Evaluation of organizational culture in peacekeeping operations

22 February 2021
Assignment No: IED-21-006
Function
“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organization. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organization;” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

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<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<td>AoR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
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<td>C34</td>
<td>Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>DCDT</td>
<td>Department of Operational Support</td>
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<td>DPPA</td>
<td>Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
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<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>EoAR</td>
<td>End of Assignment Report</td>
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<td>e-PAS</td>
<td>Electronic Performance Appraisal System</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77 at the United Nations</td>
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<td>HoFO</td>
<td>Head of Field Office</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Inspection and Evaluation Division</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<td>KII</td>
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<td>MINUJUSTH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police Contributing Country</td>
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<td>PNG</td>
<td>Persona Non Grata</td>
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<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
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<td>SIU</td>
<td>Special Investigation Unit</td>
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<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>Senior Leadership Team</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troops Contributing Country</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNHQ</td>
<td>United Nations Headquarters</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
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<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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Summary

The evaluation assessed the extent to which organizational culture in peacekeeping operations was aligned with the normative framework of the United Nations and supported missions’ effective functioning. It focused primarily on mission personnel’s perceptions about selected dimensions of organizational culture, which included: leadership and management; accountability, ethics and integrity; teamwork, collaboration and information-sharing; risk-appetite; sensitive issues; and gender. Data was collected and analysed through a literature review, an online staff survey, key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

Overall, perceptions of organizational culture in peacekeeping operations diverged depending on mission component, gender, staff level and duty station. Uniformed personnel were generally more positive about the organizational culture in their mission as compared to civilian staff. Female international civilians consistently expressed the lowest levels of satisfaction across cultural elements.

On leadership and management, the personalities and working relationships of mission leaders were perceived as critical in influencing mission culture. Accessible, collaborative and actively engaged leaders were especially valued.

On accountability, in particular results and performance, internal systems and controls, and the oversight roles and functions, staff members generally felt these to be insufficient and ineffective. The levels of ethics and integrity among mission personnel were also perceived as low. Although respondents demonstrated high levels of awareness of reporting mechanisms, non-reporting of misconduct was perceived to be common.

On teamwork, collaboration and information-sharing, though mission personnel were generally positive, they also highlighted numerous challenges. Perceived divides and power dynamics between uniformed and civilian personnel, certain mission pillars, as well as between mission headquarters and the field, hindered effective collaboration. Top-down information-sharing and communication were perceived as insufficient and overly one-directional, while bottom-up communication was often felt duplicative. Collocation and integrated teams were believed to enhance collaboration and information-sharing.

On risk-appetite, mission personnel had varied opinions, but, overall, agreed that contingents were not equally committed to performing their duties.

On sensitive issues, the likelihood of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality and religion was thought to be high, which affected the mission both internally and externally. Perceived unfair recruitment practices and discrimination based on contractual status and component also impacted staff morale.

On gender, though senior management appeared committed to achieving gender parity, some staff members saw its implementation as controversial and impacting merit-based recruitment. Finally, female staff members felt they faced limitations, hardships, prejudice and discrimination both in their operating environments and within the mission.

Overall, in part due to their difficult operating environments and internal diversity, the existing perceptions about organizational culture in missions were not fully aligned with the high standards adopted by the Organization and need to be improved to fully support missions’ effective functioning.

The evaluation made two critical and nine important recommendations.
I. Introduction and objective

1. The evaluation determined the relevance and effectiveness of organizational culture in 14 peacekeeping operations by assessing the extent to which it was aligned with the normative framework of the United Nations and supported missions’ effective functioning. Its objective was to assist mission leadership, the Departments of Peace Operations (DPO), Operational Support (DOS), Peacebuilding and Political Affairs (DPPA) and Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) to engage in systematic reflection of organizational culture. Management comments from these entities together with the 14 evaluated missions were sought on the evaluation results and given in annex VII.

2. The guiding evaluation questions were:
   a. To what extent is the existing organizational culture in missions relevant and aligned to the normative framework of the United Nations?
   b. To what extent does the organizational culture in missions support their effective functioning?

3. It is important to note that this evaluation was conducted prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and consequently does not refer to the new ways of working that this crisis both created and accelerated, or its impact on the missions’ organizational culture.

II. Background

4. Although no universal definition for the term organizational culture exists, there is general agreement that it affects the behaviour of organizations and their staff. In its simplest form, organizational culture consists of different components that influence how an organization ‘gets things done’ to achieve its goals. OIOS defined ‘organizational culture’ as:

   ‘Comprising the behaviours and underlying beliefs, assumptions and values that contribute to the unique social and psychological environment of an organization and affect how people think, act and interact with each other, with clients and with stakeholders.’

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1 At the time of the evaluation, DPO had 14 peacekeeping missions deployed: MINUSCA, MONUSCO, MINUSMA, UNMISS, UNAMID (end of mandate in December 2020), UNIFIL, UNISFA, MINURSO, UNFICYP, UNMIK, UNDOF, MINUJUSTH (end of mandate in October 2019), UNTSO and UNMOGIP.

2 MINUJUSTH closed in October 2019 and UNAMID in December 2020, thus management comments from both missions were not sought.


5. OIOS undertook an extensive document review and stakeholder engagement, and determined that organizational culture in peacekeeping operations is a complex, dynamic phenomenon that could be conceptually represented as follows:

Figure 1: Interacting and interlinked elements that generate organizational culture in peacekeeping operations

6. The United Nations does not explicitly prescribe an organizational culture for its personnel. Nevertheless, normative frameworks aim to create a culture that reflects the norms and values of the Organization. Furthermore, the Secretary-General has identified specific cultural elements as being critical to the success of the Organization, such as effective leadership, accountability, results-focus and transparency. The United Nations Security Council has encouraged peacekeeping missions to ‘standardize a culture of performance.’

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5 See: Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: ensuring a better future for all (A/72/492)  
6 See: Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2018/10)
III. Methodology

A. Evaluation scope

7. For this evaluation, OIOS considered the following elements of organizational culture in peacekeeping operations:

a. Leadership and management

b. Accountability, which includes all main components of accountability as defined by the Organization:
   i. The United Nations Charter
   ii. The programme, planning and budget documents
   iii. Results and performance
   iv. Internal systems and controls
   v. Ethical standards and integrity
   vi. The oversight roles and functions

c. Teamwork, collaboration and information-sharing

d. Risk-appetite

e. Sensitive issues

f. Gender

8. ‘Mission personnel’ or ‘staff members’ considered in this evaluation included international and national civilians, military and police personnel. ‘Components’ in this report refer to the civilian, military and police components. ‘Mission pillars’ refer to the different substantive sections and mission support.

B. Data collection methods

9. Data was collected through the following methods:

a. Key informant interviews and focus group discussions conducted during field visits and remotely, with a purposive sample of mission management and personnel from UNIFIL, MINUSMA, MINUSCA, UNMISS and MONUSCO.8

b. Online survey sent to 18,007 active civilian and uniformed staff members in 14 peacekeeping missions.9


d. Review of data retrieved from Umoja, Inspira, past staff surveys and other relevant mission sources.

e. Field visits in five10 peacekeeping missions. Direct observation was also carried out to capture salient aspects of organizational culture.

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7 A/RES/64/259
8 See annex III.
9 See annex IV.
10 See para. 9(i).
C. Limitations in assessing organizational culture

10. While acknowledging the importance of other dimensions of organizational culture, such as innovation and adaptability, as well as staff morale and well-being, these were excluded from the scope of this evaluation due to limited time and resources.

11. This evaluation focused primarily on mission personnel’s perceptions about the selected dimensions of organizational culture. Corroborating information was used where possible but was not available for many perceptions. It is, therefore, important to acknowledge that perceptions might not always reflect reality.

12. Some of the evaluation findings, particularly with regard to oversight matters, also relate to the work of OIOS. Due to the inherent conflict of interest, this report did not make any recommendations specific to OIOS to address them.

D. Dissemination of evaluation results

13. In addition to this evaluation report, OIOS provided each evaluated peacekeeping operation\(^\text{11}\) with its mission-specific results, which were based on disaggregated data from the online survey, open-ended survey questions and, where applicable, the key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FGD).

\(^{11}\) This did not include MINUJUSTH.
IV. Evaluation results

A. Leadership and management

14. The Organization’s unambiguous intent and high expectations from its leaders in creating a positive, ethical, result-oriented and inclusive culture has been elaborated in several normative and policy documents.\textsuperscript{12}

**Mission personnel were mostly positive about their direct supervisors**

15. There was strong evidence that mission leaders and managers were pivotal in creating, contributing to and changing the mission culture, both positively and negatively. Survey respondents (67 per cent) identified leadership as the key element influencing the mission’s organizational culture.\textsuperscript{13}

16. Survey results suggested that peacekeeping personnel approved of most of their direct supervisors, with 80 per cent of respondents agreeing that direct supervisors focused on achieving results. Over three-quarters of surveyed personnel indicated that their supervisors provided realistic plans and clear guidance, valued the skills and contributions of team members and were focused on achieving results. Nonetheless, one-fourth (25 per cent) of international civilians found that their supervisor did not value the skills of team members and did not provide clear guidance (see figure 2). Some civilian interviewees praised their supervisors for mentoring and encouraging subordinates, while others criticized them for providing inadequate guidance or lacking managerial skills.

**Figure 2: Perceptions on the direct supervisor**

\textsuperscript{12} See: United Nations System Leadership Framework, Chief Executive Board (CEB) High-Level Committee on Programmes; and the Senior Manager Compacts.

