

## **INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION**

## **REPORT 2021/012**

Audit of the management of troop/police personnel and equipment contributions in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Mission needed to address shortfalls in deployed capabilities and weaknesses in ammunition management

26 April 2020 Assignment No. AP2019-620-04

## Audit of the management of troop/police personnel and equipment contributions in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the management of troop/police personnel and equipment contributions in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of the management of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed between the United Nations and troop and police contributing countries, including associated controls over contingent-owned equipment (COE), unit readiness and personnel strength. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2020 and included: management and functioning of COE/MOU Management Review Board (CMMRB), verification of deployed operational capabilities; and management of COE related data.

The Mission needed to address shortfalls in deployed capabilities and weaknesses in ammunition management.

OIOS made four recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, MONUSCO needed to:

- Ensure that the CMMRB fully exercises its oversight responsibilities by ensuring key members attend meetings;
- Address major equipment and self-sustainment capability shortfalls and deficiencies, and identify major equipment that has been in the Mission continuously for more than seven years and request its redeployment and replacement, if still needed;
- Inspect ammunition storage facilities annually to ensure any safety and security risks are identified and mitigated in a timely manner; and
- Take action to ensure expired ammunitions are destroyed in a timely manner.

MONUSCO accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement them.

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## Audit of the management of troop/police personnel and equipment contributions in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

## I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the management of troop/police personnel and equipment contributions in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

2. The ability of peacekeeping missions to implement their mandates effectively and safely depends on the adequacy, capability and readiness of military and police personnel, and equipment deployed by troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs). The United Nations reimburses T/PCCs for serviceable major equipment; self-sustainment capabilities; and uniformed personnel contributions based on quarterly verification and monthly troop strength reports prepared by the Mission. The levels of deployment of troop/police personnel and equipment by T/PCCs are agreed to by the United Nations and T/PCCs in memoranda of understanding (MOUs). The reimbursement framework is specified in the contingent-owned equipment (COE) Manual on policies and procedures concerning the reimbursement and control of COE of T/PCCs participating in peacekeeping missions.

3. The Uniformed Capabilities Support Division (UCSD) in the Department of Operational Support (DOS) is responsible for supporting end-to-end force generation, MOUs, deployment, and the reimbursement process and monitoring the performance and operational capabilities of contingents. UCSD serves as a single point of entry for T/PCCs on all related administrative and logistical issues and coordinates closely with the Mission. The MONUSCO COE/MOU Management Review Board (CMMRB) is responsible for overseeing the management of the Mission's COE and MOUs including providing high-level, cross-functional guidance on: (a) results of periodic assessment of COE capabilities and operational readiness of contingents; (b) major and minor equipment holdings and self-sustainment capabilities; and (c) surplus or underutilization of equipment. The Board makes recommendations to the Headquarters CMMRB for their intervention and action with T/CCs where necessary.

4. The MONUSCO COE Unit is responsible for the day-to-day management of MOUs, including performing verification inspections and submitting verification reports to UCSD/DOS through the Uniformed Capabilities Management System for COE reimbursements. The COE Unit is headed by a Chief at the P-4 level who reports to the Chief of Mission Support Center and is supported by seven international staff, three military liaison officers, one police officer, nine United Nations volunteers, and six national staff.

5. The approved budget for troop/police and COE cost reimbursement for 2019/20 was \$645.9 million. As of 30 July 2020, MONUSCO had deployed 13,609 military, 905 formed police personnel and 10,422 pieces of major equipment. The deployed uniformed personnel comprised 16 military infantry units, 27 military support units and 6 formed police units from 16 countries.

6. Comments provided by MONUSCO are incorporated in italics.

## **II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY**

7. The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of the management of MOUs between the United Nations and T/PCCs including controls over COE, unit readiness and personnel strength.

8. This audit was included in the 2020 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to financial and operational risks related to the management of troop/police personnel and equipment contributions in MONUSCO.

