

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

REPORT 2017/042

Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

There was a need to improve prevention and enforcement measures and to address misconduct cases

6 June 2017 Assignment No. AP2016/637/04

Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of governance, risk management and control processes over the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The audit covered the period from 15 September 2014 to 31 October 2016 and included a review of prevention, enforcement, remedial and reporting activities.

MINUSCA took measures to maintain discipline and good order among uniformed personnel to ensure compliance with the United Nations standards of conduct, implemented the Department of Field Support accountability measurement framework and reporting requirements, and participated in the network of the United Nations Country Team to implement a victim assistance mechanism. However, the Mission needed to ensure effective prevention and enforcement measures are implemented.

OIOS made nine recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, MINUSCA needed to:

- Finalize its communication and outreach strategy to guide the creation of public information products and outreach activities related to sexual exploitation and abuse;
- Implement a reliable mechanism for tracking and monitoring staff compliance with mandatory training requirements and take steps to ensure all staff comply with the requirements;
- Develop and implement a detailed timetable for visits to identify and assess risks related to conduct and discipline and implement appropriate mitigating measures;
- Establish and implement a follow-up mechanism to ensure timely implementation of recommendations from risk assessment visits;
- Implement adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure welfare committees function as intended;
- Allocate adequate resources to enable conduct and discipline staff to receive and process misconduct allegations in a safe, confidential, transparent and efficient manner;
- Consistently enforce the requirements for assessing, recording and referring allegations;
- Implement a tracking system to assist in identifying long pending cases and follow up with concerned offices to resolve and close allegations; and
- Ensure the timely review of investigation reports and compliance of reports with applicable standards.

MINUSCA accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement them.

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Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

2. The Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) in MINUSCA is responsible for receiving, assessing and referring allegations of misconduct to appropriate investigative bodies of the United Nations and Member States. The Head of CDT is the principal advisor to the Head of Mission on conduct and discipline issues and is responsible for providing: (a) policy guidance and technical advice; (b) assistance in developing preventive strategies for responding to personnel misconduct; and (c) dissemination of United Nations guidelines, policies and procedures on conduct and discipline.

3. CDT is headed by a staff at the D-1 level who reports to the Mission Chief of Staff. CDT has 15 authorized posts including 10 international, 2 national and 3 United Nations volunteers. The 2015/16 and 2016/17 budgets for CDT were \$1.3 million and \$4 million respectively.

4. Comments provided by MINUSCA are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

5. The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of governance, risk management and control processes over the conduct and discipline function in MINUSCA.

6. This audit was included in the 2016 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the operational and reputation risks related to the conduct and discipline of United Nations personnel serving in MINUSCA.

7. OIOS conducted this audit from September to December 2016. The audit covered the period from 15 September 2014 to 31 October 2016. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risks in the management of the MINUSCA conduct and discipline function, which included: (a) prevention activities; (b) enforcement activities; (c) remedial activities; and (d) reporting.

8. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews of key personnel; (b) review of relevant documentation; (c) analytical reviews of data; (d) random sample testing; and (e) physical observation.

III. OVERALL CONCLUSION

9. MINUSCA took measures to maintain discipline and good order among uniformed personnel to ensure compliance with the United Nations standards of conduct, implemented the Department of Field Support (DFS) accountability measurement framework and reporting requirements, and participated in the network of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) to implement a victim assistance mechanism as part of the Organization's strategy on remedial action to address misconduct. However, MINUSCA needed to: (a) finalize and implement a communication and outreach strategy; (b) implement a reliable mechanism for tracking and monitoring staff compliance with mandatory training requirements and

ensure all staff comply with the requirements; (c) maintain complete and accurate records on allegations of misconduct; (d) allocate adequate resources for receiving and processing misconduct allegations in a secure and confidential manner; and (e) comply with the requirements for assessing, recording and referring allegations of misconduct.

IV. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Prevention activities

<u>Preventive measures were taken to maintain discipline among uniformed personnel and enforce</u> <u>compliance with United Nations standards of conduct</u>

10. The DFS Advisory on conduct and discipline in field missions (the DFS Advisory) requires MINUSCA commanding officers of deployed uniformed personnel to take all reasonable measures to maintain discipline and good order among their subordinates and ensure compliance with the United Nations standards of conduct, mission-specific rules and regulations.

