



INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

EVALUATION REPORT

Evaluation of the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations in deterring and confronting armed elements in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and the Central African Republic

2 October 2017

Assignment No.: IED-17-013

A defining feature of missions with robust mandates is to act to deter, mitigate and/or eliminate the threat posed by armed elements, before they inflict violence upon the country's population. When measured against this criterion, none of the missions has been adequately robust. It remains unclear what the difference is in practice between a robust and a regular PoC mandate, and what additional protection benefits have accrued to the population, as envisaged by the Security Council.

INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

FUNCTION

“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organisation. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organisation;” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

PROJECT TEAM MEMBERS:

ANNA GUERRAGGIO, PROJECT LEADER
CARLOTTA TINCATI, TEAM MEMBER
JENS NORMEN HAHNE, TEAM MEMBER

CONTACT INFORMATION

OIOS/IED CONTACT INFORMATION:

Tel: +212 963-8148, Fax: +212-963-1211; email: ied@un.org

RAHUL SUR, CHIEF, PEACEKEEPING EVALUATION SECTION

Tel: +1 212-963-0495, Fax: +1 212-963-1211

e-mail: sur@un.org

(EDDIE) YEE WOO GUO, DIRECTOR

Tel: +917 367-3674, Fax: +212-963-1211

e-mail: guoy@un.org

Executive Summary

The Office of Internal Oversight Services carried out an evaluation of the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in deterring and confronting armed elements in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and the Central African Republic. The evaluation covered the period 2013-15, with major security developments in the three countries considered until April 2017.

In all three missions, despite some initial success in deterring and confronting armed elements, in the absence of credible political processes, violence resurged.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSCO successfully supported the national army in the defeat of the M23 group, but did not neutralize other armed groups due to limited offensive operations. There have been instances where MONUSCO was unable to protect civilians in its areas of operations, notably Beni, and armed groups remain active, perpetrating human rights violations.

In Mali, MINUSMA was effective in supporting peace agreements and dialogue which significantly reduced direct confrontation between armed groups. However, MINUSMA was less effective in deterring the threat posed by terrorist armed groups, and the implementation of the peace agreements remains slow.

In Central African Republic, MINUSCA successfully secured the electoral process, and has been progressively more effective in protecting civilians till the second half of 2016 when violence resurged. The effectiveness of Urgent Temporary Measures remained an open question, in the absence of good infrastructures and with limited/compromised national capacity.

Across the three missions, important differences on how to engage with armed elements, and lack of internal cohesion, weakened missions' responses. The operationalization of mandates was subject to varying individual interpretations and preferences, significantly watering down the explicit intent of the Security Council. Civilian staff demanded a more robust military approach, while military personnel believed they were unjustly held responsible for shortcomings at the political level.

There were inconsistencies in military contingents' approach to proactively protecting civilians from threats. Political considerations, instructions by capitals, unclear national regulations, and sudden requests by troop contributing countries for specific deployment conditions affected the ability of the Force Commanders to fully exert their authority.

To varying degrees, and particularly in case of re-hatting, the three missions suffered a lack of Contingent-Owned-Equipment and insufficient pre-deployment training for asymmetrical environments. Missions also lacked critical capacity for intelligence, specifically human and signals intelligence. Logistical challenges affected the missions' performance, and a mismatch between civilian logistics procedures and military operational needs was reported.

The authority conferred upon missions to address the involvement of armed groups in illegal economic activities and organized crime did not match the scale and seriousness of the issues. Strategies to address the root causes of the conflict, including stopping illegal financial gains that sustain armed elements and terrorists, prolong conflict and postpone peace, are required.

OIOS made three critical and four important recommendations.

Contents

	<i>Paragraph</i>	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction.....	1-2	8
II. Background.....	3-12	8-10
III. Scope and Methodology	13-17	10
IV. MONUSCO.....	18-37	11-15
i. Strategic documents planned for a robust approach towards armed groups and highlighted political challenges linked to offensive operations. However, guidance was not clear, and did not adequately, address the complexity of the conflict		
ii. MONUSCO was successful in defeating the M23 in 2013, but the group remained a threat		
iii. Due to limited offensive operations, armed groups other than the M23 have not been neutralized		
iv. There have been instances where MONUSCO was unable to protect civilians in its areas of operation, notably Beni		
v. The conjunction of political interests and FIB support to FARDC military operations allowed for the defeat of the M23		
vi. Poor relations with the government impeded offensive operations		
vii. Mission leadership and managers in Headquarters questioned the desirability and feasibility of unilateral offensive operations		
viii. Military contingents were not proactive in protecting civilians and abstained from conducting offensive operations		
V. MINUSMA	38-60	16-20

i.	Strategic documents were outdated and conveyed ambivalent messages with respect to addressing terrorist threats		
ii.	MINUSMA was effective in supporting peace agreements and dialogue which significantly reduced direct confrontation between armed groups		
iii.	MINUSMA was less effective in deterring the threat posed by TAGs		
iv.	Northern regions have not been stabilized, and the implementation of the peace agreement remains slow		
v.	MINUSMA is deployed in a terrorism-affected environment, but without mandate and adequate capacity to address the threats posed by armed elements		
vi.	TCCs regulations and conditions affected the capacity and willingness of contingents to take risks		
vii.	MINUSMA intelligence system did not cater to tactical needs, and suffered from limited intra-mission coordination		
viii.	Host government’s limited capacity handicapped the mission		
VI.	MINUSCA.....	61-78	21-25
i.	MINUSCA strategic documents lacked clear criteria for robust actions, and underestimated the threat level		
ii.	MINUSCA successfully secured the 2015-16 electoral process		
iii.	Over time, MINUSCA was progressively more effective in protecting civilians, but serious violence resurged in the second half of 2016 indicating declining effectiveness		
iv.	The effectiveness of UTMs remained an open question		
v.	Internal differences in engaging armed groups challenged the mission’s effectiveness		
vi.	Limited capacities and political commitment by national authorities negatively affected the mission’s efforts to fight against impunity		
vii.	Until 2015, MINUSCA lacked critical operational capacity and suffered limited coordination between police and military forces		
viii.	Mission leadership pushed for more robust actions against armed groups in the second half of 2015		
VII.	Crosscutting Issues.....	79-99	26-30

- i. Important differences on how to engage with armed elements, and lack of internal cohesion, weakened missions' robust responses, in contexts of ongoing peace processes and limited government capacity or will
- ii. Some contingents lacked the will to deter and confront armed elements, with national regulations, caveats and operational deviations continuing to negatively affect performance
- iii. There was a widespread desire for better intelligence, but capacity was lacking
- iv. To varying degrees, missions suffered critical equipment shortfalls and insufficient pre-deployment training for asymmetrical environments
- v. There was a mismatch between civilian logistics procedures and the military components' operational needs
- vi. The authority conferred upon missions to address the involvement of armed groups in illegal economic activity and organized crime did not match the scale and seriousness of the issue

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations..... 100-108 31-32

Annex 1 33

Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ASIFU	All Sources Information Fusion Unit
BJTF	Bangui Joint Task Force
CAG	Compliant Armed Group
CAR	Central African Republic
COE	Contingent-Owned Equipment
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DFS	United Nations Department of Field Support
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FB	Framework Brigade
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FRPI	Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Center
MDSF	Malian Defence and Security Forces
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
OIOS-IED	Inspection and Evaluation Division of the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLA	United Nations Office of Legal Affairs
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PoC	Protection of Civilians
RBB	Results-Based-Budgeting
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SADC	South African Development Community
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SUR	Statement of Unit Requirements
TAG	Terrorist Armed Group
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UTM	Urgent Temporary Measure
UUAV	Unmanned Unarmed Aerial Vehicle

I. Introduction

1. Acting under authority of its mandate¹ and in compliance with professional norms,² the Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS-IED) carried out, as systematically and objectively as possible, an evaluation of robust peacekeeping. In line with the draft approved definition of ‘robust peacekeeping’,³ and an understanding of what it entails, the evaluation focused on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in deterring and confronting armed elements⁴ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).
2. Revolving around the criteria of relevance and effectiveness, the evaluation analysed the operationalization of the three missions’ mandates related to deterring and confronting armed elements, and the results achieved. The evaluation considered factors that had supported and/or hindered the individual missions’ efforts, and identified crosscutting issues for broader reflection.

II. Background

3. As early as 2000, the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations⁵ advocated for more robust forces as a key condition for the success of complex operations, together with political support and peacebuilding strategies. In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) reiterated the need for strong uniformed capabilities and political engagement in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), encouraging missions to adopt a proactive posture, to protect civilians and dissuade spoilers that undermine the peace process through violent means.⁶

a. MONUSCO

4. The conflict in eastern DRC has been one of the bloodiest in the world since World War II. The landscape of armed groups in Eastern DRC was crowded, with at least 70 active armed groups, most which were comprised of 200 soldiers or less.⁷
5. Taking over from the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC, MONUSCO was established in 2010 with a mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians under imminent threat,⁸ and support the government in its stabilization and peace consolidation

¹ General Assembly resolutions 48/218 B, 54/244 and 59/272, and ST/SGB/273; OIOS evaluation is also provided for in Regulation 7.1 of the ST/SGB/2016/6

² Norms and standards for evaluation, United Nations Evaluation Group, 2015

³ Posture that demonstrates willingness, capacity and capability to deter and confront, including through the use of force when necessary, an obstruction to the implementation of the mandate’ (draft DPKO/DFS concept note on robust peacekeeping, 2010)

⁴ The evaluation considered ‘armed elements’ as non-state actors, organized or semi-organized, with a propensity for and a record of violence that interfered in the international community’s efforts to re-establish peace in the country.