\textsuperscript{13} See: Annex II.
Senior leaders were generally perceived by subordinates to set a positive example

17. International civilians were noticeably less satisfied with senior leaders as compared to police and military personnel, who tended to be highly positive in their responses. Sixty-two per cent of surveyed international civilians agreed that the head of mission (HoM) set a positive organizational culture, as compared to 84 per cent of uniformed personnel. This divergence between components was starkest across gender lines: only 49 per cent of female international civilian staff indicated that the HoM set a positive organizational culture compared to 86 per cent of female uniformed personnel (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Perceptions on the HoM

![](image)

The HoM and senior leadership team (SLT) were seen as critical in influencing missions’ cultures

18. Three-quarters of survey respondents agreed that the HoM was a United Nations role model (see figure 4). The power to influence organizational culture was frequently said to be centralized in the office of the HoM. Interviewed personnel asserted that the managerial style, priorities and preferences of the HoM were felt across pillars, components and mission areas.

19. Similar to the HoM, the SLT was also seen as highly influential for the mission culture. Survey respondents were mostly positive about the SLT, with two-thirds agreeing that mission leaders had a common vision and acted as one. International civilians were the least positive about the SLT and the HoM, with over one-fourth (26 per cent) stating that the SLT did not share a common vision (see figure 4).
Rotation of the HoM and other mission leaders heavily impacted organizational culture, as this resulted in ‘wait and see’ periods during which mission personnel sought to understand and implement the guidance and preferences of new leaders. Key informants found this lack of continuity challenging. One interviewee stated that “each leadership rotation was a new game.” Similarly, interviewees asserted that high levels of turnover of key military personnel and heads of field offices (HoFO) were also disruptive to operational activities. An overlapping period with both the incoming and outgoing leaders all present in the mission area was generally thought to improve an effective handover and transfer of knowledge.

The quality of leadership and management was perceived to vary greatly

Subordinate staff believed that the quality and effectiveness of managers and senior leaders varied significantly from “very good” to “totally ineffective”. A range of leadership styles, from strictly hierarchical to more collaborative emerged. Some mission leaders were described as inspirational, while others were said to lack strategy or vision.

Interviewees and survey respondents in one mission asserted that the HoM was highly collaborative, provided clear guidance and had a results-based approach. Yet in another mission, key informants highlighted specific examples of poor management by senior leaders. In one case, interviewees felt that the arrival of a new leader threw well-functioning working methods into disarray.

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14 One EoAR (2019) highlighted that the mission in question overly relied on military personnel and that the fast rotation of military personnel resulted in a lack of continuity.

15 One EoAR (2019) proposed a minimum of four overlapping days between outgoing and incoming military officers to conduct a proper handover.
Personal relations and personalities of senior leaders were perceived to shape mission culture

23. The personalities and working relationships of mission leaders were perceived to have a profound impact on organizational culture. Interviewees also described the impact of dominant - and in some cases polarizing - personalities among members of the SLT who were thought to have an outsized influence on mission operations.

24. Surveyed staff members from one mission alleged a senior manager had intimidated and harassed subordinates, creating an “unhealthy work environment.” In a military-led mission, some civilian personnel complained of a “yes sir” culture with subordinates standing up when the HoM entered the room.

25. Harmony, tensions and interactions between senior leaders were also believed to have a substantial impact on collaboration and power dynamics between personnel. In one mission, the perceived closeness of the HoM with some other members of the SLT based on their national origin was a high-level concern and seen as bypassing established channels of decision-making. In another mission, one manager stated that conflict in the SLT had been highly disruptive to operations. Senior civilian staff were noticeably less positive than juniors when it came to the impact of internal politics on the mission.

Accessible, collaborative and actively engaged leaders were valued

26. Most survey respondents agreed that the SLT ensured effective collaboration between uniformed and civilian personnel (see figure 5). However, in some cases the collaboration between uniformed and civilian leaders appeared to be difficult, which affected lower working levels.

27. Key informants asserted that senior mission leaders who communicated openly and engaged with the field were held in high regard. In one mission, the HoM was appreciated for explaining the mandate in clear and simple terms, such as through the internal dissemination of a poster explaining the mission’s priorities. Regular visits by mission leadership to remote field offices, including overnight stays, were also seen as critical to understanding operational challenges. Staff members also noted the time spent by the HoM outside the mission area and commented upon it when considered excessive. Survey respondents generally approved of the leadership’s knowledge of the field, with 74 per cent asserting that the SLT was well-informed about challenges in the mission area (see figure 5).
Mission personnel felt that United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) overly prioritized political experience over managerial expertise in the selection of the HoM.

28. Key informants expressed dissatisfaction that UNHQ was perceived to emphasize political experience over managerial skills while selecting candidates for leadership positions. Though interviewees acknowledged the required diplomatic background for mission leaders, it was not thought to be a satisfactory substitute for competently managing peacekeeping operations.16

29. Interviewees from peacekeeping operations where mission leaders did not have prior United Nations or peacekeeping experience highlighted that unexperienced senior leaders needed too much time to master United Nations policies and procedures and were overly reliant on subordinates. Sixty per cent of survey respondents did not believe that senior leaders without prior United Nations experience were able to quickly learn the Organization’s management rules.

30. One mission leader without prior United Nations experience acknowledged that leading a peacekeeping mission as an ‘outsider’ was challenging and required a significant personal effort to adapt and learn about the system. Yet, in some cases, the approach of a newcomer was seen as an advantage and an opportunity to bring a fresh perspective that challenged the status quo.

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B. Accountability, ethics and integrity

31. The United Nations requires the highest standard of professionalism and integrity from all its personnel. The Organization has a well-defined accountability framework and has clearly expressed its expectations for staff members.\(^\text{17}\)

**International civilians were the least positive about the mission’s focus on delivering results for the host population**

32. Eighty per cent of uniformed personnel agreed that the mission was focused on delivering results for the host population, while only 65 per cent of international civilians thought this was the case. Over one-third of survey respondents (37 per cent) believed it was sometimes necessary to break the rules in order to carry out their work.

**Staff members perceived handling of underperformance and incentives for career advancement as insufficient**

33. Key informants and survey respondents across all missions expressed frustration with both the handling of underperformance and the recognition of high performance. The absence or lack of accountability for performance was referenced as a key organizational issue in about half of the interviews.

34. Nearly a third of survey respondents felt that underperformance was not actively addressed in their missions (see figure 6). This sentiment was particularly strong among international civilians at the management level (P-4 and above; 60 per cent). In addition, interviewed uniformed leadership were also at times sharply critical about the underperformance of subordinates.

**Figure 6: Perceptions on performance management**

\(^{17}\) For a United Nations definition of “accountability” and “accountability system”, see: A/RES/64/259.
Civilian managers frequently complained about the lack of adequate tools to address underperformance. e-PAS\textsuperscript{18} was widely held in low esteem at all levels. Managers saw e-PAS as minimally effective for addressing underperformance and, when used, required a large time investment that detracted from normal duties.\textsuperscript{19} One manager found the completion of e-PAS “merely a ritual that did not reflect the truth.” Interviewed staff also considered e-PAS ineffective for their professional development, as high performance was not perceived to be appropriately linked with career advancement.

Interviewees complained about a culture of mediocrity and sometimes even laziness, providing several explanations for staff underperformance, including lack of mobility within and between missions, low institutional support for professional development and weak performance incentives. Long-serving personnel were generally seen as more prone to complacency and underperformance, a perception that was particularly present in longstanding missions and duty stations.\textsuperscript{20} Underperformance without any consequences was believed to have a detrimental impact on the mission’s organizational culture, with one manager stating that “dead wood on board corrupts the whole system.” A tension between simultaneously upholding diversity and merit-based recruitment was also reported.

**Senior leaders and managers were not perceived to be effectively enforcing accountability**

Key informants at all levels consistently expressed that accountability for performance and misconduct was not sufficiently enforced by senior leaders and managers. Managers described the procedural hurdles to improve staff performance (or to not renew their contracts) as insurmountable. Agreed terminations were rare, with only 39 approved across 14 peacekeeping missions between May 2016 and November 2019.

**Levels of ethics and integrity were generally perceived to be low**

Perceptions regarding the likelihood of misconduct or unethical behaviour differed greatly between components. Sixty-seven per cent of international civilian survey respondents indicated that abuse of authority was likely to occur in their mission, while about 36 per cent of uniformed components affirmed that this type of misconduct was likely to take place. Almost half of the survey respondents (44 per cent) believed that leaking of confidential information was likely in their mission (see figure 7).\textsuperscript{21}

Key informants, including mission leaders in two missions, articulated deep concerns about fraud and corruption committed by mission personnel. Almost half (45 per cent) of international civilian survey respondents believed that fraud and corruption were likely to occur in their mission (see figure 7). Examples given included the unauthorized sale of mission property, the fraudulent sale of movement control documents for United Nations flights and demands for bribes to service vehicles or transport personal goods. In addition, key informants frequently referenced entitlement fraud and abuse of leave. Some sections were perceived as more prone to fraud and corruption.

\textsuperscript{18} Performance Management Development System, ST/AI/2010/5.


\textsuperscript{20} One EoAR (2019) noted that long tenure is an issue with older family duty stations, leading to stagnation, reduced motivation and reluctance to change.

\textsuperscript{21} This result is in line with the United Nations Staff Engagement Survey (2017), wherein nearly one-third (30 per cent) of the respondents expressed concerns over ethical conduct and accountability in the Secretariat.
Accountability for misconduct or unethical behaviour was perceived to be low

40. Across all staff levels and missions, interviewees voiced concerns about a lack of accountability in terms of corrective actions for misconduct and unethical behaviour. Key informants widely perceived investigations into misconduct to be excessive in length and lacking independence. A sense of a ‘culture of impunity’ was widespread for the five missions visited. Thirty-nine per cent of surveyed international civilians believed that personal relationships and hierarchy affected how misconduct was addressed. Uniformed personnel, however, were significantly more positive than their civilian counterparts about the handling of misconduct. Seventy per cent of uniformed staff surveyed agreed that personal relationships and hierarchy did not affect how misconduct was addressed (see figure 8).