11. A review of all seven quarterly reports and the annual performance report prepared by CDT for the fiscal year 2015/16 indicated that in the light of increased number of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) cases reported during fiscal years 2014/15 and 2015/16, MINUSCA had taken preventive measures during the fourth quarter of 2015 to maintain discipline and good order among uniformed personnel through the establishment of specific working groups focusing on SEA prevention and enforcement at both strategic and operational levels including:

- An SEA Prevention Task Force for uniformed personnel at both headquarters and sector levels created by the Force Commander's third Directive dated 16 November 2015 with the responsibility to: (a) identify potential risks to SEA; (b) visit troop locations and camps; (c) assist with educating and sensitizing on prevention; and (d) assess troop morale and motivation as well as sporting and welfare activities. Measures taken by the Task Force included amongst others, the introduction of coordinated risk assessment visits jointly with police, military and CDT staff to various military camps in MINUSCA to identify and assess risks related to conduct and discipline and implement appropriate mitigating measures.
- A Bangui-based Joint SEA Prevention Team chaired by the Force Commander comprising representatives from different components, including all United Nations agencies. The Team held weekly meetings and took various measures to mitigate risks of SEA in hotspot areas including the introduction of mobile day and night joint patrols by military and police personnel around troops and internally displaced persons camps to reduce loitering and the possibility for unauthorized movements out of their respective camps.

12. OIOS concluded that MINUSCA had taken reasonable measures to maintain discipline and good order among uniformed personnel to ensure compliance with the United Nations standards of conduct, mission-specific rules and regulations.

There was need for an SEA communication and outreach strategy

13. The DFS Advisory requires MINUSCA to develop an SEA communication and outreach strategy with the host population.

14. A review of activity reports prepared by CDT for the fiscal year 2015/16 indicated that MINUSCA had put in place an SEA Task Force which is a multi-disciplinary working group of senior managers focusing mainly on finalizing the Mission's comprehensive SEA prevention strategy, including a detailed communication strategy for prevention of SEA to enhance the Mission's efforts to disseminate appropriate messages to targeted audiences. CDT also developed a website that provides information on SEA and prohibited conducts.

15. However, MINUSCA had not finalized and implemented its communication and outreach strategy on SEA. The draft outreach strategy had not been disseminated and implemented mainly because it had to be included in the mission-wide communication strategy that was still pending finalization by the MINUSCA Public Information Office. Due to the lack of an approved SEA communication and outreach strategy, there was a risk that the Mission was not effective in communicating with the local population to address issues related to SEA.

(1) MINUSCA should finalize its communication and outreach strategy to guide the creation of public information products and outreach activities related to sexual exploitation and abuse.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 1 and stated that its draft strategic communications & public information (SCPI) strategy, including specific strategies on communications and outreach related to SEA, was under review by Mission leadership. CDT was also in the process of developing a more detailed outreach strategy and action plan. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of the final and disseminated SCPI strategy to guide the creation of public information products and outreach activities related to SEA.

There was a need for a reliable mechanism for tracking and monitoring staff compliance with mandatory induction training

16. The DFS Advisory requires MINUSCA to: (a) provide adequate and effective induction and other trainings on United Nations standards of conduct, mission-specific rules and regulations, relevant local laws, and protection of the host country public from SEA; and (b) collect data on the number of individuals in each category of personnel that have been trained.

17. A review of induction training records indicated that: 6,042 out of 10,416 military personnel (58 per cent); 2,257 out of 3,938 police personnel (57 per cent) and 768 out of 1,545 civilian staff (50 per cent) deployed in MINUSCA during the period from September 2014 to October 2016 did not attend training sessions on SEA, respectively.

18. CDT advised that: the statistics were inaccurate as there were flaws in the data collection by contingent trainers; and there were gaps between its knowledge of new arrivals and those participating in mandatory induction training sessions. Further, review by OIOS confirmed that the records and hence the statistics were unreliable as the Mission was unable to provide attendance sheets for 54 per cent of the participants. As a result, there was an unmitigated risk that Mission personnel were not fully aware of the United Nations standards of conduct and policy against SEA and did not conduct themselves accordingly.

(2) MINUSCA should implement a reliable mechanism for tracking and monitoring staff compliance with mandatory training requirements and take steps to make sure all staff have complied with the requirements.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 2 and stated that it will continue to improve the tracking system for training delivered to new personnel outside the regular induction course. MINUSCA

also stated that CDT will discuss with concerned sections the option of including a conduct and discipline check-in/check-out link in the existing system used for onboarding personnel to ensure newcomers are trained as part of the check-in process. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MINUSCA has implemented a reliable mechanism for tracking and monitoring staff compliance with mandatory training requirements.

