women, UNICEF, FAO, UN-Habitat and UNFPA). This joint ROL programme succeeded in raising \$600,000 seed money and provided operational lessons and good practices for planning and designing SLF 1 and 2 programmes.

²³ UNAMID also provided \$1.9 million to GoS in support of COVID-19 pandemic response from the SLF funds.

31. Despite its criticality in the entire transition, SLF establishment was delayed due to late finalization of MOU with 10 AFPs,²⁴ delays in disbursement of funds to agencies, late deployment of UNAMID staff and uneven finalization of staff TOR. Ensuing challenges (Table 4) adversely impacted SLF effectiveness by further delaying implementation. However, the transition managers took steps to alleviate, if not eliminate, most of these concerns. Based on an in-principle agreement, the delay in MOU finalisation was addressed through frontloading of AFP funds to begin the implementation of SLF programmes. In addition, a series of workshops and visits with SLF staff and GoS officials were conducted several months after establishment to listen to staff concerns and align programme implementation with priorities and needs on the ground.

Programmatic challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of coordination and integration across SLFs in Darfur • Late release and insufficiency of funds and tight timeline • Lack of or sporadic communication with primary UNAMID sections • Lack of visibility of the work of agency implementing partners; and • Lack of monitoring and evaluation capacity within UNAMID.
Integration challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unclear, dual reporting lines to UNAMID and agencies • Lack of orientation of staff by UNAMID and agencies • Inadequate or absent medical and security evacuation plans • Insufficient resources (i.e., cars for field work, office supplies etc.) • Lack of connectivity between SLF and UNAMID HQ and logistics base; and • Difficulty for AFPs to fully integrate UNAMID staff.
Contextual challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of cash flow in the country and delayed payments to implementing partners, contractors or vendors • Continuous inflation and lack of fuel in the country • Political upheaval in Khartoum leading to reshuffling in state authorities affecting implementation.


32. The perceived value of SLF as a joint delivery mechanism was mixed. On the one hand, nearly half of UNAMID and UNCT staff and managers (43 per cent) believed SLF added value in accelerating implementation of transition priorities, and some proposed that SLF should be replicated as a best practice in other transition contexts. They were seen to have:

- a. Brought together non-integrated United Nations entities and national authorities for a common objective.
- b. Provided additional financial and human resources to expand UNCT presence in Darfur (e.g. UN-Women and UN-HABITAT).
- c. Bridged the gap between peace and development pillars, laying the foundation for peacebuilding programmes.
- d. Provided some sense of confidence for the local population in Darfur by maintaining United Nations presence.


33. On the other hand, some managers and staff (30 per cent) were more cautious about the value of SLF. They believed it was good theoretically but had concerns related to its design, implementation, sustainability, and its effect in preventing relapse. One head of agency summarized this sentiment as, “SLF is helpful but not a game changer.” Seventy-three per cent of

²⁴ The last MOU was signed with UNICEF on March 30, 2019, three months after the stipulated start of programme implementation.

the interviewees questioned the rigor of SLF programme design, arguing infrastructure development and uncoordinated training workshops may not lead to prevention of relapse of conflict in Darfur. A few UNAMID and UNCT managers shared that SLF programmes were retrofitted to funds available with no credible assessment of comparative advantages or capacities of each implementing entity, nor of conflict dynamics on the ground. OIOS review of SLF programme design indicated that the majority of activities were capacity building workshops, training and technical support (65 per cent), infrastructure development, refurbishment and equipment support (24 per cent), needs assessment (six per cent) and educational and public information materials (five per cent) with unclear linkages between them (Figure 5).



34. Another major concern shared was costs and timeline of implementation. SLF staff and managers (44 per cent) believed financial resources assigned to SLF were insufficient to generate visible value in the long run. Even though the SLF programme budget was exponentially higher than average UNAMID programmatic spending, the amount was not considered at par with needs in Darfur.²⁵ Moreover, 23 per cent of SLF staff indicated that a 6-month period to complete the high volume of projects was difficult, adding that feasibility assessments had not been conducted. OIOS review of AFP progress reports demonstrated that while SLF 1 reached 92 per cent budget utilization and 64 per cent project completion rate only by the end of 2019, several AFPs requested no cost extension for SLF 2 activities whose budget utilization stagnated at 29 per cent and with completion rate at 28 per cent (Figure 6).



²⁵ Between 2014 and 2018 UNAMID received \$4 to \$5.5 million per year for programmatic activities. However, in 2019, assessed budget of almost \$33 million for SLF programmes raised the total to over \$40 million.

35. Despite these shortcomings in design and implementation, SLF programmes produced some early, short-term results. Some staff and managers (25 per cent) confirmed the absence of a systematic monitoring and evaluation system and capacity to assess SLF outcomes on the ground. Notwithstanding this weakness, staff and managers (90 per cent) believed that provision of basic services (i.e., seeds, pesticides, drugs, boreholes, office furniture etc.), infrastructure development (i.e., clinics, police stations, courts etc.) and capacity building for State and communities were visible results towards building, strengthening and supporting State authority across Darfur. Similarly, all GoS officials and IDP representatives (63 individuals) interviewed expressed satisfaction with the support provided through SLF programmes, especially in the areas of basic services and asked for continuous engagement and provision of resources particularly for income generating activities. It was recognized that the assessment of the impact of SLF would require longer-term engagement with the GoS and communities.
36. Staff and managers (35 per cent) were also hesitant about the sustainability of SLF programmes. Concerns were multi-faceted, ranging from untargeted selection of beneficiaries and localities to a lack of human resources and technical capacity of state and civil society actors to maintain the facilities. It was noted that peacebuilding programmes were designed based on SLF footprint across Darfur strengthening and extending SLF's early results, hence may create some sustainability.

C. (1) UNAMID and UNCT endeavoured to address conflict drivers, but significant the risks of relapse into conflict remained.

37. Above 80 per cent of the interviewees and 60 per cent of the survey respondents pointed to the persistence of the risk of relapse into conflict in whole of Darfur and expressed concern over the lack of a comprehensive strategy to address several facets of this risk, including unaddressed root causes of conflict, protracted humanitarian needs, destabilizing activities of paramilitary forces and armed groups, prevalence of small weapons and the unfinished peace process.²⁶

i. Unaddressed root causes of conflict threatened stability and peacebuilding in Darfur.

38. It is the general view of stakeholders that the root causes of conflict, including management of and access to land, water and other resources, as well as the absence of security, basic services, and livelihood opportunities leading to intercommunal clashes, were insufficiently addressed in Darfur, and impacted the effectiveness of transition. Although UNAMID, together with UNCT and GoS, provided sustainable solutions to address the drivers of conflict in order to prevent relapse, progress was slow in extending the State authority, strengthening the rule of law and finding sustainable durable solutions for displaced communities. The Security Council, UNHQ, UNAMID and GoS were cognizant of the remaining conflict drivers and expected them to be addressed by the ongoing peace negotiations and by the follow-on mechanism.

ii. The humanitarian and protection need of vulnerable populations remained high.

39. Risks related to humanitarian and protection needs in Darfur remained high and unaddressed with over 3 million people affected, including 2 million IDPs and 1.3 million refugees. Criminal attacks during livelihood activities such as farming, as well as intimidation, harassment, and sexual and gender-based violence against the vulnerable populations were reported by UNAMID as persistent. During the transition period, the analysis of JMAC data revealed that approximately 40

²⁶ Desk review of the reports of the Secretary-General on UNAMID, the Panel of Experts on the Sudan as well as external academic research and media articles supports staff perceptions.

per cent (186 out of 459 in 2019) of the civilian fatalities were due to criminalities and 17 per cent (1037 out of 6067 incidents during July 2018-January 2020) of all criminal and security incidents were against IDPs.

40. As per SCR 2429 (2018), protection of civilians continued to be a mandate for UNAMID including in areas already vacated “in extremis”.²⁷ The lack of UNAMID response to protect civilians during the attack on IDP camps and 21 villages in vicinity of El Geneina, on 29 December 2019 in which 65 people were killed, 54 others injured, 46,000 persons displaced and 11,000 persons fled to Chad had come under the scrutiny at the UNHQ and the Security Council.²⁸ The ability for UNAMID reserve force to respond to physical protection incidents outside Greater Jebel Marra area was challenged due to lack of presence, capability to respond in time, and the fact that primary responsibility remained with GoS in the vacated areas, which needs further examination.

iii. Activities of paramilitary forces and armed groups remained a concern.

