



## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

### REPORT 2014/087

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Audit of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Overall results relating to the effective management of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti were initially assessed as partially satisfactory. Implementation of eight important recommendations remains in progress

FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY

17 September 2014

Assignment No. AP2013/683/08

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# AUDIT REPORT

## Audit of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

### I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
2. In accordance with its mandate, OIOS provides assurance and advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the United Nations internal control system, the primary objectives of which are to ensure: (a) efficient and effective operations; (b) accurate financial and operational reporting; (c) safeguarding of assets; and (d) compliance with mandates, regulations and rules.
3. The Aviation Section was responsible for ensuring the safe, efficient and effective utilization of all air assets to support movements of civilian, military and police personnel and cargo within the Mission including casualty and medical evacuations. The Section was headed by an Officer-in-Charge at the P-3 level and was supported by 9 international staff, 4 United Nations volunteers and 12 national staff. The Section's activities were governed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) Aviation Manual, Aviation Safety Manual and related mission operating procedures.
4. MINUSTAH aviation budget was \$21.7 million and \$14.2 million for fiscal years 2012/13 and 2013/14 respectively. During 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2013, the Mission chartered 10 aircraft (one fixed-wing and nine rotary wing) and conducted 6,914 flights transporting a total of 45,051 passengers and 229 metric tons of cargo.
5. Comments provided by MINUSTAH are incorporated in italics.

### II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

6. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of MINUSTAH governance, risk management and control processes in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of air operations in MINUSTAH**.
7. The audit was included in the OIOS 2013 risk-based work plan because of operational, safety, security and financial risks related to air operations.
8. The key control tested for the audit was regulatory framework. For the purpose of this audit, OIOS defined this key control as the one that provides reasonable assurance that policies and procedures: (a) exist to guide the management of air operations; (b) are implemented consistently; and (c) ensure the reliability and integrity of financial and operational information.
9. The key control was assessed for the control objectives shown in Table 1 of the Assessment of key controls table.
10. OIOS conducted this audit from January to March 2014. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2013. The audit was conducted at Mission Headquarters in Port-au-Prince and a field visit was made to a regional office in Les Cayes.

11. OIOS conducted an activity-level risk assessment to identify and assess specific risk exposures, and to confirm the relevance of the selected key control in mitigating associated risks. Through interviews, analytical reviews and tests of controls, OIOS assessed the existence and adequacy of internal controls and conducted necessary tests to determine their effectiveness.

### III. AUDIT RESULTS

12. The MINUSTAH governance, risk management and control processes examined were initially assess as **partially satisfactory**<sup>1</sup> in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of air operations in MINUSTAH**. MINUSTAH established procedures to ensure that all flights were justified, duly approved and properly documented. Access controls to air terminals were adequate and contractors' performance appraisals were conducted on time. However, MINUSTAH needed to: (a) prepare an aviation support plan in support of the budget for air operations; (b) coordinate with DFS as regards the reconfiguration of the air fleet and the serviceability of some aircraft contracted under letters of assist (LOA); (c) expedite the recruitment for vacant posts in the Aviation Section, including that of the Chief Aviation Officer; and (d) ensure that the Mission Aviation Safety Council systematically follows up on the implementation of air safety recommendations.

13. The initial overall rating was based on the assessment of key control presented in Table 1 below. The final overall rating is **partially satisfactory** as implementation of eight important recommendations remains in progress.

**Table 1: Assessment of key control**

Business objective	Key control	Control objectives			
		Efficient and effective operations	Accurate financial and operational reporting	Safeguarding of assets	Compliance with mandates, regulations and rules
Effective management of air operations in MINUSTAH	Regulatory framework	Partially satisfactory	Satisfactory	Partially satisfactory	Partially satisfactory
<b>FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY</b>					

### Regulatory framework

#### Aviation support plan was not prepared

14. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual required the Aviation Section to prepare and regularly update the mission's aviation support plan by identifying necessary personnel, assets, support equipment and services to accomplish the Mission's mandated tasks. The Joint Mission Coordination Centre was required to provide the Aviation Section with necessary information to prepare the aviation support plan.

