



INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

REPORT 2015/148

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Overall results relating to the effective management of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali were initially assessed as unsatisfactory. Implementation of two critical and nine important recommendations remains in progress

FINAL OVERALL RATING: UNSATISFACTORY

27 November 2015

Assignment No. AP2014/641/06

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
I. BACKGROUND	1
II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE	1-2
III. AUDIT RESULTS	2-9
Regulatory framework	3-9
IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	9
ANNEX I Status of audit recommendations	
APPENDIX I Management response	

AUDIT REPORT

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
2. In accordance with its mandate, OIOS provides assurance and advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the United Nations internal control system, the primary objectives of which are to ensure (a) efficient and effective operations; (b) accurate financial and operational reporting; (c) safeguarding of assets; and (d) compliance with mandates, regulations and rules.
3. As of 31 March 2015, MINUSMA had 12 commercial and 15 military aircraft and operated out of six regions in Mali. MINUSMA had 17 regularly used airfields and helipads and 55 ad hoc landing sites. During the audit period, MINUSMA conducted over 9,000 flights for which about 5,000 were classed as special flights due to high number of medical evacuation cases for the Mission, the government and other United Nations entities, as well as the high risk environment that limited ground transportation.
4. The air operations budget for fiscal years 2013/14 and 2014/15 were \$51.2 million and \$128.3 million, respectively. The Aviation Section is headed by a Chief Aviation Officer at the P-5 level and has 61 international staff, 32 national staff and 15 international contractors.
5. MINUSMA as a start-up mission faced operational challenges due to delayed and haphazard deployment of staff and inadequate infrastructure. MINUSMA partly addressed initial staffing challenges by recruiting staff on temporary assignments; however, the short duration of such appointments including at the senior level, had a destabilising effect on its operations. The Mission was also confronted with security challenges impacting on air operations in the Northern part of Mali.
6. Comments provided by MINUSMA are incorporated in italics.

II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

7. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of MINUSMA governance, risk management and control processes in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of air operations in MINUSMA**.
8. The audit was included in the 2014 risk-based work plan of OIOS because of operational, safety, security and financial risks related to air operations in MINUSMA.
9. The key control tested for the audit was regulatory framework. For the purpose of this audit, OIOS defined this key control as the one that provides reasonable assurance that policies and procedures: (a) exist to guide the management of air operations in MINUSMA; (b) are implemented consistently; and (c) ensure the reliability and integrity of financial and operational information.
10. The key control was assessed for the control objectives shown in Table 1.

11. OIOS conducted the audit from October 2014 to April 2015. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2013 to 31 December 2014 and included field visits to three regional air offices and landing sites located in Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu.

12. OIOS conducted an activity-level risk assessment to identify and assess specific risk exposures, and to confirm the relevance of the selected key control in mitigating associated risks. Through interviews and analytical reviews, OIOS assessed the existence and adequacy of internal controls and conducted necessary tests to determine their effectiveness.

III. AUDIT RESULTS

13. The MINUSMA governance, risk management and control processes examined were initially assessed as **unsatisfactory**¹ in providing reasonable assurance regarding the **effective management of air operations in MINUSMA**. OIOS made 11 recommendations to address the issues identified. MINUSMA consistently conducted initial inspections of aircraft prior to their tasking. However, to improve its air operations MINUSMA needed to: (a) enhance procedures over special flights and tasking of military aircraft; (b) implement adequate flight following operations; (c) finalize and issue standard operating procedures on survey and recertification of landing sites; (d) prepare and implement an aviation quality assurance programme; (e) implement recommendations arising from aviation emergency response plan exercises; (f) enhance the functioning of the Aviation Safety Council; (g) obtain and file supporting documents for aircrew qualifications and experience; (h) ensure costs of aviation support services provided to non-MINUSMA entities are reimbursed; and (i) adequately prepare aircraft inspection and performance reports and submit them to the Department of Field Support (DFS).

14. The initial overall rating was based on the assessment of key control presented in Table 1. The final overall rating is **unsatisfactory** as implementation of two critical and nine important recommendations remains in progress.

