

Final Report

Evaluation of the incorporation of climate-related security risks by United Nations peace operations

31 March 2023

Assignment No: IED-22-016



Inspection and Evaluation Division

INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

Function *“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organization. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organization;”* ([General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B](#)).

Project team members include:

MICHAEL OLIVER SCHROLL, Team Leader

DAISY REBECCA NAKASI, Team Member

Contact Information **OIOS-IED Contact Information:**
phone: +1 212-963-8148; fax: +1 212-963-1211; email: ied@un.org

SRILATA RAO, Chief of Section

Tel: +1 212 963-3550, e-mail: rao3@un.org

YEE WOO GUO, Director

Tel: +1 917-367-3674, e-mail: guoy@un.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents	2
Executive Summary	3
1. Introduction.....	5
2. Background and Context.....	6
3. Methodology	8
4. Evaluation Results.....	10
<i>4.1 Secondary Data Analysis and Literature Review</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>4.2 Readiness</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>4.3 Integration</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>4.4 Coherence</i>	<i>18</i>
5. Conclusion	21
6. Recommendations	22
Annex I: Management Responses.....	24
Annex II: OIOS Comments on the Management Responses.....	29
List of other Annexes:	30

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED) conducted a formative thematic evaluation of the incorporation of climate-related security risks (CSR) by United Nations peace operations, covering the period 2018 to November-2022. A total of eight peace operations were sampled. The selection process considered geographical representation, balance of peacekeeping (PKOs) and special political missions (SPMs), and exposure to climate change effects/ecological threats. Three of the eight missions were subject to in-depth case studies. This was complemented by secondary data analysis focusing on the African continent, desk review, literature review, and interviews with missions, partners, stakeholders and relevant United Nations entities.

Key results from the evaluation included:

- Of the 15 countries most exposed to climate risks, eight hosted United Nations peace operations. Efforts to address the impact of climate change had gained momentum among many institutions in the Peace & Security pillar since 2017.
- Empirical research that was commissioned for this evaluation emphasized that there was no direct causal association between climate change and conflict globally. The relationship was characterized as indirect, complex, non-linear, and context-specific.
- It was also widely acknowledged that environmental degradation, sudden extreme weather events, and slow onset climate events were amplified by climate change, and these undermined livelihoods, which could lead to resource competition, trigger population displacement and weaken communities' and societies' social cohesion and resilience. These developments can undermine the peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts of the United Nations.
- Furthermore, climate change impacts could affect the operations and mandate delivery of United Nations peace operations by restricting mobility and access, e.g., for the protection of civilians. In addition, conflict and fragility weakened the capacity of states and communities to adapt to and mitigate climate change effects, and the resultant poor governance severely restricted access to climate financing.

The results from the evaluation are summarized in reference to three outcomes:

Readiness: Missions were moderately ready to consider and incorporate CSR in their analysis, planning, and implementation. All missions were aware of the potential effects of climate change on human security. A more detailed understanding of the dynamics and interdependencies was limited to missions with a dedicated focal person or Climate Security Advisor (CSA). Most missions had little or no access to medium- to long-term climate change data/projections. Where available, there were limited capabilities to analyze and translate such information to inform mandate implementation. Readiness varied significantly between missions due to the following factors: a) reflection of climate change and its effects in mandate language; b) commitment and interest by senior leadership and dedicated focal points; c) access to, knowledge, and utilization of, climate science/data and d) level of knowledge about Headquarter (HQ)-based climate security initiatives and engagement with HQ entities.

Integration: Several missions had started integrating CSR into their upstream and downstream work. Some missions, especially SPMs, used their leverage and convening power to advocate for increased attention to CSR. However, the topic usually competed with mandate components that required more urgent attention. The increase in CSA positions from one to five since 2020 was also a sign of increased

commitment and integration efforts. However, most initiatives, especially positions, were supported by extrabudgetary funding and/or the secondment of staff which were not reflected in peacekeeping/programme budgets. Several missions had started to reflect CSR in their analysis, planning and reporting, though to varying degrees. The language often remained generic and, at times, vague. Unless climate events required an immediate humanitarian response or directly threatened to undermine operations, the more long-term nature and slow-onset effects of climate change put the topic at a disadvantage during annual planning and budgeting cycles, notwithstanding the need to consider climate change impacts on long-term aspirations such as stabilization, peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

Coherence: CSRs were not yet addressed coherently. Coordination and collaboration of initiatives and activities with key United Nations agencies and respective United Nations Country Team (UNCT) was visible, though not comprehensive or systematic. Complementarity among key players could be improved, though it was more successful between missions and organizations such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) and International Organization for Migration (IOM). However, the limited presence of UNEP and its support for several countries was considered a constraint. Engaging with national stakeholders was limited, considering their pivotal role in ensuring sustainability. Apart from some regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), regional institutions, as well as civil society organizations (CSOs), were usually not actively and systematically involved. In particular, CSOs appeared under-engaged considering their relationship with communities and vulnerable groups of society.

OIOS makes a total of five recommendations addressed to specific missions and/or the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The recommendations were aligned with the findings and identified in consultation with the sampled missions, UNCT members, Headquarters entities and external partners. The recommendations address intermediate outcomes that are both important and highly relevant.

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess as systematically as possible the extent to which peacekeeping operations (PKO) and special political missions (SPM) had incorporated climate-related security risks (CSR). The evaluation focussed on the readiness of sampled missions to consider CSR in their planning and implementation, the extent to which missions had begun to integrate CSR into their strategies and programming, and how CSR was addressed coherently by key players. This evaluation referred to these three results areas – readiness, integration, and coherence – jointly as ‘incorporation.’ As the evaluation was focused on CSR, it did not review the environmental impact of peace operations nor assess compliance with the Environmental Policy for United Nations Field Missions.
2. For purposes of this evaluation, CSR was defined adapting a definition from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): the potential adverse impacts of climate change on human security¹, state-society relations, and international peace and security.²
3. Considering the limited maturity of CSR incorporation into mission plans and activities, the evaluation was designed to be formative in nature to inform current and future planning and programming and to document lessons learned. The evaluation was expected to contribute to the overall relevance, effectiveness and coherence of the Peace and Security pillar of the United Nations.
4. The evaluation was conducted in conformity with norms and standards for evaluation in the United Nations Evaluation Group³.

¹ Human Security means “protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity.” As defined by the Human Security Now report, 2003.

² United Nations Development Programme Climate Security Nexus and Prevention of Violent Extremism, October 2020

³ <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914>, 2016.

2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

5. Of the 15 countries most exposed to climate risks as identified by the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN)⁴, eight hosted United Nations PKOs or SPMs.⁵ These eight countries are: Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, and Haiti. In addition, most fragile countries hardly benefited from climate financing⁶. Only the Democratic Republic of Congo had received substantial climate financing (United States \$331.3 million)⁷. Based on the 2021 Ecological Threat Report⁸, 17 of the total 21⁹ missions (PKO and SPM) were in countries exposed to ecological threats.¹⁰
6. Since 2017, the Security Council had increasingly debated the effects of climate change on stability, where the topic gained traction and formal and informal groups/entities were initiated/set up. Some Member States collaborated with researchers and think tanks to produce reports and briefs on the topic. Furthermore, the peacekeeping high-level priorities for 2023-24 emphasized “*the reverberating effects of climate change on pre-existing conditions*”. In the New Agenda for Peace¹¹, climate change was highlighted among the emerging risks to peace and security as it contributes to instability and affects livelihoods, access to resources and human mobility trends.
7. The Security Council held its first-ever debate on the impact of climate change in April 2007,¹² and specific reference was made in a July 2011 Statement by the President of the Security Council:

*The Security Council expresses its concern that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security. ... The Security Council notes that ... conflict analysis and contextual information on possible security implications of climate change is important, when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates, or endanger the process of consolidation of peace.*¹³
8. In the Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/15, the Security Council noted the importance of considering the implications of climate change in matters relating to the maintenance of

⁴ Climate change exposure data was based on Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN), which ranks countries according to both their exposure to climate change and their readiness to adapt. The country ranks by ND-GAIN are often referenced in the Secretary-General speeches (see footnote 5) and by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) <https://dppa.un.org/en/climate-peace-security>: <https://gain.nd.edu/>

⁵ <https://press.un.org/en/2021/sgsm21074.doc.htm> The eight countries are: Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, and Haiti

⁶ Lowest beneficiaries of climate financing are: Mali, Central Africa Republic, Sudan, Lebanon, South Sudan, Pakistan, Libya, Somalia, Senegal, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria.

