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Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Management audit of United Nations civilian police operations

Note by the Secretary-General

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 48/218 B of 29 July 1994 and 54/244 of 23 December 1999, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit, for the attention of the General Assembly, the attached report, conveyed to him by the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, on the management audit of United Nations civilian police operations.

2. The Secretary-General takes note of the review of United Nations civilian police operations and the recommendations made in the report. The Secretary-General is also pleased to note that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has already taken measures to address many of the issues identified in the review.



Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the management audit of United Nations civilian police operations

Summary

The Civilian Police component of United Nations peacekeeping operations has increased significantly, both in size and scope of operations. Less than two years ago, civilian police, who are provided by Member States, numbered approximately 2,200 and functioned primarily as monitors. Currently, there are more than 8,600 civilian police personnel, 75 per cent of whom have full executive police powers. The Civilian Police Unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations coordinates and oversees the management of civilian police across all peacekeeping missions.

Based on a request from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, a management audit was initiated by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to review civilian police operations, with a view to enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency.

The audit was conducted at United Nations Headquarters and at the three missions with the largest civilian police components: the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH); the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET); and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

The OIOS audit was carried out concurrently with a study by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. OIOS believes that the findings in the present report parallel those of the Panel (A/55/305-S/2000/809), and that the recommendations should be considered as input into the Secretary-General's ongoing comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations, as requested by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (see A/54/839, para. 67).

The audit identified several positive accomplishments by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which included:

- (a) Using selection assistance teams to test and select civilian police in their home countries;
- (b) Using databases for managing police personnel, crime statistics and logistics tracking in UNMIK; integrating civilian advisers into the Police Commissioner's office at UNTAET;
- (c) Creating a fully functional police training college with an initial graduating class of 40 cadets, less than ten months after the establishment of UNTAET;
- (d) Implementing a co-location programme and joint patrols with local police in an effort to develop closer working relationships, as observed in UNMIBH.

Notwithstanding these accomplishments, many of the recommendations concerning civilian police that were made in previous reports and analyses have not been implemented. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has continued to "reinvent" civilian police management and administrative systems with the inception of each new mission. In order to assist in improving civilian police operations, the

present report contains several observations and recommendations in three broad categories, namely, strategic issues, recruitment and managerial issues.

Strategic issues

Despite the massive increase in the deployment of civilian police, a comprehensive civilian police strategy has not yet been developed. Such a strategy should establish a methodology for calculating civilian police strength, provide for a common civilian police identity across all missions and establish performance measures and mechanisms for institutionalizing lessons learned. Greater use of information technology is also needed to facilitate the management of civilian police, both at headquarters and in the missions.

OIOS recommends that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

(a) Raise the level of the post of Civilian Police Adviser within the Department and change the structure so that he reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations, thereby enabling him to better assist the Security Council in its decision-making concerning civilian police;

(b) Strengthen staff capabilities within the Civilian Police Unit to enable it to develop strategic plans and policies, and to manage information systems and technology;

(c) Develop civilian police mission start-up kits (including standard operating procedures, organizational structures, job descriptions, management information systems and equipment specifications) in order to facilitate rapid and effective deployment of civilian police to new missions;

(d) Standardize civilian police designations, uniforms, equipment and patrol vehicle markings.

Recruitment issues

Civilian police selection criteria remain unchanged throughout the life of a mission, regardless of its stage and the skills needed. In addition, the qualifying grade for the English proficiency test has been standardized, although it was clear that in certain missions, a higher level of proficiency would be more appropriate. OIOS also found that frequent civilian police rotations, particularly at senior management levels, were detrimental to operations.

The Civilian Police Unit has not been proactive in recruiting potential civilian police from Member States whose language and culture are similar to those of the mission area. Further, no programme is in place to train and develop civilian police for rapid deployment. In order to improve civilian police recruitment and training efforts, OIOS recommends that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

(a) Proactively train and develop a cadre of “United Nations-certified” civilian police who are ready for rapid deployment;

(b) Improve the effectiveness of the selection assistance teams by
(i) expanding the use of these teams to additional contributing countries and
(ii) incorporating induction training into team visits;

(c) Identify essential civilian police positions and offer regular United Nations appointments to attract candidates of the higher calibre and to help retain institutional memory;

(d) Target the recruitment of civilian police from countries with languages, cultures or legal systems similar to those of the mission area.

Managerial issues

Civilian police are deployed in several non-policing roles, such as guarding prisons, protecting dignitaries, providing security, performing customs duties and other administrative functions. The audit also revealed inefficiencies in transporting large civilian police contingents to and from missions.

To improve the overall managerial efficiency and effectiveness of the civilian police function, OIOS recommends that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

(a) Request Member States to contribute skilled civilian or non-commissioned civilian police officers to perform the administrative functions, as well as specialists in the other non-policing activities currently being performed by civilian police;

(b) Appoint a central coordinator within the Civilian Police Unit who will be responsible for managing rotations and repatriations;

(c) Establish an information technology focal point within the Civilian Police Unit to manage central integrated databases and to develop and support standard civilian police applications in areas such as logistics, crime and incident reporting.

Civilian police have an enormous responsibility in being the “face of the United Nations” who are in direct contact with local populations in war-torn countries. They must act professionally and be perceived as members of a coherent, integrated body. The operational improvements suggested above represent only a part of the total solution to the issues identified within the Civilian Police Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Department’s management must, in addition, reassess current civilian police responsibilities and determine which of these functions are critical to mission success.

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Abbreviations

IPTF	International Police Task Force
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

I. Introduction

1. United Nations civilian police have been a component of peacekeeping missions for the past three decades. Traditionally, civilian police have performed basic monitoring and verification functions. Subsequently, they began to provide advisory and training assistance and, in certain cases, reinforced and restructured local police capacity. More recently, civilian police have taken on broader law enforcement functions in such areas as traffic regulation, enforcement of border controls and criminal investigations. The scope of civilian police activities within each mission varies according to the mandate granted by the General Assembly or the Security Council.

2. Between 1964 and 1999, the authorized strength of civilian police serving in peacekeeping missions rose to approximately 2,200, the majority of whom were deployed, since 1995, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a result of the Peace Agreement.¹ With the inception of two large missions in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, the authorized strength of civilian police has increased fourfold to 8,646.² This growth in number and responsibility indicates that the civilian police element has become an integral part of peacekeeping operations.

3. For the 12-month period ending 30 June 2000, budgetary requirements for civilian police at the three missions with the largest civilian police components, namely, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), amounted to \$203 million.³ At United Nations Headquarters, a Civilian Police Unit was established within the newly created Military and Civilian Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Unit comprises nine Professional and two General Service positions, and is mandated to: coordinate and oversee civilian police activities in the field; provide necessary policy guidance to peacekeeping missions; and liaise with civilian police contributing countries.