<sup>1</sup> A rating of “**partially satisfactory**” means that important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies exist in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

15. MINUSTAH did not develop an aviation support plan for fiscal years 2012/13 and 2013/14. This was because the Joint Logistics Operations Centre had not implemented a process to provide relevant, up-to-date information to the Aviation Section to prepare a plan. As a result, the MINUSTAH aviation support plan was based only on previous years' fleet composition and aircraft use reports. Nonetheless, in January 2014, the Director of Mission Support established a task force to review the adequacy of the configuration of the Mission's air fleet. The task force concluded that the MINUSTAH fleet lacked: appropriate search and rescue aircraft, the capacity for mass casualty evacuation, and the ability to rapidly deploy troops in the Mission area. For example, the current military aircraft capacity of 42 passengers could not meet an essential military requirement to deploy a quick reaction force of two platoons composed of 60 to 80 troops. The study recommended the reconfiguration of the Mission fleet by replacing the six military aircraft with a combined capacity of 42 passengers with three higher capacity aircraft, which would raise the combined capacity to 66 passengers. The fleet reconfiguration would address capacity gaps and result in efficiency gains estimated at \$1.8 million per year.

16. Despite the above initiative, MINUSTAH needed to develop and update the aviation support plan for annual budgetary purposes to ensure that aviation requirements are adequately budgeted.

**(1) MINUSTAH should implement a process to ensure that the Joint Logistics Operations Centre provides necessary information to the Aviation Section on aviation support requirements to develop and regularly update the aviation support plan.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the draft of the Mission support plan in which the aviation support plan for fiscal year 2015/16 was embedded was being finalized. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of a copy of the Mission support plan and the aviation support plan for fiscal year 2015/16.*

**(2) MINUSTAH should seek the approval of DFS to reconfigure the Mission's air fleet to address capacity gaps and meet its operational requirements.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 2 and stated that discussions with United Nations Headquarters on the reconfiguration of the Mission's fleet to address capacity gaps were ongoing. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing the review and/or approval by DFS of the recommended reconfiguration of the Mission's air fleet.*

Special flights conducted were justified and approved

17. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual required that all requests for special flights were approved. A review of 60 out of 637 special flights requests indicated that these flights were approved by the Force Commander and Chief Aviation Section and that they were undertaken in support of mandated activities. OIOS concluded that adequate controls for approving special flights were in place and working effectively.

All flights were recorded completely and accurately

18. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual required the mission to record and collate statistical flight information and submit a monthly summary report to the Air Transport Section, DFS. A sample of 40 out of 6,914 aircraft use reports for flights conducted during 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2013 indicated that the Aviation Section accurately recorded relevant aviation information such as hours flown, crew details and number of cargo and passengers. In addition, the MINUSTAH master plan that was used to process relevant aviation information for the monthly reports submitted to the Air Transport Section, DFS was

updated on a timely basis and access to the database was appropriately restricted. OIOS concluded that controls over the recording of all flights were adequate and operating effectively.

Flight following procedures were adequate

19. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual required MINUSTAH to maintain flight following logs indicating communication between the mission aircraft and the flight following unit with details such as take-off and landing time, flight purpose, and mandatory reporting of aircraft positions every 15 minutes. Further, the Manual required three staff per shift to man the flight following cell. A review of the Mission Air Operations Centre records and 80 out of 6,914 flights conducted from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2013 indicated that the flight following cell was properly manned and the required flight following documentation was maintained. OIOS concluded that flight following procedures were adequate and operating effectively.

Air operations equipment needed to be rationalized

20. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual required certain equipment to be available for the radio room such as VHF and HF radios, telephone lines, a fax machine and computers.

21. An inspection of equipment in Port-au-Prince and Les Cayes showed that the radio rooms were properly equipped. However, a mobile control tower at Port-au-Prince air terminal costing \$339,364 had not been working since 2010 due to a fault with the fixed radio and the air conditioning system. The mobile control tower was received from the United Nations Global Service Centre following the earthquake of January 2010 and was never used. MINUSTAH advised that the tower was redundant. At Les Cayes air terminal, OIOS observed that there were only four landing lights for night vision operations against the requirement of seven. The Aviation Section explained that the shortage was due to delays in the procurement process. In addition, an X-ray machine was out of service.

