



INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

REPORT 2017/011

Audit of military operations for the protection of civilians in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

There was a need to enforce the requirements regarding the participation of relevant civilian components in the planning of military operations, conduct more night patrols, and preparation of collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments and after-action reviews

16 March 2017
Assignment No. AP2016/620/08

Audit of military operations for the protection of civilians in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of governance, risk management and control processes over military operations for the protection of civilians in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The audit covered the period from 1 January 2015 to 30 September 2016 and included reviews of non-routine and routine military operations, closure of military bases, and training.

There were adequate structures, policies, and guidelines such as Senior Management Groups on Protection, United Nations system-wide strategy for the protection of civilians, Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support Protection of Civilians Manual, and Force Commander's directives on targeting and training. However, these established processes and mechanisms were sometimes not complied with and hence not effective.

OIOS made two critical and five important recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, MONUSCO needed to:

- Operationalize the requirements of the United Nations system-wide strategy for the protection of civilians regarding the participation of civilian components in the planning of military operations to make sure risks to civilians are properly identified and assessed and appropriate mitigating measures are put in place;
- Provide guidance and training to the military component on the updating of the Integrated Text and Event Management system to ensure all required data and information such as the descriptions, dates, and times of actions taken in response to alerts/reports received are timely and completely recorded;
- Enforce the requirements for preparation of collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments, and after-action reviews (**CRITICAL**);
- Ensure the establishment of realistic targets, allocation of necessary assets and implementation of effective procedures to achieve and accurately report against the established targets;
- Conduct more night patrols in line with the prevailing threats against civilians and ensure that military contingents are equipped with functional equipment for night patrols as required by their respective memoranda of understanding (**CRITICAL**);
- Implement effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to ensure systematic pre-/post-base closure assessments; and
- Ensure that all training activities are completed, reported to the Force Headquarters and recorded in a consolidated training database.

MONUSCO accepted all recommendations and has initiated actions to implement them.

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Audit of military operations for the protection of civilians in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of military operations for the protection of civilians in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).
2. The MONUSCO military component is mandated to protect the civilian population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from physical violence from armed groups. The military component is headed by a Force Commander at the Assistant Secretary-General level and assisted by a Deputy Force Commander at the D-2 level.
3. As at 30 June 2016, the Mission had deployed 17,407 personnel comprising 16,736 military contingent personnel, 471 military observers and 200 staff officers. The 2014/15 and 2015/16 budgets for the military component were \$602 million and \$549 million respectively.
4. Comments provided by MONUSCO are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

5. The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of governance, risk management and control processes over military operations for the protection of civilians in MONUSCO.
6. This audit was included in the 2016 risk-based work plan because military operations are critical to the achievement of the Mission's mandate and accounted for approximately 44 per cent of the Mission's \$1.4 billion annual budget.
7. OIOS conducted this audit from August to October 2016. The audit covered the period from 1 January 2015 to 30 September 2016. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risk areas including: non-routine and routine military operations; closure of military bases; and training.
8. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews of key personnel of the military and civilian components; (b) review of relevant documentation such as records of military operations conducted; (c) review and analysis of data including the Integrated Text and Event Management System (ITEM System); and (d) testing of controls. The audit team visited three of five military brigades and 6 of 62 military operating bases in the eastern part of the country in Beni, Bukavu and Bunia to observe the military operations at these locations.

III. OVERALL CONCLUSION

9. There were adequate governance structures, policies, and guidelines such as Senior Management Groups on Protection, United Nations system-wide strategy for the protection of civilians (United Nations Strategy), Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO/DFS) Protection of Civilians Manual, Force Commander's directives on targeting and training, and standard operating procedures on the closure of bases to guide military operations for the protection of civilians. However,

these established processes and mechanisms were sometimes not complied with and hence not effective particularly regarding: (i) the participation of relevant civilian components in planning of military operations; (ii) preparation of collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessment, and after-action reviews; and (iii) the conduct of night patrols.

IV. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Non-routine military operations for the protection of civilians

Need for the participation of relevant civilian components in the planning of military operations

10. The United Nations Strategy requires the Mission's military and civilian components to jointly plan military operations to ensure that risks to civilians are identified and adequately assessed and appropriate mitigation strategies integrated into these operations.