41. The destabilizing activities and growing influence of paramilitary forces such as the RSF were viewed with caution and feared by the people of Darfur. According to UNAMID estimates, the return of approximately 2,500 to 3,000 RSF fighters and 1,000 others operating as mercenaries²⁹ in Libya to Darfur could fuel instability. The operations of Darfur armed groups from Chad, Central African Republic and Libya posed additional security risk in Darfur. Increased recruitment of fighters by armed groups was reported from the Darfur refugee community in Chad and from IDPs within Darfur. In Greater Jebel Marra area, confrontations between government forces and Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) faction created instability. Following political transition, a positive development reported by UNAMID was an increasing trend of RSF fighters joining SLF capacity building programmes. However, with the reconfigured area of operations, UNAMID capability to influence activities of armed groups beyond the Greater Jebel Marra area was reportedly to be limited.

iv. The prevalence of weapons among the communities and DDR challenges remained a factor that could exacerbate instability.

42. The illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons was one of the most cited risk factors against stability in Darfur by key interviewees including UNAMID, IDP and GoS representatives. JMAC assessed the Government’s weapons-collection programme in 2017-2018 as uneven and discriminatory against certain tribes and, as a result, only limited number of weapons were collected. Moreover, Darfur armed groups were reported to have acquired sophisticated weaponry to exploit the security vacuum in Darfur post-UNAMID exit.³⁰ JMAC estimated the number of weapons within Darfur communities ranged from 700,000 to two million pieces. UNAMID managers referred to the most recent killings in Kalma and Krinding IDP camps as examples of weaponization within vulnerable communities.³¹
43. With UNAMID technical and logistical assistance to the Sudan DDR Commission, approximately 7,500 combatants were demobilized between 2015-2017, and around 2,000 ex-combatants were

²⁷ UNAMID is required to maintain a reserve capacity of up to one battalion to respond to “in extremis” situations for protection of civilians in Darfur including in areas vacated until the end of the mandate.

²⁸ DPO briefing to the Security Council (8 January 2020).

²⁹ UNAMID JMAC Data.

³⁰ S/2019/34 (2019).

³¹ ReliefWeb (April 2019). UNAMID condemns violent confrontations in Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/unamid-condemns-violent-confrontations-kalma-idp-camp-south-darfur>

reintegrated³² which only partly mitigated the risk.³³ While UNAMID stopped providing support to DDR programmes since 2018 due to its misuse by beneficiaries, the need for technical support for DDR and small arms and weapon collection programmes were projected by the Prime Minister of Sudan³⁴ for inclusion in the mandate of the follow-on mission.

v. Despite the ongoing peace process, the risk of relapse of conflict in Darfur remained.

44. Despite the peace process initiated by the GoS in Juba, South Sudan in October 2019 the risk of relapse of conflict in Darfur continues to be a concern. Under the Darfur track discussions, major Darfur armed groups, except SLA-AW, signed a framework agreement in December 2019. In interviews, despite the rejection of ongoing efforts by some IDPs affiliated with SLA-AW, UNAMID and UNCT senior leadership expressed confidence about positive outcomes from the peace negotiations, paving the way for sustainable peace in Darfur. Similarly, AU and GoS authorities interviewed and some IDP groups viewed the peace negotiations as timely, positive, and credible.
45. UNAMID was mandated as per SCR 2495 (2019) to provide logistical, technical, and advisory support to the Juba peace process, which was well appreciated by GoS, AU and UNHQ. UNAMID conducted consultative meetings with women, IDPs and refugees from Darfur and facilitated their participation in the Juba peace talks. IDPs interviewed in Ed Daein however raised concerns on the process of selecting IDP representatives to participate in peace talks. UNAMID senior leadership expressed satisfaction about the mission's role in facilitating mediation between GoS and armed groups, supporting the National Peace Commission, and the preparedness to implement the provisions of peace agreements.

C. (2) UNAMID identified and endeavoured to address reputational risks.

46. The majority view among interviewees in the field and HQ noted some reputational risks for the Organization due to internal and external factors.

i. Internal asset management remained a major concern.

47. The lack of proper accounting, inventory management, disposal actions (gifting, transfer, commercial sales, scrap, e-waste, etc.) and writing off³⁵ of mission assets remained a major concern and a potential reputational risk. There was no clarity on the total volume and value of all mission assets and equipment. Available unverified UNAMID data indicated holding of almost \$400 million assets at acquisition value, \$96 million of equipment and \$52 million of inventory which needed to be disposed of and liquidated in a short period of time as per regulations. However, UNAMID survey participants pointed to several discrepancies about the physical holdings and financial aspects of these assets (Figure 7).
48. UNAMID took measures to account for and physically verify the assets during the past one year to ascertain the magnitude of challenges. The lingering problems were largely attributed to legacy issues (i.e., assets received from African Union Mission in Sudan and other peacekeeping missions) and historic factors (i.e., lack of systematic oversight, irregular physical inventory count, turnover of key staff, etc.). In addition, the migration of equipment and inventory data from Galileo to

³² DDR Section of DPO and UNAMID.


³³ The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates the number of non-integrated ex-combatants to be 11,000 (Development Policy Paper No. 28 on Mission Drawdowns).

³⁴ Letter from the Prime Minister of Sudan to the Secretary-General (SUN/030/20) dated 28 January 2020.

³⁵ Write-off backlog in August 2019 was 1800 fixed assets at the value of 60 million.

Umoja in 2017,³⁶ the existence of unopened containers,³⁷ pending disposal of items under end-user certificate restrictions and delayed destruction of dangerous goods were cited as major challenges in achieving full visibility of actual holding on ground vis-à-vis on record/inventory. Reportedly, the lack of proper accounting during drawdown and liquidation phases have increased opportunities to commit theft, pilferage, and fraud of UNAMID assets.³⁸

Figure 7. UNAMID staff either did not know or did not believe asset handover was properly managed.



ii. Misutilization and misappropriation of team sites and assets handed over to GoS entities adversely impacted community perceptions.

49. The consequences of misutilisation and misappropriation of UNAMID assets and premises by unauthorized persons and entities were cited by some key interviewees as a major reputational risk. The total net book value of assets in the 28 UNAMID bases handed over to GoS was \$126 million, including those looted in El Geneina and Nyala camps worth USD 25.7 million and \$55.7 million respectively (refer **Annex III**). The reported usurpation of assets and team sites by RSF reported in the media and by UNAMID was perceived by the local communities as detrimental to their safety and security. For example, former UN-owned assets, including vehicles, generators, furniture, air conditioners were stolen by local population including uniformed personnel during the looting of handed over Nyala super camp.³⁹

50. In response to the Transitional Military Council Decree Number 102-2019 of 13 May 2019,⁴⁰ which requested UNAMID to hand over all 'camps' to the RSF, DPO had suspended the handover of the remaining team sites to the Sudanese authorities on 14 June 2019 to prevent it from being misutilized or misappropriated by unauthorised elements. Subsequently, GoS committed to the Security Council that the handed over UNAMID team sites would be exclusively used for civilian end-user purposes.⁴¹

³⁶ Physical Inventory Reconciliation and Optimization (PIRO) project provided support for inventory data clean-up and to address data discrepancies in October 2018. The Galileo transfer issues was believed to create over 2 million data entry mistakes.

³⁷ In El Fasher alone there were more than 3,000 containers, some of it yet to be physically verified (UNAMID Document).

³⁸ Five cases were reported by CDT and Mission Security Section. In April 2019, 1.7 million worth of transport section expendable assets were reported as missing/lost.

³⁹ DPO Briefing to the Security Council (8 January 2020).

⁴⁰ Since been rescinded.

⁴¹ Meeting of the Tripartite Mechanism (07 October 2019) and Council resolution 2429 (2019).

51. Some managers noted problems with UNAMID team sites that limited their utility, such as, distance from the township reducing the accessibility, unsuitability of the infrastructure for civilian end-use purposes without modification, and need for expertise to operate high-value assets and run maintenance to sustain the facilities. Some staff members pointed to lack of constructive engagement by UNAMID with the intended-end users including local Government authorities and communities to ensure the protection, ownership, and commitment for appropriate usage of bases and assets. The Mission is currently reviewing the handover framework, evaluating stakeholder requests, and instituting new modalities and procedures to ensure proper transfer of team sites and assets to the rightful beneficiaries.

iii. *The residual team sites remained vulnerable to looting and criminal activities.*

52. Sixty-two per cent of UNAMID leadership and staff expressed concerns that the remaining team sites and high value assets continued to be lucrative targets for looting and criminal activities. DPO observed that the lessons learnt from the looting incident of El Geneina did not help UNAMID to prevent a similar incident in Nyala.⁴² UNAMID was yet to handover 12 team sites as well as the Mission HQ in Zalingei and the logistics base in El Fasher which accounted for total assets worth of \$56 million. Mission leadership pointed to the continued threat to the UNAMID team sites due to the reduced footprint of UNAMID and the limited strength of the uniformed components as well as the lack of readiness and capacity of national forces to maintain law and order and to protect the team sites. It was feared that previous looting incidents had set a precedent, and since neither GoS and UNAMID could prevent, nor respond effectively,⁴³ similar attempts in future cannot be ruled out. UNAMID senior leadership and managers highlighted the challenges and dilemmas in responding robustly against looting and/or criminal incidents, when the large looting crowd included women, children, and uniformed personnel.

