

**INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION** 

### **REPORT 2015/140**

Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Overall results relating to the effective management of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were initially assessed as partially satisfactory. Implementation of five important recommendations remains in progress

FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY

13 November 2015 Assignment No. AP2014/620/04

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### AUDIT REPORT

### Audit of the conduct discipline function in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

### I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

2. In accordance with its mandate, OIOS provides assurance and advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the United Nations internal control system, the primary objectives of which are to ensure (a) efficient and effective operations; (b) accurate financial and operational reporting; (c) safeguarding of assets; and (d) compliance with mandates, regulations and rules.

3. The Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) in MONUSCO is responsible for receiving, assessing and referring allegations of misconduct to appropriate investigative bodies of the United Nations and Member States. CDT is also the principal advisor to the Head of Mission on conduct and discipline issues and is responsible for providing: (a) policy guidance and technical advice; (b) assistance in developing preventive strategies for responding to personnel misconduct; and (c) dissemination of United Nations guidelines, policies and procedures on conduct and discipline.

4. CDT is headed by a Chief at the P-5 level who reports to the Mission Chief of Staff and has an authorized staffing level of 20 including 14 international staff and 6 national staff. The 2013/14 and 2014/15 budgets for CDT were \$1.5 million and \$1.4 million respectively.

5. Comments provided by MONUSCO are incorporated in italics.

### **II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE**

6. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of MONUSCO governance, risk management and control processes in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of the conduct and discipline function in MONUSCO**.

7. The audit was included in the 2014 risk-based work plan of OIOS because of risks relating to the management of conduct and discipline activities by CDT.

8. The key control tested for the audit was regulatory framework. For the purpose of this audit, OIOS defined this key control as the one that provides reasonable assurance that policies and procedures: (a) exist to guide conduct and discipline activities in MONUSCO; (b) are implemented consistently; and (c) ensure the reliability and integrity of financial and operational information.

9. The key control was assessed for the control objectives shown in Table 1.

10. OIOS conducted this audit from April to July 2015. The audit covered the period from July 2013 to March 2015.

11. OIOS conducted an activity-level risk assessment to identify and assess specific risk exposures, and to confirm the relevance of the selected key control in mitigating associated risks. Through interviews and analytical reviews, OIOS assessed the existence and adequacy of internal controls and conducted necessary tests to determine their effectiveness.

### **III. AUDIT RESULTS**

12. The MONUSCO governance, risk management and control processes examined were initially assessed as **partially satisfactory**<sup>1</sup> in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of the conduct and discipline function in MONUSCO**. OIOS made five recommendations to address the issues identified. MONUSCO adequately assessed, classified and referred allegations of misconduct and submitted monthly and quarterly reports on conduct and discipline activities to the Department of Field Support (DFS). However, MONUSCO needed to: (a) develop a monitoring mechanism to ensure that all personnel receive regular training on conduct and discipline matters; (b) update its public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse; (c) implement a detailed timetable for the implementation of risk assessment visits to various Mission locations; (d) align its procedures on the follow-up of investigations with the requirements of the DFS Advisory on conduct and discipline; and (e) allocate adequate resources to develop the investigative capacity of the Special Investigations Unit.

13. The initial overall rating was based on the assessment of key control presented in Table 1. The final overall rating is **partially satisfactory** as implementation of five important recommendations remains in progress.

|  |                         | Control objectives                       |   |                           |   |  |  |  |
|--|-------------------------|--|---|---------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| Business objective   | Key control             | Efficient and<br>effective<br>operations | Accurate<br>financial and<br>operational<br>reporting | Safeguarding<br>of assets | Compliance<br>with<br>mandates,<br>regulations<br>and rules |  |  |  |
| Effective management of<br>the conduct and discipline<br>function in MONUSCO | Regulatory<br>framework | Partially<br>satisfactory                | Partially<br>satisfactory                             | Partially<br>satisfactory | Partially<br>satisfactory                                   |  |  |  |
| FINAL OVERALL RATING: PARTIALLY SATISFACTORY                                 |                         |  |   |                           |   |  |  |  |