Need for improved identification and assessment of risks of misconduct

19. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to regularly identify and assess the risks of misconduct associated with different categories of United Nations personnel or specific locations.

20. Interviews with CDT personnel and a review of all 14 risk assessment reports and seven quarterly performance reports on conduct and discipline for the period ended 30 September 2016, indicated that CDT had assessed conduct and discipline related risks using an approved checklist in all camps in Bangui and made recommendations to mitigate identified risks. However, CDT did not:

• Implement nine recommendations from the risk assessment visits to contingent camps in Ngakobo, Berberati and Carnot town including those calling for: (a) fencing of perimeter camps to separate the local population from military personnel and prevent fraternization; and (b) erection of a concertina fence around a military camp to prevent access by locals who enter to collect water from the water point located inside the camp; and

• Carry out risk assessments in 19 of 37 operating bases where MINUSCA had a significant number of personnel and where incidents of SEA had been previously reported and investigated. These bases were located in Sibut with 798 troops, Bangassou with 107 troops, Rafai with 98 troops, and Obo with 49 troops.

21. The above occurred because CDT did not adequately plan its risk assessment activities. For example, CDT had not developed a schedule of locations to be visited in sectors Centre and East taking into consideration the constraints already known such as: (a) inaccessibility of some locations due to road or security conditions, especially during the rainy season; and (b) limited staffing resources. Also, CDT did not establish and implement a follow-up mechanism to ensure timely implementation of recommendations from the risk assessment visits.

22. As a result, there was a risk that the Mission did not adequately identify activities and conditions that could lead to misconduct in order to implement appropriate mitigating measures.

(3) MINUSCA should develop and implement a detailed timetable for visits to the various Mission locations, taking into consideration known constraints, to identify and assess risks related to conduct and discipline and implement appropriate mitigating measures.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 3 and stated that CDT has developed and started performing Mission-wide risk assessments linked to all types of misconduct including SEA. Risk assessment visits are scheduled based on priority areas, trends of misconduct and implicated personnel or contingents. MINUSCA also stated that each field Conduct and Discipline Officer would prepare monthly and quarterly risk assessment visit plans, which will be monitored for implementation and will form the basis for performance evaluation. These risk assessment plans will be coordinated with the Sector Joint SEA Prevention Teams and the results thereof channeled into the MINUSCA SEA risk assessment framework and mapping exercise which will be updated and inform decision-making for various activities. Recommendation 3 remains open pending

receipt of evidence that MINUSCA has developed and implemented a detailed timetable for conduct and discipline-related risk assessment visits to the various Mission locations.

(4) MINUSCA should establish and implement a follow-up mechanism to ensure timely implementation of recommendations from the risk assessment visits.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 4 and stated that CDT possesses neither the executive authority nor logistical capacity necessary to ensure compliance with past recommendations and will as part of its responsibility, continue to monitor and report on progress. MINUSCA also stated that it would, with the approval of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, establish a Risk Management Working Group to review and follow-up on the implementation of recommendations for eliminating and mitigating risks to SEA and other misconduct. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the Mission has implemented a follow-up mechanism to ensure implementation of recommendations from risk assessment visits.

Need to enhance welfare and recreation facilities and activities

23. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to monitor the implementation of welfare and recreation activities and perform an advisory role on welfare and recreation committees. Further, Circular No. IC-016/15 dated 11 September 2015 issued by the Director of Mission Support requires MINUSCA to establish welfare committees in all sector offices which should meet at least quarterly, to plan, implement and report on welfare activities and challenges faced.

24. A review of welfare records and discussions with welfare committee members including the CDT representative indicated that MINUSCA had established nine welfare committees throughout the Mission area. However, despite CDT contributing to the planning of welfare activities, providing inputs to the decisions of committees, and consistently highlighting the non-functioning of committees in its quarterly performance reports to Mission senior management, welfare committees in Bangui did not:

- Develop annual work plans including welfare activities to be carried out;
- Maintain minutes of welfare committee meetings;
- Prepare quarterly compliance reports on activities undertaken as required by the Director of Mission Support Circular No. IC-016/15;
- Establish welfare and recreation facilities at 34 permanent operating bases. MINUSCA personnel only had access to basic facilities such as television and common kitchens;
- Organize welfare activities such as cultural, sport, and trip events at any of the Mission locations; and
- Establish counselling, psychosocial and relaxation centres in any of the Mission locations.