53. To mitigate these risks, the Mission HQ and team sites developed security contingency plans and base defence plans for the remaining team sites.⁴⁴ UNAMID conducted tabletop exercises for the 12 team sites and increased military and police deployment in Zalingei and El Fasher super camps. The efficacy of these measures is yet to be tested.

iv. *Risks related to environmental fallout needed continued focus.*

54. UNAMID took effective steps to manage and reduce the mission's environmental impact on personnel, local communities, and ecosystems. The mission leadership and the environmental unit confirmed undertaking various risk-mitigating initiatives such as environmental awareness raising among mission components, outreach to GoS entities and communities, ordnance disposal screening, systematic environmental assessments and clean-ups, and obtaining clearance for the operating bases handed over to GoS. UNAMID had rolled out contracts for the disposal of e-waste and ballistic protective equipment; and procured large capacity incineration equipment for disposal of hazardous material. However, a few UNAMID managers and MSD staff pointed to continued reputational risk emanating from stockpiling, packaging, storage, record keeping of hazardous materials and dangerous goods; stockpiling and disposal of e-waste scrap materials and dangerous goods (including expired ammunition);⁴⁵ and the pending environmental inspection of unopened storage containers.

⁴² DPO briefing to the Security Council (8 January 2020).

⁴³ The Sudanese security elements are either implicated in these incidents or lack capacities to respond, and it is uncertain whether the reserve force can respond to high magnitude of violence (S/2020/202 dated 12 March 2020).

⁴⁴ UNAMID Joint Operations Centre data.

⁴⁵ UNAMID could not provide an estimate of the total tonnage for e-waste, other scrap, and dangerous goods.

v. Potential for serious misconduct including the sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) during drawdown and exit remained high.

55. During the transition, the RCO together with UNAMID developed a comprehensive framework on PSEA with an action plan, identifying activities and resources. However, the sudden spurt in the reported SEA cases in UNAMID during the first quarter of 2020 was viewed by the UNAMID leadership as a serious ethical and reputational risk and concern to the Organisation. UNAMID reported only one SEA case each in 2017 and 2019, as against five SEA cases in the first quarter of 2020. In addition, a total of 19 cases of prohibited conduct were reported during 2019 (with 13 harassment, two sexual harassment, two abuse of authority, and two discrimination related cases). It was noted that UNAMID had regularly undertaken mission-wide misconduct risk assessment including for the planned drawdown and exit. As per UNAMID CDT, the unsettled conditions during drawdown and closure, as well as the local community's effort to obtain some financial benefits before the departure of UNAMID potentially contributed to the spike in alleged cases of SEA.

D. Key factors contributed to or constrained the effectiveness and efficiency of transition in Darfur.

i. Peacebuilding efforts activities lagged due to contextual factors and needed sustained effort.

56. UNCT interviewees confirmed that the peacebuilding part of transition was inordinately delayed due to the political transition and security situation in Sudan, lack of donor support, and internal eligibility processing issues. The delay was evident in the lack of a Darfur-wide peacebuilding strategy, an integrated joint resource mobilization plan, the mapping of UNCT technical assistance for Darfur, the comparative advantage analysis of major actors on the ground required by the mandate and directives. UNAMID and UNCT managers concurred that, in addition to securing a comprehensive peace agreement, continued and substantial peacebuilding support in Darfur was crucial for contributing to the prevention of relapse into conflict, similar to PBSO's interventions in other peacekeeping settings (refer **Annex IV**).

57. The delay was further accentuated by the limited availability and unpredictability of funds for peacebuilding, early recovery, and development in Darfur. Almost half (43 percent) of the survey respondents believed that UNCT did not have the necessary financial resources to advance the peacebuilding efforts in Darfur. Both UNAMID and UNCT interviewees commented that the assessed funds were conceived as seed money and provided a foundation for peacebuilding initiatives at the micro-level. While the transition implementation started with Security Council resolution 2429 (2018), Sudan was given eligibility for Peacebuilding Fund for five years only in October 2019 and funds were made available in January 2020 (after a lapse of 18 crucial months) which eventually delayed the programme implementation.

58. GoS, UNAMID and UNCT interviewees appreciated the allocation of \$20 million for peacebuilding in Darfur, and \$2.8 million from the immediate response facility for supporting the GoS Peace Commission and establishment of a peacebuilding fund secretariat, by the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) of DPPA.⁴⁶ UNAMID and UNCT managers confirmed that the peacebuilding fund projects were aligned with, complementary to, and built on UNAMID mandate priorities; ongoing SLF programmes in Darfur; the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) as

⁴⁶ Per OECD policy paper the post-UNAMID peacebuilding funding requirements for Darfur is estimated at \$70 million by the UNCT.

well as the proposed DDS (refresher)⁴⁷ programmes. However, the RCO pointed to the need of substantial involvement of UNAMID in the peacebuilding consultations, programming, and implementation until the exit of the mission.

ii. United Nations systemic issues adversely affected transition in Darfur.

59. Persisting systemic issues afflicted transition planning and implementation. As illustrated in previous sections, the geographic and functional fragmentation of transition leadership, institutional siloes within and among entities, different mandates and application thereof limited the level of integration required to jointly implement the whole-of-system approach.
60. The lack of integration between UNAMID and UNCT, especially for SLF and peacebuilding programming, was cited by one third of the interviewees as a major challenge against effective transition. Two major contributory factors were discussed. One was the non-integrated mission structure (32 per cent of interviewees) whereby UNAMID and UNCT had not shared a common decision-making platform. The second related to different institutional mandates and cultures as evidenced in different programmatic approaches, financial and administrative rules, and regulations.⁴⁸ This reportedly delayed the implementation of SLF 1 and 2 programmes.⁴⁹ Similarly, almost all interviewees attributed the late signing of MOUs between UNAMID and AFPs to mismatching funding cycles and administrative rules, which significantly delayed SLF programme implementation.

iii. United Nations Headquarters backstopping was adequate.

61. The backstopping provided by UNHQ, especially by DPO and Department of Operational Support (DOS) for the drawdown, closure, and liquidation, was adequate. Necessary strategic guidance and directions were provided through Security Council resolutions, special reports, code cables, faxes, as well as visits⁵⁰ by senior leadership and video teleconferencing with UNAMID leadership.
62. Some guidance was found particularly effective. UNAMID senior leadership appreciated the DPO-DPPA-UNDP Joint Transition Project which provided capacity building support (i.e., training workshops, consultants, etc.), direct support (i.e., drafting the JTAP, senior level mentoring), and sharing of experiences and lessons learned from previous transitions. Similarly, some UNAMID MSD managers confirmed the use of guidance provided by the multifunctional coordination group in DOS for the closure, exit and liquidation disseminated by a planning workshop and sharing of End of Mission Reports from closures of UNMIL, ONUCI and MINUJUSTH.
63. UNHQ also provided surge capacity to fill in critical gaps at the technical level. This included deployment of a transition specialist and a consultant by the transition project; a police expert from the Standing Police Capacity; a rule of law expert from the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity; teams from the PIRO project and Environment Technical Support Unit (together with

⁴⁷ RCO and Heads of Agencies were required to use DDS refresher as the vehicle to articulate the UNCT's programmatic activities in Darfur.

⁴⁸ The UNHCR, IOM, FAO did not have delegated authority to country offices to move SLF funds allocated by UNAMID from their HQ account to the field. Moreover, the narrative and financial reports of AFPs were delayed since these were required to be certified at HQ level and the country offices had little influence over the submission.

⁴⁹ SLF 1, SLF 2, and SLF 3 should have started on 01 January 2019, 01 July 2019, and 01 January 2020, respectively. An average delay of one to two months was noticed in all three phases due to late finalization of MOUs, disbursement of funds, and finalization of staff TORs. No cost extension was granted to majority of the agencies.


⁵⁰ Deputy Secretary-General, USG DPO, and ASGs of DPO, PBSO and UNDP (as an example of UN-wide coordination for transition support) visited Sudan/Darfur to provide strategic direction and momentum to the transition.

the Rapid Environment and Climate Change Technical assistance team, Geneva) from the UNGSC; and a team from the Archiving and Records Management Section (ARMS) of UNHQ.