11. OIOS observation in the meeting of the Senior Management Group on Protection at the provincial level in Bunia; interviews with military personnel, heads of offices and staff of the Human Rights and Civil Affairs Sections in Beni, Bukavu and Bunia and review of the records of 20 military operations showed that civilian components such as heads of the Human Rights Section and regional offices were not involved in the planning of these operations. The military component advised that due to the need to ensure confidentiality, it did not involve civilian components in the planning of military operations and instead: briefed the civilian components before launching military operations; and interacted with the relevant civilian components during planning, execution, and assessment phases of every large scale operation. OIOS confirmed that the military component did not always brief the civilian components before launching operations and civilian components expressed the need for, not only briefings, but their involvement in planning of operations. Due to the lack of systematic involvement of the civilian components in planning of military operations, there was an unmitigated risk that appropriate mitigation strategies and remedial actions were not integrated into the execution of these operations.

12. The above occurred because the Mission's senior management had not implemented a formal mechanism to operationalize the provisions of the United Nations System on joint military-civilian planning of military operations by the civilian and military components.

(1) MONUSCO should implement a mechanism to operationalize the requirements of the United Nations system-wide strategy for the protection of civilians regarding the participation of civilian components in the planning of military operations to make sure risks to civilians are properly identified and assessed and appropriate mitigating measures are put in place.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 1 and stated that it: (i) had commenced a joint strategic planning process, with the first meeting held on 9 February 2017, involving the Head of Office, the Senior Political Adviser, Joint Human Rights Office, and representatives from other civilian components; and (ii) would develop standard operating procedures to formalize the protection of civilians risk assessment process in relation to military operations. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the Mission has implemented adequate procedures to systematically carry out joint military-civilian strategic planning of military operations.

Need for complete records of non-routine military operations

13. The United Nations Strategy requires the military component, United Nations police, and other substantive sections such as Civil Affairs and Human Rights to record and share protection-related information and incidents in the ITEM system.

14. OIOS interviews during field visits in Beni, Bukavu and Bunia; discussion with the ITEM Coordinator; and review of information in the ITEM System showed that the substantive sections had recorded the details of alerts about threats to civilians and reports of human rights violations received by the Mission. However, the military component did not record the actions they took in response to alerts and reports received including descriptions, dates and times of their actions.

15. The above occurred because the military component was not fully aware about the procedures for updating the ITEM System. For example, the military component advised that it did not know how and where to input actions they took in response to alerts and reports received. As a result, the ITEM System was incomplete and could not be relied upon as an integrated tool for: sharing information; assessing the timeliness and effectiveness of the Mission's protection of civilians' activities; and adjusting these activities.

(2) MONUSCO should provide guidance and training to the military component on the updating of the Integrated Text and Event Management System to ensure that all required data and information such as the descriptions, dates, and times of actions taken in response to alerts/reports received are timely and completely recorded.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 2 and stated that: the Force Headquarters had issued instructions to brigades and sectors on the use of the ITEM System; and it would develop a structured training programme on the use of the ITEM System. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that guidance and training have been provided to the military component on the use of the ITEM System and that all required data and information such as the descriptions, dates, and times of actions taken in response to alerts/reports about threats to civilians are recorded in the System.

Need for preparation of collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments and after-action reviews

16. The Force Commander's directive on targeting requires the military to estimate collateral damage prior to every lethal action and conduct timely battle damage assessments to accurately estimate the effects resulting from the use of lethal force. The MONUSCO Force Concept of Operations also requires the military to conduct an after-action review for major military operations to assess the effectiveness of operations and use as lessons learned in future operations.

17. OIOS interviews and review of records of all nine major military operations that involved lethal force such as artillery and mortar fire and attack helicopters to protect civilians in the Beni area during the audit period indicated that the military component did not have: (i) after-action review reports for four of the nine major military operations; and (ii) evidence of its battle damage assessments for all nine operations. The military component advised that collateral damage estimates were prepared at Force Headquarters during the targeting process. There were however no records of the targeting process for the nine operations.

18. The above occurred because the military component did not enforce the requirement for formal collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments and after-action reviews. As a result, there was no assurance that the required assessments were conducted and appropriate mitigating measures identified

and implemented to minimize collateral damage. There was also a risk that the Mission did not: (i) identify and use lessons learned to improve the effectiveness of future operations; and (ii) have adequate and reliable information to assess the timeliness and effectiveness of its military operations.