⁵ A/55/35, S/2000/809

⁶ A new partnership agenda: charting a new horizon for UN peacekeeping, DPKO/DFS, 2009

⁷ Prominent among them were the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Forces de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI), and the Lord’s Resistance Army. Source: The landscape of armed groups in the Eastern Congo, Congo Research Group, 2015.

⁸ In March 2014, the Security Council broadened MONUSCO PoC mandate, by dropping the requirement that the threat to civilians needed to be ‘imminent’ for the mission to intervene. According to the 2015 DPKO/DFS policy on PoC, “A POC threat is considered imminent as soon as the mission has a reasonable belief that a potential perpetrator displays a hostile intent, capacity, historical record and opportunity to inflict physical violence. The term ‘imminent’ does not therefore imply that violence is guaranteed to happen in the immediate or near future or is being carried out. A threat of violence against civilians is imminent from the time it is identified until such time that the mission can determine that the threat no longer exists’.

efforts.⁹

6. After the rebel group M23 (the March 23 movement) occupied Goma in 2012 and MONUSCO acted as a passive by-stander, the Security Council reinforced the mission's mandate to "carry out through the Intervention Brigade (FIB)¹⁰ targeted offensive operations, either unilaterally or jointly with the armed forces of the DRC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner."¹¹

b. MINUSMA

7. Mali is a terrorism-affected country with a history of instability in the North, where state authority has been largely absent. The numerous armed elements operating in Mali have been variously implicated in organized crime, cross-border trafficking and terrorism.¹²
8. Taking over from the short-lived African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), MINUSMA was established in April 2013 to protect civilians and stabilize population centres in the North, by deterring threats and taking active steps to prevent the return of armed elements in those areas.¹³
9. In 2016, the Council mandated the mission to 'anticipate, deter and counter threats, including asymmetric ones'¹⁴ and 'take active and robust steps to protect civilians', while increasing the strength of the mission's uniformed components by 2,529 personnel.¹⁵ Importantly, like in MONUSCO, the Council dropped the requirement for the threat of physical violence to be 'imminent' for the mission to act.

c. MINUSCA

10. The CAR witnessed a resumption of violence in December 2012, when fighting between the predominantly Muslim Séléka and the mainly Christian Anti-Balaka groups killed thousands of people, and left more than half of the population in need of humanitarian aid.
11. Re-hatting from the African Union-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), MINUSCA was established in 2014, to protect civilians and, under specific circumstances, take Urgent Temporary Measures (UTMs) to maintain basic law and order.¹⁶

⁹ S/RES/1925

¹⁰ The FIB was built upon a regional initiative by the South African Development Community (SADC)

¹¹ The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) confirmed that MONUSCO was thus not required to wait for a specific and concrete threat from an armed group: the very fact that it existed, and had not been disarmed, made it a legitimate target.

¹² MINUSMA has broadly classified them as compliant armed groups (CAGs), terrorist armed groups (TAGs), and criminal gangs. CAGs signed the Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in June 2015. They include: Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (which is the largest and comprise 1,200-1,400 elements), Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad, Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad, Coalition du peuple pour l'Azawad, Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance, and the Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Allies. TAGs include Ansar Eddine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Mourabitoune, and Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest.

¹³ S/RES/2100

¹⁴ Despite the reference in its mandate to asymmetric threats, and the invocation by the Council for a more robust posture, however, MINUSMA, unlike AFISMA, does not have an explicit counter-terrorism mandate. As confirmed by OLA, MINUSMA authorization to use force is linked to the protection of civilians and the protection of United Nations and associated personnel, irrespective of the source. The counter-terrorism mandate has been conferred to French Forces (Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane).

¹⁵ S/RES/2295. According to MINUSMA, however, the additional resources authorized by the Council have not yet been provided by Member States.

¹⁶ S/RES/2149 (2014). In 2015, the Security Council narrowed the UTM mandate to the arrest and detention of persons,

12. The Council also mandated MINUSCA to address root causes of the conflict by providing support to the reconciliation process, while advising national authorities on how to tackle the illicit exploitation of natural resources ‘which fund armed groups’.¹⁷

III. Scope and methodology

13. The evaluation covered the period 2013-15, with major subsequent security developments in the three countries considered until April 2017.
14. In line with the mandates conferred upon the three missions by the Security Council, the evaluation analysed the effectiveness of proactive measures by uniformed components against armed elements, as well as the results of dialogue and disarmament efforts by the mission leadership and substantive civilian components. The evaluation assessed the effectiveness of operations against an established set of available indicators, mostly derived from mission performance documents and linked to thematic impact pathways based on desk review of mandates.
15. It applied a mixed-methods approach, triangulating data collected through:
 - a) Desk review and analysis of strategic¹⁸ and programmatic documents, monitoring and evaluation reports, research papers, conflict-related datasets, military staff work, and Contingent-Owned-Equipment (COE) data;
 - b) 226 semi-structured interviews with DPKO/DFS staff, military advisors of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), members of national contingents, and others stakeholders;¹⁹
 - c) Visits to the three missions’ Headquarters and field offices.
16. The evaluation team was unable to meet with representatives of the Host Nations in the three countries, and to interview national contingents previously deployed to the missions owing to their rotation.²⁰
17. The formal response from DPKO/DFS is included in annex 1.

and tasked the mission to ‘actively seize, confiscate and destroy weapons and ammunitions of armed elements’

¹⁷ S/RES/2217 (2015)

¹⁸ Mission Concept, Rules of Engagement (ROE), Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and PoC strategy

¹⁹ United Nations Special Envoys, United Nations partners at country-level, representatives of regional organizations, coordinators of United Nations Groups of Experts, and thematic experts.

²⁰ Despite several attempts, OIOS requests for interviews with representatives of the Host Nations were not successful. The high turnover of national contingents increased reliance on documentary evidence to assess past performance.

IV. MONUSCO

Operationalization of the mandate

i. Strategic documents planned for a robust approach towards armed groups and highlighted political challenges linked to offensive operations. However, guidance was not clear, and did not adequately address the complexity of the conflict

18. MONUSCO strategic documents emphasized the adoption of a ‘robust pre-emptive approach’, taking ‘all necessary measures’ to neutralize armed groups and protect civilians ‘by action and not merely as a consequence of military presence’.²¹ The CONOPS - and further strategic guidance by Headquarters - emphasized the prominent role of the FIB in offensive operations, while the Framework Brigades (FBs)²² would integrate PoC measures in military planning, provide air assets, and hold positions cleared by the FIB.²³ The System-wide PoC strategy²⁴ was adjusted in 2014, integrating actions to counterbalance the risk that offensive operations could pose to civilians.
19. While unilateral offensive operations were envisaged only exceptionally,²⁵ strategic documents considered that operations with the Congolese army (FARDC) – while enhancing situational awareness - could lead to MONUSCO being perceived to be complicit in human rights violations.²⁶ The decision of when to proceed jointly or unilaterally was left to senior management.
20. Strategic documents did not adequately address the complexity of the conflict in eastern DRC, focusing on a ‘Shape, Clear, Hold, Build’ framework under assumptions which proved incorrect. Interviewees and documents²⁷ described the Mission Concept as ‘visionary’, and requiring a greater operational focus. Strategic documents did not include tailored strategies against armed groups, based on an understanding of the political and socio-economic motives behind the conflict. The 2016 Mission Concept rectified this.

Performance of mandate

ii. MONUSCO was successful in defeating the M23 in 2013, but the group remained a threat

21. The military defeat of M23 in 2013 was considered MONUSCO’s major achievement against armed groups.²⁸ This created a movement towards demobilization, with 4,500 elements expressing an interest to join the national army.²⁹
22. Three years later, however, hundreds of ex-M23 combatants, based in neighbouring countries, are still considered a ‘threat’.³⁰ Interviewees³¹ reported the absence of a clear

²¹ Mission Concept (2013)

²² MONUSCO regular forces

²³ CONOPS (2013); Headquarters guidance on SCR/2098 (2013) and SCR/2147 (2014)

²⁴ Revised United Nations system-wide PoC strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, November 2014

²⁵ Mission Concept (2013)

²⁶ Concept of Operations (2013)

²⁷ Feedback from Headquarters to Mission Concept

²⁸ Perspective offered voluntarily by 15 interviewees in DRC (32 per cent)

²⁹ MONUSCO data

³⁰ Afp – RD Congo : le M23 représente une menace actuelle pour l’ONU, 22 February 2017


³¹ Perspective offered voluntarily by 11 interviewees in MONUSCO (23 per cent) and one key interviewee in Headquarters

political strategy at the regional level for the reintegration of former combatants.

iii. Due to limited offensive operations, armed groups other than the M23 have not been neutralized

23. MONUSCO was not able to capitalize on the momentum created by the defeat of the M23. Due to a strained relationship with the government and its limited will to proceed with offensive actions, targeted operations to neutralize armed groups stopped for about 18 months (Figure 1).³² Key interviewees³³ confirmed that the FIB became less offensive after the M23 defeat, pointing to limited interest among its contributing countries to carry out offensive operations against other armed groups.