64. Some inadequacies of UNHQ backstopping were also mentioned. Almost all UNAMID managers expressed concern that the SAM did not fully reflect the ground reality as communicated by UNAMID Sections. A clear illustration of this was S/2019/445 that did not acknowledge the impact of political transition in Khartoum on the security situation in Darfur despite its communication by UNAMID Sections. However, DPO clarified that the SAM process was consultative and factual, and reflected UNAMID inputs. In addition, the RCO referred to a lack of information sharing and systematic engagement with the DPPA and DPO in matters related to peace and security in Sudan. The RCO also noted that the engagement with and support from the United Nations Development Coordination Office (UNDCO) for transition planning and implementation was minimal.

iv. Human resources drawdown and low morale impacted transition.


65. The human resources drawdown in UNAMID and resultant low morale impacted the preparation for drawdown, exit, and liquidation as well as the joint transition planning and implementation. Approximately 74 per cent of the total personnel were reduced over a period of six years, while 58 per cent personnel were reduced from 2017 to 2019 (Figure 8). Based on the political uncertainties, and self-protection concerns and protection of civilians, UNAMID drawdown was paused from July 2019 to 31 December 2020.⁵¹



66. UNAMID staff and managers reported that the volume and intensity of transition-related activities to be implemented as overwhelming (Figure 9 below). The uncertainty about jobs have also contributed to low morale, and productivity in some staff members. Staff counselling services were accessed 3763 times during April 2018 to February 2020, pointing to continued morale issues. Moreover, attrition in key appointments was cited as impacting institutional memory and transition management⁵² by mission leadership and staff members.

⁵¹ Security Council resolutions 2479 (2019), 2495 (2019) and 2525 (2020).

⁵² Key staff attrition includes Director, Service Chiefs, Section chiefs (property management and engineering) in MSD, Chiefs of JMAC and GCSS, etc.



67. UNAMID continued to support staff members in furthering their job opportunities and career development. Since January 2018, a total of 130 staff members⁵³ were reassigned to other United Nations system entities and peacekeeping missions, which was actively supported by the DOS and UNAMID Human Resources Section. Since July 2018 to March 2020, UNAMID conducted 178 capacity building events in which 1,866 national staff and 31 United Nations volunteers were trained.⁵⁴ However, the national staff union and national staff members were concerned about the utility and the tangible benefits accruing from these endeavours. In addition, the MOU between DMSPC, DOS and DCO to allow for more flexible placement arrangements between United Nations Secretariat and AFPs, as well as the DMSPC-DOS downsizing policy envisaged in the Secretary-General’s planning directive⁵⁵ in furtherance of “one United Nations approach to staffing” was found pending at the Headquarters level.

VI. Conclusion

68. The ongoing transition in Darfur demonstrates some successes and innovation, but also persistent challenges. An assessment of its overall effectiveness must necessarily account for its complex external environment, fraught as it was with political and security upheavals specific to it, but which now must go forward under the new global reality of the Covid-19 pandemic.

69. On the positive side, UNAMID transition activities brought the United Nations system together along with AU, GoS and local communities on a common platform. While the unprecedented political transition slowed the process, it also induced flexibility and agility in recalibrating the United Nations intervention in Darfur. Progress included realigning internal preparations, recalibrating the exit strategy, advancing the work of SLF, addressing potential reputational risks, and strengthened and proactive engagement with GoS.

70. Yet, persistent challenges related to unity of leadership, as well as differing mandates, cultures and procedures, priorities and preferences of the various United Nations system entities existed. It is unlikely that they will be substantially reduced without high-level, sustained attention of decision-makers in UNHQ. The risk of increased SEA at a time when resources are dwindling pose an additional cause for concern.

⁵³ Five D Level, 66 P level and 59 FS level staff were placed (including 65 staff members in peacekeeping operations).

⁵⁴ Include 1,425 male and 472 female staff members.

⁵⁵ The Secretary-General’s Planning Directive for the development of consistent and coherent UN Transition processes, in line with EC decision 201/38 (25 February 2019).

71. In the current context, the gains in Darfur are fragile and there is need for resolute focus by UNHQ, UNAMID and UNCT on the short to middle term to collectively work to prevent Darfur from relapsing into conflict. Shortages of food, and disruption of economic activity that deprives large numbers of people of their livelihood may present an opportunity for armed elements to increase activities that are inimical to sustained peace. Should that happen, or any combination of events with similar consequences occur, all the efforts and the results achieved by the international community could be wasted.

72. As part of institutional learning and record keeping, it would be essential to undertake a Headquarters-led comprehensive review of the legacy of UNAMID to establish the contribution and impact achieved in Darfur since its inception to the final closure, keeping in view the hybrid nature, non-integrated setting and the overall political and security environment experienced during the lifetime of the mission.

VII. Recommendations


73. OIOS-IED made the following critical and important recommendations for each result area.


Ser	Results	Recommendation	Type	Indicator
1	Result (A)(iii)	a. DPO, DOS and UNDCO should document lessons learned and best practices from prior United Nations transitions of peace operations suitable for and disseminated to each level.	Important	Publication of a compendium of lessons learned and best practices on transition.
2		b. UNHQ should revise and update the Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (2013) in line with new guidance given by the Secretary General, EC, and lessons learned from the recent transitions in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, and Sudan.	Important	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revised Policy reflect latest EC guidance on transition and lessons and best practices from recent transitions. Promulgation of revised transition policy.
3	Result (B)(i)	DPO and DCO should facilitate synergy and harmony among UNAMID and United Nations Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)/UNCT leadership to foster unity of vision and effort within and among their entities towards accomplishment of the mandated transition objectives.	Important	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNAMID reporting lines aligned with Secretary-General's directives. Increased leadership dialogue and common messages between UNAMID and UNITAMS/UNCT. Increased involvement of UNCT members in transition discussions

Ser	Results	Recommendation	Type	Indicator
4	Result (B)(ii)	a. UNAMID and RCO should establish a joint monitoring and evaluation mechanism to systematically report on and readjust the transition activities.	Important	Regular, systematic review of and progress updates on JTAP and readjustment of activities.
5		b. UNAMID and RCO should strengthen coordination mechanisms at all levels to advance transition in the wake of global pandemic.	Important	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced or no - overlap of programme coverage and outreach - redundancy and duplication of programmatic activities • Improved synergies and sequencing of programmatic activities.
6	Result (B)(v)	UNAMID and UNITAMS/UNCT should assess utility and applicability of SLF as an integrated joint delivery mechanism for future transitions before being replicated.	Important	Analysis of suitability and sustainability of SLF programmes.
7	Result (C)(1)(i)	UNHQ should ensure all significant and unmitigated risks of relapse including protection needs remain as a strategic focus in discussions on UNITAMS with the Secretary-General and the Security Council and ensure that this is supported by an analysis of peacebuilding needs and requirements in Darfur.	Critical	Analysis of unaddressed risks and protection and peacebuilding requirements by UNAMID and RCO and inclusion of these analyses in the planning of follow-on mechanism.
8	Result (C)(2)(i)	UNAMID should carry out physical verification and accounting of all assets and equipment to ensure fool-proof liquidation.	Important	Systematic accounting, disposal and write-off of all assets and equipment as per rules and regulations.
9	Result (C)(2)(ii)	UNHQ and UNAMID should review and modify the guidelines, framework, and agreement of handover process with the host government to ensure rightful use of UN premises and assets.	Important	Issuance of revised guidelines and securing commitment from GoS.
10	Result (C)(2)(iii)	Plans for security of UNAMID staff, assets and equipment in all operating bases should be reviewed and updated.	Important	Updated security plans.
11	Result (C)(2)(v)	UNAMID should identify transition-specific risks related to SEA and take measures to address them.	Important	Zero SEA cases.

Ser	Results	Recommendation	Type	Indicator
12	Result (D) (iv)	DPO, DOS, DMSPC and DCO should facilitate employment opportunities and placement of staff from missions transitioning in the follow-on mission, other peacekeeping missions, wider United Nations system entities, and National Government system (especially for the national staff), based on their competencies and skillsets.	Important	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOU on placement arrangements between DOS, DMSPC and DCO finalised. • DMSPC-DOS downsizing policy promulgated. • Opportunities provided and actual placements made. • National staff absorbed in the National Government system.
13	VI	DPO and DOS should undertake a review of the legacy of UNAMID to establish the mission's contribution and impact in the hybrid and non-integrated setting within the overall political and security environment for institutional learning.	Important	A plan to review UNAMID legacy.