(3) MONUSCO should take action to ensure the requirements for preparation of collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments, and after-action reviews to: (i) identify and implement appropriate mitigating measures to minimize collateral damage; and (ii) identify lessons learned to improve the effectiveness of future operations to make sure there is reliable information for independent assessment of the effectiveness of the Mission's protection of civilian activities.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 3 and stated that: (i) after-action reviews were being stringently carried out by brigades for each battalion level operation and documented; and (ii) it would develop a realistic methodology for battle damage assessments. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the Mission has formally conducted collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments, and after-action reviews for its military operations.

B. Routine military operations for the protection of civilians

Need to ensure accurate projection and achievement of military patrol targets

19. MONUSCO results-based budget (RBB) for 2015/16 requires the military component to maintain an average of 62 operating bases per day and conduct 83,950 patrols (an average of 230 per day) in conflict areas. The military component, like other mission components, is responsible to establish its own targets for the RBB.

20. A review of the Mission's performance report for 2015/16 and supporting data indicated that the military component had maintained an average of 70 operating bases, which was more than the target of 62 in the 2015/16 RBB. However, the military component did not achieve the average daily patrols in conflict areas as it conducted only 51,117 patrols (average of 140 per day) compared to the target of 83,950 patrols (230 average daily) or 39 per cent less than planned number of patrols. In the 2015/16 budget performance report, the military attributed the shortfall to reduction in military troop strength compared to the projected strength. However, OIOS further review and analysis showed that: (i) there was only 10 per cent reduction, which did not completely explain the lower than expected performance; and (ii) the shortfall also resulted from the diversion of military personnel and assets from routine patrols to special operations such as unplanned deployments in response to attacks.

21. The above occurred because, due to frequent rotation and the lack of effective handover procedures, the military component was not fully aware about the RBB planning and monitoring process and therefore did not: adjust the targets in line with prevailing threats; allocate necessary assets; and implement effective monitoring procedures to ensure achievement of established targets. The current leadership of the military component was of the view that the RBB targets were unrealistic. As a result, there was an increased risk that the civilian population was not adequately protected.

(4) MONUSCO should take effective actions such as providing adequate guidance and training to the military component on the: establishment of realistic operational and result-based budget targets; allocation of necessary assets; and implementation of monitoring procedures to achieve and accurately report against the established targets.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it would: develop and maintain a portfolio

of evidence for the use of the Mission's asset to meet planned target; and conduct training forecasting and establishment of realistic targets, being mindful that the operational environment is fluid and changing tactical requirements would dictate the actual number of patrols. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has provided adequate guidance and training to the military component on the establishment of realistic targets, allocation of necessary assets and implementation of monitoring and reporting procedures to achieve and accurately report against established targets.

Need to increase night patrols and adequately equip contingents responsible for conducting night patrols

22. The DPKO/DFS Protection of Civilians Manual requires the military component to undertake patrols in line with the prevailing threats against civilians.

23. OIOS field visits, analysis of data on day and night patrols in conflict-affected areas, and review of the reports of military patrols and 173 incidents against civilians in Bunia indicated that, despite the pattern of increased violence such as rape and abduction against civilians at night, the military did not conduct sufficient night patrols to deal with the prevailing threats as described below:

- Of the 51,117 patrols conducted in conflict-affected areas in the financial year 2015/16, only 30 per cent (15,423) were night patrols;
- In one location reviewed, the military contingents conducted 12,453 patrols in the financial year 2015/16 of which only 35 per cent (4,348) were night patrols; and
- A military contingent's weekly summary of patrols conducted in one location for the period from 29 May to 18 June 2016 showed that the contingent conducted 55 day patrols and only 3 night patrols, although the patrol plan required a daily night patrol from 1800 to 0600 hours

24. The above occurred because the military component did not adjust its patrols based on emerging threats and the Mission did not take effective actions to ensure that the military had functional night equipment in compliance with the respective memoranda of understanding. For example, the military contingents in Beni and Bunia complained of lack of night vision devices; however, a review of the contingent-own equipment quarterly status reports showed that contingents were not using their night devices as they were still in sealed boxes, without batteries and other spare parts to make them functional.

25. As a result, there was inadequate assurance that the military component had timely responded to threats against civilians, which mostly occurred from 1800 to 0600 hours. For example, all major attacks in the Beni area and 59 per cent of the 173 serious incidents and violations against civilians in Bunia during the period from January to September 2016 occurred at night.