9. OIOS conducted this audit from January to June 2020. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2020. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risks areas in the management of troop/police personnel and equipment contributions, which included: management and functioning of CMMRB; verification of deployed operational capabilities; and management of COE related data.

10. The audit methodology included: (a) interview with key personnel, (b) review of relevant documentation, (c) analytical review of data, (d) visits to 15 of the 172 contingent locations in Goma, Bunia and Bukavu to observe physical inspections of 210 sampled major equipment and self-sustainment capabilities; and (e) review of 30 operational readiness inspections (ORIs) and 30 periodic inspections.

11. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

## **III. AUDIT RESULTS**

## A. Management and functioning of CMMRB

Attendance of key members at CMMRB meetings needed to improve

12. MONUSCO had established a CMMRB for which its terms of reference had been updated in October 2019 to align them with the COE guidelines. The Board was chaired by the Director of Mission Support and comprised the Deputy Force Commander, the Deputy Police Commissioner as well as other representatives from military and police components and technical units from the Mission Support Division. The Chief, COE Unit was the Secretary of the Board.

13. A review of minutes of the CMMRB noted that it convened quarterly as required and deliberated on: (a) contingents' compliance with the terms of MOUs and established COE verification and reporting procedures; (b) requests from contingents for rotation of equipment at the expense of the United Nations; (c) serviceability status of major equipment and adequacy of self-sustainment categories; (d) results of ORIs and other inspections; and (e) status of implementation of recommendations from its previous meetings. The Board also notified the Headquarters CMMRB on proposed amendments to MOUs to be discussed with Permanent Missions of T/PCCs. However, key members of the Board such as the Force Commander and Police Commissioner, and the Chief of Supply Chain Management were often not in attendance and were replaced by staff that did not have decision making authority. Considering the importance of COE in implementing the Mission's mandate and the decisions that need to be made, key members of the Board should be in regular attendance.

14. Moreover, while it is the responsibility of the Board to review COE Key Performance Indicator status reports, monthly equipment serviceability reports and quarterly verification reports, in OIOS view, the CMMRB could have been more active in scrutinizing and acting on underperforming COE. For instance, as of June 2020, the average Mission-wide performance of contingents against self-sustainment

categories was 88 per cent, which was classed as unsatisfactory. This was mainly because there were 153 major items of equipment that had been deployed in the Mission continuously for more than seven years (the threshold for redeployment), and 143 of them were unserviceable. While no reimbursement was made for unserviceable equipment, it could impact on the operational capabilities of certain contingents, and action by the Board was needed to address this.

15. Additionally, there were persistent deficiencies in self-sustainment categories, mainly as the Mission was not fulfilling its obligations by providing adequate levels of accommodation to contingents and undertaking repairs to fix leaking roofs and non-functioning air conditioners. The Mission informed that delays were encountered in providing the needed assistance due to staff shortage as six posts in the COE Unit had been abolished in the 2019/20 budget. Nonetheless, in OIOS view, with better scheduling and priority given to these activities and assistance from other technical sections such as engineering, delays may be minimized.

#### (1) MONUSCO should ensure that the Contingent Owned Equipment/Memoranda of Understanding Management Review Board (CMMRB) fully exercises its oversight responsibilities by ensuring key members of the CMMRB attend its meetings.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the Director of Mission Support, as the Chairman of the CMMRB will issue an Internal Office Memorandum to the Deputy Force Commander and the Deputy Police Commissioner to commit to their attendance at the CMMRB to fulfil their crucial responsibilities on the Board. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence that key members are attending CMMRB meeting to fulfil their oversight responsibilities.