Table 1: Assessment of key control

Business objective	Key control	Control objectives			
		Efficient and effective operations	Accurate financial and operational reporting	Safeguarding of assets	Compliance with mandates, regulations and rules
Effective management of air operations in MINUSMA	Regulatory framework	Unsatisfactory	Partially satisfactory	Partially satisfactory	Unsatisfactory
FINAL OVERALL RATING: UNSATISFACTORY					

¹ A rating of “**unsatisfactory**” means that one or more critical and/or pervasive important deficiencies exist in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

Regulatory framework

The Mission finalized its aviation support plan and air operations budget explanatory notes

15. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/DFS Aviation Manual requires MINUSMA to develop an annual aviation support plan in line with the Mission's mandate and operational plan.

16. MINUSMA was delayed in finalizing its aviation support plan due to the absence of an approved mission support plan and concept of operations. This mainly resulted as Mission staff were focused on other priorities during the start-up phase of the Mission. The lack of aviation support plan resulted in some inefficiencies in the use of MINUSMA aircraft. For example, a review of tasking and utilization of 15 military aircraft from 1 July to mid-December 2014 indicated that 6 aircraft were utilized less than 25 per cent of the budgeted flight hours of 147 hours. Nonetheless, for the 2015/16 budget submission, MINUSMA satisfactorily prepared an aviation support plan, which was adequately supported by explanatory notes to ensure efficient use of resources. Based on the action taken, no recommendation was made.

Controls over special flights needed to be enforced

17. The Director of Mission Support circular of August 2013 requires special flight requests to be submitted at least 48 hours prior to the planned departure date (except for exceptional cases such as operational exigencies as well as medical and other emergencies) to provide the Mission sufficient time to properly assess such requests.

18. A review of 45 of the 4,805 special flights conducted during the audit period indicated that 20 of them were submitted less than 48 hours in advance of the planned departure. The requests were initiated without a documented justification that they were required due to operational exigencies. These 20 special flights included: (a) one request that was submitted a day after the flight departed; and (b) five requests that were submitted between one and three hours prior to the flight's departure. This condition resulted as MINUSMA did not put in place a mechanism to enforce the Director of Mission Support's instruction on scheduling of special flights. As a result, there was an increased risk of inefficiencies and ineffective use of MINUSMA aircraft as the Aviation Section was given insufficient time to consider whether there were other viable cheaper options available.

(1) MINUSMA should establish a mechanism to enforce the requirement for: special flight requests to be submitted in a timely manner; and late submissions for exceptional cases to be adequately justified in writing.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 1 and stated that it: added a function in the Electronic Special Flight Request (eSFR) tool providing an option for the eSFR requestor to include justification for an urgent routine request; and would reissue the policy on Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests System. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence that special flight requests are being submitted 48 hours prior to the planned departure and emergency flights operated are adequately justified.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Tasking of military aircraft needed to be clarified and responsibilities for approval segregated

22. The MINUSMA aviation guidelines and DPKO/DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations requires the Force Commander to exercise tasking authority over combat aviation operations and the Director of Mission Support to task military utility helicopters. MINUSMA procedures for tasking combat aviation activities require: the Force Chief of Staff/Deputy Force Chief of Staff to initially approve the tasking of the aircraft and the Force Commander to make the final approval.

23. A review of 30 of the 1,134 military Air Tasking Requests indicated that the Force Commander and the Director of Mission Support were not approving the tasking of military aircraft. Also, the Deputy Force Chief of Staff performed the role of both the first and final approver for the tasking of military aircraft as the delegate for the Force Commander. This resulted as MINUSMA: (a) had not established clear procedures that delineated the responsibilities of tasking of military aircraft between the Force Commander and the Director of Mission Support; (b) implemented an Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests System for the tasking of all military aircraft operations, which granted only the Force Commander the authority to approve all military aircraft tasking irrespective of whether the tasking authority belonged to the Force Commander or the Director of Mission Support; and (c) had not finalized and implemented adequate standard operating procedures to ensure duties related to tasking of aircraft were properly segregated.

(3) MINUSMA should finalize the aviation guidelines and reconfigure the Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests System to ensure military aircraft tasking responsibilities are clarified and properly assigned and adequate segregation of duties are in place.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it finalized the aviation guidelines for tasking military aircraft and completed the required reconfiguration of the Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests System, which would be implemented by December 2015. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation of the reconfigured Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests System to ensure segregation of duties in tasking military aircraft.