41. Despite mission personnel demonstrating high levels of awareness of reporting mechanisms, under or non-reporting of misconduct was perceived to occur frequently. A quarter of surveyed international civilians expressed that they would be fearful of reporting misconduct. Reasons given for under-reporting included fear of retaliation and the perception of lengthy, possibly biased, or inconclusive investigations. Mission living arrangements, in which oversight personnel\textsuperscript{22} worked, lived and socialized in the same limited environment as other staff, were seen as detrimental to the independence and anonymity of the internal justice system processes.

\textsuperscript{22} Mission staff understood ‘oversight personnel’ as including Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDT), OIOS investigators and Special Investigations Units (SIU) (see para. 12).
There were shortfalls in completing mandatory training

42. As of October 2019, only half (50 per cent) of civilian peacekeeping staff in the 14 missions had completed the mandatory course on ethics and integrity and over a third (37 per cent) had completed the course on preventing fraud and corruption (see figure 9). The majority of senior mission leaders, at the D-1 level and above, had also failed to complete required training, with 25 per cent having completed courses on the prevention of fraud and corruption and 37 per cent completing the course on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).\(^{23}\)

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\(^{23}\) Course completion data for analysis was retrieved from Umoja for the period April 2014 to October 2019. Umoja figures might not always be fully up to date and thus the actual completion rate could differ.
C. Teamwork, collaboration and information-sharing

43. Normatively, the United Nations considers integration within missions essential for effective peacekeeping operations. As this implies a culture supportive of teamwork, collaboration and information-sharing, the United Nations strives to incorporate integration into the many facets of missions’ work. In addition, the Secretary-General has emphasized the importance of coordination and breaking down silos on numerous occasions.

Though mission personnel were generally positive about collaboration and information-sharing, staff also highlighted numerous challenges.

44. Eighty-seven per cent of survey respondents agreed that collaboration was effective within their team and between sections (see figure 10). Results were slightly less positive for collaboration between uniformed and civilian personnel (77 per cent) and between mission support and the substantive side (74 per cent). Interviewees, however, highlighted numerous challenges, especially regarding information-sharing and internal communication across different teams and sections. International staff members felt the least positive about teamwork, collaboration and information-sharing.

Figure 10: Perceptions on teamwork and collaboration

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24 See: Action for Peacekeeping (2018)

25 Similarly, the United Nations Staff Engagement Survey (2017) found that respondents from multidimensional missions were more positive about collaboration at the team level compared to cooperation across departments.
Collocation and integrated teams were perceived as enhancing collaboration and information-sharing

45. Collocation of relevant sections and components was generally perceived to facilitate working relations, particularly for sharing critical information. Key informants indicated that integrated teams, including the deployment of liaison officers across components, improved collaboration between uniformed and civilian personnel. Positive examples given included thematic working groups, joint assessment missions (JAM) and joint inspection teams (JIT), as well as integrated mission entities such as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and joint task forces.

Perceived power dynamics between mission components were at play and often negatively impacted collaboration

46. Interviewees referred to ‘internal politics’, rivalries between different mission entities and unspoken hierarchies within the mission which sometimes hindered integration and information-sharing and deepened structural divides. One senior official stated that “silo mentality was present at all levels, from Mission HQ (MHQ) to the deep field.” Sixty-four per cent of surveyed international civilian staff members indicated that collaboration between mission support and the substantive side was effective (see figure 11). In one mission, the substantive sections expressed resentment concerning the power exercised by mission support, while in another mission the substantive side was said to receive preferential treatment.26

47. Thirty per cent of the interviews stated that power dynamics negatively impacted organizational culture and collaboration. Perceptions regarding influence over decision-making differed between missions and were said to depend heavily on individual personalities, especially within the SLT. Personnel complained about a lack of information-sharing between sections, stating that an “internal competition” sometimes resulted in a “culture of secrecy” where “the one who has information, has the power.” Female respondents (57 per cent) felt significantly less positive than males (71 per cent) about information-sharing (see figure 11).27

26 One EoAR (2019) noted several issues related to inter-pillar collaboration and information-sharing.
27 One EoAR (2019) highlighted that mission entities operated in ‘stove pipes’ and did not effectively share information.
A perceived division between uniformed and civilian personnel hampered effective collaboration and integration

48. Interviews and open-ended survey responses indicated that different working cultures between uniformed and civilian personnel sometimes hindered collaboration. Reported tensions related to differences in working methods, modes and speed of decision-making, planning and communication. Uniformed key informants suggested that they generally prioritized a longer planning horizon as compared to their civilian counterparts. In military-led missions, some civilian staff members perceived the military component as wielding undue influence.

49. In multidimensional missions, staff members generally perceived the United Nations Police (UNPOL) as the least powerful component with minimal leverage in decision-making. Both civilian and uniformed interviewees felt that UNPOL was inadequately integrated with the civilian and military components, with one staff member stating that “the police operate in their own world.” Several individual police officers (IPOs) felt frustrated over a perceived unwillingness of military and civilian colleagues to collaborate. On the other hand, police personnel often expressed a strong sense of cohesion within their component. In one mission, IPOs were particularly positive about intra-component solidarity, expressing that they belonged to “one police family.”

Divides between MHQ and the field offices were perceived to hinder effective collaboration and operational coherence

50. Approximately one-third of HoFOs interviewed in multidimensional missions, which consisted mostly of those deployed in large countries, reported not feeling fully in control of their area of responsibility (AoR) or being deliberately side-lined by MHQ. They perceived collaboration with MHQ as at times uncoordinated or overly top-down, with insufficient constructive exchanges or inputs from the field being sought. Specific examples included MHQ-led field missions without consulting the relevant HoFO, or senior management meetings where HoFOs felt they lacked the time to discuss operational challenges or seek guidance.

51. Some civilian staff members based in the field stated that dual reporting lines, such as between HoFOs and heads of sections, were not always clear or respected. The role of the HoFOs was also not standardized across missions, as it lacked any formal policy framework.

52. Staff members based in the field believed that collaboration and information-sharing worked more effectively in field offices as compared to MHQ, with one key informant stating that field offices functioned “as a microcosm” within the mission. Nearly one quarter (24 per cent) of survey respondents based in MHQ thought that necessary information was not freely shared in a constructive manner, as compared to 15 per cent of survey respondents based in the field.

Top-down information-sharing and communication was perceived as insufficient and overly one-directional

53. Some mission personnel felt that the leadership did not effectively exchange information with subordinates. Senior leadership communication was sometimes perceived as limited to “informing” instead of “exchanging” with the working level. Examples included town hall meetings that were perceived as one-directional. Several managers asserted that much information was sent through internal communication systems, but that many staff members did “not have the culture of reading.”

International staff members felt that bottom-up communication was often duplicative

54. Thirty-seven per cent of civilian leaders and managers surveyed indicated that there was too much duplication of work between different sections. One mission leader expressed that they regularly received too much irrelevant information, describing it as an “overload of emails.” Two senior managers specifically cited UNHQ as generating duplicative and excessive demands on closely related topics. Another senior manager argued that certain substantive sections could benefit from a decompartmentalized and more centralized structure, as many units shared similar responsibilities. Examples given included units focusing on women’s protection, child protection and protection of civilians. Another senior leader suggested that the civil affairs and political affairs sections could be merged.

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30 One EoAR (2019) noted that a lack of coordination between the field and Mission HQ (MHQ) had undermined effective support. Another EoAR (2018) mentioned built-in contradictions between the responsibilities of the HoFO and the independence of the sections.

31 See: DPO/Department for Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), The role of heads of field offices: moving towards increased operational coherence and effectiveness in the field. a survey of practice (2019).

32 USG/ASG, D1-D2, P4-P5.
D. Risk-appetite

55. A fundamental operational question for peacekeeping operations, especially for multidimensional missions, was the level of risk they were prepared to take in decision-making. One independent report emphasized the need for peacekeepers to take risks and change their mindset in order to be more effective in the field.33

Mission personnel had varied opinions on the risk-appetite of the missions

56. Mission personnel generally felt uncertain on why, when and how risks should or should not be taken, with interviewees stating that risk-taking primarily depended on leadership, the availability of resources and the prevailing operational situation. Key informants held differing views on whether the missions’ structures and processes allowed personnel to take appropriate risks in their work.

57. Interviewees highlighted the existence of a sharp difference between political and physical risk-taking. Some key informants asserted that the political risk-appetite of mission leaders was lacking as they were perceived to prioritize good relations over mandate implementation. One example included the perception that a mission had not fully implemented Protection of Civilians (PoC) measures in order to maintain good relations with signatories of a peace agreement. In other cases, interviewees felt that mission leaders - primarily civilians - avoided taking political risks because they did not want to jeopardize their own reputation or career development, including the fear of being declared a persona non grata (PNG).