⁷ <https://climatefundsupdate.org/data-dashboard#1541245745457-d3cda887-f010>

⁸ Issued by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP): <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/ecological-threat-report-2021-summary-and-key-findings/>

⁹ Missions that were considered in the initial sample by the OIOS evaluation.

¹⁰ These missions are: UNAMA, UNMOGIP, UNMHA, UNSOM, BINUH, MINUSMA, UNISFA, UNITAMS, UNDOF, UNTSO, UNAMI, UNOWAS, MONUSCO, MINURSO, UNMISS, MINUSCA and UNIFIL

¹¹ <https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/>

¹² <https://press.un.org/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm>

¹³ <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CC%20SPRST%202011%205.pdf>

international peace and security, conflict analysis and contextual information. As per the statement, the Security Council requested that Secretary-General reports to the council include such contextual information.

9. There was ample research and analysis on the dynamics within the Security Council on climate change and security, when and how the subject had been discussed during formal and thematic meetings, and how it had been reflected in resolutions and other outcomes of the Council.¹⁴
10. OIOS reviewed documents related to 21 missions (12 PKOs, nine SPMs) and one Support office, including resolutions, budget performance and Secretary-General reports for 2018-2022. Of the 21 reviewed missions, the Security Council recognized the adverse effects of climate change thirty-eight times in eleven mission resolutions— five PKOs and six SPMs.¹⁵ In twelve occurrences (two PKOs and five SPMs), the Council further emphasized the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the United Nations and host governments. In five instances, the Council requested missions to report on the adverse impacts of climate change. Climate-related security risk language was mainly noted in the preambular paragraphs of mission resolutions. A more detailed analysis focusing on the eight sampled missions can be found in section 4.
11. Beyond the interdependencies between climate change and human security, there were implications for the military, police and civilian infrastructure of PKOs and SPMs, for the health of mission personnel, and operability of equipment. Extreme weather and heat could reduce the ability to operate, e.g., risk of damaged airfields, reduced aircraft payload, or reduced visibility. Additionally, floods and sandstorms were recognized as affecting troops' mobility and patrolling/combat in extreme heat, as endangering the health of uniformed personnel. Furthermore, reaching civilian populations needing protection and/or humanitarian assistance could also be negatively affected.
12. Another aspect gaining prominence in recent years was a recognition of the adverse effects of climate change falling disproportionately on poor and marginalized communities who bore little responsibility for contributing to climate change. Among these communities, women, girls, and children were disproportionately impacted by climate change impacts. These vulnerable communities could not prepare for and recover from climate impacts. This was the central argument for "climate justice" or a Human Rights Based Approach to climate change - a reshaping of climate action from a technical effort to cut emissions into an approach that also addressed human rights and social inequality.¹⁶ The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)¹⁷ pointed out: *Climate justice requires that climate action is consistent with existing human rights agreements, obligations, standards, and principles.*¹⁸ For example, inadequate mitigation and adaptation strategies could lead to human rights violations where sufficient participation of local

¹⁴ https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/climate_security_2021.pdf

¹⁵ In addition to entities mentioned in para 13, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)

¹⁶ <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/climate-justice/>

¹⁷ For more information regarding human rights and climate changes see: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/HRClimateChangeIndex.aspx>

¹⁸ https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/KeyMessages_on_HR_CC.pdf

communities was not assured, or if the due process and access to justice were not respected for any climate-induced displacement.

3. METHODOLOGY

13. The evaluation covered four years, from 2018 to November 2022, to align with the period within which the Security Council had increasingly recognized the impacts of climate change on security. The evaluation scope covered two groups of missions: a) three missions for in-depth analysis¹⁹: the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), and b) restricted analysis of five missions: the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
14. The evaluation employed mixed methods for data collection and triangulated the data to increase the validity of the findings. The following qualitative and quantitative data sources were used.
 - **Document reviews:** of over 400 documents across the eight missions, including resolutions, concept notes, work plans, annual budget, budget performance reports, the Secretary-General's reports, Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) registers, briefings, Common Country Analysis (CCA), and conflict analysis reports (details in Annex 6). Available research reports on the subject within the United Nations and publications by research institutions and think tanks were also reviewed.
 - **Semi-structured interviews:** 126 interviews with mission staff across the eight missions, senior leadership, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM²⁰) staff members at headquarters, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), Civil Society Organizations (CSO), and government officials were conducted.
 - **Case studies:** following an in-depth analysis, three case studies were developed reflecting experiences, challenges, and lessons learned in addressing CSR at UNSOM, UNMISS, and UNOWAS. See case study reports in annexes 3-A, 3-B, and 3-C.
 - **Observation:** of discussions at the Regional Conference on Climate, Peace, and Security in the Sahel and West Africa and during a field trip to the flood affected Bentiu state in South Sudan.

¹⁹ The selection process was informed by an analysis of mission and country information based on a seven-criteria rubric (1. CSR language in mandates, 2. CSR language in mission concept notes/work plans/budgets, 3. Dedicated CSA/focal point, 4. Reporting on CSR, 5. Country exposure to ecological threats, 6. Receipt of climate finance, and 7. Score on governance effectiveness) and the balance between peacekeeping (PKOs) and Special political missions (SPMs).

²⁰ Climate Security Mechanism (CSM): founded in 2018 by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), UNDP and UNEP to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to analyse and address the adverse impacts of climate change on peace and security. In 2021, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) joined the CSM.

- **Secondary data analysis:** a model was designed to assess whether there was a noticeable direct relationship between climatic, environmental, and agricultural factors on the one hand and conflict²¹ on the other and compared these impacts to standard conflict determinants²². The analysis relied on predictive forecasting to assess these impacts. The Afrogrid²³ geographic dataset was employed for its ability to analyze relationships between climate and African conflict.
- **Literature review:** More than 120 publications on the topic were reviewed, 33 of which - predominantly articles in peer-reviewed journals - were subjected to an in-depth analysis of the conflict type and region covered, employed methodology, limitations, and findings (see annex 5-A).
- **Assessment Rubric:** A rubric aligned with the three outcomes of the theory of change was designed with a three-point scale to categorize the performance of missions. Indicators and performance level descriptions were established to facilitate data collection, analysis, and consolidation. The three-point scale was defined with the formative nature of the evaluation in mind. The performance levels were:
 - Nascent - just coming into existence or beginning to display signs of interest/potential
 - Developing - visible – though varying - progress to incorporate CSR.
 - Evolved - visible integration of CSR in some works and with early results.
- **Learning Forum:** At the end of October 2022, a learning forum was convened, bringing together staff from the eight missions, DPO, DPPA, CSM and other HQ entities. The objective was to share preliminary findings, secondary data analysis and experiences from the missions and discuss options moving forward. See the learning forum report in annex 9.