 Table 1:Assessment of key control

### **Regulatory framework**

Need to monitor training activities related to conduct and discipline

14. The DFS Advisory on conduct and discipline in field missions (DFS Advisory) requires CDT to ensure that all United Nations personnel receive induction training and refresher courses on conduct and discipline issues, including prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A rating of "**partially satisfactory**" means that important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies exist in governance, risk management or control process, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

15. A review of training records for the period from July 2013 to March 2015 indicated that there were no records to support that 39,361 (84 per cent) of the 47,214 uniformed and civilian personnel participated in conduct and discipline induction and refresher training. This resulted due to the absence of a monitoring mechanism to ensure that training sessions were provided to and attended by all staff. CDT also did not have a mechanism in place to follow up and ensure military trainers that had been trained by CDT delivered training sessions to their respective contingents. As a result, there was a risk of increased cases of misconduct, as civilians and uniformed personnel may not be fully aware of the United Nations policy against sexual exploitation and abuse and prohibited conduct.

# (1) MONUSCO should: (a) identify all civilian and military staff that have not participated in conduct and discipline training and ensure adequate training is provided and; (b) develop a monitoring mechanism to ensure that all civilian and uniformed personnel are regularly trained.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 1 and stated that it would: review its training strategy; ensure that all newly recruited and deployed personnel were trained; and monitor the training process on a monthly basis. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has identified untrained staff, provided them with training on conduct and discipline, and developed a monitoring mechanism to ensure that all civilian and uniformed personnel are regularly trained.

Need to update the Mission's public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse to guide outreach activities

16. The DFS Advisory requires CDT, in collaboration with the MONUSCO Public Information Office, to implement outreach activities for the host population to raise awareness on issues related to conduct and discipline and to evaluate and assess the impact of such activities.

17. A review of outreach activities for the period from July 2013 to March 2015 and discussion with CDT and public information staff indicated that CDT did not conduct outreach activities to local communities in 67 out of the 81 Mission locations. Additionally, CDT and the Public Information Office did not evaluate and assess the impact of outreach activities in the 14 locations where activities were conducted.

18. The low coverage of outreach activities resulted as the Mission did not consider the use of radio broadcasts to reach broader audiences and it did not update its public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse in line with its reconfiguration of operations from the west to the east of the country. CDT also neither developed a schedule of planned visits to ensure that outreach activities were organized in all locations where MONUSCO personnel were deployed nor prioritized visits to high-risk locations. Inadequate outreach activities to local communities impacted on the Mission's ability to raise awareness of the host population on issues related to misconduct and sexual exploitation and abuse, including preventing and reporting misconduct cases.

(2) MONUCO should update its public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse in line with its reconfiguration, develop a plan for outreach activities (including the use of radio broadcasts) to Mission locations, monitor implementation and evaluate and assess the impact of its outreach campaigns.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 2 and stated that it would update its communication strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse in line with its reconfiguration and include the use of radio broadcasts. MONUSCO also stated that it would evaluate and assess the effectiveness of its *outreach campaigns.* Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has: updated its public information strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse; implemented a revised plan for outreach activities; and evaluated the effectiveness of its outreach campaigns.

#### Need for improved conduct and discipline related risk assessments at all MONUSCO locations

19. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to conduct regular assessments and monitor activities to identify risks of misconduct associated with different categories of United Nations personnel. The CDT 2013/14 and 2014/15 annual work plans require risk assessment visits to all locations where MONUSCO personnel are deployed.