25. The above resulted because Mission management was not taking action to improve the performance of welfare activities. As a result, there was a risk that welfare activities were inadequate and ineffective to help improve the conduct and discipline situation in the Mission.

(5) MINUSCA should implement adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure welfare committees are functioning as intended and allocate adequate resources to establish welfare and recreation facilities at Mission locations.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the Director of Mission Support provides oversight over the implementation of the United Nations Welfare Policy on behalf of the Head of Mission and the CDT performs an advisory role on the provisions of the Policy and is represented on the Mission's staff welfare committee and makes the effort to hold the committee accountable. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the Mission has implemented an adequate welfare programme throughout the Mission.

B. Enforcement activities

Need for adequate resources to receive and process misconduct allegations

26. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to establish efficient, safe, confidential, transparent and accessible mechanisms for receiving and processing misconduct allegations. This includes: adequate and secure channels for reporting misconduct such as a private meeting room, telephone hotlines, private photocopy machines, vehicles, printers and secure email addresses.

27. OIOS site visits to four Mission locations in Bangui, Bambari, Bouar and Bria and discussions with CDT officers indicated that CDT offices in Bangui and Bambari had adequate channels for reporting misconduct such as a private meeting room, telephone hotlines, private photocopy machines, printers and secure email addresses. However, the CDT offices in Bouar and Bria did not have private meeting rooms, photocopiers, printers and scanners to receive and handle allegations. As a result, it was difficult for complainants to have access to CDT and there was an increased risk of the confidentiality of allegations being compromised as these officers were sometimes sharing facilities with others. For example, CDT officers in Bouar and Bria were connected to shared printers located away from their working spaces. The Officer in Bouar was using his living accommodation for official activities and the Officer in Bria was sharing a tent office space with logistics and human resources sections.

28. The above resulted as MINUSCA did not prioritize the allocation of private office space and necessary facilities for conduct and discipline activities in Bouar and Bria even though CDT had repeatedly requested the Mission Support Division for support. For example, the CDT Officer in Bouar had not received a positive response from Mission Support to three requests dated 12 October 2016, 5 December 2016 and 18 January 2017 respectively. Also, prior to the deployment of the CDT Officer in Bria, the Chief CDT through an inter-office memorandum dated 20 April 2016 and an email communication dated 27 September 2016 requested the Regional Administrative Officer to allocate a more confidential office space to enable CDT to handle the sensitive part of the work related to case management. However, as at the audit date, the Regional Administrative Officer had not allocated the requested office space to CDT.

(6) MINUSCA should allocate adequate resources including office space, photocopiers, printers, scanners and vehicles to conduct and discipline offices mission-wide to enable staff to receive and process misconduct allegations in a safe, confidential, transparent and efficient manner.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 6 and stated that CDT will continue to follow-up with the relevant offices as the absence of confidential working space undermines the CDT's ability to effectively implement its mandate. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence

that MINUSCA has allocated adequate resources including office space, photocopiers, printers, scanners, and vehicles to conduct and discipline activities throughout the Mission.

There was a need to comply with the requirements for assessing, recording and referring allegations of misconduct

29. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to: (a) assess allegations received using a prescribed template; (b) classify and record all allegations in the misconduct tracking system and upload all associated documents within seven days of their receipt; (c) report delays in assessing allegations and related reasons to the Conduct and Discipline Unit in DFS on a quarterly basis; and (c) refer allegations to the appropriate investigative entities within three days subsequent to the completion of the assessment.

30. A review of 40 of 120 cases of serious allegations including serious criminal acts and SEA entered in the misconduct tracking system during the period from September 2014 to October 2016 indicated that CDT classified all cases in the appropriate categories. However, CDT did not:

• Upload the required supporting documents for 16 cases. Examples of missing documents were: code cables sent to DFS, completed complaint reception and assessment templates, investigation review templates, communications to investigative entities, correspondence with the complainants, and investigation reports for completed investigations.

• Record the dates on which it received 10 allegations and date-stamp related supporting documents;

- Use the approved template for assessing 28 allegations. Instead, CDT recorded the assessments only in code cables sent to DFS;
- Complete assessing and recording 20 allegations in the misconduct tracking system within seven days. There was an average delay of 14 days and three allegations were assessed between 53 and 66 days; and
- Send code cables to DFS for five allegations and refer these to the appropriate investigative entities within three days of completing the assessments. CDT took on average 15 days to refer these allegations and three allegations were referred between 17 and 46 days after the assessments were completed. The reasons for the delays were not documented in the system as required.