²¹ Conflict data was drawn from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) and the Geolocated Event Dataset (GED).

²² Conflict trends, environmental and food indicators, agricultural and food production, and socioeconomic indicators.

²³ <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41597-022-01198-5>

4. EVALUATION RESULTS

4.1 Secondary Data Analysis and Literature Review

The impact of environmental, climate and agricultural predictors on conflict was contextual and specific to locations, based on the secondary data analysis²⁴ and literature review. The most consistent predictors of conflict were the history of conflict, whether conflict occurred in nearby locations, and population density in urban conflicts. Governance, social cohesion, socio-economic factors and conflict resolution mechanisms played a mediating role. Findings from the secondary data analysis and literature review are presented in paragraphs 15 -17 and 18-19 respectively.

15. Focusing on subnational geographical units across the African continent, the secondary data analysis examined whether there was a noticeable direct relationship between climatic, environmental, and agricultural factors on the one hand and conflict on the other and compared these impacts to that of standard conflict determinants such as conflict history and development. In addition, the model calculated one- and five-year forecasts of conflict to assess the validity of these relationships across the entire African continent. In addition, more specific analyses of the same relationships were conducted in eight countries: Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Six of these countries were currently hosting peace operations, whereas Burkina Faso and Nigeria were supported by UNOWAS. See annexes 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C.
16. These analyses used a newly released geographic dataset, which recorded monthly information on numerous conflict and violence types in addition to environmental and climatic factors, and which was specifically designed to study the climate-conflict relationship in Africa²⁵.
17. The continental report, as well as country assessments – in combination with country-specific information – produced several key findings:
 - a) Continentally and in most country-specific analyses, the most consistent predictor of conflict was the history of conflict, namely whether conflict occurred in the last month or two months, and the previous year, and whether conflict occurred in nearby locations. Grievances, marginalization and the absence of state services likely fuelled this.
 - b) The impact of environmental, climate and agricultural predictors was contextual, meaning that their impact was specific to and varied across different countries and locations in keeping with different levels of conflict history and development. These indicators did not show a clear impact (predictive or statistically) either continentally or within specific countries and across most types of violence. Interdependencies were highly contextual and could not be described in simple generic statements.
 - c) In cases where environmental and agricultural predictors emerged as relevant, the direction of this relationship was not clear. In some cases (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo; South Sudan), improved environmental conditions²⁶ were associated with greater conflict

²⁴ Conducted by Ore Koren, an Assistant Professor of international relations and methodology in the Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington

²⁵ <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41597-022-01198-5>

²⁶ Including; vegetation health, drought severity, temperature, precipitation, and the Sahara desert transition zone.

risk; in others, adverse climate combined with reduced agricultural productivity decreased conflict risk (e.g., Nigeria). This relationship could be explained by the existence of an unobserved “moderator,” for instance, historically strained ethnic relationships or unequal access to resources.

- d) In every case excluding one, projections of climate trends over the 2022-2027 period did not suggest climate change would impact conflict over the same period. The one exception was South Sudan, where the conflict risk across the country was not expected to increase – the variability of this risk could rise, with some locations expected to experience less violence while some were expected to experience more.
 - e) In line with the findings of past research, the most effective determinant of “urban” types of conflict – protests and riots – was local population densities and rapid urban growth, which suggested that such conflicts were directly driven by the number of individuals who can participate and have means of mobilization, coordination and transport, as well as broader concerns that primarily relate to urban residents (e.g., food price hikes).
 - f) In countries/locations characterized by rapid urbanization (e.g., Somalia), the population density was also affected by forced displacements due to the loss of livelihoods in rural areas as an effect of prolonged droughts and/or extensive flooding.
 - g) Both cross-continently and for most conflict types, national-level indicators (total population, gross domestic product, government efficiency)²⁷ generally harmed predictive performance, which was unsurprising considering the focus on local conflict risk, which was often driven by location-specific factors which would need to be understood within the specific socio-economic, political and environmental settings.
18. During the evaluation, new articles or blogs on the subject were published nearly daily. A literature review was conducted, covering over 120²⁸ external publications from research institutions and think tanks. A deep dive into 33 primarily academic articles addressing climate change and conflict revealed that 63 per cent of them were published between 2020 and 2022, and 52 per cent focused on Africa, covering mainly regions such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In terms of methodologies used, literature reviews (synthesis) and case studies were most predominantly applied for qualitative studies, while linear regressions and hypothesis testing were favoured among quantitative studies. Farmer-herder conflicts were often researched.
19. Overall, the findings from the literature review were similar to the secondary data analysis described earlier in their emphasis on the importance of the history of conflict and the context specificity of the impact of climate change on conflict. Quantitative findings varied depending on selected independent variables. Some studies used only a small number of indicators or even only one (e.g., precipitation). The results of one study²⁹ suggested that changing climatic conditions both increase and decrease conflict risk depending on the location. Overall, the reviewed quantitative and qualitative articles suggested a need for context-specific adaptation policies to avoid maladaptation, as well as the integration of CSR in adaptation initiatives as it might affect peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The articles also stressed the critical role of institutions in establishing property rights, governance, and conflict resolution mechanisms as enabling factors to address CSR (See Annex 5-A).

²⁷ Adopted from the World Bank indicators, which were used to account for governance quality and the presence of the rule of law.

²⁸ Of the reviewed publications, three focused on the gendered impacts of climate change, while others mentioned the disproportionate effects that women and girls experience and emphasized their involvement in climate resilience initiatives.

²⁹ <https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac3db2/pdf>

4.2 Readiness

Readiness (A): Missions were moderately ready to consider and incorporate CSR in their analysis, planning and implementation activities. Readiness varied significantly between missions due to the following factors:

- Reflection of climate change and its effects in mandate language
- Commitment and interest by senior leadership and dedicated focal points
- Access to, knowledge and utilization of climate science/data
- Level of knowledge of HQ-based climate security initiatives and engagement with HQ entities

A.1 Knowledge and Understanding: All sampled missions were aware of the potential effects of climate change on human security. A more detailed understanding of the dynamics and interdependencies was limited to missions with a dedicated focal person or Climate Security Advisor (CSA)³⁰. Some missions had conducted research and assessments to develop a more in-depth, localized, and nuanced understanding of these interdependencies.

20. Overall, missions were aware of the potential effects of climate change on the environment, natural resources and livelihoods of the population. Interview respondents also listed several effects on mission operations that carry the risk of undermining mandate implementation, e.g., reduced access to vulnerable populations and remote locations, inability to move swiftly to protect civilians or investigate allegations of human rights violations, or difficulties in supporting humanitarian agencies to deliver needed support.
21. Respondents shared anecdotal observations mentioning an increase in the severity and unpredictability of climate events such as storms, rainfall, heatwaves, and changing weather patterns like shorter/longer rainy seasons or dry periods. In addition, the evidence concerning severe weather conditions pointed to an increase in weather-related disasters.³¹
22. Respondents applied common reasoning in describing the interdependencies between climate change and conflict: Climate change/events led to the degradation of the environment, thereby increasing the competition for resources (water, land) and hence the risk of conflict between communities, ethnic groups, and different forms of livelihoods (agriculture, husbandry, fishing), or forced displacement and migration. In reference to migration, World Bank Groundswell Report 2021 projects that to cope with climate change effects “216 million people in six regions could move within their countries by 2050”.³²
23. Most interviewees also emphasized that climate change – and its effects - was among several drivers of conflict and that the interdependencies should not be oversimplified, thereby risking deprioritizing political, social and economic drivers as well as historical grievances of marginalized population groups.
24. Missions with a CSA or active focal point showed a more advanced and nuanced understanding. Furthermore, several missions had initiated studies or projects to deepen their understanding.