4. The audit was initiated on the basis of a request from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations that the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) review certain substantive components of peacekeeping operations, including

civilian police, with a view to enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the missions. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, at its annual session, which concluded on 10 March 2000 (see A/54/839), also recommended that a comprehensive review of the relevant elements of peacekeeping operations be undertaken. OIOS anticipates that the findings and recommendations contained in the present report will assist the Special Committee in its review of civilian police. OIOS is also encouraged by the fact that many of the recommendations made by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) parallel those made in the present report.

5. The overall objective of the audit was to identify potential improvements in the management and administration of civilian police. The audit also sought to:

(a) Determine the extent to which the current civilian police recruitment process was satisfying mission requirements;

(b) Assess whether civilian police assigned to missions possessed the skills and training needed to perform their tasks effectively;

(c) Evaluate the use of data and information systems in managing the civilian police component;

(d) Review the role and effectiveness of the Civilian Police Unit.

6. The audit was conducted from April to July 2000 and included field visits to UNMIBH, UNTAET and UNMIK. The auditors interviewed mission officials and official representatives from six of the major civilian police contributing Member States, visited eight United Nations civilian police stations and two of the Special Police Units within the three mission regions, and reviewed the activities of the Civilian Police Unit at United Nations Headquarters. The audit also considered the findings of the Lessons Learned Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, various end-of-mission analyses, minutes and papers from the civilian police workshops, as well as the annual reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The results of the audit were originally presented to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in a summary briefing report. The Department's comments were considered in the preparation of the present report and are shown in italics.

II. Strategic issues

7. The role of the civilian police component within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has evolved in a piecemeal, unplanned manner. Traditionally, civilian police were a relatively small component of peacekeeping missions, their role being less significant than that of the military contingents. In recent years, this has changed markedly. The international community has recognized that civilian police can play an important role in securing law and order within post-conflict environments. The number of civilian police in missions has increased notably, and most of these officers have been delegated full law enforcement authority. Increasingly, civilian police are seen as the “face of the United Nations”, since they have the most direct interaction with the local population in war-torn locations.

8. The functions of civilian police differ significantly from mission to mission. For example, the mandated functions of the 35 civilian police monitors currently serving in UNFICYP are limited to basic observation and monitoring duties. In contrast, the civilian police in Kosovo have been tasked with an array of policing and non-policing tasks. Annex I describes the prescribed mandates, functions and current authorized strengths for the three missions covered by the audit. Clearly, the mode of operation differs at each mission. Further, the Security Council has recently taken the unprecedented step of

authorizing the civilian police deployed in Kosovo and East Timor to carry side arms.

9. The current functions and operational capacity of the Civilian Police Unit at United Nations Headquarters are also indicative of an ad hoc approach to delivering policing services within the peacekeeping context. The Unit is nominally responsible for setting policy and for civilian police mission oversight. In reality, it operates principally as a servicing unit, responding to requests from the field missions, serving as the point of contact between the field and the permanent mission representatives of some 70 contributing countries, and providing status reports to senior management of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Apart from the chief of the Unit and his deputy, the seven other Professional staff act as desk officers for the different field operations. These desk officers have also participated in more than 50 selection assistance team visits conducted since January 1999, to ensure that civilian police candidates meet certain basic standards before deployment (see para. 48).

10. It appears that, owing to a scarcity of resources and the massive increase in civilian police staffing requirements in such a short period of time, the Unit has not been able to provide critical strategic direction and policy guidance. Management and information systems and generic standard civilian police operating procedures for field missions and the Civilian Police Unit are still being developed.

11. Owing to the fact that the resources of the Civilian Police Unit have fluctuated and it has no regular budget posts, it is subject to the instability of the peacekeeping programme support account. Moreover, the capacity to develop an institutional memory regarding policy and procedures has been limited by the departure of gratis personnel, some of whom were responsible for maintaining critical systems at the start-up phase of the Unit. At the time of the OIOS audit, most of the staff of the Civilian Police Unit were senior police officers on secondment from their Governments for a limited time. This also contributed to the Unit's inability to develop working methods, operating systems and an effective institutional memory. Of the nine Professional staff, none was dedicated full time to planning and information management functions.

A. Absence of a defined methodology for calculating civilian police strength

12. OIOS was unable to identify a rationale or accepted methodology for calculating authorized civilian police strength at the outset of a given mission, or the factors that dictate whether and when the mission strength should be recalculated. At UNMIBH, for example, an initial assessment team recommended an authorized strength of 1,722 civilian police, based on a desired ratio of United Nations civilian police to local police. This deployment was later increased to 2,057 civilian police following key Security Council decisions.

13. Nearly five years after the initial deployment, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations could not provide an updated strength rationale or a justification for the continued presence of 2,057 civilian police in that mission. In addition, many of the senior commanding officers expressed dissatisfaction with deficiencies in the actual number of civilian police employed, as compared with the authorized strength. However, they were not able to articulate exactly what tasks and work remained undone as a result of the shortfall.

14. At UNMIK, on the other hand, the methodology for determining the authorized strength of 4,718 was very specific. It was based on clear, generally accepted criteria, such as analyses of existing crime levels as well as the ratio of police officers to the population in accordance with accepted European norms.⁴

15. The key individuals interviewed by OIOS differed as to whether the initial focus on numbers in arriving at the authorized strength in the Mission should be the main priority, as opposed to ensuring that qualified, competent police are selected for critical mission and specialist policing functions. Actual achievement of the authorized strength in the Mission⁵ was complicated by the fact that up to 10 per cent of these civilian police were assigned to non-police functions, such as static guard duties and customs control. Furthermore, only some of the 1,100 officers in the four Special Police Units were performing regular police duties. While they did participate in joint patrols, they were mostly kept on standby for deployment in the event of a riot, or if the need for their performance in a paramilitary capacity arose. These factors raised questions about the validity of the calculation of 4,718 for authorized strength, relative to the services actually required by the Mission.

16. Senior managers at UNMIK, on the other hand, questioned whether the Mission's strength was sufficient, in view of the volatile mission environment. Other factors, such as post-conflict crime incident levels and the downsizing of the military presence of the international security force, known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR), are persuasive arguments for maintaining, if not increasing, the current civilian police capacity. OIOS noted that there was a plan for recruiting and training 4,000 local officers to serve in the newly formed Kosovo Police Service by July 2001. A continued international police presence of the same magnitude may, therefore, not be justified as the local authorities progressively assume the executive policing role. These factors indicate that an ongoing review of pertinent strength requirements is advisable in policing missions.