31. The above resulted as CDT did not: (a) have a dedicated reporting officer. The Mission recruited an Officer in October 2016 who was in the process of reviewing and updating data in the misconduct tracking system at the time of the audit; and (b) take adequate and effective actions to consistently enforce the requirements, including timelines for assessing, recording, referring and reporting allegations. As a result, the misconduct tracking system was unreliable and there was a risk of delays in conducting investigations or allegations not being investigated due to the lack of evidence.

(7) MINUSCA should take action to consistently enforce the requirements including timelines for assessing, recording, referring and reporting allegations.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 7 and stated that CDT is currently onboarding several staff which would enable it to undertake its actions within the expected timeframes. Case turnaround times will be monitored and reported in the quarterly reporting to DFS and in the *annual quality assurance reporting.* Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of evidence that MINUSCA has taken action to consistently enforce the requirements including timelines for assessing, recording, referring and reporting allegations.

Follow up on cases referred to investigative bodies needed to be improved

32. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to follow up on allegations under investigation: (a) every three months for investigations on SEA; (b) every six months for investigations on other types of allegations conducted by the Investigation Division of OIOS; and (c) every six months for investigations conducted by Member States through DFS.

33. A review of 40 of 120 cases received by MINUSCA during the period from September 2014 to October 2016 indicated that CDT:

• Did not follow-up on: five SEA cases that had been pending with OIOS between 8 and 15 months; one SEA case that had been pending with a police contributing country for more than five months; two SEA cases that had been pending with national investigation offices for more than six months; and one fraud case that had been pending with the Special Investigation Unit for more than 21 months;

• Sent one follow-up letter dated 13 October 2015 as opposed to the requirement for quarterly follow up on an SEA case that had been pending with OIOS for more than 20 months; and

• Sent two follow-up letters dated 20 January and 16 June 2016, as opposed to the requirement for quarterly follow up on a criminal case that had been pending with the Board of Inquiry for more than 22 months.

34. The above resulted because MINUSCA did not implement a tracking system, which would assist in identifying long pending cases and ensuring timely follow-up with the relevant investigative bodies. Inadequate follow-up meant that the Mission missed the opportunity to have investigative bodies expedite their investigations and for the Organization to timely hold perpetrators accountable.

(8) MINUSCA should implement a tracking system to assist in identifying long pending cases to ensure the Conduct and Discipline Team adequately follows up with concerned investigative bodies to resolve and close allegations in a timely manner.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 8 and stated that CDT started preparing and updating case management tables for tracking the status of cases and the case management team was conducting case management reviews bi-weekly. This process will be further enhanced with the appointment of a dedicated reporting officer. Recommendation 8 remains open pending receipt of evidence that CDT has implemented a tracking system and is conducting regular case management reviews to ensure timely follow-up on cases pending with investigative bodies.

Investigation reports were not reviewed in a timely manner

35. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to: (a) assist the Head of Mission to review and confirm that investigation reports comply with applicable United Nations standards, including evidentiary standards and requirement of due process and fairness; and (b) complete reviews within 15 days for reports of SEA and one month for all other allegations, and document results in a prescribed template.

36. Analysis of all 22 completed investigation reports from a sample of 40 allegations indicated that CDT had reviewed 4 reports on SEA and 10 reports on other forms of allegations within the stipulated timeframes. However, CDT took an average of 42 days to review 8 other investigation reports on SEA. CDT could not provide evidence that 16 of the 22 reports complied with applicable United Nations standards because CDT did not use the prescribed template, but documented its review of the reports in memoranda addressed to the Head of Mission.

37. The above resulted because CDT did not take effective actions to ensure timely review of investigation reports and consistently enforce the requirement to confirm compliance of the reports with applicable standards. As a result, MINUSCA was not timely in closing cases.

(9) MINUSCA should take effective actions to ensure timely review of investigation reports and consistent enforcement of the requirement to confirm compliance of the reports with applicable standards.

MINUSCA accepted recommendation 9 and stated that complaints and investigation reports are now distributed to CDT officers for immediate review as they are received. CDT started preparing and updating case management tables for tracking of status of cases and conducting case management reviews bi-weekly. This process would be further enhanced with the appointment of a dedicated reporting officer who will monitor deadlines. Recommendation 9 remains open pending receipt of evidence that CDT has taken action to ensure timely reviews of investigative reports and compliance with applicable standards.