58. Interviewed mission leaders largely felt they took appropriate risks but were limited by resources and operational challenges. Uniformed leaders assessed themselves as more willing to take risks in executing their mandated activities than their civilian counterparts. One mission leader stated that they were not there to “wage war,” asserting that the United Nations could not afford to be too offensive; in stark contrast, another senior official described one of the mission’s primary objectives to “neutralize” armed groups.34

Mission personnel felt that contingents were not equally committed to performing their duties

59. Thirty-one per cent of the survey respondents did not believe that contingents assumed the same amount of risk in performing their duties, with international civilians (44 per cent), in particular senior and mid-level civilians35 (61 per cent), being the least positive (see figure 12). The low risk-appetite of contingents was also revealed in several inquiries ordered by the Secretary-General (see annex VI) and in research conducted by an independent think tank.36

34 One EoAR (2019) highlighted that silo mentality coupled to a reactionary mindset had impacted the force’s posture and readiness to respond.
35 USG/ASG, D1-D2, P4-P5.
Figure 12: Perceptions on performance of contingents

60. Senior leaders identified high performing contingents and those seen as unsatisfactory. Common characteristics of high-performing contingents included their greater willingness to implement PoC mandates, refusal to back down when faced with kinetic threats and their ability to take decisive action when tasked by mission leadership. Interviewees in two missions described instances of troops on patrol remaining in their armoured personnel carriers instead of stopping to engage with the local population, also suggesting risk aversion or lacking capabilities to operate in a threatening environment.37

61. Key informants believed that national caveats of contingents impacted their risk-appetite and fundamentally undermined the mission’s ability to plan and conduct operations. Interviewees in one mission perceived some well-trained and highly equipped contingents as more risk-averse compared to contingents with fewer resources or capabilities. Examples included restrictions in deployment areas, movement controls, operational activities and no tolerance for any loss of life. Such contingents reportedly held their military doctrines in higher regard than the United Nations doctrine and refused to adapt. Some interviewees went as far as stating that the use of national caveats by contingents adversely impacted mandate implementation. Undeclared caveats and restrictions were considered particularly damaging because the leadership may only come to know of them when a contingent was asked to perform a task that was contrary to the undeclared restriction.38 In several cases in different missions, the local population had protested against specific United Nations contingents because of a perceived failure to protect. Some senior leaders stated that the low

37 One EoAR (2018) noted that low capabilities of troops remained a constant challenge and that TCCs should be held accountable if they fail to provide adequate training for their troops.
38 Office of Military Affairs has identified 14 undeclared caveats with nine TCCs (2019).
risk-appetite of missions was ultimately a political problem with UNHQ also having a risk-averse mindset.

Some contingents were perceived to prioritize their own interests, and at times limit defensive coordination

62. Key informants highlighted that low risk-appetite in contingents had resulted in the adoption of a self-imposed bunker mentality. Some Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) reportedly failed to adequately coordinate field base defences. In one mission, troops developed barriers and an exclusive gated camp within a field base, creating the impression of internal segregation and posing security risks.\(^39\) In another mission, a contingent reportedly built non-coordinated defences, such as a private bunker.

63. Staff members gave numerous examples of contingents that were perceived to prioritize their own interests or demonstrate a lack of commitment to integration. One senior leader stated that the contingents together did not comprise a ‘force’ but rather distinct “forces.” Key informants also emphasized that contingents often came to United Nations missions steeped in their regional organization’s procedures and culture, and that it was a challenge for these contingents to adjust. In one mission, it was observed that one contingent prominently displayed an image of its national leader within an integrated base easily visible from outside.

\(^{39}\) International Peace Institute (2020) *Sharing the burden: lessons from the European return to multidimensional peacekeeping*


**E. Sensitive issues**

64. United Nations norms forbid discrimination based on race, gender, language or religion in the fulfillment of the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter. Furthermore, impartiality is a fundamental principle of peacekeeping and United Nations personnel are expected to implement their mandates without favour to any party.

**Mission personnel indicated that race and religion generated internal tensions**

65. Generally, more than one-third of mission personnel felt that discrimination was likely to occur in their mission. Almost half of the civilian survey respondents believed that discrimination based on race (49 per cent) was likely to occur, while a third felt that it would for religion (33 per cent) (see figure 13). Interviewees in the five missions visited confirmed these concerns and highlighted instances that were perceived as having a detrimental impact on both the professional and personal lives of mission staff.

Figure 13: Likelihood of unequal treatment or discrimination against staff based on their:

66. Some interviewees asserted that race was considered a sensitive topic around which discussions were best avoided. One senior leader stated that racial sensitivities and stereotypes “play into everything” in the mission. Key informants also commented that at times preconceptions and negative qualities attributed to ethnic groups shaped relations and interactions between staff members. The word “mafia” was often used as a suffix for nationalities or regional groups. One senior leader mentioned the existence of informal self-segregation along racial and geographic lines for housing accommodations. In some missions, speaking about local political issues was considered sensitive and negatively impacting the internal cohesion, especially among national staff members.

67. Mission personnel also perceived religion to impact relations within the mission. In one mission, interviewees highlighted religious divisions among national staff members that
created internal tensions. Religiously symbolic messages were also displayed within a field office.

68. Key informants mentioned several issues related to ill-treatment by certain contingents towards other mission personnel based on race, ethnicity and religion. Some contingents were perceived to harbour racist attitudes towards national staff, which resulted in a strike in one mission. In another mission, African staff members complained about racial prejudice and discrimination by one contingent and, in one reported case, were told to eat separately from other mission personnel within a military base.

**Religion was perceived to impact the missions’ external relations**

69. Overt religious practices and beliefs of peacekeeping personnel were perceived to undermine external relations and impact the impartiality of the mission. In one mission, authorities had raised concerns on several occasions about contingents building places of worship outside their camps, warning the mission that any perception of impartiality would undermine the peace or may be misconstrued by the population in areas plagued by violent extremism.

70. One mission reported that local communities had demonstrated against the presence of peacekeeping forces because of suspected partiality towards specific armed groups based on a shared religion and ethnicity, something several key informants within the mission also suspected.

71. Key decision-makers in three multidimensional missions acknowledged perceived partiality based on religion or ethnicity to be a sensitive issue that needed to be dealt with openly and proactively. One mission informed UNHQ about alleged proselytizing by certain contingents. Other reported problematic aspects of religious and cultural practice included distribution of religious texts as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities among the local population; and perceived selective patronization for provision of logistics, welfare and security assistance based on religion or ethnicity.

72. One external study empirically confirmed a long-standing pattern of proselytization to spread one specific religion by certain contingents in a peacekeeping mission.40 Some troop/police contributing countries were perceived to support proselytization through their contingents. An external think tank has argued for embedding education regarding religion as a dimension of analysis in peacekeeping situations.41 With no established United Nations policy on the matter, the risk of contingents being externally perceived as religiously partial in countries with deep-rooted inter-community conflict appeared significant.

**Recruitment practices were perceived to be unfair and based on personal relations**

73. Half of surveyed international civilians (50 per cent) indicated that recruitment was unfair and may be based on personal relations. A further 70 per cent of international civilians expressed that favouritism and unfair treatment was likely to occur in their missions. Interviewees perceived personal networks and national clans to trump competencies in the recruitment process, asserting that managers at all levels used their influence to recruit preferred candidates. Close to half of all survey respondents (47 per cent) thought there were

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cliques or clans based on race and nationality, leading to a perception of overrepresentation of certain groups in some missions (see figure 14). Some interviewees stated that there were clans around mission leaders, including the HoM. In addition, key informants in one mission reported they had to constantly resist pressure by national authorities to recruit along ethnic or religious lines, which it said it always successfully resisted.

Figure 14: Likelihood of the following situation taking place in your mission:

Mission personnel thought discrimination based on contractual status, nationality and component was likely to occur

74. Almost half of civilian staff members (48 per cent) believed that discrimination based on contractual status could happen in their mission (see figure 15). Interviewees referred to the prevalence of discrimination and unequal treatment based on staff categories. Examples included national staff versus field service or international staff, substantive versus support staff and civilian staff versus uniformed personnel.
75. In both interviews and the online survey, national staff felt they received unequal treatment relative to international staff, asserting that their full potential was not utilized due to a perceived lack of trust and incompetence. Across missions, national staff were perceived to have limited influence over decision-making and access to information. Levels of trust between national and international staff members appeared generally low. In one mission, the collaboration between mission leaders and national staff during downsizing was perceived as severely challenging.

76. Thirty-six per cent of police and 40 per cent of military survey respondents believed that discrimination based on component was likely to occur in their mission. Uniformed personnel mentioned unequal treatment being meted out compared to civilian staff. Examples given included provision of lower quality, higher cost accommodation; secondary preference for transport; lack of duty of care and responsiveness by support services; as well as poor welfare measures.

Staff members described a culture of gossip and bullying, and expressed resentment concerning perceived misuse of entitlements

77. Some staff members resented what they perceived as misuse of entitlements. Thirty-seven per cent of survey respondents and almost half of international civilians (48 per cent), believed that entitlement abuse was likely to occur in their missions. Examples given by interviewees included misuse of United Nations vehicles for personal use and abuse of the provisions of annual and sick leave. Differences in entitlements between staff members in the
same mission generated tensions and were sometimes perceived as unfair, especially if duty stations in the same mission had different hardship classifications.

Mission personnel pointed to the unhealthy pervasiveness of a culture of gossip. One mission had to warn its staff about gossip being a form of harassment. About half (54 per cent) of civilian staff members and one-fourth (27 per cent) of uniformed personnel believed that emotional harassment was likely to occur in their mission (see figure 16). For example, a significant number of staff members from one mission asserted that one manager had reportedly engaged in abusive behaviour, which included humiliating, manipulating and threatening staff.

Figure 16: Likelihood that these situations could take place in your mission:
F. Gender

79. The Organization’s norms and efforts on gender mainstreaming\(^{42}\) has both internal and external dimensions.\(^{43}\) Thus, while gender mainstreaming involves addressing gender equality and empowerment of women institutionally and internally within the Organization, programmatic level gender mainstreaming seeks to ensure that gender equality is considered at all stages of a project or programme that are implemented externally.\(^{44}\) This section focuses primarily on the internal aspect, but also has some references to the external dimension as it is not always possible to clearly separate one from the other.