VIII. Annex I: Timeline of Major Events That Impacted Political Transition in Sudan and Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding Transition in Darfur





IX. Annex II: Methodology and Limitations

Number of documents reviewed		
Document type	Timeline	# of Documents
Security Council Resolutions	2007-2020	14
Meeting Minutes of the EC and Deputy Committees	2017-2019	12
Reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council	2007-2020	28
Reports of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan	2012-2019	7
Budget Performance Reports	2009-2018	9
End of Assignment Reviews	2015-2017	12
OIOS Audit Reports	2013-2019	11
After Action Reviews	2007-2017	19
Political agreements	2006-2018	2
Policy guidelines on transition	2013-2018	2
External studies (i.e., transition project, IPI)	2011-2018	8
SLF 1 and 2 programmes (concept notes, MOUs, work plans, progress and budget reports, TORs)	2018-2020	57
UNCT documents (peacebuilding programmes, staffing, resources)	2019-2020	32
UNAMID drawdown and liquidation plans, SOPs, meeting minutes, progress reports	2017-2020	28
UNAMID-UNCT bimonthly meeting minutes	2018-2019	6
5+5 Technical Coordination Committee meeting minutes	2018-2019	11
Code cables	2017-2020	12
Total		270

Number of individuals interviewed via individual and group interviews		
Stakeholder group	Phase 1 (May-July 2019)	Phase 2 (December 2019- February 2020)
United Nations HQ	29	11
UNAMID	31	83
UNCT ⁵⁶	22	15
SLF	81	32
African Union and UNOAU	5	5
Government of Sudan	2	12
Darfur communities (IDPs and CSOs)	18	31
Total	188	189

Number of UNAMID and UNCT staff and managers surveyed during June – July 2019 ⁵⁷			
Survey respondents	Population	Responses	Response Rate
UNAMID civilian staff ⁵⁸	800	260	33%
UNCT civilian staff	100	27	27%
UNAMID military staff ⁵⁹	300	141	47%

⁵⁶ All 10 AFPs participating in the SLF programmes were included in the sample.

⁵⁷ A one-time, cross-sectional survey was conducted to make a mid-term assessment of transition effectiveness.

⁵⁸ Including international and national substantive (109 participants) and support staff (151 participants)

⁵⁹ Military commanders at all levels, experts on mission, military staff officers and military contingent officers.

Number of UNAMID and UNCT staff and managers surveyed during June – July 2019 ⁵⁷			
Survey respondents	Population	Responses	Response Rate
UNAMID police staff ⁶⁰	800	64	8%
Total	2000	492	%24

SLF implementation sites observed	
Darfur State	SLF projects
East	Human Rights Resource Centre, Justice and Confidence Centre, Multipurpose Livelihood Centre, Prison and Water Yard
North	Sudanese Police Force and Child Court
South	Durable solutions/livelihood training centre
Total	8

Limitations

The evaluation process faced some limitations. First, the process was disrupted by the political and security situation on ground. The evaluation engaged with only select direct beneficiaries, such as government officials, communities, IDPs and civil society organizations to balance the views and experiences of staff and managers.

Second, although this evaluation attempted to gather evidence in two phases to capture the transition process as it was happening, it was not possible to conduct a longitudinal study to observe the outcomes after the transition was completed. This is especially true for the SLF interventions whose behavioural effects (beyond output delivery) could not be fully demonstrable at the time of writing the report.

Similarly, due to limited evaluation resources, a cross-sectional survey was administered the results of which were extensively discussed in the Advisory Memorandum, and only relevant findings were included in the final report.

The evaluation team used various methods to overcome these limitations including the standard technique of triangulation. Corroboration of evidence across interviews, cross-sectional survey, documents, and direct observations enabled potentially biased data to be excluded.

⁶⁰ Police commanders at all levels, UNPOL staff officers, individual police officers and formed police unit officers.

X. Annex III: Team sites handed over to Government of Sudan

Handed Over in 2017 (Security Council Resolution 2363)				
Ser	Location	State	Handover Date	NBV
1	Muhajeria (TS)	East Darfur	08 August 2017	\$1,751,907.53
2	Malha (TS)	North Darfur	16 August 2017	\$3,494,831.58
3	Mellit (TS)	North Darfur	17 August 2017	\$2,373,163.86
4	Um Kadada (TS)	North Darfur	29 August 2017	\$2,624,503.84
5	Ed Al Fursan (TS)	South Darfur	12 October 2017	\$1,319,601.23
6	Tulus (TS)	South Darfur	15 October 2017	\$1,578,660.60
7	Foro Baranga (TS)	West Darfur	16 October 2017	\$2,075,725.68
8	Zamzam (CPC)	North Darfur	16 October 2017	\$59,321.72
9	Habila (TS)	West Darfur	17 October 2017	\$1,022,113.58
10	Tine (TS)	North Darfur	19 October 2017	\$2,319,634.70
11	Abou Shouk (CPC)	North Darfur	20 October 2017	\$123,763.93
12	Zamzam (TS)	North Darfur	21 October 2017	\$1,718,304.24
Total				\$20,461,532.49

Handed Over in 2018 (Security Council Resolution 2429)				
Ser	Location	Sector/State	Handover Date	NBV
13	Al Salaam (CPC)	South Darfur	04 October 2018	\$49,604.15
14	El Sireaf (TOB)	North Darfur	08 October 2018	\$625,101.23
15	Otash (CPC)	South Darfur	14 October 2018	\$38,698.97
16	Dereige (CPC)	South Darfur	14 October 2018	\$285,226.31
17	Shaeria (TS)	East Darfur	30 October 2018	\$1,150,012.38
18	Labado (TS)	East Darfur	01 November 2018	\$503,451.33
19	Mukjar (TS)	Central Darfur	04 November 2018	\$1,880,356.93
20	Masteri (TS)	West Darfur	07 November 2018	\$1,736,827.60
21	Um Barru (TS)	North Darfur	08 November 2018	\$1,101,715.58
22	Korma (TS)	North Darfur	17 November 2018	\$1,615,263.49
23	Mournei (TS)	West Darfur	18 November 2018	\$407,316.39
24	Buram (TS)	South Darfur	09 December 2018	\$631,467.50
25	Graida (TS)	South Darfur	20 December 2018	\$1,531,906.06
Total				\$11,556,948.06

Handed Over in 2019 (Security Council Resolution 2429)					
Ser	Location	Sector/State	Handover Date	NBV	Remarks
26	El Daein (SHQ)	East Darfur	30 April 2019	\$12,747,535	Local protested against UNAMID during handing over to the local authorities (Governor) of GoS
27	El Geneina (SHQ)	West Darfur	15 May 2019	\$25,705,211	Looted prior to handing over to GoS authorities on 14 May 2019
28	Nyala (SHQ)	South Darfur	19 November 2019	\$ 55,720,030	Looted after handing over to GoS authorities on 27 December 2019
Total				\$94,172,776	

Legend: NBV - Net Book Value; TS – Team Site; TOB – Temporary Operating Base; CPS – Community Policing Centre; SHQ – Sector HQ

XI. Annex IV: Comparison of peacebuilding support in other peacekeeping setting

Country	PBF allocation	Transition Timeline	Remarks
Liberia (UNMIL)	75M (2008-2019)	2016-2018	Focused on i) advancing reconciliation through legislative reforms and civic engagements, ii) sustaining peace and improving social cohesion through the promotion of rural employment opportunities for youth in conflict-prone area, iii) socio-economic empowerment of disadvantaged youth, support to the multi-partner trust fund/peacebuilding fund joint secretariat; (iv) empowerment of women and to more gender responsive security institutions; and (v) human rights monitoring and protection.
Haiti MINUSTAH MINUJUSTH	11.14M	2016-2019	Focused on access to justice; transparent, efficient and reliable institutions; community violence reduction; corrections; police; and elections.
Timor Leste (UNIMET)	0.99M	2010-2012	Focused on return, relocation and reintegration support to IDPs and IDP-affected communities.
Côte d'ivoire (UNOCI)	42M (2012-2019)	2015-2017	Focused on security, socio-economic recovery, empowerment of youth, early warning systems, human rights.
Mali (MINUSMA)	50.4M (2014-19)	Not yet started	Existing Integrated Strategic Framework. Focusing on strengthening: inclusive governance and political dialogue; capacity of local authorities to provide basic social services; intercommunity social cohesion support for prevention and conflict resolution; and the judicial system
Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	100.3M (2008-2019)	Not yet started	Focusing on security, socio-economic revitalization and inclusive political dialogue.
Sudan/ Darfur (UNAMID)	25.8M (2020) (including 2M for "Two Areas"	2018-2020	Focusing on three priority areas in Darfur: rule of law, durable solutions for IDPs, and peacebuilding at the community level. PBF support aligned with UNAMID State Liaison Function (SLFs) projects.