(2) MONUSCO should: (a) address major equipment and self-sustainment capability shortfalls and deficiencies; and (b) identify major equipment that has already been in the Mission continuously for more than seven years and request their redeployment and replacement, if still needed.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the Force Commander wrote to the Office of the Military Advisor requesting that Permanent Missions be approached to improve the serviceability of equipment. Also, after quarterly inspections, the team leader debriefs the Commander and Logistics Officer and communicates all shortfalls and requests are made to T/PCCs for support to rectify them. This initiative has improved serviceability from 75 to 87 per cent (infantry) and 76 to 86 per cent (police). MONUSCO also stated that it will identify all unserviceable major equipment that has been deployed continuously for more than seven years and will approach Permanent Missions to request repatriation or disposal of unserviceable equipment. The Mission mentioned; however, that although they will continue to encourage rotation of equipment, the onus lies with T/PCCs. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence of the request by the Force Commander to the Office of the Military Advisor requesting Permanent Missions to improve the serviceability of the equipment deployed and actions taken to repatriate and replace equipment deployed beyond the seven years threshold.

## **B.** Verification of deployed operational capabilities

Repatriation inspections were adequately conducted but timeliness of arrival inspections could improve

16. MONUSCO is required to conduct arrival inspections within a month of the equipment's arrival in the Mission. These inspections are to ascertain if deployed COE is operationally serviceable and self-sustainment corresponds to categories and quantities stipulated in MOUs. During the audit period, three

contingents arrived in MONUSCO, and for these contingents, the COE Unit conducted 14 inspections and confirmed that their major equipment and self-sustainment capabilities brought to the Mission agreed with those in the MOU. There were, however, major delays in inspections, with 11 of them taking place more than one year after the equipment was deployed. This is because the Mission experienced difficulties in their transportation from the port. Equipment was being transported in-country in various ways: road, air, rail and by water, with challenges encountered due to heavy rainfall rendering roads/railways impassable and low water levels on the lake hindering the movement of barges. It also took time to assembly the equipment, which in the most part needed to be done at the end-user location where the technicians, tools, and workshops to assemble them were often located.

17. While delays were often not within the Mission's control, no plan had been established or risk mitigating measures adequately documented to reduce them. As a result, major equipment and self-sustainment was not delivered timely to camps, which impacted contingents' operational readiness to conduct their tasks. Subsequent to the audit, the Mission improved its planning and monitoring of the arrival of equipment (date of arrival in the Mission area and at end-user location, inspection date and reasons why arrival inspections could not be conducted within 30 days as required). Based on the action being taken by MONUSCO to better plan and monitor the arrival of COE, OIOS does not make a recommendation.

18. MONUSCO is also required to inspect COE before repatriation to ensure United Nations-owned equipment is not incorrectly repatriated and that COE is not inappropriately abandoned creating safety and environmental risks. For the seven contingents repatriated during the period, OIOS review of repatriation inspection worksheets and verification reports showed that the COE Unit properly conducted the required inspections prior to the departure of the contingent and related COE.

19. OIOS noted that the results of arrival and repatriation inspections were properly documented, reviewed and agreed by respective contingent commanders, the Force Commander or Police Commissioner and approved by the Director of Mission Support before submission to UCSD for their action.

#### The Mission could enhance its COE inspections by including subject matter experts

20. To ensure continued operational readiness of deployed troop and police units, MONUSCO conducted the required ORIs and quarterly inspections of major equipment and self-sustainment capabilities. COE spot checks were also conducted when necessary, to validate corrective actions taken by T/PCCs following inspections. OIOS review of 60 COE verification reports (30 ORIs and 30 periodic inspections) and observations during field visits noted that COE inspection teams: (i) adequately documented the results of their inspections against the data in the e-COE database; and (ii) updated the e-COE database with data from inspection worksheets. Inspection reports were signed by COE inspectors and T/PCC representatives and certified by the Director of Mission Support.

21. However, considering the importance of functioning COE to the Mission's operations and the large budget associated with it, there is a need for the Office of Mission Support, based on a risk-assessment (so that Mission staffing resources are allocated to higher risk areas), to assign technical experts where necessary to assist in inspections. For instance, on the 15 inspections observed by OIOS, it was only medical experts that participated, although the Ammunition Technical Officer in Bunia took part in inspections conducted at that location. In OIOS view, inclusion of subject matter experts from engineering, transport, environment and communication and information technology could enhance the inspections. For example, during the OIOS field visit, some vehicles emitted black exhaust smoke which indicated possible engine problems, but the inspection team reported them as serviceable without recording this deficiency. This may have been because the inspection team did not have the expertise to accurately assess vehicle serviceability.