**(3) MINUSTAH should take action to ensure that: (a) all necessary equipment are available and in good working condition in each terminal; and (b) appropriate action is taken to dispose of the redundant mobile control tower.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it had installed the night vision lights in Les Cayes and repaired the X-ray machine. The Mission was proceeding with the write off and disposal of the redundant mobile control tower. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing completion of disposal action for the redundant mobile control tower.*

Aircraft maintenance needed improvement

22. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual required military aircraft provided under an LOA to meet the contributing country's operating standards and comply with the terms and conditions of the LOA. The Manual also required the Aviation Section to ensure that air operators performed the agreed maintenance of aircraft. For the two governments providing aircraft under an LOA, the terms with one government required that at least three of the four helicopters be ready for mission while the LOA with the other government required that at least one of the two helicopters be always ready for air missions.

23. MINUSTAH had implemented procedures to monitor compliance with the terms of the two LOAs with regard to key provisions such as service levels, aircraft capacity and flight times. Also, the Aviation Section maintained up-to-date copies of applicable operating and technical manuals.

24. A sample of 8 out of 30 regular maintenance procedures performed during the audit period indicated that contractors maintained their aircraft in accordance with requirements. However, a sample of serviceability reports for the period January to December 2013 showed that the required number of aircraft provided by both governments were not mission-ready for 64 days (for one troop-contributing country) and 11 days (for the other troop-contributing country). MINUSTAH attributed the problem to delays in the supply of spare parts for unscheduled maintenance by the respective governments. MINUSTAH had informed DFS of the recurring non-serviceability in the case of one government's helicopters and verbally raised the issue with the other contingent. The governments were not paid for the period the aircraft were out of service.

**(4) MINUSTAH, in coordination with DFS, should take steps to address the serviceability of some aircraft contracted under letters of assist with governments.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it had written to DFS to address the aircraft serviceability issues with the two governments. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence of resolution of the serviceability of aircraft contracted under LOAs with the two governments.*

Issues identified in emergency drills were not resolved in a timely manner

25. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Safety Manual required that a full aviation safety drill be conducted yearly and the results used to update the Aviation Emergency Response Plan (AERP). The Mission Aviation Safety Council was required to coordinate the revision of the AERP with necessary changes and then submit it to the Mission Aviation Safety Officer for reproduction and distribution to the Mission.

26. MINUSTAH had an AERP, but had not updated it to incorporate lessons learned from drills conducted. For example, the 2012 drill report identified the need for emergency kits to be stored in an accessible location at Mission Headquarters in Port-au-Prince and the Joint Logistic Operation Centre to communicate details of kits to the Movement Control Section in advance. However, the AERP had not been updated to reflect these requirements. For 2013, the drill report was not available for OIOS verification; the Aviation Section explained that a full drill was conducted but a report was not prepared.

**(5) MINUSTAH should establish a mechanism to ensure that recommendations from aviation emergency drills are implemented and that documentation of such drills is properly maintained.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 5 and stated that it documented emergency drills recommendations and monitored implementation through a tracking sheet. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of the tracking sheet evidencing follow-up of recommendations from drills conducted.*

Operational risk management procedures needed improvement

27. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Safety Manual required missions to implement mission-specific standard operating procedures on operational risk management (ORM) by establishing task groups to conduct aviation risk reviews within prescribed time frames.

28. MINUSTAH conducted aviation risk reviews in May 2012 and developed mission-specific ORM standard operating procedures in May 2013. However, a review of ORM implementation reports prepared by the Mission indicated that certain areas of the aviation programme were not included in the aviation risk review including aircraft capabilities and equipment, air field infrastructure, and cargo and

passenger management. In addition, since 2012 MINUSTAH had not conducted follow-up risk reviews to incorporate changes in the operating environment. This was due to the Mission's failure to include the frequency of such reviews in the ORM standard operating procedures. There was a risk that the ORM standard operating procedures were not adequate to cover all aviation risk areas and changes in the operating environment.