B. Absence of clearly defined milestones and performance indicators

17. OIOS also noted the lack of clearly delineated milestones or critical events against which civilian police deployment could be measured. At the three missions visited, a number of critical goals had already been achieved. However, it was not always clear what work remained to be done, how it would be measured and what a desirable target date would be for the United Nations to initiate its exit strategy and ultimately transfer full responsibility to the local police

institution. This was particularly true for the monitoring mission in UNMIBH, which had been in existence for five years, and had an incomplete exit strategy at the time of the OIOS visit.

18. OIOS acknowledges the fact that achieving sustainable change in policing methods and enforcing the rule of law in these regions present complicated, multifaceted challenges, which can certainly not be met in a short period of time. Further, OIOS recognizes that the ongoing conflict and political factors beyond the control of the police, such as the establishment of a credible judiciary, also affect the ability of the police to function effectively. Nevertheless, despite differences in the dimensions of each conflict and in the missions' mandates, OIOS believes that the establishment of specific milestones and measurable performance targets could assist in the decision-making process and improve civilian police management.

C. Absence of a strategy for optimal use of information technology in managing civilian police

19. Despite the existence of several well-constructed, comprehensive databases in two of the three missions visited, the Civilian Police Unit at Headquarters had limited centralized capacity to aggregate inputs from different civilian police missions in order to provide consolidated data on a timely basis. In the opinion of OIOS, this is a key factor contributing to the inability to establish basic police systems and strategies.

20. The absence of a coordinated strategy for using technology in managing civilian police activities was demonstrated by the disparate systems encountered in the missions and the independent development of applications without central guidance from the Civilian Police Unit. The development of information systems to support civilian police depends largely on the technological expertise of that personnel in each mission. As a result, where a mission did not have technology-proficient civilian police, its information systems did not mature beyond basic spreadsheets, as was the case in East Timor.

21. Civilian police who develop sophisticated database applications are also subject to rotation policies and do not remain for the life of the mission; when they depart, they take with them the working knowledge of the systems they developed.

22. OIOS is of the view that a standard application package that is centrally supported and maintained should be deployed across all missions. The package should include a civilian police database that is integrated with a central database in the Civilian Police Unit for incident reports and crime trends, and a logistics management application.

D. Limited capacity to create policy and institutionalize improvements

23. The OIOS review of pertinent documentation showed that progress has been made in improving civilian police management. These improvements included implementation of the selection assistance team concept, issuance of a generic civilian police handbook and formulation of more precise guidance for contributing countries. However, significant problems persist, including those relating to interpretation of Security Council mandates, quality and professionalism of civilian police deployed and unclear rules of engagement. In addition, little progress has been made on such crucial issues as the creation of a rapid deployment police capacity.

24. A mechanism is needed to ensure that knowledge acquired in this relatively new area of United Nations activity is institutionalized. OIOS believes that progressively strengthening the Civilian Police Unit and raising the profile of civilian police within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations could achieve this goal.

E. Gaps in policy guidance

25. The audit identified several examples of inconsistent or insufficient policy guidance on operational matters ranging from determining criteria for the deployment of Special Police Units, to defining entitlements for compensatory time off. While standard operating procedures have been issued in all three of the missions visited, they vary considerably in terms of comprehensiveness and substance. OIOS noted that the Civilian Police Unit had not developed a generic set of standard operating procedures which could be adapted and implemented at each new mission. Furthermore, at the two newer missions (UNTAET and UNMIK), OIOS found that the operating procedures had not been clearly established and distributed from the outset. At

UNTAET, the procedures had been revised and finalized by the Police Commissioner at the end of June 2000, more than nine months after the first civilian police deployment. The inconsistency in procedures was further exacerbated by two other sources of guidance namely, notes for civilian police, issued by the mission's Chief Administrative Officer and a civilian police handbook, distributed by the mission's Induction Training Centre in Darwin.

26. There has been some restructuring and consolidation within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations affecting the role of the Civilian Police Unit in providing guidance. The Civilian Police Unit, previously part of the Mission Planning Service, was assigned to the newly created Military and Civilian Police Unit in accordance with Secretary-General's bulletin (ST/SGB/2000/9) of 15 May 2000. As under the previous structure, the Civilian Police Adviser continues to report to the Chief Military Adviser in the Department. As such, the Military Adviser is responsible for a large civilian component, the management and basic mode of operation of which is generally incompatible with the training and experience of military personnel. Furthermore, military policy and strategy may be quite different from police policy.

27. OIOS was unable to find any justification for combining civilian police and military functions within the same organizational unit. Most of the officials interviewed by OIOS indicated that police operations were not normally linked organizationally to the national military component. Rather, it was important for the police to establish a separate, independent identity, particularly in missions where police functions had traditionally been associated with oppressive, authoritarian regimes. OIOS was pleased to note that the mission police commissioners had direct reporting lines to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In UNTAET, where the United Nations exercises control of military operations, OIOS found that there was no operational or formal reporting link between the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner.

28. In the view of OIOS, the current reporting line at Headquarters limits the significance and impact of the civilian police component within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The overall civilian police function has, in fact, suffered from the lack of a high-ranking official within the Department to guide the

Security Council in its decisions on policing strengths and mandates, advocate for the interests of the civilian police component and to institutionalize Organization-wide civilian police policy.

29. In its report, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations confirmed many of the above-mentioned observations and stressed the need to further strengthen the Civilian Police Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and enhance the role of the Civilian Police Adviser.

F. Inconsistent, variable civilian police identity

30. The OIOS mission visits showed that the civilian police identity varied from mission to mission. For example, at UNMIBH, civilian police are referred to as International Police Task Force (IPTF) monitors. In Kosovo, they are the UNMIK Police, and at UNTAET, they are called United Nations civilian police. OIOS believes that the existence of Special Police Units at UNMIK and the Rapid Response Units in East Timor within the civilian police structure, causes further confusion with regard to the identity of the civilian police.

31. Additional confusion arises from the fact that civilian police wear their national uniforms and are identified as civilian police only by the blue beret and a United Nations arm badge. In some instances, UNTAET civilian police wear uniforms with the IPTF logo.

32. At UNTAET, civilian police patrol the streets in white vehicles, with the black "UN" identifier, and are thus indistinguishable from vehicles used by other civilian mission components. This makes it difficult for the local civilian population to easily recognize them. In UNMIK, however, the police have unique, identifiable vehicles, which afford them greater visibility in the local community (see annex II).

33. Although these inconsistencies may appear to be relatively minor, they reflect the significant variances among missions. United Nations military contingents, in contrast, can be clearly identified within every peacekeeping mission. The use of common and easily distinguishable uniforms and vehicles would similarly raise the visibility and establish the identity of civilian police in each mission.