20. A review of the risk assessment process, 30 assessment reports, two annual work plans, 15 monthly and quarterly reports on conduct and discipline, and interviews of CDT staff indicated that CDT: conducted 118 risk assessment visits at 43 out of 81 locations where MONUSCO had personnel; used the DFS risk assessment framework to identify and assess risks; and recommended actions to mitigate identified risks. However, CDT did not conduct risk assessment visits at the remaining 38 locations for over two years. This was because of: (a) inadequate planning by CDT; (b) insecurity in these locations; and (c) limited flights causing logistical constraints that were not within the control of CDT. As a result, there was an increased risk that activities and conditions that could lead to misconduct were not identified and appropriate preventative measures taken.

# (3) MONUCO should periodically prepare and implement a detailed timetable for visits to the various Mission locations, taking into consideration the availability of flights, for the identification and assessment of conduct and discipline related risks and implementation of appropriate mitigating measures.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it would review the list of locations to be visited in line with the approved budget. A detailed timetable would be developed for the assessment of those locations to assess the level of risks and mitigating measures. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of a detailed timetable of locations to be visited based on assessed risks and evidence that those locations have been visited.

MONUSCO established an adequate complaint reception mechanism

21. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to establish an efficient, safe, confidential, transparent and accessible complaint reception mechanism.

22. Physical inspection of the processing of allegations of misconduct in the Mission, and review of controls related to the Misconduct Tracking System indicated that the Mission provided CDT with private meeting rooms, telephone hotlines, and a secured email address for receiving and processing allegations. OIOS concluded that the Mission had put in place effective controls to ensure that there was an efficient, safe, confidential, transparent and accessible complaint reception mechanism.

## MONUSCO complied with the requirements for assessing, classifying, recording and referring allegations of misconduct

23. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to: (a) notify OIOS of all Category I cases as well as Category II cases involving staff at P-5 level and above; (b) refer cases of serious misconduct to OIOS within three days; (c) assess, classify and record other allegations within seven days; and (d) report delays and related reasons in assessing allegations to the Conduct and Discipline Unit. Category I include, for example: all

offences related to serious, complex fraud or criminal activity, sexual exploitation and abuse and gross mismanagement. Category II cases are those, for example, related to personnel matters, traffic related inquiries, simple thefts and prohibited conduct by staff.

24. A review of 30 out of 72 cases received and recorded in the Misconduct Tracking System during the audit period indicated that CDT correctly recorded, assessed, classified and referred the cases to the appropriate investigative body. CDT referred all cases of serious misconduct to OIOS as required and also provided adequate justifications for taking longer than seven days to assess, classify and record 13 (43 per cent) of the 30 cases reviewed. OIOS concluded that MONUSCO implemented adequate controls for recording, assessing, classifying and referring allegations of misconduct.

#### Need to follow up on investigations of cases referred to investigative bodies

25. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to follow-up on investigations: (a) every three months for allegations referred to MONUSCO Security Investigation Unit; (b) every six months for allegations referred to OIOS, except where such allegations relate to sexual exploitation and abuse, whereby follow-up should be after every three months; and (c) every six months for investigations conducted by Member States through DFS.

26. A review of CDT follow-up process and related communications as well as 30 out of 72 cases referred for investigation indicated that CDT did not comply with established follow-up timelines. CDT followed up with investigative bodies for selected cases based on its subjective determination of the significance of the case. This was because MONUSCO did not align its standard operating procedures on follow-up with the requirements of the DFS Advisory. As a result, there was a risk that cases could remain pending with the investigative bodies for long periods of time. Specifically, as of March 2015, the Mission had 66 pending allegations with permanent missions including 39 related to sexual exploitation and abuse.

## (4) MONUSCO should align its procedures on the follow-up of investigations with the requirements of the DFS Advisory on conduct and discipline.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it was performing quality assurance on the Misconduct Tracking System to ensure its accuracy and facilitate the monitoring and follow-up of cases with the DFS Conduct and Discipline Unit and other investigative agencies. An updated status of pending cases would be provided quarterly. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has aligned it procedures on the follow-up on investigations with the requirements of the DFS Advisory.