Mechanisms for surveying and recertifying landing sites needed to be finalized and implemented

24. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual requires landing sites to be surveyed and approved prior to being used by the Mission and all helicopter landing sites to be recertified every six months.

25. A review of documentation relating to MINUSMA landing sites indicated that 31 of the 72 sites were not surveyed prior to being used by the Mission. Also, 18 of the 19 helicopter landing sites had not been recertified for over six months. This resulted as the Mission had not finalized its standard operating procedures to guide and monitor surveys and recertification of landing sites. Inadequate surveying and recertification of landing sites increased safety risk due to the non-identification of possible aviation hazards.

(4) MINUSMA should finalize its standard operating procedures on the survey and recertification of landing sites to ensure aviation hazards are adequately mitigated.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the Airfields and Air Terminals Unit standard operating procedures were finalized. Recertification of landing sites was conducted every six months for regular helicopter landing sites and every three months for ad hoc ones. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing that landing sites are surveyed and recertified regularly.

A quality assurance programme needed to be implemented

26. The DKPO/DFS Aviation Safety Manual requires MINUSMA to establish and implement an aviation quality assurance programme to ensure its air operations are conducted in accordance with United Nations aviation standards, regulations and rules.

27. The Aviation Section had not yet established its aviation quality assurance programme. This was due to a high vacancy rate in the Quality Assurance and Standardization Unit. As at end of December 2014, only two of the Unit's five approved posts had been filled. Nonetheless, in August 2015 MINUSMA filled all the posts of the Quality Assurance and Standardization Unit. However the Unit was yet to implement a quality assurance programme.

28. The lack of adequate quality assurance programme could result in the Mission's air operations not complying with United Nations standards, increasing safety risk.

(5) MINUSMA should prepare and implement its aviation quality assurance programme.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 5 and stated it approved and implemented its aviation quality assurance programme. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation of the aviation quality assurance programme.

Mission aircraft maintenance was effectively monitored

29. The air charter contracts with commercial operators and letters of assist for military aircraft require carriers to be responsible for maintaining their aircraft. The Aviation Section is required to ensure the aircraft fleet is properly maintained and remains airworthy for the duration of the commercial contract or letter of assist.

30. A review of all aircraft maintenance records indicated that carriers properly scheduled and conducted maintenance of all 27 aircraft in accordance with respective contractual agreements. The operators provided MINUSMA with a certificate of release after an aircraft had undergone either scheduled or unscheduled maintenance to attest that the aircraft was serviceable for flight tasks. OIOS concluded that MINUSMA had implemented adequate controls over the maintenance of aircraft.

Lessons learned and recommendations arising from the emergency response plan exercise were not followed up

31. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Safety Manual requires MINUSMA to prepare, implement and regularly test its aviation emergency response plan.

32. MINUSMA established an aviation emergency response plan and conducted a desktop exercise in July 2014 to test the adequacy of the plan. The Aviation Section completed a lessons learned report with eight recommendations including: (a) to involve all sections/units in aviation emergency response planning and develop checklists clarifying their responsibilities; (b) for the Medical Unit to prepare agreements with local hospitals in case of a mass casualty accident; and (c) to assign a standby communication channel to ensure continued operations in case of an emergency. However, MINUSMA did not implement a mechanism to monitor the implementation of lessons learned recommendations. As a result, at the time of the audit, four of eight recommendations had not been implemented, increasing the risk that MINUSMA staff were not adequately prepared to respond to an aviation emergency.

(6) MINUSMA should implement a mechanism to ensure recommendations arising from aviation emergency response plan exercises are implemented.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 6 and stated that the Aviation Safety Unit established a mechanism to ensure that recommendations arising from aviation emergency response plan exercises were implemented. Recommendations would be brought to the attention of the Mission Aviation Safety Council, recorded in the action item table, disseminated accordingly and followed up periodically. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence that a monitoring mechanism has been put in place and outstanding recommendations have been implemented.

[REDACTED]

Aircrew qualifications were not being verified

38. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual prescribes minimum aircrew qualifications and experience for operating a United Nations aircraft. The Manual requires MINUSMA to verify the qualifications and experience of aircrew and maintain related supporting documentation.