³⁰ The Climate Security Advisor is a working title used in the report, but that differs across missions and entities.

³¹ <https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/weather-related-disasters-increase-over-past-50-years-causing-more-damage-fewer>

³² <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/09/13/millions-on-the-move-in-their-own-countries-the-human-face-of-climate-change>

UNOWAS, for example - in preparation for and to inform discussions at the Regional Conference on Climate, Peace and Security in the Sahel and West Africa in April 2022 - conducted climate security assessments with local institutions in Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

A.2 Capacity, Data & Analytics: Most missions had little or no access to medium- to long-term climate change data and projections for their countries/ regions. There were limited capabilities to analyze and translate such information to inform mandate implementation. A few capacity-building or training activities were underway or planned.

25. Most missions did not regularly and actively access and utilize climate change data and climate change impact research as provided by research institutions³³ or think tanks³⁴ that aspired to make climate science more accessible and relevant for policy makers. In addition, transferring such climate data into plans and budgets appeared to be challenging for most interviewed mission staff. On the demand side, the senior leadership had few or no requests to analyse and include such data systematically. This was compounded by the contested nature of the association of climate change and conflict, which calls for quantitative and qualitative, large-scale, and localized research.
26. Climate science foresight usually included projections covering several decades. Hence, there was an inherent tension between the (annual) more short-term nature of mission mandates, plans and budgets and such projections. To bridge that gap – respondents suggested that regional entities of the Peace and Security pillar – such as UNOWAS, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), or the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, among others – could play a key role in translating and embedding climate science into advocacy, policy and programming.
27. Several training and capacity building initiatives were rolled out or being developed and tested. The UN System Staff College (UNSSC) conducted three trainings on Climate Sensitive Programming for Sustaining Peace between September 2021 and October 2022 with a total of 125 participants. However, only a relatively small number of mission staff (15) attended these trainings. In November 2022, UNSSC organized the first-ever climate and security practitioners dialogue³⁵. In addition, a new modular training programme jointly developed by DPPA, the Stockholm International Policy Research Institute (SIPRI), DPO, UNSSC and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA – the Swedish government agency for peace, security and development) was underway and pilot tested at UNMISS. It was too early to assess the impact of such training in moving the missions from awareness to understanding to integrating CSR into their programming.

³³ Such as the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

³⁴ E.g., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and adelphi

³⁵ The two-day event brought together practitioners from across the humanitarian-development -peace nexus for in-depth discussions on the integration of climate change considerations into political analysis, conflict prevention, and risk management strategies and programming.

A.3 **Technical Support:** The knowledge about the CSM, the CSM toolbox³⁶, and the availability of learning opportunities was restricted to senior mission staff with a CSA or dedicated focal points only. Missions expected the future relationship with DPO and DPPA to be one of mutual support, encouragement and advocacy to build a body of knowledge and evidence, with some interest in establishing regional hubs/platforms in locations with a critical mass of expertise and interest.

28. Beyond the CSA, senior mission staff and a small number of interested staff or focal points, knowledge about the CSM, its objectives, role and composition were overall limited. The same applied to the CSM toolbox and its application. The toolbox³⁷ was established to help analysts better understand how climate change impacts peace and security. The CSM was undergoing an internal review to consider the strategic direction for the next couple of years. Most interviewees expressed their expectation to receive more specific support and guidance from the CSM and/or its members on integrating CSR considerations into the various components. At the same time, the CSM was expected to draw on the experience and understanding of the missions more actively to build up evidence and possibly establish regional knowledge hubs and/or centres of excellence.
29. UNEP had a unique role as part of the CSM and in providing technical expertise. The Disasters and Conflicts Branch/Ecosystems Division pioneered new partnerships³⁸ between UNEP and United Nations peace operations, that influenced subsequent policymaking. However, because of the global/regional structure of UNEP³⁹, most missions could not reach out to or receive substantial technical support from the organization. UNEP support was mainly via its regional or sub-regional offices, each often covering several countries. UNEP had no presence in seven of the sampled mission locations: Mali, Afghanistan, Cyprus, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan (MINUSMA, UNAMA, UNFICYP, MONUSCO, UNSOM, UNMISS and UNISFA) but collaborated with missions on individual initiatives, e.g., in the DRC and Mali. UNEP planned to deploy more environmental advisors and had also made consistent and continued efforts to design and refine its advisory model to provide needs-based integrated environmental analysis and advice tailored to the context (e.g., the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) ministerial declaration in the Horn of Africa).

4.3 Integration

Integration (B): Several missions had started integrating CSR into their upstream and downstream work, supported by the increase in CSA positions from one to five since 2020. However, most initiatives, especially dedicated staff positions, were supported by extra-budgetary funding or through secondment of staff and were not reflected in peacekeeping/programme budgets. While this illustrated the evolving integration process, it also posed a risk to the sustainability and viability of considering CSR.

³⁶ <https://dppa.un.org/en/climate-security-mechanism-toolbox-conceptual-approach>

³⁷ Available in three languages; English, French and Spanish

³⁸ Secondment of the climate security Advisor to UNSOM and deployment of a similar position at MINUSMA.

³⁹ [Official_unep_map.jpg \(2133x1600\)](#)

B.1 Commitment & Response: Some missions, especially SPMs, used their leverage and convening power to advocate for increased attention to climate-related security risks. However, the topic usually competed with mandate components that required more urgent attention. Interest and buy-in from senior leadership were critical to getting the topic “off the ground” in the first place but this alone is not sufficient to strengthen and maintain momentum.

30. Despite competition with other priorities⁴⁰ and the challenge of short-term mandate and budget cycles versus the long-term dynamics of climate change, missions had drawn increased attention to CSR. The topic was integrated into weekly and monthly senior leadership meetings in three missions⁴¹ and reflected in the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Deputy SRSG (DSRSG) meetings and conference talking points. Senior leadership at some missions briefed the Security Council and the Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on Climate Change⁴² and shared experiences in addressing CSR at different fora⁴³. At UNFICYP, the SRSG advocated for youth participation in environmental peacebuilding to unite the conflicting Greek and Turkish Cypriots and address environmental issues.
31. The Humanitarian-Development and Peace nexus (“triple-nexus”) allowed missions to draw increased attention to the topic and advocate for its integration into the wider United Nations system. At two of the missions, the position of the CSA was strategically located in the office of the DSRSG/Resident Coordinator (RC)/ Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) office to ensure linkage to the UNCT for coordinated and collaborated efforts. There was observed integration of CSR in projects designed by the UNEP, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNDP, and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) at UNSOM with the support of the CSA. While at UNMISS, the 2022 flood response initiatives were undertaken jointly with the World Food Program (WFP) and International Organization for Migration (IOM). Details and examples can be found in Annexes 3-A, 3-B, and 3-C.
32. Some missions leveraged their convening power to raise awareness and advocate for the integration of CSR by government, development partners and CSOs at national and regional levels. In April 2022, UNOWAS convened a regional conference on “Climate Change, Peace and Security in the Sahel and West Africa.” The conference’s objective was to define the effects of climate change, discuss existing efforts to address these effects from the local to the regional level, and strengthen responses to CSR together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), national governments, multilateral development partners, civil society and the UN system. At the end of the conference, a Call to Action⁴⁴ with specified responsibilities for the UN system, regional bodies, ECOWAS member states and development partners was adopted.
33. UNSOM, on the other hand, had conducted capacity-building sessions with the police and maritime government authorities on the interlinkages between climate and conflict, risk analysis, and how to integrate such analysis into their work, and had provided policy advice to the new government on

⁴⁰ MONUSCO focused on other drivers of conflict, like land issues and exploitation of natural resources, while UNAMA focused on political issues regarding the legitimacy of the Taliban government, countering terrorism financing, fiduciary risks, and anti-money laundering.