(5) MONUSCO should conduct more night patrols in line with the prevailing threats against civilians and ensure that military contingents have functional equipment while on night patrols.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the Force Headquarters had instructed that the brigade and sector concept of operations be planned and re-oriented to night operations based on the tactical commander's assessment of the prevalent operational environment, threat and tactical situation. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has conducted night patrols in line with the prevailing threats against civilians.

C. Closure of military bases

Need to follow established procedures on the closure of military bases

26. The MONUSCO standard operating procedures for closure of military bases require the head of office and military brigade commander in the respective province to: (a) jointly prepare risk assessments and submit them to the Force Headquarters prior to closing the military base; and (b) assess on a monthly basis the impact of its closure on the protection of civilian situation up to three months after the closure of the base and report to the Force Headquarters.

27. A review of the closure of nine military bases showed that for eight bases, heads of offices and military commanders did not prepare joint risk assessments and submit reports to Force Headquarters. While Force Headquarters issued orders outlining instructions on the closures of all nine bases and the military advised OIOS that these orders were issued only after the joint risk assessment had been conducted, copies of these assessments were not available. MONUSCO also did not have evidence that heads of offices and military commanders were continuing, at least for three months after the closure of the bases, to assess and document the impact of the closure on the protection of civilian situation. The military advised OIOS that most of assessments had been conducted in meetings; however, these were not documented.

28. The above occurred because the Mission did not implement monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to ensure that heads of offices and military commanders systematically complied with established procedures on the closure of military bases and that the required assessments were documented. As a result, there was inadequate assurance that potential threats to civilians following the closure of military bases were adequately assessed and appropriate mitigating measures put in place to ensure sustained protection of civilians following the closure of bases.

(6) MONUSCO should implement effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to ensure that heads of offices and military commanders systematically conduct pre-/post-base closure assessments, as well as document and submit the results of these assessments to the Force Headquarters.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 6 and stated that it would conduct joint post-closure follow-up assessment by heads of offices and military commanders 60 days after closure of a base under the aegis of the Force Headquarters. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the Mission has systematically conducted joint pre-/post-base closure assessments and documented the results of these assessments.

D. Training

Need to maintain records for training delivered to troops

29. The Force Commander's training directive requires the Military Training Cell to provide a training plan to all military contingents to ensure that troops are suitably trained to perform their mandated tasks. It also requires contingents to comply with the plan and report the completion of training activities to the Force Training Officer at the Military Training Cell for recording in a consolidated training database.

30. Interviews with military personnel in Beni, Bunia and Bukavu and the Force Training Officer in Goma and reviews of the Force annual training plans and records for the period from January 2015 to June 2016 indicated that the Military Training Cell provided monthly training plans to military contingents. However, the Cell did not maintain supporting documents on the completion of 59 per cent (48 out of 81) of the required training activities.

31. The above resulted because the Military Training Cell did not implement effective follow-up procedures to ensure that the training activities were completed, reported to Force Headquarters and recorded in the consolidated training database. Without adequate documentation to support the completion of training, there was inadequate assurance that all troops received appropriate training to enhance their operational capacity to perform their mandated functions.

(7) MONUSCO should implement effective follow-up procedures to ensure that all training activities are completed, reported to the Force Headquarters and recorded in a consolidated training database.

MONUSCO accepted recommendation 7 and stated that sufficient procedures were in place for Force Headquarters and the Military Training Cell to manage and track training and that greater emphasis would be placed on 'top-down' support by clarifying training requirements, mechanisms for feedback, and tracking. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of evidence that all training activities have been completed, reported to the Force Headquarters and recorded in a consolidated training database.

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

32. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MONUSCO for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
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Office of Internal Oversight Services

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Audit of military operations for the protection of civilians in the
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	C/ O ³	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁴
1	MONUSCO should implement a mechanism to operationalize the requirements of the United Nations system-wide strategy for the protection of civilians regarding the participation of civilian components in the planning of military operations to make sure risks to civilians are properly identified and assessed and appropriate mitigating measures are put in place.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that the Mission has implemented adequate procedures to systematically carry out joint military-civilian strategic planning of military operations.	30 June 2017
2	MONUSCO should provide guidance and training to the military component on the updating of the Integrated Text and Event Management system to ensure that all required data and information such as the descriptions, dates, and times of actions taken in response to alerts/reports received are timely and completely recorded.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that guidance and training have been provided to the military component on the use of the ITEM System and that all required data and information such as the descriptions, dates, and times of actions taken in response to alerts/reports about threats to civilians are recorded in the System.	30 June 2017
3	MONUSCO should take action to ensure the requirements for preparation of collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments, and after-action reviews to: (i) identify and implement appropriate mitigating measures to minimize collateral damage; and (ii) identify lessons learned to improve the effectiveness of future operations to make sure there is reliable information for independent assessment of the effectiveness of the Mission's protection of civilian activities.	Critical	O	Receipt of evidence and OIOS verification that MONUSCO has conducted collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments, and after-action reviews for its military operations.	30 June 2017
4	MONUSCO should take effective actions such as	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has	31 December 2017