MINUSCA implemented adequate controls over the closure of misconduct cases

38. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to: (a) close unsubstantiated cases after the Head of Mission has reviewed and endorsed the investigation findings; (b) close substantiated cases after appropriate disciplinary or administrative action has been taken; and (c) ensure that all relevant supporting documentation including closure notices are signed off by the Chief of CDT and uploaded in the misconduct tracking system.

39. A review of all 10 cases closed during the period from September 2014 to October 2016, indicated that CDT closed all: (a) 4 unsubstantiated cases after the Head of Mission had reviewed and endorsed the investigation findings; and (b) 6 substantiated cases after appropriate sanctions were imposed on offenders including reprimands for 3 cases and repatriation and jail sentence for 3 other cases. In addition, all relevant supporting documentation including corresponding closure notices were signed off by the Chief of CDT and uploaded in the system. OIOS concluded that MINUSCA had implemented adequate controls over the closure of misconduct cases.

C. Remedial action activities

There was an SEA victim assistance mechanism in place

40. The DFS Advisory requires CDT to: (a) participate in the UNCT network to implement a victim assistance mechanism as part of the Organization's strategy on remedial action to address misconduct; and (b) maintain up-to-date mapping of services and assistance (e.g., medical care, legal, psychological and social support) available for victims of SEA.

41. A review of the activities of CDT and discussions with staff indicated that CDT was participating in the network of the UNCT to implement a victim assistance mechanism. The UNCT comprising MINUSCA, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, International Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other local partners had established a Protection from SEA Task Force. Within this Task Force, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) was the referring partner for victims under age 18, and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) for adult victims (over 18). Further, CDT developed a victim assistance tracking tool for consolidating information on specific forms of assistance provided to each victim of SEA by MINUSCA personnel. The tool was being populated in collaboration with UNICEF and UNFPA who were maintaining their own internal databases.

42. OIOS concluded that MINUSCA in conjunction with the UNCT had established adequate controls over the implementation of a victim assistance mechanism.

D. Reporting

The accountability measurement framework had been implemented

43. In a code cable dated 10 July 2014, DFS provided guidance on the implementation of a newly developed accountability framework designed to monitor the performance of individual field missions in carrying out conduct and discipline functions. The Framework required MINUSCA to prepare performance-based quarterly reports on conduct and discipline starting 1 July 2014 using a prescribed report template.

44. A review of all seven quarterly reports prepared during the period from September 2014 to September 2016 indicated that CDT implemented and complied with the new quarterly reporting requirement using the required template. OIOS concluded that MINUSCA had implemented adequate controls to ensure compliance with the reporting requirements of the DFS accountability framework for conduct and discipline in field missions.

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

45. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MINUSCA for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns Director, Internal Audit Division Office of Internal Oversight Services

ANNEX I

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the conduct and discipline function in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	C/ O ³	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁴
1.	MINUSCA should finalize its communication and outreach strategy to guide the creation of public information products and outreach activities related to sexual exploitation and abuse.	Important	0	Receipt of final and disseminated Strategic Communications & Public Information (SCPI) strategy to guide the creation of public information products and outreach activities related to sexual exploitation and abuse.	31 October 2017
2.	MINUSCA should implement a reliable mechanism for tracking and monitoring staff compliance with mandatory training requirements and take steps to make sure all staff have complied with the requirements.	Important	Ο	Receipt of evidence that MINUSCA has implemented a reliable mechanism for tracking and monitoring staff compliance with mandatory training requirements.	31 October 2017
3.	MINUSCA should develop and implement a detailed timetable for visits to the various Mission locations, taking into consideration known constraints, to identify and assess risks related to conduct and discipline and implement appropriate mitigating measures.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that MINUSCA has developed and implemented a detailed timetable for conduct and discipline-related risk assessment visits to the various Mission locations.	31 October 2017
4.	MINUSCA should establish and implement a follow- up mechanism to ensure timely implementation of recommendations from the risk assessment visits.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that the Mission has implemented a follow-up mechanism to ensure implementation of recommendations from risk assessment visits.	31 October 2017
5.	MINUSCA should implement adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure welfare committees are functioning as intended and allocate adequate resources to establish welfare and recreation facilities at Mission locations.	Important	Ο	Receipt of evidence that the Mission has implemented an adequate welfare programme throughout the Mission	1 October 2017
6.	MINUSCA should allocate adequate resources	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that MINUSCA has	31 December 2017

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

 3 C = closed, O = open

⁴ Date provided by MINUSCA in response to recommendations.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