⁴¹ UNSOM, UNMISS, UNOWAS

⁴² UNMISS SRSG update to the Security Council on floods in South Sudan and DSRSG-Political briefing to the Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on Climate Change.

⁴³ UNSOM DSRSG-Political sharing experience at the 2022 DSRSG’s annual retreat, UNOWAS focal point sharing experience at the 2021 Challenges Forum

⁴⁴ https://unowas.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/call_to_action_-_regional_conference_on_climate_change_peace_and_security_in_west_africa_and_the_sahel.pdf

integration in setting up and planning for CSR. UNISFA and UNMISS were involved in convening seasonal cattle migration conferences with UNCT and IGAD that ensured communities agreed on migration routes and the movement of resources to avoid farmer-herder conflicts.

B.2 Initiatives, Activities, Budget, Reporting: Several missions had started to reflect climate-related security risks in analysis, planning, budgeting and reporting, though in varying degrees. The language often remained generic and, at times, vague. This likely reflected the limited availability of local, context-specific evidence of interdependencies between climate change and conflict and the more long-term nature and slow-onset effects of climate change.

34. Missions undertook different initiatives to integrate CSR into their operations. Several working groups were established at various missions to coordinate initiatives in addressing CSR. UNMISS established (i) an Informal task Force on Climate Security to coordinate with UNCT in the establishment of a UN Working Group on Climate Change and Security to develop a joint UNMISS-UNCT Climate and Security Strategy and (ii) a floods task force that coordinated floods response initiatives and developed a joint contingency plan for Bentiu. UNOWAS established (i) a regional UN Working Group on Climate Change, Security, Environment, and Development⁴⁵ and (ii) the ECOWAS-UNOWAS Working Group on Climate Change and Security⁴⁶. UNSOM established the United Nations Environmental Task Force to coordinate approaches between the Friends of the Environment Group of Donors and interested United Nations agencies for knowledge exchange and learning.
35. A review of mission planning documents revealed that five⁴⁷ of the eight missions had integrated CSR into their annual budget, work plans or concept notes. UNOWAS integrated CSR initiatives into its workplans annually from 2020 consistently. Planned initiatives ranged from conducting climate security risks assessments in five countries to participating in the UN Community of Practice on Climate Security and developing joint cross-border pilot projects in cooperation with the Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO) Senegal and organizing the climate security research seminar to finalize UNOWAS study on climate change, peace, and security in West Africa and the Sahel.
36. UNSOM developed a pilot project in Hirshabelle state to integrate climate security and gender-sensitive approaches to support local processes that address conflict in the Mataban District. Unfortunately, the start of the project was put on hold due to security concerns. UNSOM also undertook capacity-building initiatives for the political mediation group and a consortium of non-governmental organizations working on CSR and was leading a mapping exercise of existing natural resources in Somalia and programmes implemented by different entities focusing on climate security.
37. Other initiatives that integrated CSR included; (i) the UNOWAS 2018 study on “Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel,” which examined the cause and possible solutions to pastoralism-related conflicts, (ii) the MINUSMA study that assessed the relationship between climate change, environmental conditions, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), (iii) UNISFA water surveillance project that utilized a combination of sensors, satellite imagery combined with topographical modelling in Geographical Information System (GIS) to understand the situation vis-a-vis water resources. The objective of the project was to monitor water use to avoid overuse and

⁴⁵ Established together with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UNEP and IOM to promote knowledge sharing and coordination on climate-related work within the United Nations


⁴⁶ To ensure that the climate-security linkages are better understood by ECOWAS member states and integrated into the National Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

⁴⁷ UNOWAS, UNAMA, MINUSMA, UNISFA, UNSOM

identify possible conflict triggers. In its joint programme with Sudan and South Sudan UNCT, UNISFA planned to support agro-pastoralist communities in adopting climate change adaptation mechanisms. UNISFA was also in the process of developing the Mission’s Environmental Action Plan which will comprehensively cover relevant risks and mitigation strategies related to CSR, and (iv) Youth-led Peacebuilding working groups established by UNFICYP that raised awareness on environmental issues and the 12 established bi-communal technical committees formed by leaders of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots that addressed several issues including health, criminal matters, environment, climate change, crisis management, and cultural heritage. Some missions had integrated CSR into the ERM and developed response plans and strategies.

38. Reference to CSR in the Secretary-General’s reports on the missions grew markedly from seven instances in 2018 to 15 in 2019, 18 in 2020, and 24 in 2021. Missions mainly reported on the adverse effects of climate change in general, followed by reporting on efforts undertaken to address the impacts of climate change and, lastly, on the effects of climate change on mission operations, as reflected in the graph below. The Secretary-General’s reports on UNOWAS, UNSOM, and UNAMA ranked the highest in terms of their reference to CSR.

Figure 1: Reporting on CSR by mission



39. As of October 2022, four CSA positions had been established. Three of four had been filled at the following missions: UNSOM (since June 2020, seconded by UNEP for two years), UNMISS (since August 2022), UNOWAS (since October 2022) and MINUSMA position was not yet published. In addition, two positions had been established in missions that were not part of the evaluation sample: UNOCA (since September 2022) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa (since February 2022). The positions were not from the same job families and an analysis of the Terms of Reference showed that their focus was on the following aspects:

- Advising mission leadership on emerging and current risks to peace and security issues relating to natural resources and climate change and ensuring that the risks are addressed in a coordinated manner.

- Research and analysis on climate change, environmental degradation, conflict over natural resources, and the current and potential impact on the political and security situation in the countries.
 - Building networks to enhance coordination and cooperation on CSR between missions and partners to support policy development and implementation by the United Nations system, regional organizations and national governments.
40. Respondents had different expectations of the CSA role, including framing climate security in a manner that was easy to understand and operationalize, developing tools and checklists to support missions in integrating CSR in planning, implementation and reporting, participating in conflict analysis and leading contextualized research on climate change and conflict based on climate projections, advise leadership on implications for the missions, and coordination of the triple nexus efforts to address CSR.
41. As the intention was to mainstream the topic into ongoing work, similarities between CSA and the roles and responsibilities of gender advisors/units became apparent. Interviewees shared lessons from integrating gender as a crosscutting topic and suggested considering the following to ensure success:
- Continuous advocacy and awareness raising on the topic amongst mission staff, UNCT, government, CSOs, and other partners.
 - Designing tools, checklists, indicators, and strategic questions that guide the integration of the topic in different section plans and reports.
42. There was no observed common/standard conflict analysis approach among the peace operations, which was considered a barrier to integrating CSR in such analysis. The CSM developed guidelines⁴⁸ on how to conduct integrated CSR assessments while DPPA developed guidelines⁴⁹ on integrating climate considerations into mediation efforts.

4.4 Coherence

Coherence (C): CSRs were not addressed coherently. Complementarity and coordination among key players could be improved, though it was more successful between missions and organizations such as UNDP, UNEP (likely a downstream effect of the CSM) and IOM. However, the absence of UNEP in several countries and limited support by its regional offices was considered a constraint. Engaging with national stakeholders and CSOs was a challenge and not yet adequate considering their pivotal role in ensuring sustainability and buy-in at the local level.

⁴⁸ https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/csm_toolbox-2-conceptual_approach.pdf

⁴⁹ <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/DPPAPracticeNoteTheImplicationsofClimateChangeforMediationandPeaceProcesses.pdf>

C.1 Coordination & Collaboration: Coordination and collaboration of initiatives and activities with key United Nations agencies and the respective UNCT was visible, though not comprehensive. Considering the multitude of challenges and priorities of host governments, addressing CSR was often not high on their agenda. Apart from some regional bodies such as IGAD, ECOWAS, or the African Union, regional institutions as well as CSOs were usually not actively and systematically involved. In particular, CSOs appeared under-engaged considering their relationship with communities and vulnerable groups of society.