22. The Mission stated that the COE team possessed some level of technical expertise, and therefore, in their opinion, it was not cost effective to include subject matter experts in all inspections, and funds were not always readily available for payment of the extra daily subsistence allowances that would be needed. The Mission informed that it would continue to recruit COE personnel with additional skills in various technical areas to ensure such issues are more readily identified during inspections. Based on the comments provided, OIOS did not make a recommendation on this matter.

## C. Management of COE related data

Reimbursement for expired ammunition and explosives were properly supported

23. To enable accurate reimbursement to T/PCCs for ammunition and explosives that expired in the Mission, contingent commanders are required to prepare an Operational Ammunition Expenditure Certificate (OAEC) based on the ammunition disposal certificate issued by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). During the audit period, UNMAS, in the presence of T/PCC representatives, destroyed 637,910 pieces of ammunition and issued the ammunition disposal certificates. Based on these certificates, contingent commanders prepared 49 OAECs, all of which were endorsed, verified, certified, and approved by the required officials. OIOS concluded that MONUSCO had implemented adequate controls over reimbursements to T/PCCs for ammunition and explosives that had expired and destroyed in the Mission.

#### Ammunition management needed improvement

24. To assess ammunition management and identify safety and security risks related to their storage, MONUSCO is required to inspect military and police contingents' ammunition storage facilities annually. The United Nations Weapons and Ammunition Management Policy dated 1 January 2019 requires the Mission to establish a Weapons and Ammunition Advisory Board (WAAB) to advise Mission leadership on all aspects of weapons and ammunition management and provide a platform for addressing critical ammunition safety matters and other issues concerning weapons and ammunitions management.

25. During the audit period, only 32 of the required 98 inspections were conducted mainly as there were only two ammunition technical officers and one force explosive safety officer assigned to inspect ammunition for 16 military infantry units, 27 military support units and six formed police units. The inspections conducted noted that generally ammunitions were in good condition and stored adequately.

26. However, inspections identified that some ammunitions pertaining to three contingents had expired. Although the Mission did not reimburse for the associated weapons for the time they were without ammunition, expired ammunition should be disposed of in timely manner to reduce any safety, security, and environmental risks. Moreover, OIOS additional analysis found that T/PCCs were holding about 990,000 pieces of expired ammunitions waiting to be disposed of. This was because although a list of expired ammunition had been prepared and provided to UNMAS for destruction, the process was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It was also because MONUSCO had not yet established its WAAB to oversee such matters.

## (3) MONUSCO should inspect ammunition storage facilities annually to ensure any safety and security risks are identified and mitigated in a timely manner.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 3 and stated that the shortfall in inspections was due to shortage of ammunition technical officers but it has now four ammunition technical officers deployed at each sector. The Mission aims to complete the annual inspections of ammunition storage facilities by the end of June 2021. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence that ammunition

storage facilities are inspected by June 2021, and action is being taken to address safety and security risks identified.

#### (4) MONUSCO should take action to expeditously destroy all expired ammunitions.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the delay in destroying all expired ammunitions was due to a change in the procedures that UNMAS had to follow and the limitation on work and travel restrictions due to COVID-19. These new procedures, which came into effect at the onset of COVID-19, required approval from the T/PCC home country before disposal and/or destruction of expired ammunitions. The Mission stated that it will now take action to initiate the process of obtaining approval from the T/PCC through their Permanent Mission. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence that expired ammunitions have been disposed of.