#### The Mission submitted monthly and quarterly reports on conduct and discipline activities

27. The DFS Advisory and the accountability framework and reporting requirements require CDT to prepare and submit monthly/quarterly reports on its conduct and discipline activities to DFS with copies to the Head of the Mission. The monthly and quarterly reports should include: new allegations received; the time taken to assess such allegations; actions taken in response to each allegation; and pending cases, training and outreach activities.

28. A review of reporting by CDT from the period July 2013 to March 2015 indicated that CDT prepared and submitted to DFS and MONUSCO senior management all required monthly and quarterly reports. OIOS concluded that CDT implemented adequate controls over reporting on its conduct and discipline activities.

#### Need for adequate resources to develop the capacity of the Special Investigations Unit

29. The DFS Advisory and the General Assembly resolution on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Nations require MONUSCO to have adequate investigative capacity to handle cases that do not fall within the purview of OIOS or Member States. The Special Investigations Unit of the Mission's Security Section is responsible for investigating such cases.

30. Review of all the 15 CDT reports on conduct and discipline from July 2013 to March 2015 and interviews with the staff of CDT and the Special Investigations Unit indicated that: (a) the Unit did not have the resources to conduct investigations that required forensic analysis of evidence; and (b) staff did not have the experience or the training needed to conduct complex investigations. The above resulted as MONUSCO did not allocate adequate resources to the Special Investigations Unit. As a result, the Mission did not always dispose of misconduct cases in a timely manner. For example, 22 cases had been pending with the Special Investigations Unit for an average of four years. Further, DFS and the Office of Human Resources Management routinely rejected reports prepared by the Unit because these reports were considered as not meeting the minimum standards of evidence.

## (5) MONUSCO should allocate adequate resources to develop the investigative capacity of its Special Investigations Unit.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the Security Section had taken steps to develop the investigative capacity of the Special Investigations Unit. Action had been taken to recruit four security assistants. The Section was also reprogramming some posts in order to recruit additional national and international staff with strong investigation backgrounds. CDT would also seek additional resources through external partners to strengthen the Mission investigative capacity, which would include specialized capacity building of the current investigators with a deployment of trained investigators. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has allocated sufficient resources to develop the investigative capacity of the Special Investigations Unit.

The Conduct and Discipline Team participated in the implementation of the victim assistance mechanism

31. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to: (a) participate in the network of the United Nations Country Team in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to implement a victim assistance mechanism as part of the Organization's strategy on remedial actions to address misconduct; and (b) maintain up-to-date mapping of services and assistance (e.g. medical care, legal, psychosocial and social support) available for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse.

32. A review of CDT activities indicated that CDT: (a) participated in the network of the Country Team; (b) provided training to United Nations agencies on their role related to victim assistance activities; and (c) developed a mapping of assistance and support services available to victims. A recent OIOS inspection and evaluation report (IED-15-001) dated 12 June 2015 highlighted that all 15 victims recorded by the Mission had been referred to mapped services. However, full implementation of the Organization's strategy on remedial actions to address misconduct had been slow and ineffective mainly due to a lack of funding and reliance on local service providers. To deal with this systemic issue, OIOS Inspection and Evaluation Division recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/DFS propose a funded comprehensive strategy to provide appropriate assistance and support to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. Based on this, no recommendation was made in this report.

### **IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

33. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MONUSCO for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

*(Signed)* David Kanja Assistant Secretary-General, Acting Head Office of Internal Oversight Services

#### STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

| Recom.<br>no. | Recommendation  | Critical <sup>1</sup> /<br>Important <sup>2</sup> | C/<br>O <sup>3</sup> | Actions needed to close recommendation   | Implementation<br>date <sup>4</sup> |
|---------------|---|---|----------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| 1             | MONUSCO should: (a) identify all civilian and<br>military staff that have not participated in related<br>training on conduct and discipline and provide<br>them with relevant training and; (b) develop a<br>monitoring mechanism to ensure that all civilian<br>and uniformed personnel are regularly trained.                         | Important   | 0                    | Receipt of evidence that MONSUCO has<br>identified untrained staff, provided them with<br>training on conduct and discipline, and<br>developed a monitoring mechanism to ensure<br>that all civilian and uniformed personnel are<br>regularly trained. | 28 February 2016                    |
| 2             | MONUSCO should update its public information<br>strategy on sexual exploitation and abuse in line<br>with its reconfiguration, develop a plan for<br>outreach activities (including the use of radio<br>broadcasts) to mission locations, monitoring<br>implementation and evaluate and assess the impact<br>of its outreach campaigns. | Important   | 0                    | Receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has:<br>updated its public information strategy on sexual<br>exploitation and abuse; implemented a revised<br>plan for outreach activities; and evaluated the<br>effectiveness of its outreach campaigns.             | 31 December 2015                    |
| 3             | MONUSCO should periodically prepare and<br>implement a detailed timetable for visits to the<br>various Mission locations taking into consideration<br>the availability of flights, for the identification and<br>assessment of conduct and discipline related risks<br>and implementation of appropriate mitigating<br>measures.        | Important   | 0                    | Receipt of a copy of the detailed timetable of<br>locations to be visited based on assessed risks<br>and evidence that those locations have been<br>visited.   | 30 March 2016                       |
| 4             | MONUSCO should align its procedures on the follow-up of investigations with the requirements of the DFS Advisory on conduct and discipline.   | Important   | 0                    | Receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has<br>aligned its procedures on the follow-up on<br>investigations with those of the DFS Advisory.   | 30 March 2016                       |
| 5             | MONUSCO should allocate adequate resources to<br>develop the investigative capacity of its Special<br>Investigations Unit.  | Important   | 0                    | Receipt of evidence that MONUSCO allocated<br>sufficient resources to develop the investigative<br>capacity of the Special Investigations Unit.  | 30 September 2016                   |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$  C = closed, O = open

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Date provided by MONUSCO in response to recommendations.

# **APPENDIX I**

# **Management Response**

|         | Mission de l'Organisation d<br>pour la Stabilisation en Rép<br>démocratique du Congo |           | 12, Avenue des Aviateurs - Gombe<br>Kinshasa, RD Congo - BP 8811 |
|---------|--|-----------|--|
| MONUSCO | United Nations Organisatio<br>Mission in the Democratic F                            |           | Tél. +243 81 890 5000<br>+243 81 890 6000                        |
| PRC     | TECT   | STABILIZE | CONSOLIDATE PEACE  |

#### **INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM**

11 November 2015 Ref. ODMS/15/OM/04051

- To: Ms. Eleanor T. Burns, Director Internal Audit Division Office of Internal Oversight Services
- From: Mr. Guy Siri Director of Mission Support MONUSCO

#### Subject: Mission Response to Draft Audit Report on conduct and discipline functions in MONUSCO (Assignment No. AP2014/620/04)

1. Thank you for your interoffice memorandum reference IAD-15-23 dated 29 October forwarding the subject audit report.

2. Attached please find the Mission response in respect of the recommendations in the report. Supporting documents will be provided to the Resident Audit Team only.

Kind regards.

Cc Mr. Cheick Conde, Deputy Chief of Staff, MONUSCO
 Mr. Ian Sinclair, Mission Chief of Staff, MONUSCO
 Mr. Bolton Tarleh Nyema, Chief, Peacekeeping Audit Service, IAD, OIOS
 Ms. Adama Ndao, Chief, Conduct and Discipline Team, MONUSCO
 Ms. Judith Atiagaga, Audit Focal Point, MONUSCO
 Ms. Kerry Zillner, Audit Focal Point, MONUSCO
 Mr. James Okwakol, Chief Resident Auditor for MONUSCO, IAD, OIOS
 Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo, Professional Practices Section, Internal Audit Division, OIOS