XII. Annex V: Management response

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Routine

Date 12 November 2020

REFERENCE: DPPADPO-2020-02692

TO: (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo, Director
A: Inspection and Evaluation Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

THROUGH:
SIC DE:

FROM: Jean-Pierre Lacroix,
DE: Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations



SUBJECT: **Feedback on the Final Draft Report on the evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in supporting transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT)**
OBJET:

1. A reference is made to OIOS-2020-01277 of 28 August 2020, with which the final draft report of the OIOS on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of UNAMID in supporting transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with the UNCT (IED-19-008) is transmitted for our formal review and comments. We would like to take this opportunity to thank OIOS for completing this evaluation and conveying valuable insights and lessons learned for the ongoing transitions in Sudan/Darfur.

2. We have shared our views on the prior drafts of the report, as well as on the advisory memorandum on the first phase of the evaluation in our DPPADPO-2019-05962, dated 6 January 2020. We would like to reiterate some of these comments, which also echo the points raised by the Joint Special Representative of UNAMID in his response dated 25 September 2020, as follows:

- (1) The State Liaison Functions (SLF) concept was a novel approach to fill the gap in non-integrated settings, and its applicability in other mission areas should be explored;

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- (2) The issue of resistance to change, which comes out in a latent way, would merit special attention, particularly in the conditions of volatile environment UNAMID and most of our operations are compelled to deliver;
- (3) The rigor of methodology could strengthen the objectivity of the study's findings based on staff interviews. Views and experiences of those designing the SLFs, for example, could be paired with those of Darfuri beneficiaries or against scenarios in which these innovations did not exist; and
- (4) The linkage between the substantive discussions on the transition, on the one hand, and asset management and handover issues, on the other, is not clear. The latter subject will merit an examination in its own right.

3. In addition, further analysis on the following two aspects could enrich the recommendations of the report:

- (5) Whether the geographical reconfiguration of the Mission structure, and the consequent fragmentation of UNAMID leadership, is a shortcoming of strategic nature in attempting to tailor peacekeeping approaches to local conditions, or whether the shortcoming was a result of how the decision was implemented. In case of the latter, what rules and procedures could have mitigated these challenges?; and
- (6) which factors led to delays in launching the SLFs, and whether their impact would require longer-term engagement.

4. These important themes will have broader implications in our ongoing efforts to ensure sustainable transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. We look forward to a continued constructive partnership.

cc: Mr. Diana
Ms. DiCarlo
Ms. Gbeho
Ms. Keita
Mr. Mamabolo
Mr. Piper

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United Nations
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



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MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

CONFIDENTIAL

Routine

DATE: 23 December 2020

REFERENCE:

TO: (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo, Director
A: Inspection and Evaluation Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

FROM: Bintou Keita, Assistant Secretary-General for Africa,
DE: Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bintou Keita".

SUBJECT: **Action plan for implementation of recommendations of the evaluation of the
: relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the African Union-United Nations
OBJET: Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in supporting transition from
peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with the United
Nations Country Team (UNCT)**

1. Further to the response we have provided to the final draft report of OIOS on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of UNAMID in supporting transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with the UNCT (IED-19-008), please find attached our feedback to your action plan for the implementation of its recommendations. These inputs have been coordinated within DPPA-DPO, DOS, and UN DCO.

2. While these recommendations are aligned with findings of the report, we are also confronted by peculiar challenges concerning the transition and drawdown of UNAMID, which hinges on the extent of cooperation from the Sudanese authorities. While we strive to ensure the orderly and safe withdrawal and handover of UNAMID's assets and expertise to UNITAMS, UNCT, and the Sudanese authorities, the timeline and framework to do so may diverge from the standard practice or past experiences of mission closure. In addition, as the Security Council is expected to terminate the mandate of UNAMID by 31 December 2020, a number of recommendations go beyond the scope of the Operation. We hope to work with OIOS to readjust what is expected in the action plan, as the process moves forward, so as to reflect the complexity and dynamics on the ground.

**SELECT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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CC: Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations
Mr. Jeremiah Mamabolo, Joint Special Representative, United Nations - African
Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
Mr. Robert Piper, Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations Development
Coordination Office (UN DCO)
Ms. Anita Kiki Gbeho, Deputy Joint Special Representative United Nations -
African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
Mr. Massimo Diana, Humanitarian Coordinator a.i. for Sudan

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of the Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Supporting Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding in Darfur in Collaboration with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT)

DPPA-DPO Action Plan for Implementation of Recommendations

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
<p>Recommendation 1: DPO, DOS and UNDCO should document lessons learned and best practices from prior United Nations transitions of peace operations suitable for and disseminated to each level.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lessons and good practices from previous transitions were shared with UN staff working in or on Sudan in a number tailored ways, including through: (1) Leadership to leadership exchanges have been organized – both between UNAMID leadership and HQ leadership as well as with senior managers of recently completed transitions (e.g. Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire); (2) a workshop with Heads of Agencies Funds and Programmes and UNAMID Section Chiefs in Khartoum in February 2019; (3) a townhall meeting with interested UNAMID staff on transition planning in February 2019; (4) the preparation of several thematic papers to inform the UNITAMS planning process (e.g. on mission to mission transitions, on options to sustain the state liaison functions, and on integrated planning in the post-UNAMID phase); (5) the conduct of a UNCT capacity mapping in Sudan, building on similar exercises in Liberia and Haiti; and (6) the Study on <u>RoL and Human Rights in Transitions</u>, carried out in collaboration with ISSAT, OROLSI, UNAMID, and the UN Transitions Project. 	DPO, DOS and UNDCO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> December 2020
<p>Recommendation 2: UNHQ should revise and update the Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (2013) in line with new guidance given by the Secretary General, EC, and lessons learned from the recent transitions in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, and Sudan.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>In an effort to mainstream transition planning into relevant integrated assessment and planning processes</u>, the decision has been made to focus on the integration review and the revision of the IAP policy with a view to adequately incorporate relevant transition considerations. Once those processes are completed, it will be determined whether the Transition Policy itself needs to be revised and updated. 	DPO, DOS and UNDCO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
<p>Recommendation 3: DPO and DCO should facilitate synergy and harmony among UNAMID and United Nations Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)/UNCT leadership to foster unity of vision and effort within and among their entities towards accomplishment of the mandated transition objectives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide strategic support to the UN Country Team in preparing a new generation Common Country Analysis (CCA), and help strengthen interlinkages/synergies in the development of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), taking into account the findings and recommendations of the capacity mapping of AFPs and EC decision: 2020/84/4 to strengthen UNDS capacity in Sudan. • Support the DSRSG/RC/HC in coordinating the scaling up of capacities of AFPs to respond to the capacity gaps identified in the capacity mapping exercise. 	DPO and UNDCO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • June 2021
<p>Recommendation 4: UNAMID and RCO should establish a joint monitoring and evaluation mechanism to systematically report on and readjust the transition activities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not applicable at the current stage of the Operation • UNAMID, UNITAMS and UNCT developed a framework for the transition of joint responsibilities, including in support of the peace process, <u>peacebuilding</u> and protection of civilians. Regular meetings ongoing to discuss progress along these three work streams. 	UNAMID and RCO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N/A
<p>Recommendation 5: UNAMID and RCO should strengthen coordination mechanisms at all levels to advance transition in the wake of global pandemic.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not applicable at the current stage of the operation • Coordination mechanisms established between UNITAMS, UNAMID and UNCT to ensure a smooth transition of responsibilities where applicable. Regular coordination meetings ongoing. 	UNAMID and RCO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N/A
<p>Recommendation 6: UNAMID and UNITAMS/UNCT should assess utility and applicability of SLF as an integrated joint delivery mechanism for future transitions before being replicated.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNAMID, in cooperation with ISSAT, OROLSI and the UN Transitions Project has analyzed the usefulness of the State Liaison Functions on <u>RoL</u> and Human Rights transitions. The report will be finalized by the end of 2020. • Based on the abovementioned report, OROLSI and the UN Transitions Project will articulate a practice note in 2021 that will serve as guidance for planners in other mission settings. • In early 2021, an informal knowledge exchange at the leadership level is planned with other missions in transition settings to share lessons learned on the SLFs. 	UNAMID, UNITAMS and UNCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • June 2021