39. A review of the credentials of 45 pilots operating MINUSMA aircraft indicated that the Mission did not have records of the qualifications of 14 aircrew. This resulted because: (a) MINUSMA had not implemented an adequate filing system to safeguard documents; and (b) some troop contributing countries had not provided the necessary supporting documents for aircrew qualifications and experience

as required by the letter of assist. As a result, MINUSMA was unable to verify and demonstrate that all MINUSMA aircrew had the required credentials to perform their functions. Consequently there was an increased safety risk that aircrew may not be sufficiently qualified to perform their assigned functions.

(9) MINUSMA should obtain and adequately file copies of the qualifications and experience of aircrew operating United Nations aircraft.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 9 and stated that it implemented a well-protected Aviation Aircrew & Business Partners Database to ensure maximum confidentiality and to record all necessary information as per the long-term aircraft charter agreements and letters of assists, including crew qualifications. With the exception of one troop-contributing country/military aviation unit, all military aviation units had adhered to the letter of assist requirement for the provision of crew information related to their personal/professional qualifications. MINUSMA also raised this issue with DFS. Recommendation 9 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the Mission has verified the credentials of all aircrew operating United Nations aircraft.

Inadequate procedures for recovery of cost of air transport services provided to third parties

40. The DPKO/DFS Aviation Manual requires MINUSMA to: (a) obtain written agreements from third parties to reimburse costs related to the provision of aviation services; and (b) ensure that reimbursements are made at or before services are delivered to third parties and in accordance with United Nations Financial Rules.

41. MINUSMA provided air transportation services to United Nations entities, the host government, contractors and non-governmental organizations without written agreements on the reimbursement of related costs. MINUSMA also did not maintain adequate and up-to-date records of the cost of aviation services provided to third parties. However, an analysis of available records held by the Aviation Section estimated that services costing about \$3.3 million were provided to third parties without being recovered.

42. The above condition was because MINUSMA had not established adequate procedures on the provision and subsequent cost of air transportation services to third parties. As a result, since the inception of the Mission, MINUSMA was recovering costs on some air transport services provided; but not on others, because no clear criteria had been established. For example, MINUSMA did not request recovery of costs of approximately \$462,055 for flights provided in support of non-MINUSMA mandated mediation activities by third parties. MINUSMA advised that air transportation provided to the host country were not recoverable as such services were in support of mandate implementation.

(10) MINUSMA should: (a) establish procedures on provision and reimbursement of air transport services to non-MINUSMA entities; and (b) recover outstanding accounts receivable for air transport services provided to entities not involved in MINUSMA mandate implementation.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 10 and stated that it had streamlined the cost recovery mechanism. The Mission would review the implementation of this cost recovery mechanism on 30 November 2015. Recommendation 10 remains open pending receipt of evidence that previous and current costs are recovered from those entities provided air services that were not involved in MINUSMA mandate implementation.

Aircraft performance evaluation reports were not regularly prepared and submitted to DFS

43. The DKPO/DFS Aviation Safety Manual requires MINUSMA to: (a) inspect aircraft on arrival in the Mission and before the initiation of the renewal of the contract or letter of assist; and (b) undertake quarterly evaluations of the performance of commercial and military air operators and aircraft. The Manual requires MINUSMA to submit inspection and performance evaluation reports to the Air Transportation Section within one week of completion of the inspection/evaluation.

44. A review of relevant documents and interviews with staff indicated that MINUSMA consistently conducted initial inspections of aircraft prior to air tasking. However, MINUSMA was delayed in submitting these reports to DFS by an average of 59 days. A review of all 49 performance evaluation reports indicated that MINUSMA did not prepare 26 quarterly reports and took an average of 134 days to complete the remaining 23 reports.

45. The above was due partly to resource constraints as referred to in paragraph 5 of the present report, but also because the Office of Mission Support was not systematically: (a) monitoring the preparation and submission of reports to DFS; and (b) supervising and monitoring the performance evaluation process. MINUSMA also attributed the condition to technical issues, which the mission had communicated to DFS, with the electronic system used to submit reports.

46. Under-reporting by MINUSMA to DFS and insufficient evaluation of aircraft performance increased the risk that underperforming aircraft could continue to be used in the Mission impacting on the safety and security of staff.