#### Controls over the arrival and departure of uniformed personnel were adequate

27. On arrival of uniform personnel, the MONUSCO Movement Control Section (in liaison with host country immigration) physically counted and verified their identity against the host government-approved entry visa list. The COE Unit also reconciled the number of arriving uniformed personnel on the manifest with the MOUs. A similar procedure was in place for departing personnel whereby each individual had documentation that included a Mission's approved staff repatriation form, passport exit stamps and air tickets.

## IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

28. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MONUSCO for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(*Signed*) Eleanor T. Burns Director, Internal Audit Division Office of Internal Oversight Services

#### STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	C/ O <sup>3</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>4</sup>
1	MONUSCO should ensure that the Contingent Owned Equipment/Memoranda of Understanding Management Review Board (CMMRB) fully exercises its oversight responsibilities by ensuring key members of the CMMRB attend its meetings.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that key members are attending CMMRB meeting to fulfil their oversight responsibilities.	31 December 2021
2	MONUSCO should: (a) address major equipment and self-sustainment capability shortfalls and deficiencies; and (b) identify major equipment that has already been in the Mission continuously for more than seven years and request their redeployment and replacement, if still needed.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence of the request by the Force Commander to the Office of the Military Advisor requesting Permanent Missions to improve the serviceability of the equipment deployed and actions taken to repatriate and replace equipment deployed beyond the seven years threshold.	31 December 2021
3	MONUSCO should inspect ammunition storage facilities annually to ensure any safety and security risks are identified and mitigated in a timely manner.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that ammunition storage facilities are inspected by June 2021, and action is being taken to address safety and security risks identified.	31 December 2021
4	MONUSCO should take action to expeditously destroy all expired ammunitions.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that expired ammunitions have been disposed of.	30 June 2022

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Please note the value C denotes closed recommendations whereas O refers to open recommendations. <sup>4</sup> Date provided by MONUSCO in response to recommendations.

# **APPENDIX I**

# **Management Response**



United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Tél. +243 81 890 5000 +243 81 890 6000

MONUSCO

### INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 22 April 2021 Ref: SRSG-DMS-2021-00598

- To: Ms. Eleanor T. Burns, Director
- A: Internal Audit Division, OIOS

From: Bintou Keita

De: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO

## Subject: Mission response to the Draft Report on the audit of the management of Objet: troop/police personnel and equipment contributions in MONUSCO (Assignment No. AP2019/620/04)

1. I acknowledge with thanks receipt of your interoffice memorandum dated 29 March 2021 (Ref: OIOS-2021-00415) forwarding the Draft Audit Report on the subject audit. Thank you for giving the Mission another opportunity to comment on the findings and recommendations of the audit.

2. Please find attached the Mission comments for your consideration in finalizing the report. Attachments mentioned in the comments will be provided to the Resident Audit Team only.

3. Kind regards.

Attachments:

- CC: Ms. Fatoumata Ndiaye, Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services Major-Gen. Thierry Lion, Acting Force Commander General Mody Berethe, Police Commissioner Brig Gen. John Stanley Chaika, Force Chief of Staff Ms. Safia Boly, Mission Chief of Staff Ms. Ayna Khaidova, Chief, Operations and Resources Management Mr. Elie Rizkallah, Senior Administrative Officer Mr. Daniel Maier, Chief, Strategic Planning Cell Mr. Bandula Seneviratne, Chief, Transport Officer Mr. David John, Chief, MOVCON Mr. Rogers Tonda, Chief, Mission Support Centre Mr. Jose Luis Medina, Chief, Contingent Owned Equipment
  - Ms. Judith Atiagaga, Mission Audit Focal Point