Figure 1: FIB operations 2014 – first quarter of 2016



(Source: OIOS analysis of data provided by MONUSCO)

24. With one exception,³⁴ the FIB never conducted unilateral operations, despite authorization by the Security Council to do so, a deteriorating security situation, and the reiteration in several documents that such operations were allowed when ‘the government fails to protect civilians under threat’.³⁵ Even when the government appointed two generals³⁶ alleged to have committed human rights violations in an operation against the FDLR, effectively blocking the possibility of joint action,³⁷ MONUSCO did not proceed unilaterally. DPKO underlined the inherent difficulty of conducting unilateral operations, which they reported had previously resulted in increasing threats to MONUSCO, and OLA considered that even unilateral operations to neutralize armed groups could be undertaken only with the concurrence of the government.

iv. There have been instances when MONUSCO was unable to protect civilians in its areas of operation, notably Beni

25. Fatalities caused by armed conflict in eastern DRC increased from 1,235 in 2014 to 1,643

³² In 2016, MONUSCO brigades and Special Forces conducted a few operations resulting in killing and disarmament of armed elements (Operation Bronco, Operation Eagle Eye, Operation Esalami Bongo).

³³ Eighteen interviewees in DRC (38 per cent)

³⁴ Neutralization of Minova and Musanga camps, October 2015

³⁵ S/2014/957


³⁶ The so-called ‘red generals’

³⁷ Because of the Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces

in 2015.³⁸ The highest rise³⁹ occurred in the most conflict-ridden provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, which were in the MONUSCO area of operations. Serious incidents involving civilian deaths persisted, including the ones in Mutarule (June 2014) and Miriki (January 2016) where 35 and 17 people were killed, respectively. The mission admitted its responsibility and apologized for an inadequate and late response.⁴⁰

26. Confirmed incidents of human rights violations in areas of armed conflict increased from 1,741 in 2013/14 to 2,620 in 2014/15.⁴¹ Grave violations against children for which armed groups were largely responsible increased from 1,704 in 2014 to 2,549 in 2015.⁴²

Figure 2: Fatalities in selected provinces of Eastern DRC, 2013-15



(Source: ACLED)

27. In the area around Beni, armed groups killed over 500 people since October 2014, and tens of thousands fled their homes.⁴³ Despite some initial support to FARDC operations against ADF,⁴⁴ the FIB did little to try stopping the continued massacres. The ADF command structure remained intact, and to date the FIB has not been able to capture any ADF combatant involved in the killings.⁴⁵
28. A joint analysis by MONUSCO and the government⁴⁶ indicated that conditions remained unchanged or had deteriorated in 21 of the 28 territories of eastern DRC, including in places where MONUSCO had established ‘islands of stability’. In October 2016, the Secretary-General reported that armed violence continued to place civilians at risk, resulting in increased population displacement and insecurity.⁴⁷

³⁸ Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project

³⁹ From 764 to 1,003

⁴⁰ MONUSCO press conferences

⁴¹ A/69/620 and A/70/613

⁴² MONUSCO Child Protection Strategy 2013-17, S/2015/741 and S/2014/698

⁴³ Who are the killers of Beni? Congo Research Group, 2015

⁴⁴ Operations Umoja II and Umoja III

⁴⁵ In 2015, the Group of Experts recommended to the Security Council to conduct an independent inquiry into the inability of MONUSCO to protect civilians in Beni, “considering that the incidents occurred repeatedly over a period of eight months, in an area in which there was a substantial presence of peacekeepers”. (S/2015/797) OIOS-IED was unable to determine whether the independent inquiry was conducted. The Security Council visited DRC in November 2016 to take stock of the situation.

⁴⁶ Mission conjointe d’évaluation MONUSCO-Gouvernement RDC - Résolution 2211, 1^{ère} étape, 2015

⁴⁷ S/2016/833. Subsequent developments such as the killing of two United Nations experts and the discovery of mass graves shows a deteriorating security situation, although this admittedly occurred outside MONUSCO’s areas of operations.

Factors affecting performance

v. The conjunction of political interests and FIB support to FARDC military operations allowed for the defeat of the M23

29. The FIB support to ‘well-trained and disciplined FARDC units’,⁴⁸ combined with political pressure by the United Nations and bilateral diplomatic efforts to reduce external support to the M23,⁴⁹ led to a “quick win”. As a senior manager pointed out: “we were all behind this”.

vi. Poor relations with the government impeded offensive operations

30. Most interviewees⁵⁰ observed that poor relationships between MONUSCO and the government⁵¹ negatively affected mission effectiveness in deterring and confronting armed elements. While almost half⁵² put the onus on the “ambiguous” commitment by the government against armed groups,⁵³ some⁵⁴ found fault in the way the mission civilian leadership had engaged with the government.

31. Some experts considered that the approach adopted by the government and MONUSCO against armed groups was ‘single-mindedly military’, and not part of a broader political strategy.⁵⁵ Given the conflict’s regional dimension, a separation between the regional political role of the Special Representative for the Great Lakes and MONUSCO control of the military was considered not helpful.⁵⁶

vii. Mission leadership and managers in Headquarters questioned the desirability and feasibility of unilateral offensive operations

32. Interviews with MONUSCO senior managers revealed a complete split in the period 2013-15 between the civilian and military leadership on the desirability and feasibility of unilateral offensive operations: while the former favoured a more robust approach, the latter considered unilateral offensive operations “an illusion” without the government’s support. Headquarters code cable pushing for unilateral operations were not heeded.

33. At Headquarters too, a long running disagreement over the offensive use of force by a mission within a Chapter VII mandate remained unresolved, with some key senior managers opposing the unilateral offensive actions mandated by the Security Council.

viii. Military contingents were not proactive in protecting civilians and abstained from conducting offensive operations

34. As indicated in paragraphs 23-24 and 27, military contingents were not proactive in protecting civilians, advancing several reasons for their inaction. These included limited

⁴⁸ Assessing the performance of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade, C. Vogel, July 2014

⁴⁹ The United Nations Group of Expert had stressed the direct military support by the Rwandan Government to the M23 (S/2012/843)

⁵⁰ Volunteered by 32 interviewees (68 per cent)

⁵¹ In 2014, the government wanted MONUSCO to start its withdrawal as soon as possible

⁵² 49 per cent

⁵³ Implementation by the government of commitments in the 2013 Peace Security and Cooperation Framework was limited (S/2016/232), while little direct negotiation with armed groups occurred.

⁵⁴ 19 per cent

⁵⁵ C. Voegel, The landscape of armed groups in the Eastern Congo, 2015

⁵⁶ FIB Lessons learnt study report, DPKO/DFS, 2016

intelligence, the difficulty in distinguishing members of armed groups from the FARDC because of similar uniforms, inhospitable terrain, challenges of dealing with guerrilla armed groups, insufficient capacities in the assigned area of responsibility and the “limiting nature” of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) signed by individual TCCs. Contingents showed a preference to take offensive action through aerial means rather than undertaking riskier ground operations.

35. Most interviewees⁵⁷ – mostly civilian staff and external stakeholders - commented on the contingents’ risk aversion, with one senior manager perceiving the reasons for inaction advanced by the contingents as ‘an excuse’. About a quarter of interviewees⁵⁸ specifically reported the lack of will of the FIB to take robust action after the defeat of M23. A DPKO report also stressed how ‘political interests between DRC and the SADC shaped the FIB determination to fight’, with MONUSCO suffering the results of ‘fragmented political interests amongst regional stakeholders’.⁵⁹ MONUSCO reported ‘frustration’ related ‘to the increasingly static position of the FIB in the Beni area’, and admitted that the ‘FIB had become fixed and unable to move for fear of ADF committing atrocities’.⁶⁰ MONUSCO requested Headquarters to reassess the suitability of certain TCCs, considering their ‘appetite, standard of training, and capability to execute targeted offensive operations’.⁶¹
36. Prominent TCCs maintained their reservations about the MONUSCO offensive mandate, and continued dissociating themselves from it following its adoption.⁶² With some exceptions, the FBs maintained a static posture, and conducted few long-range night patrols.⁶³ The reluctance of MONUSCO contingents ‘to engage militarily against armed groups, despite orders from the leadership to do so’, was already noted by the Secretary General in 2014.⁶⁴ The 2015 Headquarters strategic guidance advocated for FBs to ‘play a more active role in protecting civilians’ and invited MONUSCO to ‘report cases of under-performance or refusal to comply with operational orders’. However, as of June 2016, no case was reported.
37. Some perceived that the differentiation in the mandate between the FIB and the FBs roles made command and control problematic in areas where both FIB and FBs were present.⁶⁵ Field observation by OIOS revealed lack of direct communication between the military contingents of the FIB and the FBs when deployed adjacent to each other.⁶⁶

⁵⁷ 34 interviewees (72 per cent)

⁵⁸ 11 interviewees (23 per cent)

⁵⁹ FIB Lessons Learnt Study Report, DPKO/DFS, 2016

⁶⁰ On at least one occasion, MONUSCO senior management raised concerns in this respect to high-level government officials of one of the FIB TCCs.