ANNEX I

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	C/ O ³	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁴
	including office space, photocopiers, printers, scanners and vehicles to conduct and discipline offices mission-wide to enable staff to receive and process misconduct allegations in a safe, confidential, transparent and efficient manner.			allocated adequate resources including office space, photocopiers, printers, scanners, and vehicles to conduct and discipline activities throughout the Mission.	
7.	MINUSCA should take action to consistently enforce the requirements including timelines for assessing, recording, referring and reporting allegations.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that MINUSCA has taken action to consistently enforce the requirements including timelines for assessing, recording, referring and reporting allegations.	31 October 2017
8.	MINUSCA should implement a tracking system to assist in identifying long pending cases to ensure the Conduct and Discipline Team adequately follows up with concerned investigative bodies to resolve and close allegations in a timely manner.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that CDT has implemented a tracking system and is conducting regular case management reviews to ensure timely follow-up on cases pending with investigative bodies.	31 October 2017
9.	MINUSCA should take effective actions to ensure timely review of investigation reports and consistent enforcement of the requirement to confirm compliance of the reports with applicable standards.	Important	0	Receipt of evidence that CDT has taken action to ensure timely reviews of investigative reports and compliance with applicable standards.	31 October 2017

APPENDIX I

Management Response



Mr. Bolton Tarleh Nyema, Chief

Peacekeeping Audit Service

Internal Audit Division, OIOS



United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MINUSCA

Nations Unies

Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République centrafricaine

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

DATE: 2 May 2017

REFERENCE: OSRSG/011/2017

FROM: Parfait Onanga-Anyanga DE: Special Representative of the Secretary-General MINUSCA

SUBJECT: OBJET:

TO:

A:

MINUSCA response to draft audit report of conduct and discipline

1. With reference to your IAD 17-367-04 of 18 April 2017, the Mission has reviewed the OIOS draft audit report and is pleased to share its response.

2. MINUSCA welcomes the report and accepts all of its recommendations, which provide a helpful roadmap to improve the Mission's prevention and enforcement measures to address misconduct, particularly the scourge of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Our responses in the attached matrix detail the actions the Mission plans to take and the target dates for completion.

3. Given the importance of SEA prevention and the particular context of peacekeeping in CAR, MINUSCA strengthened its conduct and discipline function since 2014, when the team was staffed with six members at start up to a team of 17 members from the 2016/17 budget year, with leadership at the D1 level. This increase in resources has enabled the Mission to progressively improve its SEA efforts and provide appropriate remedial measures.

4. As outlined in the 2017 Secretary-General's strategy on SEA, the Mission takes seriously its role to ensure that all military, police and civilian personnel are aware of the problem of SEA and that all personnel play their part in preventing and eliminating it. This includes SEA awareness and prevention training at induction and carrying out a "trainer of trainers" programme for military and police personnel, when appropriate. In this regard, I have instructed the Mission's Conduct and Discipline Team to update the Mission's current strategy to ensure compliance with the Secretary-General's new SEA strategy.

Attachments: Management response matrix for the Audit of the conduct and discipline function in MINUSCA

cc: Ms. Barrie Freeman, Chief of Staff, MINUSCA Mr. Milan Trojanović, Director of Mission Support, MINUSCA Mr. Diakaridja Bakayoko, OIC Chief, Conduct and Discipline Team, MINUSCA

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	MINUSCA should finalize its communication and outreach strategy to guide the creation of public information products and outreach activities related to sexual exploitation and abuse.	Important	Yes	Chief PIO and / OIC, CDT along with Conduct & Discipline Officer, Outreach	31 October 2017	 MINUSCA's Draft Communications & Public Information (SCPI) strategy has been completed and is being shared with mission components to provide comments. CDT provided feedback regarding SEA Prevention. Meanwhile, CDT- Outreach Strategic Communication in under development in line with the strategic priorities of the Mission Concept.
2	MINUSCA should implement a reliable mechanism for tracking and monitoring staff compliance with mandatory training requirements and take steps to make sure all staff have complied with the requirements.	Important	Yes	Conduct & Discipline Officer responsible for training	31 October 2017	It is imperative that an improved tracking mechanism be established, especially for new comers to the mission. In this regard, MINUSCA CDT will discuss with Human Resources or RSCE and in close cooperation with GITTS, to set up a mandatory training tracking system or explore the option of including a C&D