III. Recruitment issues

34. The civilian police recruitment process is initiated by the Secretary-General's request to members of the General Assembly for contributions of police officers to support a peacekeeping mandate. This is followed by a note verbale to Member States from the Civilian Police Adviser, reiterating the Secretary-General's request and providing the Member States with details regarding the basic criteria for selecting civilian police. OIOS found this process to be largely reactive, which limited the speed of civilian police deployment. Further details regarding the operational issues are discussed below.

A. Static recruitment criteria for all missions

35. The recruitment criteria for civilian police in all three missions visited were generic and have remained largely unchanged since the inception of the missions. The current civilian police specifications require that police officers:

- (a) Be over 25 years of age;
- (b) Have at least five years of service in a national police force;
- (c) Be proficient in English;
- (d) Have a valid driver's licence;
- (e) Meet the Organization's medical requirements.

Furthermore, civilian police in UNTAET and UNMIK must be experienced in handling firearms. Both the selection assistance teams that were invited to test candidates in each country, and the induction testing in the mission, focused exclusively on the above-mentioned criteria.

36. As missions progress in achieving their mandates, conditions change. Therefore the skills set should change to match prevailing conditions. In UNMIBH, for example, IPTF has progressed to a stage where this civilian police role involves co-location with local police. This requires that, in addition to serving as monitors, civilian police be experienced in coaching and mentoring, if they are to be effective in institutionalizing international policing standards in the

local police. The selection criteria, however, have not been expanded to include these competencies.

37. According to civilian police officials, UNMIK and UNTAET have progressed to the point where the number of civilian police who possess only basic police skills should be reduced, while specialists in areas such as training, investigations, organized crime, forensics, drug trafficking and police intelligence should be increased. In the view of OIOS, the appropriate civilian police skills could be brought to the mission at the right time if the Civilian Police Unit, when establishing recruitment specifications for civilian police, consulted with the Police Commissioner to determine the specific skills needed. The missions currently attempt to fill the demand for specialist police on an ad hoc basis, by recruiting from civilian police already in the mission, using a skills search where a database exists, or through internal advertising. This approach is not effective because the best suited candidates may not be in the mission at the time the specialist skills are being sought.

38. These observations point to the need for police commissioners to regularly assess mission requirements, in order to determine the appropriate mix of recruitment specifications and skills. The Civilian Police Unit could then advise the Member States of any changes to the recruitment specifications and police specialties needed. This approach would ensure that Member States are kept informed of the updated skills requirements and allow them to nominate candidates who meet the existing mission requirements.

B. Standardized passing grade for the language proficiency test

39. In addition to establishing standardized recruitment criteria, the Civilian Police Unit also standardized the qualifying grade for the English proficiency test at 60 per cent for all missions. In the opinion of OIOS, standardizing the passing grade does not allow for distinguishing between monitoring duties and active policing. The Unit's decision was taken without input from the police commissioners interviewed by OIOS. The ability to communicate effectively with colleagues, the chain of command and the public were cited in several interviews as being critical for policing in missions mandated with executive authority. Violent situations or civil disobedience could develop unexpectedly, thereby

requiring civilian police to react without having the added complication of misinterpreting orders or being unable to call for emergency assistance.

40. Only the civilian police in UNMIK are required to obtain a higher qualifying grade for English proficiency. The grade, 75 per cent, was set by the Police Commissioner, who believed that the higher standard was necessary given the nature of the mandate and mission conditions. OIOS found that the quality of the reports and operations information was higher at UNMIK than at UNMIBH and UNTAET. Commanding officers, particularly those who had served at other United Nations missions, noted that greater English language proficiency has had a significant positive impact on operations, particularly in providing flexibility with regard to how and where civilian police are deployed. Senior management at UNMIK attributed the high quality of the civilian police directly to this selection standard and expressed their strong reluctance to lower it. OIOS acknowledges the scarcity of police resources and the difficulty in meeting the authorized strength. However, in its view, consistent emphasis on high standards in recruiting civilian police will result in improved effectiveness.

C. Absence of a recruitment strategy for targeting contributing nations

41. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations had not developed a recruitment strategy for targeting contributing countries with culture, language, geography or legal system similar to those in the peacekeeping mission areas. Requests for the contribution of police officers are directed to all members of the General Assembly, but no further effort is made to identify specific countries that may have a distinct advantage because of their language, culture, geography, or legal system. While all contributions of scarce resources, such as police officers, are acceptable, OIOS supports a recruitment approach that targets certain countries to increase their mission presence. In East Timor, for example, civilian police who could speak Bahasa or Portuguese, or who were familiar with the Timorese culture were reportedly more effective in their duties. Unfortunately, there were not enough of such officers to reduce the demand for local language assistants. Targeting of contributing nations would also require the Civilian Police Unit to

fully understand the missions in order to identify appropriate contributing countries.

D. Selection assistance teams

42. The selection assistance team approach, developed in late 1996 to provide assistance and guidance to police-contributing Member States in selecting civilian police candidates, has assisted the United Nations and Member States to reduce costs. The selection assistance team usually includes representatives of the mission and Civilian Police Unit. The OIOS review confirmed the value of this approach, which merits recognition and further enhancement. Although pre-deployment testing by the teams has generally helped to reduce the cost of repatriating unqualified police and to save time lost in retraining and re-testing police in the mission area, the process needs to be further refined.

43. In UNMIBH, for example, despite the widespread application of the selection assistance team concept, there was a high degree of re-testing of basic requirements once the civilian police arrived. This took up approximately one quarter of the total induction period. OIOS believes that this resource-intensive task could be eliminated if missions were able to rely on the integrity and uniformity of the testing.

44. In another instance, Member State authorities received less than 24 hours' notice of the arrival of the selection assistance team, which occurred on a weekend when most civilian police candidates were off duty and scattered throughout the country. Of the 63 candidates originally scheduled for testing, only 24 could be located, of which 4 met the requirements.

45. In theory, candidates presented for testing by the team should be pre-screened by their respective Member States to ensure that they meet the minimum requirements established by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in accordance with the prescribed pre-screening guidelines provided to Member States. However, as illustrated by a sample of seven selection assistance team visits shown below, the pre-screening process needs to be improved. It should be further noted that, in some cases, selection assistance teams have had to visit the same country repeatedly, owing to the lack of candidate preparedness and/or lack of coordination with the Member States.

<i>Testing date</i>	<i>Candidates tested</i>	<i>Candidates approved</i>	<i>Candidates failed</i>	<i>Percentage of failed candidates</i>
26 January 1999	177	67	110	62
24 April 1999	112	21	91	81
26 January 2000	194	5	189	97
30 January 2000	183	5	178	97
6 February 2000	194	5	189	97
19 April 2000	334	50	284	85
26 April 2000	302	76	226	75

Data supplied by the Civilian Police Unit.