⁶¹ DPKO response to the evaluation draft

⁶² SC/10964

⁶³ Long-range night patrols in North Kivu were 5-10 per cent of the total in 2015. In South Kivu, no long-range night patrol was conducted in that period.

⁶⁴ S/2014/957

⁶⁵ 15 interviewees (32 per cent)

⁶⁶ MONUSCO reported improved communication between the FIB and the other brigades in the Ituri Sector

V. MINUSMA

Operationalization of the mandate

i. Strategic documents were outdated and conveyed ambivalent messages with respect to addressing terrorist threats

38. The MINUSMA strategy against armed elements revolved around a ‘Shape Deter Stabilize and Assist’ model. Its objectives encompassed the stabilization of population centres and PoC in areas at risk through ‘robust patrolling and intelligence-led operations’, as well as the facilitation of dialogue between national authorities and armed groups, including over the cantonment and Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process.⁶⁷ Despite changes in the operational environment with increasing threats by TAGs, strategic documents were never fully updated to address terrorist threats, raising questions of their relevance.
39. MINUSMA strategy for PoC in Mali was finalised only in March 2015.⁶⁸ While consulted, United Nations Country Team (UNCT) members did not sign it, as they considered that joint PoC activities with the mission would compromise humanitarian principles, demonstrating the difficulty of integrated approaches in a terrorist-affected environment.
40. Strategic documents and guidance from Headquarters variously referred to ‘defensive’, ‘offensive’, and ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ actions that MINUSMA could take against armed groups, without specificity on how each permitted response worked in practice.

Performance of mandate

ii. MINUSMA was effective in supporting peace agreements and dialogue which significantly reduced direct confrontation between armed groups

41. MINUSMA supported the negotiations of two key peace agreements,⁶⁹ which significantly reduced confrontation between the Plateform coalition and the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad. From November 2015 to March 2016, MINUSMA facilitated inter-and intra-communal meetings for over 4,000 participants, contributing to the mitigation of tension over natural resources and armed group alliances.⁷⁰
42. Interviewees⁷¹ volunteered that dialogue with armed groups and the signature of the 2015 peace agreement were the mission’s most important results, largely contributing to the decrease of internally displaced people from 254,822 (2013) to 62,000 (2015).⁷²

iii. MINUSMA was less effective in deterring the threat posed by TAGs

43. MINUSMA conducted patrols and reconnaissance flights to deter violence, especially during full moon nights. However, despite increasing threats and the authorization to

⁶⁷ MINUSMA Mission Concept (2013)

⁶⁸ MINUSMA strategy for the PoC in Mali, 2015

⁶⁹ The Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement (2013) and the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation (2015)

⁷⁰ Update on recent intercommunity tensions and conflicts, as well as dialogue and reconciliation efforts at the regional and local levels, MINUSMA, March 2016


⁷¹ Thirteen interviewees in Mali (24 per cent)

⁷² Internally Displaced Population Falls in Mali – press release, International Organization for Migration (IOM), February 2016

‘undertake operations where there is credible evidence [...] that hostile groups or persons (including terrorists) are about to attack’,⁷³ MINUSMA seldom conducted pre-emptive operations. Secretary-General reports mentioned only three cases when MINUSMA could anticipate further attacks.⁷⁴ Interviewees attributed it to a lack of human and signals intelligence, strained military capacity, as well as different understanding of the mission’s role in deterring terrorist threats.

44. MINUSMA intention to have ‘no large-scale violent and terrorist activity in key areas of Mali’ was not achieved.⁷⁵ TAGs continued to conduct complex attacks⁷⁶ against the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) and international forces, challenging the mission’s ability to protect civilians.⁷⁷ From August 2015 to January 2016, TAGs targeted MINUSMA and the French forces 44 times.⁷⁸ In January 2017, a suicide bomber killed 54 people and injured over 100 more in Gao,⁷⁹ demonstrating the mission’s limited intelligence capacity to deter this type of threat.
45. Since 2013, MINUSMA lost 68 peacekeepers from hostile acts, becoming one of the deadliest missions.⁸⁰
46. The average monthly number of fatalities by conflict in Mali increased from 31.4 (2014) to 34.25 (2015).⁸¹ Insecurity spread significantly towards the centre and, to a lesser extent, the south of the country, with ‘a qualitative improvement’⁸² in the capability of TAGs. In 2016, the Security Council expressed concern about the expansion of terrorist and other criminal activities into central Mali and reinforced the mission’s mandate in this respect.⁸³

Figure 3: Fatalities in Mali by region⁸⁴



(Source: ACLED)

⁷³ HQ code cable, December 2014

⁷⁴ MINUSMA indicated that the tactical intelligence available was inadequate to conduct pre-emptive operations. MINUSMA efforts have concentrated on deterrence through patrolling, backed by helicopter surveillance.

⁷⁵ Draft military CONOPS (2015)

⁷⁶ Attacks that combine rockets, mortars, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

⁷⁷ TAGs responded to patrols with an increase in IED attacks (S/2014/229)

⁷⁸ Criminality and terrorism: threat to humanitarian actors, MINUSMA, March 2016. High-profile terrorist attacks included the hotel attack in Bamako (November 2015), and attacks against MINUSMA in Gao and Aguelhok (May and October 2016)

⁷⁹ S/2017/271

⁸⁰ DPKO website (specify page please or provide link)

⁸¹ ACLED

⁸² Draft Mission Concept (2016), and Military CONOPS (2015), Annex A

⁸³ S/2295 (2016)

⁸⁴ Number of fatalities recorded by MINUSMA in January-April 2016 differs as follows: 1 in Kidal, 44 in Gao, 11 in Tombouctou, and 21 in Mopti.

iv. Northern regions have not been stabilized, and the implementation of the peace agreement remains slow

47. The number of violent incidents in the seven major urban areas was twenty times higher than the target.⁸⁵ Interviewees⁸⁶ reported that northern regions remained “out of control”, and that illegal traffic of weapons and humans by armed groups persisted.
48. The September 2016 Secretary-General report noted resurging tension between armed groups over the control of Kidal, and military observers reported ceasefire violations in Timbuktu.⁸⁷
49. The restoration of State authority in the North faced significant challenges.⁸⁸ As of June 2016, just three of the eight cantonment sites agreed upon by the parties were under development, and the national security sector reform coordination mechanism was also not yet functioning.

Factors affecting performance

v. MINUSMA is deployed in a terrorism-affected environment, but without a mandate and adequate capacity to address the threats posed by armed elements

50. MINUSMA is expected to reduce the threat from all armed elements, but is disadvantaged without a specific mandate to conduct anti-terrorist operations.⁸⁹ The mission’s asymmetric environment has compelled it to devote its primary military efforts to protect itself rather than civilians. According to MINUSMA military leadership, more than 70 per cent of its force was used to protect United Nations assets, DDR sites and convoys.⁹⁰
51. A shortfall of 95 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and other COE affected the contingents’ capacity to protect and deter threats. Most military personnel interviewed⁹¹ and four civilian senior managers reported it as a significant operational difficulty. In addition, MINUSMA reported that damage to equipment caused by hostile attacks had left it with reduced capabilities,
52. The role of MINUSMA in combating terrorism is unclear to both its staff and the population. Most interviewees⁹² noted a lack of clarity over MINUSMA role vis-à-vis Malian and French security forces in proactively deterring terrorist threats.⁹³

vi. TCCs regulations and conditions affected the capacity and willingness of contingents to take risks

53. Caveats and conditions imposed by TCCs limited the ability of some contingents to be

⁸⁵ 202 versus a target of 10 (A/70/592)

⁸⁶ Fourteen interviewees (26 per cent)

⁸⁷ S/2016/819

⁸⁸ S/2016/819 and S/2295 (2016)

⁸⁹ While the Security Council ultimately renewed the MINUSMA mandate in 2016 without an anti-terrorism component, discussions among members of the Council demonstrated different preferences on how they would like MINUSMA to react in the prevailing asymmetric environment. Some stakeholders, including the African Union, desired a more proactive role for MINUSMA in support of the national army, while others remain concerned that doing so ‘would change the nature of what a peacekeeping mission should be’.

⁹⁰ UNCT personnel had to request MINUSMA escort two months in advance

⁹¹ Thirteen interviewees (60 per cent)


⁹² 29 interviewees (54 per cent)

⁹³ A key interviewee suggested the population did “not understand why 12,000 people come here and do not fight the terrorists”

deployed on a permanent basis in certain areas, and to perform their duties as instructed. About a third of interviewees⁹⁴ expressed concern over the unwillingness of some contingents to be deployed in high-risk areas, often based on national regulations linked to medical rescue. A sudden request for aircraft hangars, not specified in the Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) but considered a *sine qua non*, was also mentioned as an example of a *de facto* caveat.

54. The asymmetric environment affected contingents' attitude, with one military official stating that "the aim is to get them back alive, not do robust peacekeeping".
55. The risks of operating in an asymmetrical environment were not equally borne. Deployment patterns, and the number of casualties suffered by TCCs, showed the extent to which the risks differed. No military personnel from two permanent members of the Security Council and other European TCCs contributing to MINUSMA were permanently based in Sector North. Over a third of interviewees⁹⁵ volunteered that a marked disparity between capacity, capabilities and living standards of European and other TCCs (especially African re-hatted) existed,⁹⁶ creating issues of internal cohesion.