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	MONUSCO should ensure that the Contingent Owned Equipment/ Memoranda of Understanding Management Review Board (CMMRB) fully exercises its oversight responsibilities by ensuring key members of the CMMRB commit to attending meetings.	Important	Yes	Director of Mission Support	31 December 2021	The Mission accepts the recommendation to ensure that the COE/MOU Management Review Board (CMMRB) fully exercises its oversight responsibilities. To ensure that the key members of the CMMRB (Deputy Force Commander (DFC) and Deputy Police Commissioner (DPP)) attend all the meetings, the Director of Mission Support who is the Chairman of the CMMRB will issue Internal Office Memoranda to the DFC and the DPP requesting them to commit to attending the CMMRB in order to fulfill their crucial responsibilities on the Board.
2	MONUSCO should: (a) address major equipment and self-sustainment capability shortfalls and deficiencies; and (b) identify major equipment that has already been in the Mission continuously for more than seven years and request their redeployment and replacement, if still needed.	Important	Yes	Chief, COE	31 December 2021	<ul> <li>a) To address the major equipment and self-sustainment capability shortfalls, the Force Commander wrote to the Office of the Military Advisor requesting that the Permanent Missions be approached to improve the serviceability of equipment. In addition, after every quarterly inspection, the team leader conducts a debriefing with the Commander and the Logistics Officer and communicates all the shortfalls and outlines the necessary actions required to rectify. Based on these debriefings, the Logistics Officers request their</li> </ul>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						T/PCC for the necessary support to rectify the shortfalls. This initiative has improved the serviceability as the T/PCCs have sent logistic support to the units in form of equipment, spare parts and consumables (details of equipment received attached). Due to these initiatives, the serviceability has improved in the last three quarters of Q2, Q3 and Q4 of 2020 (evidence attached). The evidence shows that the serviceability has improved from 75% to 87% (infantry units), 76% to 86% for FPUs and 87% to 91% (enabling units) Therefore, this recommendation should be considered implemented.
						b) The Mission will identify all the unserviceable major equipment that have been in the Mission continuously for more than seven years. Major equipment like containers being used by the contingents as storage or for welfare will be reclassified as self-sustainment equipment. For the remaining unserviceable equipment e.g. Armored Personnel Carriers, the Mission will approach the Permanent Missions and request authorization for repatriation or disposal. The action of the Mission will therefore depend on the feedback received from the T/PCC. In line with above recommendation and mission concurrence, the Mission has been reminding and encouraging contingents to either rotate, repatriate or dispose their unserviceable COE that have been deployed in the Mission continuously

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
3	MONUSCO should inspect ammunition storage facilities annually to ensure any safety and security risks are identified and mitigated in a timely manner.	Important	Yes	Force Explosive Safety Officer	31 December 2021	for 7 years or more and as a result, RSA Force Intervention Brigade repatriated 2 x Generator on 22 March 2021 (see attached email for ease of reference). The Mission awaits response from other T/PCC. However, the Mission wishes to also draw the auditors' attention to the fact that, as much as the Mission will continue to encourage T/PCC to rotate their equipment deployed in the Mission area for 7 years or more, the onus lies with the T/PCC to initiate the process, because the T/PCC must have new equipment ready to replace those in the Mission and be willing to do so before the process can go through. The Mission accepts the audit recommendation that ammunition storage facilities be inspected and evaluated annually. The shortfall in inspections was occasioned by the shortage of Ammunition Technical Officers (ATO). However, the Mission now has four ATOs who are all deployed at each
						sector to cover the inspection of the ammunition storage facilities of the Units. The Mission now aims to complete the annual inspections by the end of June 2021 according to the attached inspection schedule. The attached schedule shows the inspections completed todate with an aim to complete all inspections by end of June 2021.
4	MONUSCO should take action to expeditously destroy all expired ammunitions.	Important	Yes	Force Explosive Safety Officer	30 June 2022	The Mission accepts the recommendation to expeditiously destroy all expired ammunitions due to the environmental and safety threat. The delay was occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic and the

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical <sup>1</sup> / Important <sup>2</sup>	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						change in the procedures required to be followed
						before UNMAS can destroy the expired ammunitions – which includes approval from the
						T/PCC of the contingent requesting the disposal.
						These are new procedures that came into effect after
						the initial approval was granted in 2019 and the
						onset of COVID-19. The Mission will now take
						action to initiate the process to obtain approval from
						the T/PCC through the Permanent Mission.