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
<p>Recommendation 7: UNHQ should ensure all significant and unmitigated risks of relapse remain as a strategic focus in discussions on UNITAMS with the Secretary-General and the Security Council and ensure that this is supported by an analysis of peacebuilding needs and requirements in Darfur.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinated messaging through EC/DC, the Security Council, and the media to articulate challenges and opportunities, including the need for national ownership and government responsibility regarding the protection of civilians in Darfur. Analysis of peacebuilding needs in Darfur conducted jointly by UNAMID, UNITAMS and UNCT. DPPA-DPO advocacy in support of the development of a joint priority peacebuilding programme in 2021, and for donors to contribute to an MPTF. 	DPPA-DPO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> June 2021
<p>Recommendation 8: UNAMID should carry out physical verification and accounting of all assets and equipment to ensure fool-proof liquidation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (To be populated by UNAMID) 	UNAMID	<ul style="list-style-type: none">
<p>Recommendation 9: UNHQ and UNAMID should review and modify the guidelines, framework, and agreement of handover process with the host government to ensure rightful use of UN premises and assets.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HQ-level coordination in providing strategic guidance to UNAMID on handover and liquidation. High-level engagement with the Security Council and the Government of Sudan to ensure orderly and safe drawdown and liquidation. 	DPO, DOS and UNAMID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> June 2021
<p>Recommendation 10: Plans for security of UNAMID staff, assets and equipment in all operating bases should be reviewed and updated.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To be populated by UNAMID) 	UNAMID	<ul style="list-style-type: none">
<p>Recommendation 11: UNAMID should identify transition-specific risks related to SEA and take measures to address them.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To be populated by UNAMID) 	UNAMID	<ul style="list-style-type: none">

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
<p>Recommendation 12: DPO, DOS, DMSPC and DCO should facilitate employment opportunities and placement of staff from missions transitioning in the follow-on mission, other peacekeeping missions, wider United Nations system entities, and National Government system (especially for the national staff), based on their competencies and skillsets.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UN System has been working to fulfil its obligation to seek placement for the international staff with permanent and continuing contracts (some 200 in UNAMID), amid the current budgetary climate. • DOS has approached the status of national staff with the Sudanese authorities. UNAMID held a <u>number of</u> job fairs and training sessions for national staff to enhance their job seeking skills and provide them with better chance of finding jobs going forward. • UNAMID personnel are advised that they will have to apply and compete for UNITAMS posts. 	DPO, DOS, DMSPC and UNDCO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • June 2021
<p>Recommendation 13: DPO and DOS should undertake a review of the legacy of UNAMID to establish the mission's contribution and impact in the hybrid and non-integrated setting within the overall political and security environment for institutional learning.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A <u>lessons learnt</u> study of UNAMID will be completed as part of the drawdown of the Operation for submission to the Security Council by October 2021 (as per current draft resolution) 	DPO and DOS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • June 2021

AFRICAN UNION

الإتحاد الأفريقي



UNAMID



UNITED NATIONS

الأمم المتحدة

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

28 December 2020

To: Mr. (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo, Director
Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED)
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

From: Jeremiah Nyamane Mamabolo
Joint Special Representative

Subject: UNAMID's Response on The Draft Final Report on the evaluation of the African Union United Nations Hybrid Operations in Darfur (UNAMID) in supporting transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with the United Nations country Team (UNCT) and Action Plan for implementation of recommendations

1. I acknowledge the report and am pleased that the Mission's last round of comments provided on 5 September to your technical team on the earlier draft report have been largely accommodated.
2. I am grateful for the new sections on the methodology and limitations as earlier requested by the Mission. These allow the legacy of the SLFs to be better understood within context.
3. Adoption and implementation of the recommendations has supported the development of a joint monitoring and evaluation framework that has guided a new field validation and monitoring exercise, reviewing over 50 activities, conducting site visits, preparing case studies, and human-interest stories. Additionally, through the renewed UNAMID-RCO coordination mechanisms through the expanded, regularized meetings both of UNAMID and the UNCT, but also of the so-called 5x8 mechanism, including SLF implementation partners and federal-level representation drawn from the ministries in the Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS).
4. With reference to the suggestion in Paragraph 22 that SLF 1 and 2 programmes did not fully reflect TGoS's needs, I wish to remind that SLF is a mandate implementation modality, and that the Government's needs can be considered when they are within the mandate. Similarly,

with reference to Para 38, a line to note that the magnitude of the problem requires systemic changes from within Sudan would have placed UNAMID's attempts in perspective.

5. I wish to record my sincere thanks to you and your team for the report and the recommendations. Many of the relevant recommendations have been actioned as the attached action plan would show. UNAMID is working closely with UNITAMS and UNCT to complete the remaining action points.

Best regards,

United Nations  الأمم المتحدة

OFFICE OF THE RESIDENT AND HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR


SUDAN

السودان

24 December 2020

To: (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo, Director
Inspection and Evaluation Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

Cc:

From: Massimo Diana 
RC/HC/DO a.i. in Sudan

Subject: Management response to final report of the evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in supporting transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur in collaboration with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT)

1. I formally accept the recommendations contained in the Final Report of 8 December 2020 and I am pleased that the Plan of Action clearly shows the progress made by the UN system in Sudan in addressing the recommendations to date, as listed overleaf.
2. I am pleased that the Joint Transition Cell (JTC) is monitoring progress on the transition and residual actions are identified and collectively addressed so there are no gaps. It is also evident that UNITAMS is benefiting from the State Liaison Function (SLF) experience to inform the development of its comprehensive peacebuilding and stabilization programme for the UNCT to support UNSCR 2524 (2020) mandate implementation as well as the development of peacebuilding projects in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.
3. From experience in other mission settings, I know how difficult it is for UN entities to work in an integrated manner, and for this reason I applaud the progress made in Sudan particularly in terms of the SLFs. I believe we have in the SLFs a tried and tested vehicle for transition. What UNAMID achieved through the SLFs is remarkable - very few missions that I am aware of could have managed to channel USD 42 million to joint programming together with the embedding of staff with the UNCT beyond mere co-location in only a two-year period.

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of the Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Supporting Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding in Darfur in Collaboration with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT)

UNAMID-UNCT-UNITAMS Action Plan for Implementation of Recommendations

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
<p>Recommendation 1: DPO, DOS and UNDCO should document lessons learned and best practices from prior United Nations transitions of peace operations suitable for and disseminated to each level.</p>	<p>Completed Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNITAMS, through its planning process that took place from Apr to Oct 2020, received advice from the UN Transition Project, a group that includes expertise from DPO, DPPA and the DCO, to ensure that lessons learned from past transitions were taken into account in the start-up of UNITAMS. • The Team Leader and the Core Team of the UNITAMS Planning Team met with former Transition Team Leaders responsible for transitions in Haiti and Somalia to discuss challenges and prepare for integration efforts. 	DPO, DOS and UNDCO	•
<p>Recommendation 2: UNHQ should revise and update the Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (2013) in line with new guidance given by the Secretary General, EC, and lessons learned from the recent transitions in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, and Sudan.</p>	•	DPO, DOS and UNDCO	•
<p>Recommendation 3: DPO and DCO should facilitate synergy and harmony among UNAMID and United Nations Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)/UNCT leadership to foster unity of vision and</p>	<p>Completed Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UNITAMS planning process was highly inclusive, with the participation of over 20 UN entities and 85 experts including from UNAMID, DPPA and DPO. The Planning Process included five technical working groups that facilitated active participation and the sharing of practices and lessons learned. 	DPO and UNDCO	•

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<p>effort within and among their entities towards accomplishment of the mandated transition objectives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The UNITAMS Start-up Team has benefited from this inclusive planning process and continued close collaboration with UNAMID while on the ground in Khartoum with the support of the JTC. The JSR, DJSR, <u>QIC</u> for UNITAMS and RC/HC <u>a.i</u> co-chaired a mini-workshop on 5 Nov 2020 to ensure close coordination and handover of activities related to (i) the peace process & peace implementation (ii) protection of civilians and (iii) peacebuilding. The four co-chairs commissioned further technical work that was completed by 15 Dec 2020. The RC/HC <u>a.i.</u>, DJSR and Chief of Staff of UNITAMS will continue to track handover of all substantive materials and activities through the first quarter of 2021 via the JTC. 		
<p>Recommendation 4: UNAMID and RCO should establish a joint monitoring and evaluation mechanism to systematically report on and readjust the transition activities.</p>	<p>Completed Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JTC, as requested at the UNAMID-UNCT Coordination Meeting on 16 Dec, is reviewing residual/priority UNAMID transition actions and developing a way forward between UNAMID, the UNCT and UNITAMS to ensure that the actions that need to be transferred are taken up by the UNCT and UNITAMS and those that can be closed are finalized by UNAMID and to track progress in this regard. Concerning the SLF programme, the ODJSR together with the pillar conveners, pillar leads, SLF agency staff and the JTC are finalizing an M&E framework for ongoing activities under SLF Phases 3-5 and are presently undertaking a validation exercise to confirm the completion of a representative sample of SLF Phase 1 and 2 projects. UNAMID and the UNCT launched the UN SLF Data Mapping [https://bit.ly/slfwebreport] on 8 Sep 2020, a web-based tool to map and visualize data on completed SLF projects from all phases (presently loaded with Phase 1 and 2 (partial) data), to support, <i>inter alia</i>, evidence-based planning and decision-making for future stabilization and peacebuilding programming. <p>Anticipated Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNAMID, UNITAMS and the UNCT to agree on the coordination mechanism for the continued monitoring of the implementation of the 	<p>UNAMID and RCO</p>	<p>Before 31 December 2020</p>