Figure 4: MINUSMA fatalities by nationality until 2017⁹⁷



(Source: DPKO)

vii. MINUSMA intelligence system did not cater to tactical needs, and suffered from limited intra-mission coordination

56. The mission's unique All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) produced high-value strategic analysis. Most mission personnel⁹⁸ volunteered that ASIFU analytical products had played a meaningful role in informing MINUSMA stabilization plans.

57. However, ASIFU did not cater to intelligence needs at the tactical level. ASIFU officers in

⁹⁴ 16 interviewees (30 per cent)

⁹⁵ 19 interviewees (35 per cent)

⁹⁶ The deployment pattern has generated some pushback. In 2014, the Chadian government informed the United Nations that it could not accept that its contingent served "as a shield for other contingents positioned further back" and called upon MINUSMA to "ensure a fair and equal treatment of all contingents." The Chadian contingent had requested to be rotated out, but this was not being considered for budgetary reasons.

⁹⁷ These include fatalities by accident, illness, malicious act, and others. Data available on DPKO/DFS website did not allow further disaggregation.

⁹⁸ 37 interviewees (69 per cent)

the field did not report to Sector Commanders, and had limited coordination with infantry battalions. ASIFU was also not present in Kidal, the most terrorist-affected region in the country.

58. ASIFU was not well integrated into the existing United Nations information and intelligence structures. Many interviewees⁹⁹ raised issues of poor information sharing with the military intelligence unit and the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC). A joint coordination board was not entirely successful, with one senior official stating the challenge of “coordinating the coordination”.
59. ASIFU did not allow the Organization to access raw data stored in its nationally owned intelligence networks, as Member States did not perceive the United Nations information systems as secure. A DPKO/DFS report acknowledged, ‘issues surrounding the ownership and sharing of information gathered by nationally-owned intelligence assets are currently insufficiently treated by United Nations policy’.¹⁰⁰

viii. Host government’s limited capacity handicapped the mission

60. Almost half of mission staff and stakeholders¹⁰¹ interviewed noted how the prolonged absence and limited capacity of the national army and civilian authorities in the North affected their ability to protect civilians, and delayed, overall, the restoration process. As of June 2016, only 11 per cent of the Malian army was deployed in the North of Mali. About a third of the interviewees¹⁰² have referred explicitly to the national authorities’ limited will to progress with peace talks, DDR, and security sector reform, advocating for a more robust and concerted political approach by the mission and the international community at large.

⁹⁹ 28 per cent

¹⁰⁰ Lessons learned exercise on the ASIFU and MINUSMA intelligence architecture, DPKO/DFS, 2015

¹⁰¹ 26 interviewees (48 per cent)

¹⁰² 16 interviewees (30 per cent)

VI. MINUSCA

Operationalization of the mandate

i. MINUSCA strategic documents lacked clear criteria for robust actions, and underestimated the threat level

61. MINUSCA strategic documents grouped its efforts with armed elements around three areas of engagement: security, PoC, and human rights; support to the political process and reconciliation, and; restoration and extension of State authority, including the implementation of UTMs and measures to fight against impunity.¹⁰³
62. These strategic documents, however, lacked clarity. Specifically, while MINUSCA could perform unilateral law enforcement operations when ‘national authorities are either not present or unable to respond’,¹⁰⁴ what this meant in practice was not clear. MINUSCA finalised standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the arrest, detention, and hand-over of individuals under the UTM mandate only in January 2017.¹⁰⁵
63. The 2014 CONOPS identified Bangui as the centre of gravity, and left to the Bangui Joint Task Force (BJTF), under the command of the Police Commissioner, the provision of security and PoC. Following the serious outbreak of violence that occurred in Bangui in 2015, it was clear that mission planners had underestimated the level of threat in the capital. The CONOPS allowed the Force Commander to assume charge in case of a deteriorating security situation, without specifying the conditions for transfer of authority. The CONOPS was updated only in April 2017.

Performance of mandate

ii. MINUSCA successfully secured the 2015-16 electoral process

64. MINUSCA secured the constitutional referendum, the elections, and the consequent installation of the government. A reinforced military approach, engaged dialogue with armed elements, strong messages to both candidates on the importance of publicly accepting the results, and pressure from the international community set the stage for a peaceful transition.

iii. Over time, MINUSCA was progressively more effective in protecting civilians, but serious violence resurged in the second half of 2016 indicating declining effectiveness

65. In the first nine months of MINUSCA operations, the security situation remained highly volatile, particularly in the Centre and West sectors. No operation was conducted until December 2014, as the mission was in its deployment phase. In February 2015, MINUSCA dislodged armed groups from Bria, allowing the return of the state authorities.
66. Violence exploded in September-November 2015 with significant human rights violations targeting and killing of hundreds of civilians.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Disarmament and dialogue with armed groups were planned as parallel activities, with efforts to deter armed groups from illegally exploiting natural resources phased to a later stage. Source: MINUSCA Mission Concept (2015)


¹⁰⁴ Police CONOPS (2015)

¹⁰⁵ A memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the government was signed in August 2014

¹⁰⁶ According to S/2015/918 and Amnesty International (2016), sectarian and inter-communal clashes resulted in at least

67. From December 2015 to April 2016, MINUSCA was more effective in deterring and expelling armed groups from government buildings, with important support from French Forces. MINUSCA managed to clear the main supply route from armed groups. Weapons-free zones were largely respected.¹⁰⁷ MINUSCA reported that projects for youth at risk and reconciliation initiatives at grassroots level also contributed to reducing the influence of armed groups on communities.
68. Fatalities by violence diminished from 353 in the last quarter of 2014 to 45 in the first quarter of 2016.¹⁰⁸ Killings and maiming of children and children victims of sexual violence, largely by armed groups, declined from 146 and 406, to 62 and 70, respectively, in 2014-2015.¹⁰⁹

Figure 5: Fatalities by Sector, September 2014 - April 2016



(Source: ACLED)

69. In the second half of 2016, however, CAR experienced a serious deterioration in the security situation,¹¹⁰ due to the end of the rainy season, and heightened competition among and within armed groups for resources and power, as mediation initiatives continued.

100 persons killed, more than 400 injured, and 40,000 displaced.


¹⁰⁷ 39 combat weapons were collected in the center sector

¹⁰⁸ OIOS-IED analysis of ACLED data

¹⁰⁹ S2016/133, A/69/926-S-2015/409

¹¹⁰ In November 2016, the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide expressed concern that civilians were targeted based on their ethnicity or religion.

Figure 6: Reported incidents in CAR (2015-16)¹¹¹



iv. The effectiveness of UTMs remained an open question

70. Little progress was made in the fight against impunity, partly due to delays in the establishment of the Special Criminal Court. MINUSCA reported having arrested approximately 400 criminals without the assistance of national forces, although interviewees noted challenges and lack of clarity in the implementation of the UTM mandate. In addition, about 750 prisoners escaped,¹¹² revealing the challenge of keeping arrested persons in prisons with poor infrastructure and limited or compromised national capacity.¹¹³ Most of the high-profile individuals suspected of crimes under international law or responsible for the systemic violence in the CAR were not arrested or effectively investigated.¹¹⁴

Factors affecting performance

v. Internal differences in engaging armed groups challenged the mission’s effectiveness

71. Majority of the mission civilian staff interviewed¹¹⁵ recognized that maintaining relationships with armed groups was essential but also problematic, as armed elements were both perpetrators and stakeholders in the political process. While some interviewees considered armed groups “criminals and not legitimate”, others labelled them as “political stakeholders, with whom we work especially where the State is absent”.¹¹⁶ The lack of guidance on how to engage with them caused concern.¹¹⁷

vi. Limited capacities and political commitment by national authorities negatively affected the mission’s efforts to fight against impunity

72. MINUSCA efforts to maintain law and order were hampered by the limited capacity of

¹¹¹ Incidents reported to MINUSCA JMAC included crime (86 per cent), armed conflict (7 per cent) and civil unrest (7 per cent). Civilians represented the largest target of attacks (over 170 incidents), followed by MINUSCA and United Nations agencies (35 incidents), Non-Governmental Organizations (18), armed groups (16), and State security (13).

¹¹² Nearly 700 from Ngaragba prison on 28 September, and 50 other prisoners from a gendarmerie holding facility in Bouar on 29 September

¹¹³ Prisoners escaped digging a tunnel, presumably with the complicity of prison guards, according to the media.