43. Coordination and collaboration on initiatives and activities to address CSR with UNCT and the government was visible at UNSOM and UNOWAS but limited in other missions. This was facilitated by the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF)⁵⁰ and the strategic positioning of the CSA role in the DSRSG/RC/HC office that provided easy linkage to the UNCT at UNSOM. Several United Nations entities⁵¹, government agencies and other partners were working together to achieve established actions and targets, and capacity-building sessions were conducted for the Somali Maritime Authority.
44. At UNOWAS, coherence was facilitated by the established working groups (referenced in outcome B.2) through which the mission co-chaired bi-monthly meetings. The Security Council mandated UNOWAS to facilitate the implementation of United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) which provided an opportunity for collaboration and coordination with other UNCT members and regional representations of agencies charged with implementing UNISS. By addressing the root causes of conflicts, UNISS' security pillar also addressed CSR.
45. The flood response in Bentiu, Unity State (South Sudan), was the most visible example of how UNMISS coordinated and collaborated with the UNCT. UNMISS, IOM and WFP set up a floods task force to coordinate initiatives addressing floods response and develop an integrated contingency plan for Bentiu. The mission planned to develop a joint UNMISS-UNCT Climate and Security Strategy to strengthen engagements with government entities and partners at different levels.
46. At UNAMA, before the Taliban takeover in August 2021, climate change and related risks were captured in the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF), a guiding framework for UN and government action and collaboration. Unfortunately, this was put on hold due to political circumstances. It exemplifies the risk that in fragile contexts progress regarding integrating and addressing CSR can be reversed or stalled.
47. Due to its regional mandate, UNOWAS collaborated with regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). UNOWAS contributed to the design of the ECOWAS Climate Strategy and ensured that CSR was reflected and contributed to the implementation of the Lake Chad Regional

⁵⁰ United Nations Sustainable Development Framework 2021-2025 was developed and signed by all United Nations Entities in Somalia and the federal government as a guiding document for joint actions to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity for all Somalis in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Based on it, UNSOM advised the design and implementation of projects by other United Nations agencies to address CSR and conducted capacity-building sessions for government entities.

⁵¹ UNDP, UNEP, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), WFP, United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women)

Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience (the SRSR was part of the steering committee, and the mission co-chaired the cluster on governance).

48. However, there was no visible and deliberate coordination/collaboration with regional bodies like the African Union, or national and regional institutions at most other missions. Engagement of CSOs and NGOs was minimal, considering their close relationships with the communities and vulnerable groups. There was also still a need for more advocacy to ensure national ownership and buy-in at the local level.

C.2 Complementarity & Alignment: Due to the newness of the topic in peace operations, with a relatively small number of initiatives and activities underway, complementarity and alignment with government plans and strategies did not yet pose a critical challenge. However, with the expectation of the field getting more crowded with national governments, bilateral partners and possibly climate finance institutions likely to address CSR more systematically, the questions of complementarity and alignment may surface. The CSAs will likely play a significant role in handling this aspect.

49. All missions were nascent in aligning and working in complementarity with government plans and strategies that contained climate change/risk elements. All case study countries had either climate change adaptation plans or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Apart from UNSOM and UNOWAS, which had national and regional framework documents to guide collaborative initiatives with the respective governments, other missions still needed to align and work in complementarity with individual governments.
50. The Lake Chad Basin Commission planned to establish a knowledge platform for their strategy to ensure experience sharing on lessons learned and challenges encountered in addressing CSR. UNOWAS would be a member of the platform. Other missions did not have existing/planned knowledge hubs/centres of excellence that brought together the United Nations, governments and regional bodies to coordinate, share knowledge and data, and build networks for addressing CSR.
51. In March 2021, the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) released an unprecedented communique⁵² acknowledging the negative effects of climate change and the growing threat they pose to socioeconomic development, as well as to sustainable peace, security and stability in Africa, and the livelihoods and general well-being of the African people. In November 2021, they released another communique⁵³ highlighting how climate impacts can aggravate conflict and called for an "informed climate-security-development nexus." On that basis, the African Union was a natural counterpart for the missions to engage to drive the agenda forward, especially on their Great Green Wall Initiative⁵⁴ to address cross-border environmental challenges and associated conflicts.

⁵² <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/communique-984th-meeting-psc-held-level-heads-state-and-government-9-march-2021-theme>

⁵³ <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1051th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-psc-held-on-26-november-2021-on-the-theme-climate-change-and-peace-and-security-the-need-for-an-informed-climate-security-development-nexus-for-africa>

⁵⁴ An initiative aimed at restoring Africa's degraded landscapes and transforming millions of lives with the ambition to restore 100 million hectares of degraded land, sequester 250 million tons of carbon and create 10 million green jobs.

5. CONCLUSION

52. A systematic assessment of the eight sampled missions across the seven immediate outcomes (A.1 – C.2) is depicted in Table 1 below. UNSOM, UNOWAS and UNMISS scored the highest. The table also shows progress on the immediate outcomes: Knowledge & Understanding (A.1), Commitment & Response (B.1) and Initiatives, Activities, Budget & Reporting (B.2). Gaps were apparent concerning Capacity, Data & Analytics (A.2) and Technical Support (A.3). There was also room for improvement at Coherence (C.1, C.2).

Table 1: Summary assessment of incorporation of CSR, by mission, by outcome.

	UNOWAS	UNSOM	UNMISS	MONUSCO	MINUSMA	UNISFA	UNFICYP	UNAMA	Score
Readiness									
A.1 Knowledge & Understanding	Evolved	Evolved	Evolved	Nascent	Developing	Developing	Developing	Developing	18
A.2 Capacity, Data & Analytics	Nascent	Developing	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	9
A.3 Technical Support	Nascent	Developing	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	9
Integration									
B.1 Commitment & Response	Developing	Developing	Developing	Nascent	Developing	Nascent	Nascent	Developing	13
B.2 Initiatives, Activities, Budget, Reporting	Developing	Evolved	Developing	Nascent	Nascent	Developing	Nascent	Nascent	13
Coherence									
C.1 Coordination & Collaboration	Developing	Developing	Developing	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	11
C.2 Complementarity & Alignment	Developing	Developing	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	Nascent	10
Score	13	16	12	8	10	10	9	10	

53. Climate change, regarding temperature, precipitation and sea levels, among others, can lead to extreme and unseasonal weather effects such as heat waves, cold spells, drought, floods and storms. This in turn could affect livelihoods and has been termed ‘vulnerability multiplier’ by researchers and academicians. With knock-on effects leading to migration and competition for resources compounding existing historical, political and inter-communal grievances, there is greater likelihood of the escalation of conflict. However, this need not be inevitable as missions can create opportunities for collaboration using early warning systems and incorporating foresight and analytics into its programmatic, advocacy and partnership activities, thereby fostering better governance and greater resilience to climate-related crisis.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