**Senior managers were generally seen as committed to gender mainstreaming and increasing female representation, but underrepresentation and treatment of women at the middle and senior leadership levels was perceived as an issue**

80. Many interviewees mentioned that senior managers were adequately committed to achieving gender parity, but also pointed out that gender parity should start at the top and noticed a lack of female representation in senior positions, middle management level and in the field. Senior leaders highlighted challenges in recruiting female managers, pointing at instances where selected candidates had not accepted the offered post or left the duty station prematurely.

81. Close to three-quarters of the survey respondents felt that female and male leaders were equally competent (see figure 17). Still, a significant minority of both male and female survey respondents, in particular civilian staff members, were undecided or did not agree that male and female managers were equally competent. Interviewees highlighted that senior female leaders had proactively brought greater impetus and importance to gender issues. One female senior manager explained how she gave more attention to certain issues that she believed to be overlooked by her male colleagues. Nonetheless, female leaders often complained about a perceived lack of acceptance from male colleagues. One female senior leader recalled how she had advised an incoming female mission leader not to allow herself to be interrupted by her male counterparts, as was common in high-level forums.

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\(^{42}\) See: United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Agreed Conclusions, 1997/2

\(^{43}\) See: United Nations Strategy on Gender Parity

Most staff saw gender parity as necessary for gender mainstreaming within the mission, although a significant minority did not

82. Staff members generally saw gender parity as the main facet of institutional gender mainstreaming. About two-thirds (72 per cent) of survey respondents agreed that having more gender balance within the mission would lead to better results, and 62 per cent was supportive of the practice of reserving quotas for mission personnel (see figure 16). However, there remained a significant minority of respondents, both male (23 per cent) and female (16 per cent), who did not agree that reserving quotas for women was essential for successful gender mainstreaming. In interviews, some among this minority expressed frustration and resentment at its implementation, stating that it compromised merit-based recruitment and delayed the process.

83. Some male staff members interviewed felt gender parity discriminated against them in recruitment and career development, as some posts were seen to be reserved for female candidates. Resentment was particularly strong amongst male middle-managers who sought to advance into senior positions. On the other hand, female managers did not always feel accepted by their subordinates, whom they felt perceived their selection to be based on their gender and not on competence. Some mission personnel also saw sharp increases in gender parity within the military and police components as unrealistic, “too doctrinaire,” rapid or even undesirable as it would lower standards of recruitment. However, some military staff officers praised the United Nations gender mainstreaming efforts as bringing positive change in their country’s armed forces.
Gender affairs sections, gender advisors and gender focal points were appreciated and perceived to promote a culture of gender sensitivity

84. Key informants in several missions welcomed the role of and initiatives taken by gender affairs sections, gender advisors and gender focal points. Positive examples included a women’s working group in MINUSMA and female engagement teams in MONUSCO and MINUSCA. In addition, some staff members made positive references to the contribution of the gender affairs sections in recruitment and gender mainstreaming work plans.

Female staff members felt they faced limitations, hardships, prejudice and discrimination in their work environment

85. About two-thirds of survey respondents felt men and women were treated equally in their mission (69 per cent). Nonetheless, the results differed strongly between male and female staff: international female civilians were the least satisfied about the state of gender mainstreaming in their mission, with almost half (44 per cent) indicating that men and women were not treated equally. Female staff members at all levels reported challenging aspects of life in peacekeeping and felt they faced limitations because of their gender.

86. More than half of female international respondents (54 per cent) believed that serving in a mission hindered their family life, with male survey respondents holding similar views (see figure 18). However, a mission leader in one mission stated that it was especially difficult to attract female international civilians to one family-duty station because personnel were not entitled to periodic leave (rest and recuperation) and the location was generally thought not to be conducive to family life.

Figure 18: Perceptions on gender mainstreaming and gender parity
87. Key informants identified numerous challenges related to work and living conditions in the field. Almost half of the female international civilian survey respondents (43 per cent) indicated that their mission did not address the specific concerns of its female personnel, a sentiment that also came out during the interviews. Female staff deployed in field locations complained about a lack of privacy, inadequate living conditions, as well as in some cases a feeling of increased vulnerability. However, some uniformed personnel resisted preferential treatment for female staff, with one male military leader stating that females of lower rank should not have better living conditions than their superiors.

88. Talking about how women experienced the workplace in their mission was perceived as a taboo issue, and some deeply problematic attitudes towards women surfaced: some contingents reportedly refused to collaborate or shake hands with female staff; one female chief complained of a contingent that only addressed her subordinate male colleague; one national male staff reportedly told another national female staff that women had to obey men based on his religious convictions, and; a mission order on dress codes had to be withdrawn after protests from female staff. Some female staff members also complained about excessive flirting from male colleagues. Some civilian sections were repeatedly mentioned as too male-dominated and as having “macho cultures.” Different military subcultures also existed among female military personnel: in one contingent, female officers were addressed as ‘sir’.

89. Challenges that female staff faced, such as harassment and limited privacy, were at times more acute in heavily male-dominated environments and field locations. Women developed coping mechanisms and support networks to address these challenges, such as female-only groups and mentorship groups for female staff to encourage discussions on issues that affected them.

90. A gender makeup analysis of duty stations showed that female personnel were more likely to be stationed at MHQ and to occupy specific sections. Female civilian staff comprised fewer than a quarter of personnel in field offices and female representation varied per staff level and mission (see annex V).

91. Surveyed female international civilians reported the lowest levels of morale (see figure 20) and were least positive about organizational culture in their missions (see figure 19). International female civilians consistently expressed the lowest levels of satisfaction across all cultural elements covered in the survey.  

45 The United Nations Global Client Satisfaction Survey (2017) found that female staff members deemed sanitation, office space and staff counseling to be more important than their male counterparts.
46 Activities of the Office of the United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services (A/71/157) mentioned that some United Nations offices were vestiges of an ‘old boys club’ culture. This appeared particularly prevalent in field missions, where the mix of military and civilian cultures injected additional layers of a male-dominated culture.
47 the United Nations Staff Engagement Survey (2017) found that females expressed less favourable opinions than male staff about the workplace; and female staff members reported more mental health issues than males.
Figure 19: How would you rate the organizational culture in your mission?

Figure 20: How would you rate your overall morale in the workplace?
V. Conclusion

92. Contextually, it is important to note that this evaluation of peacekeeping organizational culture relied primarily on experiences and perceptions of staff. These are important for mission leaders to understand as they clearly have a role in shaping organizational culture and influencing personnel’s actions. No organization can afford to ignore the perceptions of its personnel in its quest for greater effectiveness.

93. It is acknowledged that organizational culture may differ from mission to mission, as well as within missions. This evaluation attempted to identify broad, cross-cutting dimensions of organizational culture that are applicable to most, if not all peacekeeping operations. Notwithstanding positive views held by mission personnel regarding certain elements of organizational culture, including aspects of leadership and collaboration, the evaluation identified a number of critical challenges. Often, the existing organizational culture in missions was not fully aligned with the high standards adopted by the Organization and needs to be improved to fully support missions’ effective functioning. To this end, some recommendations, which are not exhaustive, are made below. Of particular importance is the perceived lack of trust in handling of misconduct. Heads of Missions should continue to raise awareness on key accountability and oversight processes, including expectations of confidentiality, critical timelines and outcomes of disciplinary proceedings, as part of outreach to all personnel.

94. Given the complex nature of peacekeeping operations and the many systemic and inter-linking issues identified in the evaluation, the required improvements cannot be brought about by missions alone. UNHQ, as well as Member States, which fell outside the scope of this evaluation, must necessarily have a large if not decisive role to play in this.

95. As both the Secretary-General and the ongoing risk assessments have identified staff perceptions of culture as a starting point for identifying gaps and improving the organization culture, missions are encouraged to utilize the results of this evaluation as an input into their efforts, including conducting more fact-based enquiries, to confirm the validity of existing perceptions, and consequently identify and apply specific corrective measures as required. The subtlety, pervasiveness and complexity of organizational culture require ongoing efforts to monitor and improve it.
VI. Recommendations

OIOS-IED makes two critical and nine important recommendations.48

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<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Key Finding</th>
<th>Critical Recommendations</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<tr>
<td>CR1</td>
<td>Para. 40-41</td>
<td>To address the perceived culture of impunity and power dynamics that contribute to the general lack of trust in handling of misconduct, missions should assess, with the guidance and support of relevant mandated UNHQ entities, whether the existing mechanisms are effectively implemented, and while taking rules and regulations into account, missions should communicate more openly on the process, anticipated timelines and outcomes of misconduct proceedings. DMSPC and relevant mandated UNHQ entities (as referenced in the DMSPC formal comment to CR1) should consider and address cross-cutting and systemic issues that the missions’ efforts may reveal.49</td>
<td>Development of a time-bound plan to assess and address negative perceptions of handling of misconduct, and steps taken towards implementation and communication. Evidence that DMSPC and relevant mandated UNHQ entities have considered and, as appropriate, taken action to address cross-cutting and systemic issues in the handling of misconduct in peacekeeping missions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CR2</td>
<td>Para. 85-92</td>
<td>Missions should assess the level of morale among their staff and identify the root cause(s) of low morale and widespread dissatisfaction among female personnel, especially international civilians. Leaders should take practical steps to address these issues, including increasing female participation in critical decision-making forums and establishing support networks to address specific grievances.</td>
<td>Greater satisfaction of female staff members as assessed by results of periodic staff surveys or other methods.</td>
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<th>Nr.</th>
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<tr>
<td>IR1</td>
<td>Para. 18-20</td>
<td>To identify and address critical issues and (mis)perceptions among staff, mission leadership should, while taking existing tools into account, conduct periodic staff surveys and/or explore alternative methods to assess their mission’s organizational culture. To this end, all staff members should participate in end of assignment surveys and/or exit interviews as part of the checkout procedure. Senior staff should</td>
<td>Comprehensive knowledge management and assessment tools developed and used. If required, a change management plan put in place.</td>
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48 In order to implement these recommendations, all stakeholders should consider the relevant evaluation findings, together with, as applicable, the mission-specific evaluation findings (see para. 13).