**(6) MINUSTAH should implement a plan to: (a) revise the Mission's operational risk management standard operating procedures to include procedures for and frequency of reviewing aviation risks; and (b) ensure that the implementation of operational risk management covers all the required aviation areas in its review of aviation risks.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 6 and stated that it was in the process of updating the standard operating procedures in line with guidance received from United Nations Headquarters. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MINUSTAH has revised its ORM standard operating procedures to include frequency of risk reviews and that the risk review task group is reviewing all areas of the aviation programme as part of ORM.*

#### Access controls to air terminals were adequate

29. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual required missions to implement vehicle and passenger access controls at Mission air terminals. A review of access procedures at Port-au-Prince and Les Cayes air terminals showed that access controls were adequate. Authorized officials had special access badges, only authorized vehicles were granted access, gates were guarded and passengers were issued with boarding passes and escorted by a movement control official to the boarding area.

#### Functioning of the Mission Aviation Safety Council needed improvement

30. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Safety Manual required the Director of Mission Support to establish a Mission Aviation Safety Council, responsible for reviewing the effectiveness of the aviation safety programme, identifying safety issues, reviewing air accidents/incidents/hazards and inspection reports and recommending corrective actions.

31. The Mission Aviation Safety Council was properly constituted and the terms of reference were in line with the DPKO/DFS Aviation Safety Manual. However, minutes of all six meetings conducted during the audit period indicated that the Council did not discuss, follow up and resolve safety issues. For example three recommendations made by the Aviation Safety Unit, DFS were outstanding since 2012, which included two recommendations related to improving guidance for conducting night operations and one recommendation for improving weather forecasting by hiring an Aviation Meteorological Officer. Additionally, MINUSTAH did not implement an adequate system to systematically resolve safety issues arising from the Council's meetings. This resulted, as minutes of the Council did not indicate time frame to resolve identified issues.

**(7) MINUSTAH should take steps to ensure that the Mission Aviation Safety Council systematically follows up on air safety recommendations, including those raised by technical assessment teams.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 7 and stated that it would ensure systematic follow-up of safety recommendations including those raised by technical assessment teams. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation of a system to follow up on air safety recommendations.*



Vacancies in key positions impacted the work of the Aviation Section

32. As of July 2014, three out of 26 authorized posts of the Aviation Section including the Chief Aviation Officer (P-4) and the Chief of Air Operations Centre (P-3) were vacant. Since March 2013, a Technical Compliance Officer at the P-3 level was acting as the Chief Aviation Officer; and a military officer was acting as the Chief of the Air Operations Centre. The vacancies had adversely affected the work of the Aviation Section. For example, because one of the two Technical Compliance and Quality Assurance Officers was acting as the Chief Aviation Officer, the technical compliance and quality assurance function was not performed adequately. For instance, during the period from October 2012 to December 2013 the Technical Compliance and Quality Assurance Unit had only inspected 3 of the 103 helicopter landing sites, did not review data entry into the aviation database and did not have the resources to prepare minutes for daily operations briefing with aviation staff and contractors' crew. As at July 2014, the recruitment process for the vacant posts was ongoing.

**(8) MINUSTAH should expedite the recruitment for the vacant positions in the Aviation Section to ensure that functions are effectively and fully performed.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 8 and stated that it was in the process of filling the remaining two vacant posts. Recommendation 8 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MINUSTAH has completed recruitment for all the vacant posts in the Aviation Section.*

Contractors' performance evaluations were regularly performed

33. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual required missions to periodically evaluate contractors' performance and submit the evaluation reports to the Air Transport Section, DFS. A review of all contractors' performance evaluations in the audit period showed that the Mission properly conducted contractors' performance evaluations.

Terms of a medical evacuation contract were not fully enforced

34. The MINUSTAH medical evacuation and aviation standard operating procedures required the Chief Aviation Officer to maintain and ensure operational readiness of aircraft for medical evacuations.

35. In September 2013, MINUSTAH engaged a vendor to provide medical evacuation services to a medical hospital in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic or to any other approved medical facility outside Haiti for a period of six months with a not-to-exceed amount of \$439,100, with possibility to extend the contract for another six months. Three of the five medical evacuations conducted for the period September to December 2013 were done using a slower rotary wing aircraft instead of a fixed-wing aircraft that was contracted for. The aircraft was also not pre-inspected by the Mission as required in the contract terms.

36. The medical evacuation contract was managed by the Medical Unit with the support of the Aviation Section. MINUSTAH advised that the non-compliance was communicated to the vendor including the implications of using a slower aircraft. In March 2014, MINUSTAH extended the vendor's contract up to September 2014 and initiated a procurement exercise for a new contract. As at June 2014, the procurement process was ongoing and the Mission had already submitted a draft statement of work to the Procurement Division in New York for review.