¹¹⁴ S/2015/936 and Amnesty International

¹¹⁵ 19 interviewees (70 per cent)

¹¹⁶ Interviews with MINUSCA civilian staff

¹¹⁷ MINUSCA finalised an SOP on engagement with armed non-State entities in February 2017

national institutions. In 2016, for example, an armed group leader, alleged to be involved in the September violence, was freed from custody the day he was arrested.¹¹⁸ Civilian interviewees¹¹⁹ stressed the challenges to “deal with a government which is neither professional nor reliable’ and where dialogue occurs with “people, not institutions”.¹²⁰

73. Half of civilian interviewees,¹²¹ including MINUSCA senior leaders, highlighted the mission’s challenges with arrests and UTMs, questioning the extent to which MINUSCA could perform unilateral law enforcement operations, without a full executive mandate.¹²²

vii. Until 2015, MINUSCA lacked critical operational capacity and suffered limited coordination between police and military forces

74. MINUSCA initially suffered reduced military personnel¹²³ and COE, as well as the lack of a robust posture by some contingents that allowed armed groups to move freely in the absence of State authority.¹²⁴ Some interviewees¹²⁵ reported the lack of robustness of some contingents, who understood their task of protecting civilians as “just sitting near a camp”.¹²⁶ The population of Mbrés sent MINUSCA four petitions lamenting the approach of one contingent that ‘never reacts and does not guarantee security’.¹²⁷

75. A third of interviewees¹²⁸ highlighted the need for increased, better-equipped, and better-trained national contingents. MINUSCA leadership considered the support of Sangaris a *sine qua non* for the effectiveness of operations. A temporary Quick Reaction Force from the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire also enhanced the mission’s deterrence efforts.

76. Reports assessing the 2015 incidents¹²⁹ concurred on the lack of intelligence as a key factor behind MINUSCA inability to halt the violence. MINUSCA lacked capacities at operational and tactical levels, and admitted to challenges with the independent verification of information.¹³⁰

77. Command and control within the BJTF was not well integrated, and lacked well-defined SOPs. Persistent friction between the police and military leadership¹³¹ over planning and tasking¹³² led to inefficiencies, and prevented the BJTF from making use of 450 soldiers in a reserve force during the 2015 violent outbreak. When the 2015 crisis erupted, the BJTF had only one infantry battalion of 750 soldiers at disposal, which was considered

¹¹⁸ S/2016/305 (2016)

¹¹⁹ 12 interviewees (44 per cent)

¹²⁰ Interview with senior civilian staff

¹²¹ 14 interviewees (52 per cent)

¹²² According to OLA, UTM have to be requested by national authorities, but it is unclear whether such requests have been made.

¹²³ In June 2015, MINUSCA force was still 1,640 below its authorized strength

¹²⁴ As reported in nine interviews and the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic

¹²⁵ 12 interviewees (29 per cent)

¹²⁶ Interview with senior civilian staff

¹²⁷ Pétition Mbres, Chefs de groupe, quartier, et village, 2016

¹²⁸ 14 interviewees (34 per cent)

¹²⁹ Investigation report regarding the operations conducted by the MINUSCA units in the 3rd district of Bangui from 1st to 4th of August 2015; MINUSCA After Action Review of the September Crisis – Recommended Actions; ‘Mandated to protect, equipped to succeed?’, Amnesty International, 2016

¹³⁰ In November 2015, MINUSCA deployed an Automated Threat Monitoring System, including an aerostat balloon, to generate real-time information for situational awareness.

¹³¹ Military interviewees were highly skeptical of being placed under the control of the police. The police, on the other hand, felt set-up for failure and complained about the lack of capacity, which significantly increased only when the BJTF command moved to the military.

¹³² S/MSC/2016/1

insufficient given the level of threat in the area of responsibility.

viii. Mission leadership pushed for more robust actions against armed groups in the second half of 2015

78. While some interviewees¹³³ noted the risk aversion of some contingents, others¹³⁴ volunteered that a more robust posture overall in the second half of 2015, stemming from senior leadership instructions, worked as effective deterrent. Frequent patrols were conducted in hotspots, barricades were removed, and attacks repelled, “sending signals that MINUSCA was there for business”.¹³⁵

¹³³ 12 interviewees (29 per cent)

¹³⁴ 10 interviewees (24 per cent)

¹³⁵ At the same time, the mission and the government conducted three inquiries on the excessive use of force by uniformed personnel, which were said to have lowered morale and adversely affected robust operations.

VII. Crosscutting Issues

i. Internal differences on how to engage with armed elements, and lack of internal cohesion, weakened missions' robust responses, in contexts of ongoing peace processes and limited government capacity or will

79. The Security Council and missions appear to adopt a binary classification towards armed groups: spoilers or stakeholders.¹³⁶ However, in the three countries, the hybridity of armed groups, who opportunistically shifted between politically oriented insurgents and criminals, 'made policy decisions much harder than before'.¹³⁷
80. Internal differences on how to engage with armed elements were reported in all three missions, with civilians demanding a more robust military approach while military personnel believed they were unjustly held responsible for shortcomings at the political level.¹³⁸
81. In Mali and CAR particularly, reconciling different mandates presented challenges, with discussions on DDR still unfolding. Specifically, mission staff was conflicted when the involvement of human rights offenders in a political process necessitated compromise between peace and justice.¹³⁹
82. Over a third of interviewees in the three countries¹⁴⁰ demanded a more integrated approach vis-à-vis armed elements within the mission, with clearer political guidance from mission leadership including on 'innovative' elements of mandates for which significant differences in interpretation remained.¹⁴¹ In two missions, legal advisers were not systematically consulted in clarifying mandate-related ambiguities.
83. The lack of internal cohesion was exacerbated by the instability of the contexts, and various conditions in the host governments raised by mission staff. Principal amongst these were a perceived lack of requisite political will, limited institutional capacity, alleged involvement in illicit activities, and linkages with armed elements.

ii. Some contingents lacked the will to deter and confront armed elements, with national regulations, caveats and operational deviations continuing to negatively affect performance

84. Across the three missions, there were inconsistencies in military contingents' approach to proactively protecting civilians from threats. While some contingents were singled out as proactive, most interviewees across the three missions¹⁴² pointed to the limited

¹³⁶ Based on the OIOS analysis of Security Council documents and interviews, armed elements that harm civilians are treated as spoilers, but when they lay down arms and/or demonstrate a willingness to enter the DDR process and participate in peace-talks, they are stakeholders.

¹³⁷ 'Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups', United Nations System Staff College and Center for International Peace Operations (2015), page 81

¹³⁸ Police components across missions believed they had a role in addressing criminality but not armed groups, and advocated for better integration with the military components.

¹³⁹ In Mali, interviewees admitted to frustration when confidence-building measures led to freeing human rights violators. In one case, MINUSCA mission leadership decided to delay the arrest of an armed group member accused of human rights violations because of political reasons.

¹⁴⁰ 53 interviewees (37 per cent)

¹⁴¹ Shortcomings were also noted in the guidance from Headquarters to missions on how to tailor communication strategies to include the robust elements of the mandate, and in the missions' outreach to the population.

¹⁴² 101 interviewees (70 per cent)

commitment of others to face risks.

85. While written caveats were rare,¹⁴³ political considerations, instructions by capitals, unclear national regulations, and sudden requests by TCCs for specific deployment conditions after the signature of the SURs were said to have affected the ability of the Force Commander to fully exert his authority.¹⁴⁴

iii. There was a widespread desire for better intelligence, but the capacity was lacking

86. Strategic documents in all three missions recognized the need for information-driven operations. Mission personnel however considered current intelligence capacities, especially at tactical level, insufficient,¹⁴⁵ resulting in untimely and poor quality information¹⁴⁶. Almost half of interviewees¹⁴⁷ reported critical gaps, particularly in terms of human intelligence, signals intelligence, and human terrain tracking software. The role played by community liaison assistants was acknowledged, while their limitations in terms of number and reliability were also highlighted. Military officials in two missions indicated the need for financial resources to purchase intelligence.
87. Key interviewees¹⁴⁸ in the three missions considered the use of Unmanned Unarmed Aerial Vehicles (UUAVs) crucial. In MONUSCO and MINUSMA, UUAVs were seen as an important complement to other sources, and were used to follow the routes taken by armed groups, and record human rights violations. In DRC, UUAVs were extensively utilised against FRPI and ADF, although only in the area around Bunia due to their limited range.
88. In April 2017, DPKO/DFS approved a policy on peacekeeping intelligence, which defined intelligence as ‘the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission [...] to meet requirements for decision making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate’.

iv. To varying degrees, missions suffered critical equipment shortfalls and insufficient pre-deployment training for asymmetrical environments

89. To varying degrees, all three missions suffered a lack of COE.¹⁴⁹ At the end of 2015, 32 per cent of units in MONUSCO and 21 per cent in MINUSMA still suffered a gap higher than 10 per cent. Data for MINUSCA are less indicative, as 22 units were deployed without a MOU.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴³ Caveats are permitted at two stages of the force generation process

¹⁴⁴ 57 interviewees (25 per cent). Due to the existence of such unregulated practices, it was not possible to determine the total number of caveats and restrictions imposed by TCCs in a definitive way.

¹⁴⁵ With the exception of ASIFU, intelligence qualified staff officers were said to be lacking in military Headquarters and contingents.

¹⁴⁶ The situation was particularly problematic in CAR, due to the lack of operational and tactical intelligence capacity and resulting reliance on Sangaris. In MONUSCO, a senior official attributed the mission inability to arrest any of the perpetrators of the attacks on Beni to a deficiency in such intelligence.