46. Mission managers unanimously supported pre-testing, urging that it be made mandatory for all countries. In addition to eliminating re-testing, the selection assistance teams have reduced costs, because testing in the contributing country eliminates the need for paying mission subsistence allowance to unqualified civilian police who report to the mission area and have to be repatriated. The selection assistance teams also allow for incorporating induction training into the visit for selected candidates. The costs incurred by the increased duration of the team's stay could be offset by the savings in allowances that would normally be paid to civilian police while on induction training in the mission. Performing induction training in the contributing country also expedites civilian police deployment upon arrival in the mission area.

47. Strong internal controls are required to preserve the integrity of pre-selection testing and to obviate the need for re-testing in the mission. The controls should ensure that the candidates who passed the test in their home country are, in fact, the same candidates sent to the mission.

E. Ineffectiveness of the current medical clearance process

48. The value of the current medical clearance process is limited. Statistics show that large numbers of civilian police were deployed to the field without having obtained prior clearance from the United Nations Medical Service. For example, more than 7,000 monitors were deployed to the field in 1998 and 1999, yet the Medical Service only had clearance records for two thirds of them. Although only 25 of the

monitors had been declared medically unfit prior to deployment, the Medical Service was unable to determine whether or not they had been deployed.

49. There was no compelling evidence to suggest that a larger number of civilian police had fallen sick in the mission as a result of weaknesses in the current medical clearance process. The current medical clearance process therefore appears to be of little value and OIOS believes that the responsibility for providing civilian police who are medically fit for service in a mission should lie with the contributing Member State. This would eliminate the need for the United Nations to medically screen civilian police candidates.

IV. Training issues

50. A significant proportion of civilian police resources were allocated to training and assessing local police cadets and to providing induction training for new civilian police officers. In the opinion of OIOS, the local police training programmes were well formulated and operated in a professional manner at all three missions reviewed. Mission management had selected civilian police with proven training experience in developing curricula, providing instruction, and formulating mentoring and monitoring programmes.⁶ The nature and format of civilian police induction training varied significantly among the missions. Improvements are needed in training to raise the overall level of civilian police professionalism and preparedness.

51. The table below summarizes the length of time and amount of resources devoted to civilian police induction training. The induction period at UNMIBH appeared to be too long, given the fact that it is a monitoring mission where, arguably, the civilian police functions are less complicated.

52. OIOS also noted that only UNMIBH had established an assessment system which was used soon after the arrival of the civilian police in the mission. This system facilitated deployments based on the skills and experience of the civilian police. In the other two missions, the induction period was not used to match skills to specific positions.

Analysis of civilian police induction training programmes in three missions

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Length of induction programme (days)</i>	<i>No. of trainers</i>	<i>Comments</i>
UNMIBH	8	19	About two days spent on re-testing in-mission.
UNMIK	4 days plus 6 days in the field	46	46 includes 10 driving instructors who re-test driving in mission.
UNTAET	4-5 days	16	Induction training in Darwin; Driving re-tested in Dili; Construction of shooting range planned for Dili

53. In all three missions, audit interviews provided anecdotal evidence of inadequate levels of preparedness. Some contributing Member States' representatives also commented that regular, up-to-date materials on living and working conditions in specific mission areas were not always available for distribution. Examples of the varying degrees of civilian police lack of preparedness included:

(a) Officers arriving with summer uniforms only, which were unsuitable for extreme winter weather conditions;

(b) The use of more than 60 different side-arm models and types of ammunition;

(c) Civilian police possessing little or no basic policing equipment;

(d) Officers who had received improper pre-deployment immunizations or who had not been provided with sufficient preventative medication against prevalent health risks, such as malaria.

54. Statistics provided by the Office of the Chief Medical Officer at UNTAET revealed that, of 898 civilian police examined, 105 were diagnosed with febrile illness, 72 with malaria and 5 with dengue fever. The office confirmed that the risk of illness is increased when civilian police arrive in the mission without having received any of the required vaccinations or preventative medication in their home countries.

55. Another less tangible, but equally critical factor in ensuring that civilian police are mission-ready is the management of expectations. Police officers should know what to expect in terms of their duties and working conditions prior to arrival. In addition to a healthy mental attitude, civilian police need to be educated in the methods and rules of engagement for each specific police mission, which may vary significantly between a monitoring or an executive policing mission.

56. Applicable local laws and standards vary, and the national chain of command of the civilian police is no longer applicable. In the mission, civilian police receive operational instructions from officers of different nationalities, who may be of lower rank. Knowledge of the United Nations structure and administrative requirements is also necessary. In some instances, civilian police need to adapt to an entirely new environment. They must be prepared for high levels of violent crime and civil disobedience, which are endemic to a post-conflict operating environment. In short, civilian police will generally not function in the same manner as they did in their home countries.

57. At UNMIK, for example, OIOS noted more than 160 cases of early civilian police repatriation in the year following initial deployment "for personal reasons or on other grounds". Commanding officers attributed this relatively high rate (46 per cent) of early repatriations to the unexpected stresses of mission life, difficult working conditions or unrealistic expectations of the nature of civilian police work. In that regard, one senior commanding officer commented that the civilian police responsibilities at his posting in the volatile region of Mitrovica in Kosovo were the most challenging of his 20-year career.

58. The guidance sent to contributing States indicates clearly that Member States are responsible for pre-mission training and briefing. The extent to which those responsibilities are met varies significantly from country to country. Some individual countries, particularly within the European Union, have formulated specific training programmes for preparing their contingents prior to deployment to United Nations missions.

59. Currently, the Organization is not capable of ensuring that police from all contributing Member States have adequate mission-preparedness training. It is not realistic to expect that a brief induction

programme, offered when police are already on site, can compensate for a large disparity in mission-preparedness training.

60. OIOS believes that a pre-certification system could help to ensure that a cadre of pre-trained senior officers from contributing Member States are qualified to serve in critical functions in any police mission, on short notice. These officers could also serve as trainers for civilian police contingents in their own home countries. This system could partially address national preparedness disparities and take the first critical step in establishing an ongoing, sustainable rapid-deployment capacity. The United Nations Staff College Project in Turin, Italy, could be a site for establishing a centrally located civilian police certification programme. Small groups of officials from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including police representatives, have already attended courses at this facility since 1996. OIOS believes that the viability of a central civilian police training facility in such a location should be examined.