54. OIOS makes five important recommendations addressing achievement of intermediate outcomes.

Table 2: OIOS Recommendations

Outcome	Recommendation	Indicators of Achievement	Responsible entity
Readiness	1. Inclusion of available climate information and medium- to long-term projections into analysis, planning and reporting – complemented by facilitation of and support for local and contextualized research and analysis considering vulnerabilities of different population groups.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of use of climate data and projections, including reference to local/national research and analysis. 	All eight sampled missions
	2. Strengthen staff and management capacity via needs-based, focused and tailored capacity building activities such as training, guidance, checklists and tools, with a focus on <i>How to incorporate CSR</i> , including exchange of experiences with and among the CSAs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of widespread utilization and adaption of the CSM toolbox. Evidence of needs-based content of capacity-building opportunities responsive to and reflecting the different needs of women and other vulnerable groups. Evidence of capacity-building events and periodic experience-sharing events attended by CSA and CSR focal points. 	All eight sampled missions, supported by DPO/DPPA
Integration	3. Integrate CSA positions and activities into the programme budget submissions for select SPMs and PKOs during the next two to four years with a balance of responsibilities between downstream (mainstreaming into operations and activities) and upstream work (advocacy, coordination, alignment). For missions in/expected transition,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of efforts to request funding for CSA positions from the peacekeeping/programme budget. Evidence of balanced CSA responsibilities and tasks Design of a generic job profile to classify the CSA positions. 	MINUSMA, UNMISS, UNSOM, UNOWAS, and DPO/DPPA

	advocate for the establishment of CSA positions within the UNCT.		
	4. Integration of CSR lens into political and conflict analysis, through the utilization and possible adaptation of the CSM toolbox and building on existing processes like ERM and CPAS.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of references to CSR in Secretary-General reports, ERM and CPAS. • Evidence of integration into ERM or CPAS or any other regular risk assessment or analysis process. • Evidence of integration into mission-funded projects/activities. 	All eight sampled missions
Coherence	5. Strengthen inter-mission networks and coordinated approaches, including at the regional level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of strengthened inter-mission networks. • Evidence of coordinated approaches. 	DPO/DPPA

ANNEX I: MANAGEMENT RESPONSES

Comments received from the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel

1. Thank you for your memo dated 9 February 2023 in which you transmitted, for our review and response, the Draft Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Evaluation of the incorporation of climate related security risks by United Nations Peace Operations.
2. I am pleased to confirm UNOWAS' acceptance of the report and its recommendations.
3. As requested, please find attached the completed recommendation action plan template.
4. I wish to thank you for conducting this important study which will contribute to our ongoing efforts to enhance responses to climate-related security risks in West Africa and the Sahel.

Comments received from the Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNISFA

5. I am pleased to inform you that I have reviewed the following OIOS evaluation reports:
 - Draft Biennial Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on "Strengthening the role of evaluation and the application of evaluation findings on programme design, delivery, and policy directives" for the 2020-2021 biennium.
 - Draft Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Evaluation of the incorporation of climate-related security risks by United Nations Peace Operations.
 - Draft Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Thematic evaluation of the United Nations Secretariat support to the Sustainable Development Goals.
6. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the OIOS team for its evaluation reports and invite you to consider the responses herewith attached.

Comments received from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission UNFICYP

7. I refer to your interoffice memorandum, reference #OIOS-2023-00192, dated 9 February 2023.
8. I am pleased to confirm UNFICYP's acceptance of the report and recommendations. Accordingly, the completed recommendation action plan is attached.

Comments received from the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia

9. This memo refers to your memorandum reference OIOS-2023-00192 of 9 February 2023.
10. We do not have further comments on the Detailed Evaluation Results titled *Final Draft report on Evaluation of the incorporation of climate-related security risks by United Nations peace operations dated 9 February 2023*. However, we have a few suggestions on Annex 1-B titled *Case Study Report: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)*, please find attached our comments.

11. We hereby confirm our acceptance of all the IED recommendations 1-4 applicable to UNSOM. Please find the UNSOM action plan and associated timetable for the implementation of recommendations for the OIOS evaluation on the subject matter.
12. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for your excellent cooperation and assistance to UNSOM.

Comments received from the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations

13. Reference is made to your Memorandum (OIOS-2023-00192) of 9 February 2023 transmitting the draft report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of the incorporation of climate-related security risks by United Nations Peace Operations. I would like to express my appreciation for the consultations and the Learning Forum organized in October 2022 that led up to the finalization of the Detailed Evaluation Results. The OIOS Evaluation adds to the recognition within DPO that climate change can be a risk multiplier that impacts conflict dynamics in complex ways.
14. Peace operations must assess and seek to mitigate the climate-related risks to our mandate implementation, including where climate change impacts affect mobility and access, as emphasized by the Evaluation. Analysing and addressing risks that may lead to intensifying competition or exacerbating intercommunal conflicts requires strong partnerships across the UN system and beyond. For this reason, as also recognized in the Evaluation, DPO is strengthening its efforts to include climate-related peace and security risks analysis across its work, including through solidifying its membership in the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), a joint endeavour with DPPA, UNDP, and UNEP. This partnership has enabled DPO to deploy the first Climate, Peace, and Security Adviser to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in August 2022 and prepare the ground for the deployment of a second adviser in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Designed in close partnership with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, a pilot training on Climate, Peace, and Security for UN Field Missions was delivered in UNMISS this month.
15. The implementation of the recommendations of the evaluation will be helpful to further address the impact of climate-related security risks in the United Nations. I am pleased to inform you that DPO will accept recommendations 2 and 5. With regards to recommendation 3, the text of the recommendation ought to be amended as reflected in the attached action plan. Missions can only make budget proposals, which are reviewed and approved by the Secretary-General, before being submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration and approval. Similarly, missions cannot transfer positions to the United Nations Country Team (UNCT): as part of the transition planning, they can only advocate for the establishment of such a function within the UNCT. We would also like to emphasize that missions will implement the recommendations of the evaluation within the constraints of their mandate, the capacities available to them, and the necessary prioritization of their resource requirements as political and operational circumstances evolve.
16. Further, the responsibilities of DPO under recommendation 3 can only be construed as supporting its implementation, namely with the development of a Generic Job Profile jointly with DPPA. Therefore, the indicator on “Evidence of efforts to request funding for CSA positions from the

peacekeeping/programme budget” was removed from the DPO Action Plan. Any request for CSA posts would have to emanate from missions, given their control over the development of their budget. Similarly, the indicator “Evidence of balanced responsibilities and tasks” will not apply to DPO since posts are managed by missions.

17. Please find attached an action plan to implement the recommendations under the responsibility of the department, which reflects the clarifications provided above.

Comments received from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

18. I refer to your memorandum of 9 February 2023 transmitting the draft report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the Evaluation of the incorporation of climate-related security risks by United Nations Peace Operations.
19. UNAMA appreciates the opportunity offered to our staff throughout the evaluation process. We acknowledge that our comments on previous versions have been taken into consideration, and we have nothing further to add.
20. I take note that the OIOS report has accurately captured the nascency of incorporating CSR in UNAMA. I am pleased to see that the report acknowledges the efforts by the mission to incorporate CSR into reporting and mission planning while also acknowledges the changing and challenging political environment following the August 2021 collapse of the Afghan government and Taliban takeover.
21. The management welcomes this final draft report and fully accepts recommendations 1 and 2, while conditionally accepting recommendation 3 pending budgetary allocations for a dedicated Climate Security Advisor.
22. Thank you again for this important report on the incorporation of climate-related security risks. I look forward to the implementation of recommendations and the next steps in strengthening the mission’s capacity considering Afghanistan’s significant vulnerabilities in this regard.