(11) MINUSMA should establish monitoring procedures over the preparation of aircraft inspection and performance reports and their submission to DFS.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 11 and stated that it implemented in July 2015 the Aircraft Corrective Action Plan Database to follow up on compliance issues arising from aircraft inspections. MINUSMA completed all quarterly aircraft performance evaluation reports and semi-annual performance evaluation reports for military aircraft. Once completed, these evaluations were automatically available to DFS through the Aviation Inspection and Recommendations Module. Recommendation 11 remains open pending OIOS verification that the aircraft inspections and performance evaluation reports are being completed and submitted to DFS as required.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

47. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MINUSMA for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) David Kanja
Assistant Secretary-General, Acting Head
Office of Internal Oversight Services

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	C/ O ³	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁴
1	MINUSMA should establish a mechanism to enforce the requirement for: special flight requests to be submitted in a timely manner; and late submissions for exceptional cases to be adequately justified in writing.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that special flight requests are being submitted 48 hours prior to the planned departure and emergency flights operated are adequately justified.	November 2015
3	MINUSMA should finalize the aviation guidelines and reconfigure the Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests System to ensure military aircraft tasking responsibilities are clarified and properly assigned and adequate segregation of duties are in place.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of implementation of the reconfigured Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests System to ensure segregation of duties in tasking military aircraft.	December 2015
4	MINUSMA should finalize its standard operating procedures on the survey and recertification of landing sites to ensure aviation hazards are adequately mitigated.	Important	O	Receipt of documentation showing that landing sites are surveyed and recertified regularly.	November 2015
5	MINUSMA should prepare and implement its aviation quality assurance programme.	Critical	O	Receipt of evidence of implementation of the aviation quality assurance programme.	December 2015
6	MINUSMA should implement a mechanism to ensure recommendations arising from aviation emergency response plan exercises are implemented.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that a monitoring mechanism has been put in place and outstanding recommendations have been implemented.	December 2015

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

³ C = closed, O = open

⁴ Date provided by MINUSMA in response to recommendations.

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	C/ O ³	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁴
9	MINUSMA should obtain and adequately file copies of the qualifications and experience of aircrew operating United Nations aircraft.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that the Mission has verified the credentials of all aircrew operating United Nations aircraft.	March 2016
10	MINUSMA should: (a) establish procedures on provision and reimbursement of air transport services to non-MINUSMA entities; and (b) recover outstanding accounts receivable for air transport services provided to entities not involved in MINUSMA mandate implementation.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that previous and current costs are recovered from those entities not involved in MINUSMA mandate implementation.	July 2016
11	MINUSMA should establish monitoring procedures over the preparation of aircraft inspection and performance reports and their submission to DFS.	Important	O	OIOS verification that the aircraft inspections and performance evaluation reports are being completed and submitted to DFS as required.	December 2015

APPENDIX I

Management Response

Management Response

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implement ation date	Client comments
1	MINUSMA should establish a mechanism to enforce the requirement for: special flight requests to be submitted in a timely manner; and that late submissions for exceptional cases are to be adequately justified in writing.	Important	Yes	Director of Mission Support (DMS)	November 2015	MINUSMA took note of this recommendation and added a function in the Electronic Special Flight Request (E-SFR) tool providing an option for the E-SFR requestor to include justification for an urgent routine request. The policy on Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests System will be re-issued pending Global Service Center (GSC) and MINUSMA's Information Technology Section's actions on software migration to the GSC server with relevant data input into the policy document.
3	MINUSMA should finalize the aviation guidelines and reconfigure the Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests	Important	Yes	DMS Force Commander	December 2015	The aviation guidelines have been finalized and reflected in the Aviation SOP, Part 1 General, specifically set forth in paragraphs 6.6.2 (Chart 19), 6.6.2.1, 6.6.2.2, 6.6.2.3, 6.6.3.3, 6.6.4.1, and 6.6.4.2. Additionally, Administrative Instruction AI 2013-013 (SFR,

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management, and control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management, and control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