V. Issues related to management efficiency and effectiveness

A. Excessive number of civilian police performing non-police functions

61. The audit identified several examples of civilian police performing non-police functions. OIOS found that about 18 per cent of the civilian police in UNMIBH and UNMIK, and 10 per cent in UNTAET, were assigned to mission headquarters. Furthermore, approximately 8 per cent of the total number of civilian police in the three missions were performing administrative functions, in areas such as personnel, procurement, developing databases and logistics. OIOS believes that it would be more efficient to use experienced civilian staff or non-commissioned police officers in the performance of such duties rather than trained policemen in uniform.

62. In the missions, administrative and headquarters-based civilian police positions are more desirable than those in the field, owing to lower risk, better working conditions and more regular hours. The recruitment of candidates for those positions therefore becomes highly competitive, to the point where there is a preoccupation with who will get the positions, the fairness of

selections, and whether there is equitable representation of nationalities. Such competition introduces issues that must be resolved by the civilian police management, often when there are other priorities directly related to the mandate to be urgently dealt with. OIOS believes that the missions would be better served by limiting the use of civilian police to police work and staffing the non-police positions through specific requests to Member States for contributions of civilian or non-commissioned personnel experienced in such areas as logistics, personnel management and information technology.

B. Lack of institutional memory in civilian police management

63. The institutional memory of a mission's civilian police component is lost each time key members rotate at the end of their assignments, as critical information regarding the complexity of a mission is often not documented or handed over when there is a change in leadership. As a result, progress in developing systems, key projects and relationships with external agencies and community leaders is impeded. OIOS also noted that there is no system for debriefing civilian police prior to their rotation. The Civilian Police Unit does not gather any data on civilian police experiences nor suggestions for improvement. This results in considerable loss of institutional memory and in mission experiences not being recorded before the individual police officers return to their countries.

64. The impact of frequent changes at the management level in civilian police administration was evident at UNTAET, where the incumbent police commissioner was the third in nine months, and several of the senior managers were also recent appointees. The audit showed that vital UNTAET operations data was not accessible and that systems for recording personnel information and logistics were discontinued when the officers responsible for their development and implementation ended their tours of duty. UNMIBH has had five police commissioners in five years and, at the time of the audit, the new incumbent had only been in office for two weeks. UNMIK in contrast, had not experienced any change in commissioners or deputy commissioners during the period in which UNTAET had had three commissioners.

65. OIOS found that key senior managerial positions, including that of deputy commissioner, were filled by civilian police who were subject to the rotation policy of their countries and did not receive remuneration from the United Nations, except for mission subsistence allowance. The police commissioner is the only civilian police official holding a United Nations appointment. While the commissioner's contract is renewable, it has a fixed term of between 6 and 12 months.

66. Civilian police tours of duty range from six months to one year, depending on the policy of the contributing country. Only the commissioner, with the approval of a given police officer's national Government can authorize the extension of a civilian police's tour of duty in a mission. Countries are often reluctant to grant extensions either because they need the officer to resume duties at home, or because they prefer to give other officers the opportunity to serve as civilian police. While the rotation of civilian police is normal, its effect on mission operations needs to be minimized.

67. There appears to be no incentive for senior civilian police managers to remain in missions at the expense of career advancement opportunities in their home countries. OIOS believes that the impact of civilian police rotations on the mission could be minimized if key positions were treated differently with regard to the duration of tours of duty and the type of appointment offered.

68. Institutional memory could also be maintained through the approach used at UNTAET, where United Nations-appointed civilian staff are recruited to work as special advisers to the Police Commissioner. OIOS is optimistic that, in addition to longer contracts for key civilian police staff, the relative stability offered by civilian United Nations employees will strengthen the institutional memory of the civilian police in the mission and minimize setbacks resulting from frequent changes in leadership.

C. Need for improved coordination in planning rotations of civilian police

69. The audit showed that there have been problems in processing major rotations of departing contingents. The OIOS review of travel and charter arrangements for civilian police rotations showed that the current

system is fragmented in terms of coordination and with regard to the criteria used for deciding whether to use commercial airlines or charters.

70. The experience in UNMIBH confirmed the need to better coordinate rotations and selection assistance team visits. In one example, the lack of coordination between the team, UNMIBH management and the Civilian Police Unit resulted in a five-day delay in the repatriation of 84 civilian police. The mission had to pay \$30,000 in mission subsistence allowance to civilian police who had already completed their exit procedures. In addition, failure to communicate with the selection assistance teams resulted in the incoming contingent not being able to travel on the same chartered aircraft used to transport the outgoing contingent from the same country. Systemic improvements are therefore necessary to ensure that problems encountered at UNMIBH are not replicated on a larger scale at the two new missions, which have not yet experienced such problems.

D. Fragmented system for recovering early repatriation costs

71. The rules covering early repatriation for failure to meet qualifications and the financial obligations of the Organization and contributing countries were reiterated in an instruction issued by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on 10 August 1998. A test of compliance with this instruction showed that the system for recovering civilian police repatriation costs to be borne by the contributing countries was fragmented and largely ineffective. One critical criterion for determining responsibility for such costs is whether the civilian police passed the selection assistance team test held in the country of origin. If so, the Organization is obliged to pay all costs. The OIOS analysis of the most recent data regarding early repatriations from the three missions since 1999 showed the following:

1. United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

72. The Accounts Division compiled a summary showing a total of \$195,647 in early repatriation costs to be recovered as at 31 December 1999. However, in one instance, the Member State disputed the charge, stating that a selection assistance team had tested the monitors who had been repatriated. The Accounts

Division does not have access to the team's records and is therefore not in a position to know whether this argument is valid. The Division sought clarification on the case from the Field Administration and Logistics Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but at the time of the audit, the matter had not been resolved. Based on the percentage of repatriated civilian police, who had been pre-tested, OIOS estimated that approximately \$125,000 of the total receivable balance is recoverable. The Accounts Division was unable to confirm the extent to which these monies had been recovered.

2. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

73. Between the start-up of the mission in July 1999 and the audit visit one year later, there had been 157 early repatriation cases and an additional 165 cases of police officers returning home for disciplinary or other reasons. The Accounts Division had invoiced \$153,770 in respect of 114 monitors as at 25 July 2000. Once again, however, it was not clear whether this figure was complete or whether it excluded the travel costs of the selection assistance team-approved civilian police. OIOS was unable to determine whether the system of recovery would ensure that the Organization was reimbursed for all funds due.

3. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

74. Cost recovery does not appear to be a material issue, as there had been only 16 cases of early repatriation at the time of the audit. Nevertheless, this may become a more significant issue as the mission approaches its authorized strength.