**(9) MINUSTAH should monitor and enforce compliance with all terms of the contract to ensure effective medical evacuations of staff.**

*MINUSTAH accepted recommendation 9 and stated that Headquarters had reminded the vendor in December 2013 to comply with the terms of the contract as regards the type of aircraft to be used for medical evacuations. In January 2014, the Mission followed up with a coordination meeting with the vendor and since then there had been no further cases of non-compliance. Based on actions taken by the Mission, recommendation 9 has been closed.*

#### **IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

37. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the Management and staff of MINUSTAH for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) David Kanja  
Assistant Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

## Audit of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	C/ O <sup>3</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>4</sup>
1	MINUSTAH should implement a process to ensure that the Joint Logistics Operations Centre provides necessary information to the Aviation Section on aviation support requirements to develop and regularly update the aviation support plan.	Important	O	Receipt of a copy of the Mission support plan and the aviation support plan for fiscal year 2015/16	31 August 2014
2	MINUSTAH should seek the approval of DFS to support to reconfigure the Mission's air fleet to address capacity gaps and meet its operational requirements.	Important	O	Receipt of documentation showing the review and/or approval by DFS of the recommended reconfiguration of the Mission's air fleet	31 December 2014
3	MINUSTAH should take action to ensure that: (a) all necessary equipment are available and in good working condition in each terminal; and (b) appropriate action is taken to dispose of the redundant mobile control tower.	Important	O	Receipt of documentation showing completion of disposal action for the redundant mobile control tower	31 December 2014
4	MINUSTAH, in coordination with DFS, should take steps to address the serviceability of some aircraft contracted under letters of assist with governments.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of resolution of the serviceability of aircraft contracted under LOAs with the two governments	31 August 2014
5	MINUSTAH should establish a mechanism to ensure that recommendations from aviation emergency drills are implemented and that documentation of such drills is properly maintained.	Important	O	Receipt of the tracking sheet evidencing follow-up of recommendations from drills conducted	31 August 2014

<sup>1</sup> Critical recommendations address significant and/or pervasive deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>2</sup> Important recommendations address important deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>3</sup> C = closed, O = open

<sup>4</sup> Date provided by MINUSTAH in response to recommendations.

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

## Audit of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti


Recom. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	C/ O <sup>3</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>4</sup>
6	MINUSTAH should implement a plan to: (a) revise the Mission's operational risk management standard operating procedures to include procedures for and frequency of reviewing aviation risks; and (b) ensure that the implementation of operational risk management covers all the required aviation areas in its review of aviation risks.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that MINUSTAH has revised its operational risk management standard operating procedures to include frequency of risk reviews and that the risk review task group is reviewing all areas of the aviation programme as part of the operational risk management	31 December 2014
7	MINUSTAH should take steps to ensure that the Mission Aviation Safety Council systematically follows up on air safety recommendations, including those raised by technical assessment teams.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of implementation of a system to follow up on air safety recommendations	31 December 2014
8	MINUSTAH should expedite the recruitment for the vacant positions in the Aviation Section to ensure that functions are effectively and fully performed.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that MINUSTAH has completed recruitment for all the vacant posts in the Aviation Section	31 December 2014
9	MINUSTAH should monitor and enforce compliance with all terms of the contract to ensure effective medical evacuations of staff.	Important	C	Action taken	Implemented

# **APPENDIX I**

## **Management Response**





TELEFAX TRANSMISSION

Outgoing fax msg no: <b>bms/14/OF/394</b>	Page 1 of 4
To: Ms. Eleanor T. Burns Chief, Peacekeeping Audit Service, IAD, OIOS, UNHQ, NY	From: Sandra Honoré Special Representative of the Secretary-General MINUSTAH 
Fax no: 3-3388 (via email)	Fax no: 7-9080
Info: Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo IAD, OIOS, UNHQ, NY Mr. Iswari Bhattarai ( <a href="mailto:bhattarai2@un.org">bhattarai2@un.org</a> )	Date: 19 August 2014
	Ref: IAD: 13-683/08
Subject: <b>Assignment No AP2013/683/08 – Audit of Air Operations in MINUSTAH</b>	

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 01 August 2014 on the above mentioned subject, under cover of which you forwarded the OIOS Draft Report relating to the effective management of air operations in MINUSTAH.
2. Please find attached MINUSTAH's comments on the recommendations as requested.