¹⁴⁷ 55 interviewees (49 per cent)

¹⁴⁸ 8 key interviewees

¹⁴⁹ 19 combat units, 14 enabling units and 9 Formed Police Units suffered equipment shortfalls, with average gaps of 7.2, 15.6 and 5.9 per cent, respectively. Largest shortfalls were noted in MINUSMA in a mechanized infantry coy contributed by Benin (48.2 per cent), an infantry battalion by Niger (31.9 per cent), a combat engineer unit by Senegal (23.7 per cent), and a Formed Police Unit by Nigeria (23.9 per cent). In MONUSCO, four enabling units by South Africa presented a COE gap ranging from 17.8 to 57.2 per cent.

¹⁵⁰ Units deployed without a signed MOU are not subject to shortfall statistics. As of 2017, 12 of the 38 units in MINUSCA are still deployed without a MOU, waiting for the concurrence by TCC/PCC.

Table 1: Shortfalls due to absent and non-functional COE (2015)

	No shortfalls	Shortfalls under 5%	Shortfalls 5-10%	Shortfalls 10-25%	Shortfalls over 25%	Units without MOU
MONUSCO	33%	26%	9%	18%	14%	0
MINUSMA	41%	32%	6%	9%	12%	9
MINUSCA	58%	29%	10%	3%	0%	22

Source: DFS

90. Re-hatted troops¹⁵¹ suffered major equipment and self-sustainment capacity shortfalls, in non-compliance with the SUR.¹⁵² Available data showed that, out of four units, only one contingent in MINUSCA had full capacity.¹⁵³ In MINUSMA, nine units had an average 68 per cent equipment capacity and 62 per cent self-sustainment capacity.¹⁵⁴ Senior officials in Headquarters indicated that waivers had often been lifted to ensure consistency between Letters of Assists/MOU and SURs, based on available capacity rather than needs.
91. Interviewees¹⁵⁵ indicated that the scarcity of equipment had adversely affected the effectiveness of operations. In particular, operations suffered from inadequate night vision capability,¹⁵⁶ limited-range radio communications, and poor inter-operability between air and ground troops. National military forces¹⁵⁷ supplied additional equipment and services to compensate partly for the lack of COE. DPKO/DFS however believed that a mismatch continued to exist between robust mandates and available resources.
92. Shortfalls were also reported in pre-deployment training of military personnel. Most military personnel¹⁵⁸ indicated that the more asymmetrical operational environment require new skills and capabilities, which they considered absent in most of the deployed contingents.¹⁵⁹
93. Missions tried to compensate for inadequate pre-deployment training by imparting in-mission tactical training, which however resulted in distraction from mandated duties.¹⁶⁰

v. There was a mismatch between civilian logistics procedures and the military components' operational needs

94. As the three CONOPS acknowledged, provision of highly mobile support for a timely and effective response by the Force has become an increasingly important factor in the current peacekeeping environment. However, missions' support and military components viewed

¹⁵¹ OIOS-IED is conducting an evaluation of re-hatting in MINUSMA and MINUSCA

¹⁵² COE/MOU Management Review Board memo and minutes

¹⁵³ The other three ranged between 20-45 per cent equipment capacity, and 34-54 per cent self-sustainment capacity. The mission also reported that all re-hatted units, except two, reached standard equipment levels only after mid-2016

¹⁵⁴ Chadian contingents presented the highest gaps, with two units having less than half the major equipment necessary, and only 17 per cent self-sustainment capacity (DPKO/DFS data)

¹⁵⁵ 36 per cent in Mali, 24 per cent in CAR, and 19 per cent in DRC

¹⁵⁶ Which are required (United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual, 2012) and requested in SURs

¹⁵⁷ The United States of America (USA) donated 115 APCs to MINUSMA, 16 of which however remained long stuck in Mozambique because of problems with custom regulations. Together with France, the USA also supported MINUSCA with vehicles, night vision goggles, and spare parts for helicopters.

¹⁵⁸ 44 interviewees (83 per cent)

¹⁵⁹ Twenty-six interviewees indicated that contingents, especially those re-hatted, were insufficiently skilled at both at operational and tactical level. MONUSCO has sought key enablers including forces with specialized jungle warfare to contest armed groups in harsh operating terrains.

¹⁶⁰ DPKO Office of Military Affairs, in collaboration with TCCs, is developing manuals and training materials, including on intelligence and IEDs, to fill the gap and adapt to this new operational environment.

logistics and planning issues very differently.

95. Mission support functions placed a premium on advance resource planning, and accordingly wished that military components communicated their operational needs well in advance, due to the financial implications that any change has on the mission.

96. The military components conversely viewed questioning by the Offices of the Director of Mission Support on operational matters as intrusions in their specialised domain. The majority of military personnel interviewed¹⁶¹ stressed the need for flexibility to respond in high-tempo operations. In particular, interviewees in the three missions reported complex and time-consuming procedural requirements to obtain military airlift assets, and expressed the desire that military rotary wing assets be put under the exclusive control of the Force, in order to ensure a timely and effective response to threats.¹⁶² In June 2016, MINUSCA granted the Force a number of flight hours for which special request was not required, and strengthened the coordination between mission support and military through co-location of functions.

vi. The authority conferred upon missions to address the involvement of armed groups in illegal economic activity and organized crime did not match the scale and seriousness of the issue

97. There was recognition across the United Nations System of both the scale and seriousness of the nexus between conflict and organized crime, exploitation of natural resources and, in some cases, terrorism. Interviewees in all three missions¹⁶³ referred to increased conflict in areas where mineral resources were located, and noted that armed groups were dependent on illegal trade and taxation. A 2015 Headquarters report on DRC concluded that ‘armed groups could largely be described as organised crime groups with national and transnational ties’.¹⁶⁴ In Mali, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime established that, ‘unless contraband was addressed, instability and lawlessness would persist in northern regions’.¹⁶⁵

98. The Security Council has acknowledged economic factors as determinants of conflict in all three countries, but it did not envisage a proactive role for PKOs to tackle organized crime. The Council tasked MINUSCA and MONUSCO¹⁶⁶ to support national authorities in the management of natural resources whose exploitation fuels conflict. Yet, compelled by several priorities and limited in their capacities, the two missions did not prioritize their work in this area.¹⁶⁷

99. Across the three operations, some mission staff and stakeholders¹⁶⁸ characterised the

¹⁶¹ 37 interviewees (70 per cent)

¹⁶² An interviewee in CAR noted that short-notice take-off was difficult, as special flight request papers had to be signed by eight people located in three different places, which could take 24-48 hours for final approval. The Military Staff Committee also reported (S/MSC/2016/1) that 11 signatures were needed to task a helicopter. The HIPPO report recommended that Force commanders had increased direct tasking authority for military utility helicopters when the mission concept of operations requires it, and where there is need.

¹⁶³ Twenty-two in DRC, 14 in Mali, and 4 in CAR

¹⁶⁴ OROLSI-DDR Report of MONUSCO field visit, November 2015

¹⁶⁵ Transnational organized crime in West Africa, a threat assessment, 2013

¹⁶⁶ S/RES/2098, S/RES/2147, S/RES/2211, S/RES/2277, S/RES/2149, S/RES/2217

¹⁶⁷ While MINUSCA delayed its support for the development of a strategy on national resources,¹⁶⁷ MONUSCO gradually reduced its involvement with the monitoring of mining sites, due to both resistance from the Congolese authorities and its Force being occupied with neutralization efforts, until the mining dossier was handed over to IOM in July 2014.¹⁶⁷ MINUSMA supported the Malian authorities in the establishment of a judicial center specialized in the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime.

¹⁶⁸ 19 interviewees (13 per cent)

United Nations response as “patchy”, “piecemeal”, and “inconsistent”. Missions were seen as lacking intelligence and capacity to address the armed groups’ economic foundations, and staff demanded a better collaboration with national and international forces on intelligence sharing.¹⁶⁹ Interviewees agreed that a more concerted approach was needed to address the illicit economic dimension of these conflicts.

¹⁶⁹ As also recommended by the Panel of Experts on CAR and in the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. External factors included porous borders, illicit income benefitting the local population thus creating vested interests, and close connections between traffickers and armed groups.