Attachment: Appendix I - Management Response

#### Peace it!

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| Rec.<br>no. | Recommendation  | Critical <sup>1</sup> /<br>Important <sup>2</sup> | Accepted?<br>(Yes/No) | Title of<br>responsible<br>individual | Implementation<br>date | Client comments  |
|-------------|---|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|--|
| 1           | MONUSCO should: (i) identify all<br>civilian and military staffs that have not<br>participated in related training on conduct<br>and discipline and provide them with<br>relevant training and; (ii) develop a<br>monitoring mechanism to ensure that all<br>civilian and uniformed personnel are<br>regularly trained. | Important   | Yes                   | Training<br>Officer                   | 28 February 2016       | i) The Mission will review its<br>training strategy to ensure that (1)<br>FCDTs in coordination with the<br>Brigade Force Provost are provided<br>with the training returns from the<br>Unit Commanders. To that effect the<br>accountability of the Brigade and<br>Unit commanders will be enforced.<br>(2) CDT will coordinate with<br>substantive sections managing<br>experts on mission and Government<br>Provided Personnel (GPPs) to review<br>their check in process to ensure that<br>all personnel from this categories are<br>provided with mandatory training for<br>the protection against SEA (3) IMTC<br>in coordination FCDTs, will develop<br>a strategy to ensure that all newly<br>recruited National staff members are<br>provided with the mandatory briefing<br>on the protection against SEA (4) The<br>FCDTs in coordination with the Field<br>Administrative Officers (FAO) under<br>the supervision of the Heads of Fields<br>Offices will ensure that all local and<br>international contractors employees<br>deployed in the Area of Operation |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

| Rec.<br>no. | Recommendation  | Critical <sup>1</sup> /<br>Important <sup>2</sup> | Accepted?<br>(Yes/No) | Title of<br>responsible<br>individual       | Implementation<br>date | Client comments   |
|-------------|---|---|-----------------------|---|------------------------|---|
|             |   |   |                       |   |                        | will be provided with the relevant<br>mandatory Conduct and Discipline<br>including the SEA training. CDT will<br>ensure that all newly recruited and<br>deployed personnel are traced and<br>will monitor the training process in a<br>monthly basis. Attendance lists will<br>be uploaded in the designated files<br>and available to OIOS/audit as<br>relevant.  |
| 2           | MONUSCO should update its public<br>information strategy on sexual<br>exploitation and abuse in line with its<br>reconfiguration, develop a plan for<br>outreach activities (including the use of<br>radio broadcasts) to mission locations,<br>monitoring implementation and evaluate<br>and assess the impact of its outreach<br>campaigns. | Important   | YES                   | Mission SEA<br>Focal Point<br>/PID          | 31/12/2015             | MONUSCO will update its<br>"communications strategy" dated<br>2007 on sexual exploitation and abuse<br>in line with its reconfiguration and<br>including the use of radio broadcasts.<br>The updated strategy will be<br>immediately implemented and will<br>include an evaluation timeline of six<br>(06) months after its implementation<br>in coordination with PID.<br>The Field offices will be briefed on<br>the strategy and role that they would<br>play in its implementation. The use of<br>the local community radios and social<br>media will be redesigned and<br>reconfigured to ensure that relevant<br>and accurate information is provided<br>to visitors. |
| 3           | MONUSCO should periodically prepare<br>and implement a detailed timetable for<br>visits to the various Mission locations  | Important   | YES                   | Field Conduct<br>and Discipline<br>Officers | 30 /03/2016            | Taking into account the<br>reconfiguration and newly created<br>locations where staffs and troops are   |