Management Response

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
	system to ensure military aircraft tasking responsibilities are clarified and properly assigned, and adequate segregation of duties are in place.					31/08/2013) paragraphs 6 and 10. Effective 13 November 2015, the required reconfiguration of the Electronic Military Air Tasking Requests system was completed and implemented.
4	MINUSMA should finalize its standard operating procedures on the survey and recertification of landing sites to ensure aviation hazards are adequately mitigated.	Important	Yes	Chief Aviation Officer	November 2015	The Airfields and Air Terminals Unit (AATU) standard operating procedure has been finalized. Recertification of landing sites are being conducted every 6 months for regular helicopter landing sites (HLS) and every 3 months for ad hoc HLSs.
5	MINUSMA should prepare and implement its aviation quality assurance programme.	Critical	Yes	Chief Aviation Officer	December 2015	A copy of the approved and implemented aviation quality assurance program and annual plan is provided (Aviation SOP, Part 5, QASU, Appendix 1).
6	MINUSMA should implement a mechanism to ensure recommendations arising from aviation emergency response plan exercises are implemented.	Important	Yes	Chief Aviation Safety Unit	December 2015	MINUSMA ASU has established a mechanism to ensure that recommendations arising from aviation emergency response plan exercises are implemented. Issued recommendations will be brought to the attention of the Mission Aviation Safety Council, recorded in the action item table, disseminated accordingly, and followed up periodically.

Management Response

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implement ation date	Client comments

Management Response

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implement ation date	Client comments
9	MINUSMA should obtain and adequately file copies of the qualifications and experience of aircrew operating United Nations aircraft.	Important	Yes	Chief Aviation Officer	31 March 2016	<p>MINUSMA has established and has been implementing a well-protected Aviation Aircrew & Business Partners Database in Lotus notes to record all necessary information as per the long-term aircraft charter agreements and LOAs, including crew qualifications. Access to this database is only given to a limited number of international staff, particularly those working in the Aviation Technical Compliance Unit, to ensure maximum confidentiality.</p> <p>All military aviation units have adhered to the LOAs requirement for the provision of crew information related to their personal/professional qualifications. However, it is only TCC/Military Aviation Unit that continuously fails to provide details of their crews. Consequently, MINUSMA has requested UNHQ for clarification and advice on this aforementioned concern as per reference facsimiles (MINUSMA/ODMS/2014/468 dated 10 December 2014 and MINUSMA/ODMS/2014/416 dated 01 November 2014). MINUSMA is still waiting for the response from UNHQ. Additionally, the Mission through the Office of the DMS also sent an IOM (Ref: MINUSMA/ODMS/M/2014/88 dated 20 August 2014) to the Contingent Commander. Aviation Unit to inform the TCC of the observed non-compliance of their MAU to the provisions of their Letter of Assist. Evidence is attached.</p>
10	MINUSMA should: (a) establish procedures on provision and	Critical	Yes	Chief Aviation Officer	July 2016	The promulgated August 2015 Mission's policy/mechanism on cost recovery has been streamlined in the IOM (Ref. MINUSMA/SD/2015/019 dated 12 November 2015) from CSD to

Management Response

Audit of air operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implement ation date	Client comments
	reimbursement of air transport services to non-MINUSMA entities; and (b) recover outstanding accounts receivable for air transport services provided to entities not involved in MINUSMA mandate implementation.			Chief Budget and Finance Section		MSD Section Chiefs. The next review on the implementation of cost recovery will be undertaken by OIC Movcon on 30 November 2015. In order to avoid further delays, Umoja training for raising sales recovery orders has been provided to SAU staff.
11	MINUSMA should establish monitoring procedures over the preparation of aircraft inspection and performance reports and their submission to DFS.	Important	Yes	Chief Aviation Officer Chief Aviation Safety Unit DMS	December 2015	MINUSMA has already created and implemented (July 2015) the Aircraft Corrective Action Plan Database to follow up on compliance issues arising from aircraft inspections. MINUSMA implements/utilizes the Aviation Inspection and Recommendations Module Database to perform both quarterly Aircraft Performance Evaluation Reports (civil aircraft) and semi-annual Performance Evaluation Reports (military aircraft under LOAs) as well as to record results of aircraft inspections. The Aviation Inspection and Recommendations Module Database is the primary tool (managed by the Aviation Safety Section in UNHQ) that MINUSMA uses for follow-ups and future references. So far, MINUSMA has completed all due quarterly Aircraft Performance Evaluation Reports as well as Military Aircraft semi-annual Performance Evaluation Reports. Once MINUSMA completes these evaluations, the reports are automatically available to UNHQ because the database is electronic.