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						check-in/check-out link in the existing FSS system.
3	MINUSCA should develop and implement a detailed timetable for visits to the various Mission locations, taking into consideration known constraints, to identify and assess risks related to conduct and discipline and implement appropriate mitigating measures.	Important	Yes	Multiple persons: 1. Chief CDT along with C&D officers for each Sector 2. SEA Prevention Team focal point / Force / FPU 3.	31 October 2017	CDT has developed and started performing Mission-wide Risk Assessment linked to all types of misconduct including SEA. Risk assessment visits are scheduled based on priority areas, trends of misconduct and implicated personnel or contingents. Each field C&D Officer will prepare monthly and quarterly risk assessment visit plans, which will be monitored for implementation and will also form the basis for EPAS evaluation. These risk assessment plans will be coordinated with the Sector Joint SEA Prevention Teams. The results of these risk assessment visits would be channeled into the MINUSCA SEA risk assessment framework and mapping exercise which would be updated and inform

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						on decision making for various activities.
4	MINUSCA should establish and implement a follow-up mechanism to ensure timely implementation of recommendations from the risk assessment visits.	Important	YES	Risk Management Working Group (RMWG) – comprising CDT, Force and Administration (O/DMS)	31 October 2017	CDT already produces comprehensive reports on every risk assessment visit conducted. With the approval of the SRSG for the formation of a Risk Management Working Group, this forum will review, follow-up the implementation of recommendations for eliminating and mitigating risks to SEA and other misconduct. CDT possesses neither the executive authority nor logistical capacity necessary to ensure compliance with past recommendations. It is important that a multi- representative Working Group be established and assigned the responsibility to follow-up on implementation of recommendations. CDT as part of its responsibility, will continue to monitor and report on progress.

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
5	MINUSCA should implement adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure welfare committees are functioning as intended and allocate adequate resources to establish welfare and recreation facilities at Mission locations.	Important	YES	DMS and Staff Welfare Committee (SWC)	1 October 2017	The UN Welfare Policy ("Welfare & Recreation, 30 APR 2007) states that it is the Head of Mission who is responsible for establishing welfare and recreation committees, and that the DMS will then provide oversight of the implementation of the Policy on behalf of the Head of Mission. CDT's performs an advisory role on the provisions of the Policy, and on the Mission's SWC. A staff of CDT is already a Representative of the SWC and makes the effort to hold the Committee accountable.
6	MINUSCA should allocate adequate resources including office space, photocopiers, printers, scanners, shredders and vehicles to conduct and discipline offices mission-wide to enable staff to receive and process misconduct allegations in a safe, confidential, transparent and efficient manner.	Important	YES	DMS / Chief CDT for follow-up with Administration	31 December 2017	CDT field offices require confidential office facilities. These inadequacies have been reported in the quarterly reports, weekly reports to varying levels of management. CDT will continue to make follow-up with the necessary offices as the absence of confidential working space undermines the CDT's ability to effectively implement its mandate.

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
7	MINUSCA should take action to consistently enforce the requirements including timelines for assessing, recording, referring and reporting allegations.	Important	YES	Chief CDT	31 October 2017	CDT is operating with half of its staffing capacity, especially experienced case management officers and this is impacting the efficiency of case management and turn-around times for processing cases and allegations – reviews, assessments referrals. Two (2) additional P4's are onboarding and will enhance staffing and increase turn-around times as per CDU advisory for handling cases. Case turn-around times are already monitored and reported in the
8	MINUSCA should implement a tracking system to assist in identifying long pending cases to ensure the Conduct and Discipline Team adequately follows up with concerned investigative bodies to resolve and close allegations in a timely manner.	Important	Yes	Chief CDT and newly appointed Reporting Officer	31 October2017	quarterly reporting to DFS and in the annual quality assurance reporting. CDT has prepares and updates case management tables for tracking of status of cases and the case management team meets weekly for review. This process will be further enhanced with the appointment of a dedicated reports officer – CDT has never

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						recruited a Reports Officer which remained for more than 4 months. The TOR of the CDT Reporting Officer would be allocate cases to CDT officers, and track their processing. Case managers EPAS should reflect their ability to meet turn-around times as established by the C&D Advisory.
9	MINUSCA should take effective actions to ensure timely review of investigation reports and consistent enforcement of the requirement to confirm compliance of the reports with applicable standards.	Important	Yes	Chief CDT and case management officers (4)	31 October 2017	Complaints and investigation reports are distributed to CDT officers for immediate review as they are received. Again, same recommendation as in item 8 above: A dedicated CDT Reporting Officer would enhance the tracking system within the office. The Reporting officer will ensure overview and monitoring of time frames and limits, and have the ability to address non-compliance to Chief CDT so that outstanding cases can be resolved within acceptable time frames.