Comments received from the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

23. I refer to your Memorandum (OIOS-2023-00192) of 9 February 2023 transmitting the draft report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the evaluation of the incorporation of climate-related security risks by United Nations peace operations. We thank you for the consultative nature of the process and for incorporating our comments on the earlier draft of the report.
24. As the report underscores, the interlinkages between climate change, peace, and security are of growing importance for my department. The majority of special political missions are deployed in highly climate-vulnerable contexts, and climate change has profound implications for the ability of these missions to implement their mandates effectively. As a founding member of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), DPPA has made a concerted investment since late 2018 to increase its capacity and technical expertise to analyse and address climate-related security risks at Headquarters and in the field.
25. Partnerships, including with UN entities, Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations, civil society, and research institutions, are critical for DPPA’s efforts to address climate-related

security risks. Collaboration across the peace and security pillar plays a central role, and a number of joint initiatives are underway, with more in the pipeline, to increase capacity and knowledge. Progress in expanding and mainstreaming the climate, peace, and security agenda will also continue to require the political support of Member States, particularly members of the Security Council and governments hosting SPMs, as well as the provision of adequate mandates and resources.

26. Having reviewed the evaluation and its recommendations, I am pleased to inform you that DPPA will accept recommendations 2 and 5 that are aimed at our department. We propose an amendment to recommendation 3 and related indicators of implementation, as DPPA is not in a position to decide on the integration of new posts in mission budgets, given the prerogatives of the General Assembly on administrative and budgetary questions, nor on the transfer of such positions to UN country teams. DPPA is prepared to accept recommendation 3 as revised. Please find attached an action plan to implement the relevant recommendations, reflecting the points raised above. Please also note that our response has been coordinated with DPO.
27. My office stands ready to provide any clarification or additional information that may be required. Thank you for your continued cooperation.

Comments received from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINSUMA)

28. I express my sincere appreciation for the Evaluation Team's work on this important topic and their valuable observations and recommendations.
29. MINUSMA takes note of the useful and important report findings, inter alia:
 - 'Academic research that was commissioned for this evaluation emphasized that there was no direct causal association between climate change and conflict globally. The relationship was characterized as indirect, complex, non-linear, and context specific.
 - It was also widely acknowledged that environmental degradation, sudden extreme weather events, and slow onset climate events were amplified by climate change, and these undermined livelihoods, which could lead to resource competition, trigger population displacement, and weaken communities' and societies' social cohesion and resilience. These developments can undermine the peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts of the United Nations.
 - Furthermore, climate change impacts can affect the operations and mandate delivery of United Nations peace operations by restricting mobility and access, e.g., for the protection of civilians. In addition, conflict and fragility weakened the capacity of states and communities to adapt to and mitigate climate change effects, and the resultant poor governance severely restricted access to climate financing.
30. Further to the findings and to help us better understand the report, we would be grateful for OIOS's clarification of the implicit objectives that the recommendations are intended to help missions meet. Is it to respond to factors that 'undermine the peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts of the United Nations, [...] impacts [that] can affect the operations and mandate delivery of United Nations peace operations or others?

31. Under my leadership, MINUSMA is currently undertaking various actions related to climate-related security, which are consistent with the recommendations and notably include:
- Increasing consideration of environmental and climate-change-related factors in our peace and conflict analysis (e.g., partnership with UNOWAS and their Climate, Peace, and Security Adviser; learning event in February 2023, organized in collaboration with Climate Security Mechanism, UNEP, UNDP, and PBF inter alia.; discussions about the collection of data in CPAS and SAGE; and consideration of environmental impact in project templates).
 - Establishing a Post of Senior Climate Security Adviser for MINUSMA in coordination with UNEP and the Climate Security Mechanism.
 - Coordination of activities related to climate and security with the UNCT via the office of the DSRSG RC/HC, based upon comparative advantages and avoiding duplication.
 - Reducing our carbon footprint and contribution to environmental degradation and climate change ('do no harm'), since the 2017 DOS environment strategy; MINUSMA focusing on energy saving, with more efficient equipment (efficient prefabricated offices and accommodation, electric vehicles, efficient inverter air conditioners, generator synchronization, air conditioning temperature controls, LED bulbs, etc.); and using renewable energy production on a larger scale (pilot project starting in Bamako, and possible extension to other locations).

Supplementary comments received from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

32. I thank you for your reply dated 9 March 2023, providing clarifications on the evaluation's scope and recommendations raised in your draft evaluation report dated 9 February 2023 on the incorporation of climate-related security risks by United Nations Peace Operations.
33. I am pleased to share with you MINUSMA's action plan for the implementation of those recommendations. As highlighted in your report, it is important to ensure that issues related to climate security are addressed in a coordinated, coherent, and collaborative way between peace operations and members of the UN country team to ensure complementarity of actions based upon their respective mandates and comparative advantages. This would create synergies and avoid duplication noting that UN agencies, funds, and programmes' mandates include a more direct link to address climate change mitigation and adaptation in the host country.
34. We confirm MINUSMA's acceptance of recommendations 1 and 2.
35. The Mission is not in a position to accept recommendation 3 as formulated (integration of Climate Security Adviser (CSA) positions into peacekeeping budget), which is beyond MINUSMA's own decision as it depends on both the mandate given by the Security Council and negotiations within the General Assembly. Please note, however, that the Mission has taken steps to establish a CSA position through extra-budgetary funding from UNEP. The recruitment process is ongoing.
36. We accept recommendation 4, noting that the development of indicators for CPAS and reporting processes, including SAGE, need to be driven by UNHQ so that there is harmonization of approaches across missions.

Comments received from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

37. UNMISS gratefully acknowledges receipt of the interoffice memorandum, reference number OIOS-2023-00192, dated 9 February 2023, requesting a formal management response to the Draft Report of the evaluation of climate-related security risks by United Nations Peace Operations.
38. UNMISS accepts the recommendations of the Draft Report while noting that the Mission has already undertaken steps to meet the requirement surrounding recommendations 2 and 3 on strengthening staff and management capacity via needs-based, focused, and tailored capacity-building activities, the integration of joint CSA position, and implementation of Mission activities.
39. Please find attached the Mission's comments on the recommendations and opportunities for improvement as provided in the UNMISS Action Plan for implementation of the recommendations.
40. Thank you for your consideration and support.

ANNEX II: OIOS COMMENTS ON THE MANAGEMENT RESPONSES

1. OIOS thanks all entities for their response to the evaluation report and takes note of concerns raised in paras 10, 15, 16, 26, and 30 of the management responses in Annex I.
2. OIOS accepted all editorial comments suggested in Annex 1-B, renamed as Annex 3-B titled *Case Study Report: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)*, referenced in para 10 of Annex I.
3. OIOS revised the wording of recommendation 3 to reflect suggestions provided by DPO and DPPA in paras 15, 16, and 26 of Annex I. Additionally, OIOS deleted the indicator "Evidence of efforts to request funding for CSA positions from the peacekeeping/programme budget" from the DPO and DPPA action plans but maintained it for the missions. Similarly, the indicator "Evidence of balanced responsibilities and tasks" was only deleted from the DPO action plan as requested.
4. Regarding clarification sought by MINUSMA in para 30 of Annex I, OIOS provided a detailed explanation of the objectives of the recommendations and further sought MINUSMA's acceptance of the recommendations and submission of an action plan. (*OIOS reply to MINUSMA management response to the OIOS thematic evaluation on climate-related security risks by United Nations Peace Operations (IED-22-016), dated 9 March 2023*). To that effect, MINUSMA submitted supplementary comments and an action plan on 24 March 2023, as detailed in paras 32 to 36.

LIST OF OTHER ANNEXES:

#	Title / Content
3-A	Case study report: UNOWAS
3-B	Case study report: UNSOM
3-C	Case study report UNMISS
4-A	Secondary Data Analysis: Consolidated Report
4-B	Secondary Data Analysis: Continental Report
4-C	Secondary Data Analysis: Country Reports
5-A	Literature Review
5-B	Reference List
6	Document review
7	Enabling and impeding factors
8	Comparative advantage
9	Learning Forum report
10	Theory of Change