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
	<p>Joint Transition Action Plan during UNAMID's drawdown and liquidation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The ODJSR to handover the UN SLF Data Mapping to UNCT, UNITAMS and/or the Government, as appropriate. 		
<p>Recommendation 5: UNAMID and RCO should strengthen coordination mechanisms at all levels to advance transition in the wake of global pandemic.</p>	<p>Completed Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At its meeting on 16 Sept 2020, Government membership of the 5+5 Joint Technical Committee, the only UN-Government coordination forum on the SLFs, was expanded with the inclusion of relevant technical ministries to make it the 5+8. The Committee met on 30 April, 14 May, 18 June, 18 Aug and 16 Sept 2020. To address SLF implementation bottlenecks and strengthen intra-Government coordination between federal and state levels, a workshop for 5+8 members and state authorities was held in El Fasher, North Darfur, on 29 Sept 2020. The UNAMID-UNCT Coordination Meeting, co-chaired by the DJSR and RC/HC a.i., met on 15 Mar, 4 June, 21 June, 18 Oct, 16 Dec 2020, with the follow-on presence planning team/UNITAMS participating from 4 June onwards. Under the auspices of the UNAMID-UNCT, a strategic-level discussion was held on the programming of unencumbered SLF 2020 funds and carryover of SLF activities into 2021 (26 Nov 2020). As agreed at the UNAMID-UNCT Coordination Meeting on 18 Oct 2020, principals-level meetings have commenced between UNAMID, UNCT and UNITAMS on supporting the implementation of the National Plan on the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC) and transition issues related to protection, with meetings held on 9 Nov and 13 Dec 2020. At the same UNAMID-UNCT meeting, a technical-level working group, co-chaired by UNAMID HRS-POC and UNHCR as Protection Sector lead, was established to follow-up on NPPOC implementation, meeting on 28 Oct and 19 Nov 2020. 	<p>UNAMID and RCO</p>	

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
	<p>Anticipated Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNITAMS to be invited by the Government co-chair to join the 5+8 and meet on the sustainability of the SLFs post-UNAMID. In line with S/RES/2559 "that UNAMID and UNITAMS should continue to closely cooperate via the established coordination mechanism" UNITAMS to be formally included in future UNAMID-UNCT Coordination Meetings. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At the initiative of the Government January 2021
<p>Recommendation 6: UNAMID and UNITAMS/UNCT should assess utility and applicability of SLF as an integrated joint delivery mechanism for future transitions before being replicated.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNITAMS considers the SLF experience, apart from the co-location of staff, to be useful and applicable to other contexts in Sudan. The SLF experience has informed the application for funding from the DPPA Multi-year Appeal (MYA) for priority peacebuilding and protection activities in Darfur that is designed as a bridge between the departure of UNAMID and the operationalization of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), Peacebuilding and Stabilization Window, and the development of a comprehensive peacebuilding and stabilization programme throughout Sudan. It is also informing the development of peacebuilding projects using assessed funding in South Kordofan and Blue Nile as well as the peacebuilding architecture for the entire country. While independent studies by EPON and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance have looked favourably on the SLFs the recommended assessment is better placed with UNHQ since it deals with the utility and applicability of the SLFs in other contexts. 	UNAMID, UNITAMS and UNCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none">
<p>Recommendation 7: UNHQ should ensure all significant and unmitigated risks of relapse remain as a strategic focus in discussions on UNITAMS with the Secretary-General and the Security Council and ensure that this is supported by an analysis of</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 	DPPA-DPO	<ul style="list-style-type: none">

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
peacebuilding needs and requirements in Darfur.			
<p>Recommendation 8: UNAMID should carry out physical verification and accounting of all assets and equipment to ensure fool-proof liquidation.</p>	<p>Completed Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MSD is, and has been in the past, employing all efforts to ensure an orderly drawdown and liquidation with adequate accountability on assets and equipment and conducting team-site specific joint verification of assets and equipment that are the basis for decision briefs on the management or disposal of assets prior to closure and handover of team sites. Note: UNAMID cannot guarantee a ‘full-proof’ liquidation especially in view of the timelines involved, volume of assets, and nature of operating environment. <p>Anticipated Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNAMID has advocated with the Government for a joint workshop to discuss the drawdown, <u>transition</u> and <u>handover of teamsites</u>. 	UNAMID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Before 31 December 2020
<p>Recommendation 9: UNHQ and UNAMID should review and modify the guidelines, framework, and agreement of handover process with the host government to ensure rightful use of UN premises and assets.</p>	<p>Completed Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNAMID has modified the handover guidelines and framework in a revised SOP, issued by the JSR on 5 Nov 2020. UNAMID <u>teamsites</u> have been engaging locality authorities since mid-Oct 2020 to identify appropriate civilian end-users and to capture communal sentiments to inform the handover process. <p>Anticipated Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensitize the Government on the SOP during the above-mentioned workshop (see Recommendation 8). 	DPO, DOS and UNAMID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Before 31 December 2020
<p>Recommendation 10: Plans for security of UNAMID staff, assets and equipment in all operating bases should be reviewed and updated.</p>	<p>Completed Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDSS, UNAMID Force and Police components jointly developed Security Concept Note 3 of 12 Nov 2019 for the security of UNAMID personnel and assets within UNAMID <u>premises</u>, and reviewed the joint contingency plans for in Nov 2020. 	UNAMID	

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The UN-Government Joint Security Operations Centre (JSOC) concept, operational in South and North Darfur, is being extended to the remaining Darfur states. The e-SRM, Area Security Plans and Residential Security Measures were approved up to June, August and July 2021, respectively. <p>Anticipated Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Further collaboration with GoS authorities is necessary to ensure the JSOC concept remains effective after UNAMID's exit. The e-SRM, Area Security Plans and Contingency Plans remain living documents to be reviewed whenever there is a major shift in the threat environment. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing
<p>Recommendation 11: UNAMID should identify transition-specific risks related to SEA and take measures to address them.</p>	<p>Completed Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Sudan PSEA Network, is operational and, supported by the PSEA Network coordinator, with a national PSEA Officer under recruitment, and contributes to PSEA coordination and the implementation of the Joint Framework for Action on Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, that includes Output 3.3 'Transitional Arrangements for PSEA Response Post UNAMID' that UNAMID signed on 16 July 2019. The Ministry of Labour and Social Development has formally approved the Network's proposal for the Salaam Sudan hotline, a referral service for all public enquires, including those that are SEA related. 	UNAMID	<ul style="list-style-type: none">
<p>Recommendation 12: DPO, DOS, DMSPC and DCO should facilitate employment opportunities and placement of staff from missions transitioning in the follow-on mission, other peacekeeping missions, wider United Nations system entities, and National Government system (especially for the national staff),</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 	DPO, DOS, DMSPC and UNDCO	<ul style="list-style-type: none">

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity/Entities	Target Date for Completion
based on their competencies and skillsets.			
<p>Recommendation 13: DPO and DOS should undertake a review of the legacy of UNAMID to establish the mission’s contribution and impact in the hybrid and non-integrated setting within the overall political and security environment for institutional learning.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	DPO and DOS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •

XIII. Annex VI: OIOS response to formal comments from DPPA-DPO, UNAMID and UNCT

1. OIOS thanks and appreciates DPPA-DPO, UNAMID and RCO-Sudan/UNCT for their valuable comments made on the evaluation report and the action plan to implement the recommendations in support of the transition in Sudan and future transition in other conflict settings.
2. OIOS acknowledges and appreciates the concerted and proactive steps taken by DPPA-DPO as well as UNAMID in coordination with UNCT to concurrently refine/readjust/recalibrate transition activities based on the OIOS Advisory Memorandum issued on 07 October 2019 and the regular feedback provided to the leadership/managers by the evaluation team as part of the real-time nature of the evaluation.
3. OIOS underscores the need for UNITAMS and UNCT to continue build on the peace dividends gained through the activities of UNAMID and maintain the momentum of transition for durable peace and security.
4. The progress made on the implementation of the recommendations will be monitored by OIOS through existing procedures.