49 See para. 12 on the relevance of this recommendation to OIOS.
systematically provide End of Assignment Reports (EoAR). These assessments should also be used to strengthen strategic and systematic internal communication with staff and to develop an exhaustive change management plan addressing organizational culture at the mission-level.

<p>| IR2 | Para. 18-20; 73-76; 80-83; 85-92 | Mission leadership should actively champion diversity, inclusion and gender equality to address resistance to these issues. Dialogues among all staff should be formally and informally encouraged to help address any prejudice and discrimination, acknowledge biases and identify ways to mitigate them. Gender mainstreaming should include enhanced and systematic engagement of male staff and decisionmakers in missions through leveraging the role of Gender Affairs Units. | Documentary evidence of these activities. |
| IR3 | Para. 73; 82-83 | To address the perception of lack of trust in the civilian recruitment process and the existing perceptions of unfair treatment and favouritism, missions should increase the transparency of human resources and periodically publish demographic statistics. To improve trust and staff morale, while taking time and resource limitations into account, additional feedback mechanisms should be developed for qualified, shortlisted internal applicants who are not selected. | A strategy and plan to address existing perceptions; publication of periodic and transparent human resources reports; and improved staff satisfaction with the recruitment process. |
| IR4 | Para. 33-36 | UNHQ and the missions should review, identify, and address the root causes of the lack of trust in and perceived poor use of performance management tools and mechanisms, including e-PAS. In addition, UNHQ should integrate the systematic use of performance assessments in the promotion, career development and mobility of staff members. | Improved use of performance appraisal mechanisms as intended and required. |
| IR5 | Para. 28-30 | To address existing negative perceptions of personnel towards the managerial skills and recruitment process of mission leaders, and restore trust in the recruitment process of political appointees, DPO should review and improve internal communication on the process and the outcome of mission leadership recruitment. Furthermore, DPO should undertake a review of the managerial skills and experience of incoming mission leaders, and, if required, enhance this component in the selection process. | Strengthened internal communication to enhance trust, and, subject to the results of the review, an effective assessment methodology for the selection of mission leaders put in place, in particular with regard to managerial skills and experience. |</p>
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<tr>
<th>IR6</th>
<th>Para. 18-20</th>
<th>To improve continuity of leadership, smoothen leadership transition periods, and better prepare incoming mission leaders on operational challenges, DPO should review its leadership transition arrangements and consider a period of overlap where both the incoming and outgoing senior leaders are physically present in the mission.</th>
<th>Completed review of leadership transition arrangements, and improvements made including consideration of overlapping incumbency.</th>
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<td>IR7</td>
<td>Para. 59-63</td>
<td>To ensure contingents perform their duties in accordance with the policy on PoC, DPO and missions should review and strengthen accountability frameworks for contingents to reward, encourage and incentivize positive performance and sanction demonstrated instances of non-performance or undue risk-aversion.</td>
<td>Optimum use of existing performance appraisal systems. Underperforming contingents are considered for remediation, including repatriation from peacekeeping missions.</td>
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<td>IR8</td>
<td>Para. 27</td>
<td>To enhance coordination between the field and MHQ, the mission’s senior leadership should periodically visit field offices in order to gain first-hand knowledge of operational issues, listen to, motivate and guide staff to enhance their effectiveness.</td>
<td>Increase in relevant visits to field locations.</td>
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<td>IR9</td>
<td>Para. 69-72</td>
<td>To enforce the impartiality of peacekeeping operations, missions should review the need and consider developing internal operational policy that regulates external expressions of religion by mission personnel, including contingents, in their interactions with the host population. DPO should undertake, through missions, to remind peacekeeping personnel of their duty to uphold the impartiality required of their function and ensure that none of their actions affect their official duties or the interests of the United Nations, per the relevant regulations or standards of conduct for each relevant category of personnel, approved by the General Assembly.</td>
<td>Review undertaken and internal operational policy developed if deemed necessary. Relevant communication from DPO to personnel through missions.</td>
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Annex I: Organizational culture by the numbers

Leadership and management

- Eighty per cent of respondents agreed that direct supervisors focused on achieving results.
- Seventy-four per cent of respondents agreed that the SLT was well-informed about the mission area.

Ethic, integrity and accountability

- Sixty per cent of international civilians at management level\textsuperscript{50} indicated that underperformance was not actively addressed.
- Sixty-seven per cent of international civilians indicated that abuse of authority was likely to occur.
- Ninety per cent of respondents stated that they knew how to report misconduct.
- Forty-eight per cent of international civilians believed that entitlement abuse was likely to occur.
- Fifty-four per cent of civilian staff members and 27 per cent of uniformed personnel believed that emotional harassment and bullying was likely to occur in their mission.
- Thirty-seven per cent of respondents believed it was sometimes necessary to break the rules in order to carry out their work.
- Thirty-nine per cent of international civilians believed that personal relationships and hierarchy affected how misconduct was addressed.

Teamwork, collaboration and information-sharing

- Twenty-nine per cent of international civilians believed there was too much duplication of work.
- Thirty-seven per cent of senior and mid-level civilians\textsuperscript{51} believed there was too much duplication of work.
- Eighty-seven per cent of respondents agreed that collaboration was effective within their team and between sections.
- Fifty-seven per cent of female staff believed necessary information was freely shared in a constructive manner.
- Sixty-four per cent of international civilians indicated that collaboration between mission support and the substantive side was effective.

Risk-appetite

- Thirty-one per cent of respondents did not believe that contingents were ready to assume the same amount of risk in performing their duties.
- Sixty-one per cent of senior and mid-level civilians felt that contingents were not equally responsive in performing their duties.

Sensitive issues

- Forty-nine per cent of civilians believed that discrimination based on race was likely to occur.
- Thirty-three per cent of civilians believed that discrimination based on religion was likely to occur.

\textsuperscript{50} USG/ASG, D1-D2, P4-P5
\textsuperscript{51} See footnote 32.
• Forty-eight per cent of civilians believed that discrimination based on contractual status was likely to occur.
• Thirty-six per cent of police and 40 per cent of military personnel indicated that discrimination based on component was likely to happen.

Gender
• Forty-four per cent of female international civilians believed that men and women were not treated equally.
• Fifty-four per cent of female international civilians and 30 per cent of female military staff believed their gender hindered their life and work in the mission.
• Forty-three per cent of female international civilians indicated that their mission did not address specific concerns of its female personnel.

Annex II: Perceptions on mandate delivery
Do you believe that your mission’s mandate is realistic and achievable?
Do you believe your mission is overall on the right track to deliver results?

Has the organizational culture in your mission improved over the period you were deployed?
Please select 3 cultural elements internal to your mission that you believe have the strongest influence on effective mandate implementation.
**Annex III: Demographic overview of interviewees**

Interviewed and surveyed uniformed personnel included contracted senior military and police leadership (ASG/D2/D1/P)\(^\text{52}\), Military Staff Officers (MSO), Individual Police Officers (IPO) and seconded officers. Members of contingents and Formed Police Units (FPU) were not included in the data collection. Representatives of Member States and external stakeholders were also not interviewed.

**Key informant interviews (KII)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Staff level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff level</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Management</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Management</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Leadership</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Focus Group Discussions (FGD)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total # of FGD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>236</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{52}\) See: United Nations Staff Categories.

\(^{53}\) FGDs were generally composed based on gender, level, mission entity or thematic area, and included civilian, military and police personnel.
Annex IV: Demographic overview of survey respondents

The response rate of the online survey was 31 per cent (5,670) and the completion rate was 70 per cent (3,953). Civilian-NS refers to national staff (G and NO positions), Civilian-IS to international staff (P and FS positions). Respondents who could not be identified by their component were excluded from the sample. Reported survey percentages exclude responses of “Don’t know”.54

Number of survey respondents per mission component and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>78.71%</td>
<td>73.89%</td>
<td>N = 5670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21.29%</td>
<td>26.11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample of survey respondents as compared to total population size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Int'l / Nat'l Staff</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54 The full questionnaire used for the online survey is available upon request.
Annex V: Gender analysis

Deployment of female civilian personnel based on level per selected multidimensional missions

Deployment of female civilian personnel per mission entity

White numbers represent count of staff. Umnoja data. Jan 2020, N = 1,289
Between 2016 and 2018, the United Nations Secretariat convened the following special investigations into incidents that occurred in peacekeeping missions:

- Violence which occurred in Juba, South Sudan (UNMISS, 9-29 September 2016);
- PoC response of MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (14 to 28 November 2017);
- The 7 December 2017 Semuliki attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO, 10 to 28 January 2018);
### Annex VII: Formal management response of key stakeholders

#### A. Overview of key stakeholder responses to request for formal comments on Final Draft Report (October and December 2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Formal comments</th>
<th>Formal acceptance findings and recommendations</th>
<th>Action plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>No comments</td>
<td>Not received</td>
<td>Not received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>No comments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>No comments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>No comments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>No comments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>No comments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>No comments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>No comments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DPO</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DMSPC</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not received</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. UNHQ entities

United Nations

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Yee Woo Guo
Insurance and Evaluation Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

DATE: 8 February 2021

THROUGH: S/C DE:

FROM: Christophe Monier

Business Transformation and Accountability Division
Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC)


1. I am writing with reference to your email on 2 February 2021, in which OIOS shared the final draft report on the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations. My office has coordinated with relevant stakeholders within our Department and, based on their inputs, is presenting you with a formal management response for DMSPC.