75. OIOS also noted that recovery depended upon whether account clerks in the mission charged the relevant account code and sent an inter-office voucher to the Accounts Division to recover the costs from the Member State. In the absence of a formal contract or binding memorandum of understanding, the Organization relies on the terms and conditions set out in the notes for guidance, to determine liability for early repatriation costs. Furthermore, the extent to which the Organization can forcefully pursue these charges with delinquent countries is unclear, especially since it is making concurrent appeals to the same Member States for further contributions of civilian police. Nevertheless, OIOS believes that, where it is

clear that the Member State is liable, cost recovery should be pursued.

76. UNMIBH officials also provided details concerning monitors who had failed mission requirements, but were not repatriated immediately. The table below shows the most extreme cases of delayed repatriation. These monitors continued to receive mission subsistence allowance, although they were not contributing to the police effort within the Mission. This practice led to the unnecessary payment of nearly \$250,000 in subsistence allowance to 57 civilian police and had a demotivating effect on those officers who had met the requirements and were functioning productively.

	<i>Number of civilian police</i>	<i>Number of days in Mission</i>	<i>Subsistence allowance paid (in United States dollars)</i>
1.	2	104	15 600
2.	2	74	11 100
3.	23	47	81 075
4.	16	58	69 600
5.	6	61	27 450
6.	3	63	14 175
7.	5	79	29 625
	57	486	248 625

77. The guidance indicates that the contributing Member States are responsible for ensuring that officers meet all the mission requirements. In the opinion of OIOS, the Organization should not have to pay the travel costs or the related mission subsistence allowance to repatriate officers who should have been pre-screened before arriving in the Mission.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

78. In the last decade, civilian police have become increasingly important as a component of the United Nations effort to enforce law and order in post-conflict environments. Each of the three missions visited by OIOS evidenced some degree of excellence and best practices which deserve to be recognized and replicated in future missions. These practices include:

(a) Developing integrated databases for police personnel, crime statistics and logistics tracking in

UNMIK, which were used by senior management for decision-making;

(b) Integrating civilian human rights positions and expertise within the office of the UNMIBH Police Commissioner;

(c) Creating a fully functional police training college in East Timor, with a graduating class of 40 cadets, less than ten months after formation of UNTAET;

(d) Establishing selection assistance teams leading to more productive use of resources and fewer repatriations in all three missions;

(e) Improving working relationships with the local police (e.g. development of a co-location programme in UNMIBH and a joint patrolling/mentoring system with the newly formed and trained Kosovo Police Service).

79. However, OIOS also noted that many of the recommendations made in the numerous studies, reports, and analyses covering management of civilian police in the last five years have not yet been implemented. As a result, the Organization has not been able to ensure that weaknesses in civilian police management and procedures are avoided at the inception of missions. OIOS has identified several important areas for improvement. Its recommendations generally follow the structure of the reported findings.

80. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented on a preliminary draft of the present report and noted that OIOS had identified key problems and offered timely and practical solutions concerning civilian police operations, which have made an important contribution to the Department's self-assessment. The Department generally agreed with the OIOS recommendations, and its specific comments are shown below in italics.

81. Recommendations in the present report which parallel those made by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations are marked with an asterisk (*).

Strategic issues

Recommendation 1

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should:

(a) Promulgate a United Nations Police protocol, including a methodology for determining mission strength, performance indicators, as well as entry and exit strategies;

(b) Strengthen the role and prominence of the Civilian Police Unit by:

(i) Allocating additional resources to the Unit;*

(ii) Developing a professional planning and information management capacity;*

(iii) Ensuring operational independence from the military side of the Department and establishing a direct reporting line to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.* (AM2000/41/01)

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations generally concurred with these recommendations and noted that the issue of strengthening the role and prominence of the Civilian Police Unit needed to be considered within the context of the reforms recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

Recommendation 2

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should:

(a) Reclassify the level of the post of the Civilian Police Adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the same level as his military counterpart and ensure that the incumbent has the organizational status and proper authority to influence policy decisions on handling firearms, staffing and deployment of special forces; leverage support from contributing countries; and act as the police spokesperson at Headquarters;*

(b) Ensure that the Civilian Police Adviser is represented at all mission start-up and assessment visits. (AM2000/41/02)

The Department noted that these recommendations were similar to those made in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and that they would be addressed within the relevant implementation process.

Recommendation 3

In order to facilitate the timely and efficient establishment of civilian police operations in peacekeeping missions, the Civilian Police Unit should develop a police mission start-up kit, including generic operating procedures, codes of conduct, logistics specifications, job descriptions, information systems requirements, recruitment standards and reporting requirements.* (AM2000/41/03)

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations stated that this recommendation would be addressed in the context of implementing the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, but indicated that developing start-up kits would require a significant amount of staff time.

Recommendation 4

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should develop a standard policy setting out the civilian police nomenclature within missions, specifications concerning mission police uniforms and the identification of patrol vehicles in missions having executive police authority, in order to ensure easy identification and to avoid confusion among the local population. (AM2000/41/04)

The Department stated that the civilian police nomenclature was being standardized by the Civilian Police Unit as part of its information management strategy. While recognizing that standardizing uniforms and vehicles could be beneficial, the Department expressed a number of concerns: first, this effort would involve considerable financial and organizational implications. Second, the varied terrain, climates and political cultures of mission areas may pose particular requirements which could not be accommodated without extensive stockpiling of uniforms. Third, according to the Department, the wearing by civilian police of their national uniforms could help to emphasize the universality of the Organization.

OIOS acknowledges the Department's comments concerning this recommendation. However, OIOS continues to believe that the potential benefits of standardizing uniforms and vehicles outweigh the costs, particularly in missions where civilian police have executive police authority.

Recruitment and Training

Recommendation 5

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should:

(a) Establish a permanent United Nations Police preparedness training programme to develop a standing cadre of United Nations-certified civilian police from all contributing countries;*

(b) Institutionalize a police training programme for trainers in contributing countries;*

(c) Consider using the International Labour Organization Training Centre in Turin for these purposes. (AM2000/41/05)

The Department noted that this recommendation was similar to the findings of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, but advised that developing a comprehensive training programme would require additional human resources for the Civilian Police Unit and the Training Unit.

Recommendation 6

The Civilian Police Unit should improve the effectiveness of the selection assistance team mechanism by:

(a) Expanding the use of these teams to additional countries based on those countries' prior record of early civilian police repatriation;

(b) Ensuring that the test is administered only to those candidates who provide adequate identification and evidence of medical clearance;

(c) Adding at least one non-police civilian United Nations staff member, preferably with human resource testing experience, to the team, to ensure the objectivity of the testing process;

(d) Discontinuing the practice of re-testing civilian police in the field;

(e) Providing successful candidates with induction training and mission-preparedness materials. (AM2000/41/06)

In concurrence with the OIOS recommendation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has instituted policies which preclude civilian police that have been tested by selection assistance teams from

being re-tested in the mission. In addition, the Department is issuing pre-deployment training packages to assist the contributing Member States. The Department did not comment on paragraphs (b) and (c) of this recommendation in its response.