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

³ C = closed, O = open

⁴ Date provided by MONUSCO in response to recommendations.

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Audit of military operations for the protection of civilians in the
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	C/ O ³	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁴
	providing adequate guidance and training to the military component on the: establishment of realistic operational and result-based budget targets; allocation of necessary assets; and implementation of monitoring procedures to achieve and accurately report against the established targets.			provided adequate guidance and training to the military component on the establishment of realistic targets, allocation of necessary assets and implementation of monitoring and reporting procedures to achieve and accurately report against established targets.	
5	MONUSCO should conduct more night patrols in line with the prevailing threats against civilians and ensure that military contingents have functional equipment while on night patrols.	Critical	O	Receipt of evidence that MONUSCO has conducted night patrols in in line with the prevailing threats against civilians.	30 June 2017
6	MONUSCO should implement effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to ensure that heads of offices and military commanders systematically conduct pre-/post-base closure assessments, as well as document and submit the results of these assessments to the Force Headquarters.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that the Mission has systematically conducted joint pre-/post-base closure assessments and documented the results of these assessments. .	31 December 2017
7	MONUSCO should implement effective follow-up procedures to ensure that all training activities are completed, reported to the Force Headquarters and recorded in a consolidated training database.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that all training activities are completed, reported to the Force Headquarters and recorded in a consolidated training database.	30 June 2017

APPENDIX I

Management Response

	Recommendation	Critical⁵/ Important⁶	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client Comments
1	MONUSCO should implement a mechanism to operationalize the requirements of the United Nations System-wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians regarding the participation of civilian components in planning for military operations to make sure risks to civilians are properly identified and assessed and appropriate mitigating measures are put in place.	Important	Yes	Mission PoC Lead and FHQ DCOS Ops	30 June 2017	<p>a. MONUSCO agrees with the recommendation to reinforce the participation of civilian components in strategic planning of military operations, considering Protection of Civilians (PoC) aspects.</p> <p>b. Building on the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ adopted in MONUSCO, the Force Strategic Forum has already commenced the Joint Strategic Planning process. The first monthly meeting was held on 09 February 2017 co-opting the Head of Office (HoO), the Senior Political Adviser, PoC Lead (Joint Human Rights Office) and other civilian component representatives.</p> <p>c. In addition, the Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO), Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration; and Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (ODSRSG) Rule of Law (RoL) and Operations (OPS), already participate in Daily Force briefings.</p> <p>d. The Mission PoC lead will work with the Force Headquarters (FHQ) Staff and Office of the Mission</p>

⁵ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

⁶ Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

	Recommendation	Critical⁵/ Important⁶	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client Comments
						Chief of Staff in developing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to formalise the PoC risk assessment in relation to military operations.
2	MONUSCO should provide guidance and training to the military component on the updating of the Integrated Text and Event Management system to ensure that all required data and information such as the descriptions, dates, and times of actions taken in response to alerts/reports received are timely and completely recorded.	Important	Yes	DCOS Ops at FHQ, ITEM focal point (ODSRSG RoL Ops)	30 June 2017	<p>a. MONUSCO accepts the recommendation on reinforcing ITEM adaptation training.</p> <p>b. Instruction from FHQ has already been issued to Brigades and Sectors. The first model ITEM data input was demonstrated to the 5th Committee by North Kivu Brigade and will be carried forward to the remainder of the FORCE elements adopting the 'Train the Trainer' concept.</p> <p>c. MONUSCO will develop a structured training programme to implement the recommendation in accordance with existing ITEM Standard Operating Procedures.</p>
3	MONUSCO should take action to ensure the requirements for preparation of collateral damage estimates, battle damage assessments, and after-action reviews to: (i) identify and implement appropriate mitigating measures to minimize collateral damage; and (ii) identify lessons learned to improve the effectiveness of future operations to make sure there is reliable information for independent assessment of the effectiveness of the Mission's protection of civilian activities.	Critical	Yes	DCOS Ops (FHQ) and O/COS (MONUSCO)	30 June 2017	<p>a. MONUSCO confirms that Post-operation After-Action reviews are being stringently carried out by Brigades for each Battalion level operation and documented. These reviews include, Armed Groups (AG) neutralized / surrendered, AG infrastructure destroyed and warlike stores recovered (Battle Damage Assessment).</p> <p>b. With the introduction of the advanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</p>