2. DMSPC agrees with some of the broad issues with and challenges to organizational culture in the Secretariat as identified in the report. The report speaks about organizational culture from a broad range of perspectives, including power dynamics, communications, teamwork etc. These elements, taken together, are reflected in the results of the perceptions surveys and issues of lack of trust that arose. It would have been important for Critical Recommendation 1 (CR1) to take a holistic approach to addressing these perceptions.

3. DMSPC does not agree with the relevance of CR1 to the findings in the evaluation, and of the singular focus on misconduct and the resulting implications of its implementation for stakeholders involved. The perceptions and related findings described in the report speak to the larger issue of accountability and leadership responsibility and go beyond the issue of misconduct. While conduct and discipline/misconduct falls within this overall accountability, other areas of oversight play important parts, including investigations, management of disciplinary matters and the United Nations’ system of administration of justice, the ethics office, among others. This broader network of players in the accountability system are identified and discussed in the report itself, but not accordingly reflected in CR1. While OIOS has provided amendments to this recommendation based on consultations with DMSPC, the significance and impact of larger systemic challenges are still not reflected in the current formulation of CR1.

4. In addition, DMSPC is concerned with the practical feasibility of implementing CR1 as missions do not carry out the oversight process, nor is it clear they have the requisite data from OIOS to conduct the assessments.
5. DMSPC appreciates OIOS’ engagements with DMSPC throughout this process and efforts to try to accommodate some of our substantive feedback. However, we regret that the core concerns were not reflected in the reformulation of CR1, hence DMSPC is not able to accept the recommendation.

6. However, DMSPC will commit to the following action plan:

   a. DMSPC will, in coordination with other UNHQ key stakeholders including ID/OIOS, Ethics Office, DPO, DPPA, and SRSGs at mission level, issue a holistic communication by UNHQ to Secretariat entities, including missions, on information to include in awareness-raising activities aimed at strengthening understanding and trust in accountability mechanisms and related end-to-end processes as they impact on overall culture, power imbalances, collaboration, teamwork and performance. This action will be carried out by UNHQ entities in Q2, 2021.

   b. DMSPC will also, further to the UNHQ communication, request SRSGs to, upon receipt from OIOS of detailed data from the present report for missions which were subject to perception surveys, raise awareness among mission personnel from a holistic perspective aimed at addressing the challenges to the organizational culture noted in the report. Subject to missions receiving the necessary information, DMSPC will request that missions undertake this action in Q3-Q4 2021.

7. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your team for your engagement and collaboration throughout this process.

   cc: Aruna Thanabalasingam

DPO Recommendations Action Plan (January 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. #</th>
<th>Anticipated Actions</th>
<th>Entity(ies)</th>
<th>Target date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CR1</td>
<td>DPO cannot undertake to provide strategic guidance for a review of the effectiveness of conduct and discipline mechanisms, which are not under its functional purview. DPO had indicated from its earliest comments on the draft report that this recommendation would fall under the purview of DMSPC, which has the functional remit over and expertise on conduct and discipline processes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR5</td>
<td>For posts, whose selection falls under DPO’s responsibility (Heads and Deputy-Heads of Mission), DPO has reviewed the skills and experience needed for incoming senior managers at this level and, based on the outcome of the review, strengthened the assessment of managerial skills and improved selection tools, by including a leadership and motivation questionnaire to be filled out by candidates before the interviews and scenario-based questions asked during the interview. The Department will strengthen internal communication on the selection process of Heads and Deputy-Heads of Mission.</td>
<td>DPO (for Heads and Deputy-Heads of Mission)</td>
<td>Dec. 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR6</td>
<td><strong>Anticipated Actions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPO reviewed leadership transition arrangements and issues have been remedied to the extent possible, given constraints. Efforts are systematically undertaken to ensure that departing Deputy/Heads of Mission (D/HoMs) and incoming D/HoMs connect at Headquarters or via video/phone, when one is in-briefing and the other is out-briefing, as well as through the sharing of End-Of-Assignment reports. The overlapping incumbency of these senior managers was considered, but actual overlaps in mission for HoMs remain difficult to organize and in fact are typically not recommended for political reasons. Such overlaps also require funds and Member States’ concurrence, which for Deputy Heads of Mission is rarely granted. DPO will continue to implement the measures outlined above and seek overlaps in incumbency whenever feasible. DPO considers this recommendation implemented.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Entity(ies)</strong>: DPO</td>
<td><strong>Target date</strong>: December 2021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR7</th>
<th><strong>Anticipated Actions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independently of the evaluation, DPO, DOS and DMSPC undertook a review of performance and accountability mechanisms across all components of missions – civilian, police and military – and developed the Integrated Peacekeeping Performance and Accountability Framework, finalized and shared with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in September 2020. By the target date, DPO will provide documentation of the implementation of the framework, as it relates to contingents and the recommendation. Specific priority projects in the framework are focused on strengthening the existing accountability for contingents, as well as establishing a new mechanism to recognize outstanding performance. The framework also includes a detailed matrix with triggers if serious and systemic performance issues, including on PoC are identified. Such steps include action by the mission and UNHQ and remedial measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Entity(ies)</strong>: DPO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR9</th>
<th><strong>Anticipated Actions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPO reviewed current administrative guidance for the relevant categories of peacekeeping personnel and determined that it could not develop a policy regulating external expressions of religion by mission personnel. Per DPO’s review, no current regulation or standard of conduct approved by the General Assembly appears to allow for the development of such policy, including specifically for peacekeeping personnel. DPO therefore considers that any such regulation would have to be considered at Secretariat or United Nations-system level and, if developed, approved by the General Assembly. DPO will undertake, through missions, to remind peacekeeping personnel of their duty to uphold the impartiality required of their function and ensure that none of their actions affect their official duties or the interests of the United Nations, per the relevant regulations or standards of conduct for each relevant category of personnel, approved by the General Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Entity(ies)</strong>: DPO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 6 October 2020
Ref.: MONUSCO-2020-01267

To: Mr. Yee Woo Guo, Director
A: Inspection and Evaluation Division
   Office of Internal Oversight Services

From: Nancee Oku Bright
De: Mission Chief of Staff

Subject: Draft Report on OIOS evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Missions

1. I refer to your memorandum, dated 28 August 2020, regarding the draft report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Missions (OIOS/2020/01263).

2. MONUSCO appreciates the detailed analysis undertaken by OIOS and extends its gratitude to the evaluation team for the consultative approach undertaken in preparing the report. The Mission also recognizes the importance of this thematic evaluation, which relied primarily on experiences and perceptions of staff, and the valuable insights for the Organization, and for peacekeeping operations in particular, contained in the report.

3. The Mission has reviewed the report and its recommendations closely and observes that certain of the recommendations refer to challenges that are inter-linked with broader, systemic concerns for which the required improvements cannot be brought about by Missions alone. The Mission nevertheless accepts the report’s recommendations and expresses its commitment to taking into account the results of the evaluation, inter alia, as an integral part of the Mission’s Action Plan on staff engagement. The Mission further notes that it has already taken a number of steps in the key areas that are the focus of the evaluation, including by holding sensitization sessions on critical accountability mechanisms for disciplinary matters such as SEA, fraud and theft, conducting focus groups to advance discussions of female staff well-being and identify specific challenges and concerns, and streamlining the performance assessment of the Mission’s uniformed components in cooperation with Headquarters and Troop and Police Contributing Countries.
4. As highlighted in the report, Mission Leadership plays a critical role in influencing a Mission’s organizational culture, and I am in full agreement with the need for accessible, collaborative, and actively engaged leaders. MONUSCO’s leadership is deeply committed to remaining actively engaged in addressing the findings set forth in the evaluation and, together with OIOS and DPPA/DPO, will continue to work towards implementing OIOS’ recommendations with a view to strengthening the Mission’s organizational culture and enhancing its effective functioning.

Kind regards.

Cc: Ms. Leila Zerrougui, SRSG and Head of MONUSCO
    Mr. Ebrima Ceesay, Director of Mission Support
    Mr. Elie Rokallah, Senior Administrative Officer
    Ms. Judith Atiagaga, Audit Focal Point
    Mr. Daniel Maier, Senior Strategic Planning Officer
To: Mr. (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo  
A: Director  
Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED)  
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

Through:  
A:

From: Mr. Nester Odaga-Jalomayo  
OIC- Head of Mission, UNMOGIP

Subject: UNMOGIP: Formal Management Response to Evaluation of Organizational Culture in PKOs

This is to acknowledge receipt of your interoffice memo dated 04 December 2020 and your email dated 13 January 2021 regarding the subject.

Kindly be advised that the Mission does not have any further comments on the Final Report of the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations and you may therefore treat this interoffice memo as our formal acceptance of the Final Report’s recommendations.

Best regards.
To: Mr. Yee Woo Guo, Director
    Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED)
    Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

From: Alan Doyle
      Officer-in-Charge
      UNTSO

Subject: Final Report of the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations

1. Reference is made to your interoffice memorandum OIOS-2020-01775 concerning the request for a formal management response on the Final Report of the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations.

2. We have reviewed the draft report shared with us and we agree with, and accept, the recommendations made therein. As requested, we will develop and provide the action plan for implementation of the recommendations.

Best regards.
DATE: 28 December 2020
REF: OSRSG-201218

TO: Mr. Yee Woo Guo, Director
A: Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED)
   Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

FROM: Elizabeth Spehar, Special Representative of the Secretary-General
       and Head of Mission

SUBJECT: Request to formal management response on Final Report of the Evaluation of
OBJECT: Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations

1. I refer to your interoffice memorandum, reference number OIOS-2020-01775, dated 4
   December 2020, requesting a formal management response to the Final Report of the
   Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations.