The Department disagreed with the recommendation for mandatory selection assistance team testing of civilian police from all contributing Member States. However, OIOS has modified its recommendation to require testing based on the contributing countries' record of early repatriations, as it is more cost-effective to use a selection assistance team than to repatriate a contingent of civilian police.

Recommendation 7

The Civilian Police Unit should improve the current recruitment system by:

(a) Ensuring that contributing countries sign a formal memorandum of understanding for providing civilian police under prescribed terms and conditions, including assurances that each monitor has been properly screened, equipped and medically cleared;

(b) Relating recruitment requirements to the mission mandate, such as requiring higher English comprehension and firearms handling standards for executive policing missions;

(c) Preparing generic job descriptions for specialist police functions such as investigators, trainers, forensics, drug control and organized crime, to be sent with the initial request to contributing countries;

(d) Establishing a strategy for developing a larger pool of potential candidates, which should include approaching countries that are currently not contributing police, and developing suitable criteria for the selection of retired officers. (AM2000/41/07)

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations did not comment on recommendation 7 (a). Regarding recommendation 7 (b), the Department noted that it would be reluctant to vary requirements by mission, since this would run counter to the maintenance of a transparent, universal and comprehensive standard, which was established in response to the strong wishes of Member States. It commented that the Civilian Police Unit Policy and Planning Agenda included specific projects for developing generic job descriptions, which would require additional human

resources. The Department advised that a new policy regarding the use of retired police had been developed. Notwithstanding the Department's reservations concerning recommendation 7 (b), OIOS points out that UNMIK has already applied a higher English comprehension standard. Further, OIOS does not believe that this action would result in a loss of transparency.

Recommendation 8

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should direct mission police commissioners to complete a cyclical revision of staffing needs and recruitment criteria to ensure that the Civilian Police Unit's periodic approach to contributing country representatives is based on the most up-to-date assessment of needs. (AM2000/41/08)

The Department fully concurred with this recommendation, but noted that the police commissioners' ability to conduct such reviews was dependent on appropriate pre-mission planning and budgeting to ensure that they have adequate resources.

Recommendation 9

The Civilian Police Unit should improve mission administration and ensure that institutional memory is preserved by:

(a) Requesting a complement of civilian personnel or non-commissioned officers at each mission to handle administrative functions (logistics, personnel management, scheduling) on behalf of civilian police;

(b) Establishing a small number of civilian positions within the Commissioner's office to educate the police on United Nations administrative procedures and to facilitate coordination with mission administration and Headquarters;

(c) Ensuring that the positions of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner receive United Nations appointments of at least one year, to attract and retain a high calibre of applicants. (AM2000/41/09)

The Department fully concurred with all elements of this recommendation and noted that it favoured expanding such civilian positions to include sociologists and human rights experts.

Recommendation 10

The Civilian Police Unit should seek to increase the deployment of selected nationalities with cultural and language familiarity or knowledge of the operative legal system in the mission area. (AM2000/41/10)

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations agreed in principle with this recommendation, but noted that the deployment of civilian police officers depended upon the willingness of contributing Member States. Further, the Department pointed out that political sensitivities could hinder the Organization's ability to deploy officers from Member States with cultural and language familiarity of the mission area.

Recommendation 11

The management of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should task at least one individual within the Civilian Police Unit to analyse and implement lessons learned, experiences gained and recommendations made at the annual civilian police workshops.* (AM2000/41/11)

The Department fully agreed with this recommendation and advised that it would be implemented in the context of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

Recommendation 12

The Civilian Police Unit should direct police commissioners to institute debriefings of departing civilian police, which could help to improve mission preparedness and induction programmes, as well as overall management of civilian police. (AM2000/41/12)

The Department concurred with this recommendation.

Managerial efficiency and effectiveness issues**Recommendation 13**

The Civilian Police Unit should coordinate more closely with the Field Administration and Logistics Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations when arranging rotations of civilian police, in order to ensure that the most economical mode of transportation is used. (AM2000/41/13)

Recommendation 14

The Field Administration and Logistics Division should develop criteria for allocating early repatriation costs and ensure proper recovery of such costs, including the amounts already owing for monitors repatriated from UNMIBH and UNMIK. (AM2000/41/14)

(Recommendations 13 and 14 were reformulated in response to comments made by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on a preliminary draft of the present report.)

Recommendation 15

The Civilian Police Unit should make optimal use of data management and information technology by:

(a) Developing standard, easily deployable systems, software and reporting specifications for personnel, logistics and crime incidents from the inception of a mission;*

(b) Establishing an information technology focal point within the Unit;*

(c) Ensuring that all mission databases are accessible and can be integrated with the Unit's databases.* (AM2000/41/14)

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations fully concurred with this recommendation and advised that it would be implemented in the context of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

(Signed) Dileep Nair
Under-Secretary-General for
Internal Oversight Services

Notes

¹ General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (collectively, the Peace Agreement), signed at the Paris Peace Conference on 14 December 1995 (S/1995/999, annex).

² The figures related to authorized strength were provided by the Civilian Police Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and are as at 4 August 2000.

- ³ This figure excludes base salary costs, which are covered by the contributing countries. The budgetary provisions for UNTAET civilian police were for the seven-month period ending 30 June 2000.
- ⁴ Ratios vary from 400 citizens to 1 police officer in Germany, to 800 to 1 in Sweden. The UNMIK authorized police strength of 4,718 envisages a ratio of 331 citizens to 1 police officer.
- ⁵ As at 6 July 2000, 3,880 civilian police were deployed to Kosovo, including the Special Police Units.
- ⁶ At UNMIK, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was responsible for establishing and operating the local police academy, as well as for funding its operations.

Annex I

Summary of the mandates of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the International Police Task Force

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Security Council resolution and date</i>	<i>Summary of mandate</i>	<i>Authorized strength</i>	<i>Actual strength as at 31 July 2000</i>
UNTAET	1272 (1999), 25 October 1999	Overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.	1 640	1 306
UNMIK	1244 (1999), 10 June 1999	Establish an international civil presence in Kosovo, in order to provide an interim administration under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration, ... whose responsibilities will include maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces ..., while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.	4 718	3 882
IPTF	1035 (1995), 21 December 1995	Monitor law enforcement activities and judicial organizations; advise and train law enforcement personnel, facilitate law enforcement activities; assess threats to public order; advise governmental authorities on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and assist by accompanying the Parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities.	2 057	1 572