| Rec.<br>no. | Recommendation  | Critical <sup>1</sup> /<br>Important <sup>2</sup> | Accepted?<br>(Yes/No) | Title of<br>responsible<br>individual | Implementation<br>date | Client comments   |
|-------------|---|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|---|
|             | taking into consideration the availability<br>of flights, for the identification and<br>assessment of conduct and discipline<br>related risks and implementation of<br>appropriate mitigating measures. |   |                       |                                       |                        | deployed (Island of Stabilities, Force<br>Intervention Brigade) CDT will<br>review the list of locations to be<br>visited in line with approved budget.<br>A detailed timetable will be<br>developed for the assessment of those<br>locations so as to determine if the<br>level of the risks and advise<br>accordingly. It should be noted that<br>the timetable may affected by<br>unforeseen factors linked the weather<br>and security conditions that will allow<br>staffs to travel to those locations. |
| 4           | MONUSCO should align its procedures<br>on the follow-up of investigations with the<br>requirements of the Department of Field<br>Support Advisory on conduct and<br>discipline.                         | Important   | YES                   | Chief CDT                             | 30/03/2016             | A quality assurance on MTS is<br>underway to be completed by 31<br>December 2015. This will ensure<br>accuracy of the MTS database and<br>facilitate monitoring and follow up of<br>cases with DFS/CDU and other<br>investigation agencies. An updated<br>status of the pending cases will be<br>provided under the quarterly reports.<br>A copy of the SOP has been provided<br>to the Audit Team.   |
| 5           | MONUSCO should allocate adequate<br>resources to develop the investigative<br>capacity of its Special Investigations Unit.  | Important   | YES                   | Chief<br>CDT/MCOS                     | 30/09/2016             | <ul> <li>The Mission has taken steps to develop the investigative capacity of the Special Investigations Unit as follows:</li> <li>i) UN Security Section has taken action to recruit 4 Security Assistants to enhance the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) capacity. Furthermore the</li> </ul>   |

| Rec.<br>no. | Recommendation | Critical <sup>1</sup> /<br>Important <sup>2</sup> | Accepted?<br>(Yes/No) | Title of<br>responsible<br>individual | Implementation<br>date | Client comments                          |
|-------------|----------------|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|--|
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | Section is in the process of             |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | reprogramming some posts in order to     |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | recruit additional national and          |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | international staff with strong          |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | investigation background to deal with    |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | complex cases such as fraud, forensic    |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | investigations and SEA. In addition,     |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | one international staff at FS level will |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | be reassigned from Aru to Bunia as       |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | Officer in Charge of SIU.                |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | ii) SIU organized basic                  |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | investigations training sessions in      |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | Kinshasa, Bukavu, Bunia, Beni,           |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | Kisangani from February to June          |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | 2015. As of November 2015, a total       |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | of 63 security officers (59 national     |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | staff and 04 International staff)        |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | attended the training. The second        |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | phase of this training is due to be      |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | conducted in Lubumbashi, Uvira,          |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | Dungu, GOMA and Matadi.                  |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | iii) Two internationally recruited       |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | investigators attended the training on   |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | UN Standards of Investigations           |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | organized in Entebbe by UNHQ             |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | during year 2014 (from 05 September      |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | to 28 Sept 2014) in addition to two      |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | others that attended the same training   |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | during year 2013 (08 April to 24         |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | April 2013) following the review of      |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | the Investigation Manual. The            |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | Section will also ensure attendance to   |

| Rec.<br>no. | Recommendation | Critical <sup>1</sup> /<br>Important <sup>2</sup> | Accepted?<br>(Yes/No) | Title of<br>responsible<br>individual | Implementation<br>date | Client comments  |
|-------------|----------------|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|--|
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | upcoming training sessions and is<br>looking forward to certify two<br>investigators on Breathalyzer<br>calibration as may be required.<br>Supporting documents have been<br>provided to the Audit Team.   |
|             |                |   |                       |                                       |                        | In addition to strengthening the<br>capacity of the SIU, the CDT is<br>seeking additional resources through<br>external partners to support the<br>mission investigation capacity<br>including the newly implemented<br>Immediate Response Team. This<br>support will include specialized<br>capacity building of the current<br>investigators, with a deployment of<br>trained investigators. |