2. UNFICYP accepts the recommendations of the Final Report, while noting that the
   Mission considers “Important recommendations” # 5, 6, 7 and 9 as not applicable to UNFICYP.
   Please find attached the Mission’s plan of action for each recommendation.

   Best regards.
To: (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo  
Director, Inspection and Evaluation Division  
OIOS

From: Major General Kefyalew Amde Tessema  
Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander  
UNISFA

Subject: Final Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations

1. I am pleased to inform you that I have received the final report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Missions.

2. I welcome the findings and recommendations of the report which form a good basis for further improving the organizational culture in UNISFA. Accordingly, my team has developed the attached action plan to respond to the recommendations and will report to me on progress regularly.

3. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the OIOS team for its efforts and cooperation with UNISFA focal points.

4. Thank you and best regards.
TO: Mr. (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo, Director
Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED)
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

DATE: 29 December 2020

FROM: Guang Cong
Officer-in-Charge
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)


1. UNMISS would like to thank OIOS for conducting the evaluation of organizational culture in peacekeeping operations and for transmitting to us the detailed results. While many of the results relate to longstanding, well-known and often systemic issues in peacekeeping operations, the detailed findings and conclusions offered by the evaluation provide new impetus and ideas for effecting improvements. The evaluation has also brought to light some issues that, have so far not been high on the agenda in peacekeeping – for example, in the area of racial discrimination among staff – but that could, if properly addressed, have a great positive impact on the organizational culture and thus staff motivation, effectiveness and retention.

2. UNMISS is pleased to note the positive Mission-specific results, such as on leadership and on some gender-related topics (in particular among uniformed female staff), and also acknowledges the negative ones, such as in the areas of gender more generally, discrimination, as well as regarding communication and information sharing. We note that implementing the recommendations will for the most part require a concerted effort by missions in close collaboration with departments at United Nations Headquarters, while some improvements require, as the report notes, inputs from Member States.

3. UNMISS has already undertaken measures to implement some of the recommendations, focusing on the areas, mentioned above, where the evaluation has found gaps that the Mission can address on its own. Under the area of information sharing, regular and frequent town hall meetings were conducted with staff and at the onset of COVID-19 pandemic with increased frequency. These have been found to be a best practice for increased information sharing, both top to bottom and bottom to top.

4. The Mission-level action plan to address the recommendations is enclosed. We have only included anticipated actions for the recommendations that are addressed to missions. UNMISS would also like to note the following regarding specific recommendations:

   a) With regard to CR1, many of the perceptions that are held by mission personnel are a result of processes that are not handled at the Mission level but instead by various UNHQ entities (OIOS, DMSPC, internal justice bodies and mechanisms) as well as TCCs and PCCs. Furthermore, the Mission does not include oversight entities. Therefore, while the Mission agrees to improve its communication on these processes to its personnel, further Mission-level action to address such perceptions will likely only have limited effect.

   b) With regard to CR2, the Mission has already taken steps to enhance the working and living experiences of female personnel, ensure a positive work-life balance, broaden the range of offered welfare activities, and improve the accommodation provided to personnel in efforts to address several of the root causes of dissatisfaction.

   c) With regard to IR1, the introduction of exit interviews as a required part of the checkout process of all individual personnel is well advanced. Exit interviews are already being conducted with UNMISS female individual police officers.
d) With regard to IR3, the Mission is in the process of launching a staffing dashboard, which contains both geographical and gender distributions by category and section. The dashboard will be shared with all staff via internal broadcast.

e) With regard to IR8, UNMISS senior leadership already conducted regular visits to field offices before the COVID-19 pandemic. With the onset of the pandemic the mission increased virtual contact and information exchange with field offices. In the last quarter of 2020, the tempo of field visits by the leadership increased while observing COVID preventative measures.

Cc: Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations (DPO)

Mr. Atul Khare, Under Secretary-General for Operational Support (DOS)

Ms. Catherine Pollard, Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC)
Subject: FW: - MINUSMA: Formal acceptance and requested inputs for recommendations action plan as per the Final Report of the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations

Date: Tuesday, 5 January 2021 at 12:42:56 Central European Standard Time

From: Joanne Adamson

To: Lucas Destrijcker


Priority: High


Dear Lucas,

On behalf of MINUSMA, in my capacity as Officer in Charge Head of Mission, I would like to indicate the senior leadership's formal acceptance of the recommendations in the Final Report of the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations.

In addition, please find the Mission’s inputs for the recommendations action plan. Kindly note that additional supplementary documents are attached, including:

1. An action plan to address lack of trust in handling misconduct in the Mission (Critical Recommendation 1)
2. An implementation plan for the UN-System side gender parity strategy (Important Recommendation 4)
3. The Terms of Reference for the Gender Task Force (Important Recommendation 4)

In 2021, the Mission will continue to work on other critical elements as identified in the recommendations action plan, most notably among others:

- Developing a plan to address existing perceptions by staff of recruitment process, including the publication of periodic and transparent human resources reports as well as providing feedback to internal applicants on status of their applications, test and interview results. (Critical Recommendation 2)
- Conducting an annual survey to assess staff satisfaction with recruitment processes. (Critical Recommendation 2)

If you have any additional questions or require further information, please contact the MINUSMA Chief of Staff, Claudia Banz (banz@un.org), with Monica Bernardo (costabernardo@un.org) in copy.

My very best wishes to you in 2021,

Joanne Adamson
Officer-in-Charge, Head of Mission, MINUSMA
15 January 2021

To: Mr. (Eddie) Yee Woe Guo, Director Inspection and Evaluation Division, OIOS

From: Major-General Stefano Del Col, Head of Mission and Force Commander, UNIFIL

Subject: Office of Internal Oversight Services - Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations - Evaluation Report

1. We refer to your memorandum addressed to the USGs of DPO, DOS and DMSPC dated 04 December 2020 on the subject evaluation report and subsequent internal request from IED for formal acceptance and a mission level action plan for the recommendations contained therein.

2. Accordingly, please find enclosed proposed UNIFIL action plan.

Best regards.

Cc: Mr. Effendi Syukur, Audit Focal Point, UNIFIL
Mr. Ibrahim Bah, Chief, MERAO, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo, Professional Practices Section, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
TO: (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo, Director
Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED)
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

DATE: 13 JAN 2021

REFERENCE: DOF/FC/014/2021

FROM: Lt Gen Ishwar Hamal, HoM/FC
UNDOF


1. Reference is made to the interoffice memorandum OIOS-2020-01775 concerning the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations.

2. We appreciate the efforts made in developing the report and accept the Final Report’s recommendations.
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 29 December 2020
Reference: SRSRG/047/2020

To: Mr. (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo, Director Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED) Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

From: Colin Stewart SRSRG and Head of Mission

Subject: Final Report on the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Missions

1. Reference is made to your inter-office memorandum OIOS-2020-01775 of 4 December 2020 on the final report of the OIOS on the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Missions and the related MINURSO findings.

2. MINURSO accepts the final report and herewith encloses its action plan as approved by the SRSRG. The Mission remains committed to implementing the relevant recommendations to improve its organizational culture.

3. Going forward, we remain available for further coordination with OIOS towards the ultimate closure of these recommendations.

Best regards.
TO: (Eddie) Yee Woo Guo, Director  
A: Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED)  
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

FROM: Zahir Tanin  
DE: Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Head of Mission  
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

SUBJECT: Final Draft Report on the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Missions

1. I am pleased to inform you that I have received the draft report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the Evaluation of Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Missions (OIOS/2020/01263) on 28 August 2020.

2. I welcome the findings and recommendations of the report which form a good basis for further improving the organizational culture in UNMIK. Accordingly, I have instructed my team to develop an action plan to respond to some of the recommendations and report to me on progress regularly.

3. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the OIOS team for its efforts and cooperation with UNMIK focal points.

4. Thank you and best regards.
Annex VII: OIOS/IED response to formal management response

1. OIOS thanks all missions and stakeholders at UNHQ for their strong engagement throughout this evaluation and their continued commitment to improving organizational culture in peacekeeping operations.

2. On CR1, OIOS notes the DPO formal comment that it cannot provide strategic guidance for a review of the effectiveness of conduct and discipline mechanisms, which are not under its functional purview. DPO was included in CR1 in recognition of its roles in supporting and streamlining communication strategies, and as an interlocutor between the missions and the relevant UNHQ entities such as DMSPC. As DPO did not specify which role it saw for itself to support the implementation of CR1, and as the focus of the recommendation is on missions, reference to DPO has been removed from the recommendation.

3. On CR1, OIOS appreciates the formal comments received from DMSPC and agrees that a ‘holistic approach’ with a ‘broad network of players in the accountability system’ will be needed in order to address the issue of trust deficits amongst peacekeeping personnel relating to misconduct proceedings, and it was in recognition of this that CR1 named: ‘Missions, DMSPC and relevant mandated UNHQ entities’ as relevant actors. OIOS notes that all missions have accepted CR1 and have proposed several actions to implement the recommendation. At the same time, the missions have also acknowledged that they cannot fully address the issue without the necessary support from relevant mandated UNHQ entities, including DMSPC. The proposed actions by DMSPC to address this matter are very welcome, and these have been included as recommendations made to DMSPC, with assumption that they are accepted.

4. On IR1, OIOS appreciates the formal comment received from DOS and has added the requirement for missions to develop change management plans to address organizational culture issues.

5. On IR9, OIOS notes that all peacekeeping missions have welcomed IR9 as it is formulated and expressed the need for guidance and support from DPO on this matter. In view of DPO response, the action for DPO has been adjusted accordingly; i.e., for DPO to undertake, through missions, to remind peacekeeping personnel of their duty to uphold the impartiality required of their function and ensure that none of their actions affect their official duties or the interests of the United Nations.