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations

100. The Security Council gave MONUSCO, MINUSMA, and MINUSCA robust mandates, requesting the three missions – to different extents – to be proactive in deterring and confronting armed groups and spoilers to peace.
101. A defining feature of missions with robust mandates is to act to deter, mitigate, and/or eliminate the threat posed by armed elements, before they inflict violence upon the country's population. When measured against this criterion, none of the missions has been adequately robust. It remains unclear what the difference is in practice between a robust and a regular PoC mandate, and what additional protection benefits have accrued to the population, as envisaged by the Security Council.
102. The three missions have all reported some initial successes in deterring and confronting armed elements: the FIB was militarily defeated in DRC in 2013; a peace agreement reached with compliant armed groups in Mali, and national elections were held in CAR in 2015.
103. However, in the absence of credible political processes, violence has resurged. The three missions operated in an environment akin to peace enforcement. State institutions with limited capacities made the work of the missions more difficult.¹⁷⁰
104. The operationalization of robust mandates was subject to varying interpretations and preferences, in overall effect, watering down the explicit intent of the Council. Differences between Member States on what precisely constituted robust peacekeeping, and opposition to the concept by key TCCs, cascaded down to every level, extending from Headquarters, to mission leadership, various mission components, and troops on the ground. While the missions, with few exceptions, did not demonstrate the level of proactivity and will required to effectively deter, inadequately equipped and poorly trained contingents raised the risk of the excessive use of force.
105. The implementation of strategies against armed elements needs to include both security and political elements, in line with the recommendations of the HIPPO report. It requires stronger dialogue with regional organizations and Member States, to enhance the political pressure for peace. Consensus among Member States is required to progress on critical issues, including improved intelligence and strategies to address the root causes of conflict – more specifically stopping illegal financial gains that sustain armed elements and terrorists, prolong conflict and postpone peace.
106. The Secretary-General is best placed to address these issues as a part of his broader reform in the area of peace and security, to enhance the ability of peacekeeping operations to protect civilians and transmit concrete proposals for the consideration of Member States.
107. As thousands of United Nations personnel risk their lives daily to keep the peace and to protect civilians, and as many have paid the ultimate sacrifice, there is great urgency to not let those unfortunate instances, when robust actions were not taken, to perpetuate the misperception of United Nations troops as pacific, complacent peacekeepers who only protect themselves in their camps. United Nations peacekeepers need to be respected as

¹⁷⁰ A senior official in CAR noted that the mission had ‘in several places replaced a failed State’.
<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/453480/politique/centrafrique-parfait-onanga-anyanga-minusca-aujourd'hui-dernier-rempart-contre-chaos-centrafrique/>

protectors of civilians and as fierce warriors for peace. Pertinently, the Secretary-General has called for ‘a greater conceptual clarity and a shared understanding of the scope of peacekeeping’, which is needed to pave the way for urgent reforms.¹⁷¹

108. OIOS makes three critical and four important recommendations to strengthen robust peacekeeping.

CRITICAL

- I. DPKO/DFS, in cooperation with DPA, UNODC and UNOCT, should approach partners to discuss the commissioning of a study on ways, including the role of the United Nations system, to curtail the financial incentives that armed groups derive from crime, terrorism, and other illegal activities, including those related to exploitation of natural resources (paras 97-99).
- II. DPKO/DFS should report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, the political and operational challenges of conducting unilateral offensive operations to deter and confront armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo to support the Council in its deliberations and decisions when considering a similar approach/modality in the future (paras 23-24 and 27).
- III. DPKO/DFS should initiate a dialogue with TCCs to ensure that risks related to operating in asymmetric environments are more equally shared amongst contingents. To this end, all SUR must cater for pre-agreed ‘in extremis conditions’ between TCCs and DPKO/DFS, which accord the Force Commander the flexibility to re-assign areas of responsibilities between TCCs or re-deploy forces across the area of responsibility (paras. 84-85)

IMPORTANT

- IV. DPKO/DFS should ensure that the missions’ (MONUSCO, MINUSMA, and MINUSCA) strategic documents are updated in a timely manner, and, as part of the regular review process, include, as appropriate, tailored strategies against armed groups encompassing both military and civilian elements (paras. 20, 39 and 63).
- V. DPKO/DFS should ensure that senior legal advisors in missions, and ultimately OLA, are consulted and actively involved in resolving and addressing ambiguities related to the interpretation and implementation of robust mandates (para.82).
- VI. DPKO/DFS should ensure that missions develop coherent strategic communication strategies, conveying the robust elements of their mandates effectively to the local population, including what missions can and cannot do. (para.52).
- VII. DPKO/DFS should determine an appropriate way forward to overcome gaps in human and signals intelligence (para.86).

¹⁷¹ Speech of the Secretary-General while taking oath of office, December 2016



UNCLASSIFIED

Immediate

TO: Mr. Yee Woo Guo, Director,
A: Inspection and Evaluation Division,
Office of Internal Oversight Services

DATE:

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

REFERENCE: UNHQ-AR-BOI-Memo-2-
2017-11759

FROM: Atul Khare, Under-Secretary-General
DE: for Field Support

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Atul Khare', written over a horizontal line.

SUBJECT: **Final Draft Report on the Evaluation of the Effectiveness of United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Deterring and Confronting
Armed Elements in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and the
Central African Republic**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the final draft report (hereafter referred to as "the report"). In formulating this response, the respective officials at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) were conferred, and their comments, where appropriate, have been incorporated in this reply. Please find set out below our comments on the findings. Our comments on the recommendations are reflected in the attached Recommendation Action Plan.

UNCLASSIFIED

General

2. In the future, it would be relevant to look beyond military deterrence and military means to address non-state armed groups (NSAG); the aspect of coordination between military and civilian components in deterring NSAG should be included in such evaluations.

Paragraph 20

3. With regard to the statement in paragraph 20 of the report that: “*Strategic documents did not adequately address the complexity of the conflict in eastern DRC...*”, it should be noted that even though MONUSCO only developed formal tailored strategies by civilian planners in 2016, military strategies were established long before this.

cc: Mr. Lacroix
Mr. Sur

Recommendation Action Plan

Evaluation of the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations in deterring and confronting armed elements in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and the Central African Republic

27/09/2017

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
<p>Recommendation 1: DPKO/DFS, in cooperation with DPA, UNODC and UNOCT, should approach partners to discuss the commissioning of a study on ways, including the role of the United Nations system, to curtail the financial incentives that armed groups derive from crime, terrorism, and other illegal activities, including those related to exploitation of natural resources (paras 97-99).</p>	<p>DPKO and DFS consider this to be a useful recommendation in an area requiring more focused research. To this end, and in the spirit of the Secretary-General's drive for enhanced partnerships across the spectrum of peace and security work, DPKO and DFS, in cooperation with DPA, UNODC and UNOCT will approach partners who may have comparative advantages in this area in terms of expertise and networks.</p>	<p>DPKO</p>	<p>First quarter of 2019</p>
<p>Recommendation 2: DPKO/DFS should report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, the political and operational challenges of conducting unilateral offensive operations to deter and confront armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo to support the Council in its deliberations and decisions when considering a similar approach/modality in the future (paras 23-24 and 27)</p>	<p>DPKO will, through regular reports of the Secretary-General, including in fulfilment of reporting requirements on performance pursuant to resolution 2348 (2017) (e.g. OP 52 (iv)), provide information to the Security Council on these topics.</p>	<p>DPKO</p>	<p>First quarter of 2019</p>

<p>Recommendation 3: DPKO/DFS should initiate a dialogue with TCCs to ensure that risks related to operating in asymmetric environments are more equally shared amongst contingents. To this end, all SUR must cater for pre-agreed 'in extremis conditions' between TCCs and DPKO/DFS, which accord the Force Commander the flexibility to re-assign areas of responsibilities between TCCs or re-deploy forces across the area of responsibility (paras. 84-85)</p>	<p>Since the HIPPO report, the statement of unit requirements (SURs) state that a unit can be deployed anywhere within the area of responsibility, based on the Force Commander's request, despite its initial deployment location. In future, DFS will attach the SURs to the memorandum of understanding in accordance with the new Contingent-owned Equipment Manual. DPKO and DFS will also explore the need to expand the role of pre-deployment visits to allow for a broader assessment of the capacities of the units under review.</p>	DPKO	Third quarter of 2018
<p>Recommendation 4: DPKO/DFS should ensure that the missions' (MONUSCO, MINUSMA, and MINUSCA) strategic documents are updated in a timely manner, and, as part of the regular review process, include, as appropriate, tailored strategies against armed groups encompassing both military and civilian elements (paras. 20, 39 and 63)</p>	<p>DPKO will send a code cable to the relevant missions with guidance and will ensure necessary follow up towards this end.</p>	DPKO	Second quarter of 2018
<p>Recommendation 5: DPKO/DFS should ensure that senior legal advisors in missions, and ultimately OLA, are consulted and actively involved in resolving and addressing ambiguities related to the interpretation and implementation of robust mandates (para.82)</p>	<p>DPKO will send a code cable to all missions with guidance to this end.</p>	DPKO	First quarter of 2018

<p>Recommendation 6: DPKO/DFS should ensure that missions develop coherent strategic communication strategies, conveying the robust elements of their mandates effectively to the local population, including what missions can and cannot do. (para.52)</p>	<p>DPKO will send a code cable to all missions with guidance to this end.</p>	<p>DPKO</p>	<p>First quarter of 2018</p>
<p>Recommendation 7: DPKO/DFS should determine an appropriate way forward to overcome gaps in human and signals intelligence (para.86)</p>	<p>DPKO and DFS will take the following actions to address the gaps highlighted in the recommendation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Approach TCCs to deploy tactical ground-based collection systems and seek unmanned aerial vehicle platforms which also include SIGINT; - Conduct manpower review to ensure U2/JMAC structure is sufficient for analysing SIGINT data; - Explore opportunities to deploy a military technical assistance unit (MATU), similar to that being employed in MONUSCO; - Assess viability of deploying HUMINT collection teams as part of military or police force structure; - Determine feasibility of employing biometric collection systems in the field. This may require extended legal authorities and significant cost for procurement, training, and network; - Develop a job description for a U2X empowered to coordinate all HUMINT across the mission, not just military (just like is being generated in the new U2 structure for MINUSMA). Adjust the existing policies/ regulations in this regard; and - Review of Intel architecture in all missions. 	<p>DPKO</p>	<p>Third quarter of 2018</p>