	Recommendation	Critical⁵/ Important⁶	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client Comments
						<p>(UAV) anticipated in June 2017, BDA may be possible through-out the Force Area of Operations. Terrain, resource and operating environment challenges in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are likely to constrain BDA even with technology enablers.</p> <p>c. A MONUSCO working group will develop a realistic methodology for BDA that is; (i) in line with the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) and other provisions governing the use of the Force; (ii) has consensus in MONUSCO and amongst Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and incorporates Advanced Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) inputs.</p>
4	MONUSCO should take effective actions such as providing adequate guidance and training to the military component on the establishment of realistic targets, allocation of necessary assets and implementation of procedures to achieve and accurately report against the established targets.	Important	Yes	O/COS (Strategic Planning Cell) and Force (DCOS Ops)	31 December 2017	<p>a. MONUSCO will ensure adherence to Results Based Budgeting (RBB), planning and reporting requirements through development and maintenance of a portfolio of evidence for the use of Mission assets in order to meet planned targets. As part of an ongoing collaborative process that includes the Force, training to enable the trend-forecasting of realistic targets will be conducted. The training will address specific concerns expressed by the Force related to the recommendation.</p> <p>b. The Mission is fully mindful that the</p>

	Recommendation	Critical⁵/ Important⁶	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client Comments
						operating environment is fluid and changing tactical requirements will clearly dictate the real numbers of patrols in the fiscal year. The targets forecasted are thus likely to be dynamic and not a defining parameter for RBB.
5	MONUSCO should: (a) during its process of establishing realistic targets, ensure more night patrols are being conducted in line with the prevailing threats against civilians; and (b) ensure that military contingents are equipped with functional equipment for night patrols as required by their respective memoranda of understanding.	Critical	Yes	DCOS Ops	30 June 2017	<p>a. MONUSCO accepts this recommendation. FHQ has instructed that Brigade and Sector Concept of Operations (CONOPS) be planned and re-oriented to night operations at a frequency depending on the Tactical Comander's assessment of the prevalent operational environment, threat and tactical situation obtaining on ground. Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 99-2016 outlines this methodology.</p> <p>b. A portfolio of evidence in the form of Situation Reports (SITREPS), FRAGOs, Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Inspection reports and such like documentary records will be maintained at Brigade levels</p>
6	MONUSCO should implement effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to ensure that heads of offices and military commanders systematically conduct pre-/post-base closure assessments, document and submit the results of these assessments to the Force Headquarters.	Important	Yes	DCOS Ops and DCOS Ops Sp O/DSRSG RoL Ops and HoO	31 December 2017	<p>a. MONUSCO accepts the recommendation and confirms the existence of a promulgated SOP on the issue.</p> <p>b. The Force Commander authorizes the establishment / closure of a Company Operating base (COB)</p>

	Recommendation	Critical⁵/ Important⁶	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client Comments
						<p>Temporary Operating Base (TOB) Standing Combat Detachment (SCD) in consonance with operational imperatives and considering the recommendations of Brigade / Sector Commanders and HoO (through the Senior Management Group on Protection at the Provincial level – (SMGP-P).</p> <p>c. In addition to the existing SOP (Seven-step Process) which has been validated over a period of time (best practice), a joint post-closure follow-up assessment will be conducted under the aegis of FHQ 60 days after closure of a Base to allow for an impact assessment window.</p>
7	MONUSCO should implement effective follow-up procedures to ensure that all training activities are completed, reported to the Force Headquarters and recorded in a consolidated training database.	Important	Yes	DCOS PET	30 June 2017	<p>a. MONUSCO and accepts the recommendation and confirms that sufficient procedures are in place for FHQ and Military Training Cell to manage and track training.</p> <p>b. Greater emphasis will be placed on ‘top-down’ support by clarifying training requirements, mechanisms for feedback, and tracking.</p>