Best regards.

Drafted by: K Zillner, AA O/DDMS 	Cleared by: B. Gueye, OIC ISS 
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## Management Response

## Audit of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	MINUSTAH should implement a process to ensure that the Joint Logistics Operations Centre provides necessary information to the Aviation Section on aviation support requirements to develop and regularly update the aviation support plan.	Important	Yes	Chief JLOC	31 Aug 2014	The draft of the Mission Support Plan in which the Aviation support plan for the 2015/16 budget period is embedded, is currently being finalized.
2	MINUSTAH should seek the approval of the Department of Field Support to reconfigure the Mission's air fleet to address capacity gaps and meet its operational requirements.	Important	Yes	Aviation Section/ISS Office	31 Dec 2014	Discussions between United Nations Headquarters and MINUSTAH on the reconfiguration of the Mission's air fleet in order to address capacity gaps are ongoing.
3	MINUSTAH should take action to ensure that: (a) all necessary equipment are available and in good working condition in each terminal; and (b) appropriate action is taken to dispose of the redundant mobile control tower.	Important	Yes	Aviation Section/Aviation Security	31 Dec 2014	a) The night vision lights in Les Cayes have been installed and are fully operational while the X-ray machine has since been repaired and is also fully operational. b) The Mission is proceeding with the necessary write off and disposal action of the redundant mobile control tower.
4	MINUSTAH, in coordination with DFS, should take steps to address the serviceability of some aircraft contracted under letters of assist with governments.	Important	Yes	Aviation Section/ISS Office	31 Aug 2014	The subject of aircraft serviceability has been raised through official correspondence to United Nations Headquarters to ensure that these issues are addressed directly with the respective governments providing

<sup>1</sup> Critical recommendations address significant and/or pervasive deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>2</sup> Important recommendations address important deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

APPENDIX I

Management Response

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						the aircraft under Letters of Assist (LOA). The Mission is closely monitoring the situation and will immediately seek assistance from United Nations Headquarters to address any future recurrence of aircraft unserviceability.
5	MINUSTAH should establish a mechanism to ensure that recommendations from aviation emergency drills are implemented and that documentation of such drills is properly maintained.	Important	Yes	Aviation Safety	31 Aug 2014	Recommendations arising from Aviation Emergency Drills are duly documented in a report immediately following the drill. The Mission monitors the implementation of the recommendations using a tracking sheet, the records of which are kept on file.
6	MINUSTAH should implement a plan to: (a) revise the Mission operational risk management standard operating procedures to include procedures for and frequency of reviewing aviation risks; and (b) ensure that the implementation of operational risk management covers all the required aviation areas in its review of aviation risks.	Important	Yes	Aviation Safety	31 Dec 2014	Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) are being developed in line with new guidance recently received from United Nations Headquarters on Aviation Risk Management. The first draft of the SOP should be concluded by October 2014.
7	MINUSTAH should take steps to ensure that the Mission Aviation Safety Council systematically follows up on air safety recommendations, including those raised by technical assessment teams.	Important	Yes	Aviation Safety	31 Dec 2014	MINUSTAH will ensure the systematic follow up of air safety recommendations including those raised by technical assessment teams.
8	MINUSTAH should expedite the recruitment for the vacant positions in the Aviation Section to ensure that functions	Important	Yes	Aviation Section/ISS Office	31 Dec. 2014	Three of the five vacancies have since been filled. Steps are being taken to temporarily fill another



## Management Response

## Audit of air operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
	are effectively and fully performed.					vacant post, pending the completion of the recruitment process.
9	MINUSTAH should monitor and enforce compliance with all terms of the contract to ensure effective medical evacuations of staff.	Important	Yes	Aviation Section/Medical Section	31 August 2014	In December 2013, United Nations Headquarters reminded the vendor via email of its contractual obligations to ensure strict compliance with the terms of the contract with regards to the type of aircraft to be used for medical evacuations. The Mission followed up with a coordination meeting with the vendor in January 2014 to reinforce compliance. Since then, no other incidents have been reported.