Evaluation of the contribution of the UNMISS Civil Affairs Division to the reduction of local conflict in South Sudan

26 April 2019

Assignment No: IED-19-007
Function

“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organization. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organization;” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

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**Acronyms**

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Division</td>
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<td>CIVIC</td>
<td>Center for Civilians in Conflict</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DMS</td>
<td>Department of Mission Support</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DSRSGs</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>FIOC</td>
<td>Field Integrated Operations Centre</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HoFO</td>
<td>Head of Field Office</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Inspection and Evaluation Division</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Service</td>
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<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>PAD</td>
<td>Political Affairs Division</td>
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<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public Information Office</td>
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<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
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<td>POLNET</td>
<td>Political, Peace and Humanitarian Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBB</td>
<td>Results Based Budget</td>
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<td>RCO</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator Office</td>
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<td>RRP</td>
<td>Relief, Reintegration, and Protection</td>
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<td>SAGE</td>
<td>Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>Special Expenditure Project</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>UN Country Team</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UN Police</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VISTAS</td>
<td>Viable Support to Transition and Stability</td>
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Summary

The evaluation determined the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and their plausible contribution to local conflict reduction in the country. Amongst the missions’ largest civilian component, CAD led the missions’ efforts to reduce conflict at the local level.

With the respect to the relevance of its activities, the evaluation found the location of CAD activities were relevant to local conflict reduction. CAD activities were generally clustered close to the conflict locations with 82 and 59 per cent of CAD daily activities and Special Expenditure projects (SEP) respectively occurring within a 20-kilometer radius. However, there was scope for CAD to improve its engagement with relevant parties to the conflict. In the backdrop of ethnic polarization in South Sudan, CAD had to necessarily engage with a broad cross-section of involved ethnic groups to lessen intra- and inter-ethnic conflict at the local level. However, the Dinka or its sub-clans remained the primary conflicting party that CAD engaged in their SEPs (63 per cent).

With respect to cattle, which was a major source of conflict in South Sudan, the evaluation found that CAD had invested resources to address the issue near the Sudanese border but that most cattle-related conflict fatalities had occurred in the interior of South Sudan. Thus, there was a disconnect between the areas of conflict and SEP expenditure, which suggests opportunity to improve alignment of resources in terms of expenditure on this issue.

Local communities provided positive feedback about CAD’s work. These included women who highly valued its long-term field presence and contributions. About 58 per cent of CAD SEPs exclusively involved civilians including representation from groups involved in cattle-related conflicts. Communities were unanimous in considering CAD as peace builders. CAD's extensive field presence also raised expectations among the communities who expressed a desire for CAD to increase its efforts to improve relations between civilians and national security actors.

With respect to its day-to-day activities, CAD appeared to have relied (85 per cent of time) on its engagement with government officials for information seeking purposes. Additionally, 52 per cent of SEPs involved government officials. While it was reasonable to assume a level of continuous engagement with the government, evidence suggested an imbalance which led to divergent perceptions of CAD’s engagement with stakeholders within the Mission headquarters.

In terms of partnership, with one exception (Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)), CAD had developed positive and collaborative relationships with partners, both within and outside the Mission. While CAD was largely credited for being a significant source of field information to the Mission, the reported lack of reciprocity from JMAC in sharing information with CAD resulted in strained relationship.

Knowledge about CAD’s work and its contribution was weak within the members of the senior mission leadership. This was in contrast with the field offices where CAD was recognized as a primary contributor to early warning mechanisms and situational awareness.

Finally, CAD appeared to have made a plausible contribution to the reduction in occurrence of local conflict in areas where it had engaged. CAD significantly increased its daily activities and SEPs during the second half of the evaluation period that resulted in specific agreements on ground that established security guarantees and freedom of movement for civilians and their livestock.

The evaluation made one critical and six important recommendations. The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and Department of Operational Support (DOS) accepted all but one recommendation (# 7) which was deleted from the report.
I. Introduction and objective

1. The Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS-IED) conducted a risk assessment of peacekeeping missions that identified the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as a priority subject for evaluation.

2. The general frame of reference for OIOS is in General Assembly resolutions 48/218B, 54/244, 59/272, as well as ST/SGB/273, which authorize OIOS to initiate, carry out and report on any action it considers necessary to fulfil its responsibilities. OIOS evaluation is provided for in the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation.¹

3. The objective of the evaluation was to determine, as systematically and objectively as possible, the plausible contribution of the UNMISS Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to local conflict reduction in South Sudan between January 2015 and December 2017. The evaluation topic emerged from a mission-level risk assessment described in the evaluation inception paper produced at the outset of the evaluation.² The evaluation was conducted in conformity with norms and standards for evaluation in the United Nations System.³

4. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) management comments were sought on the draft report and considered in the final report. Their response is included in the annex.

II. Background

5. UNMISS was established on 9 July 2011 with a state-building mandate, after South Sudan gained its independence.⁴ It was the second largest United Nations peacekeeping mission with an approved budget of USD $1.07 billion⁵ and 19,101 deployed personnel as of August 2018.

6. UNMISS operated within a conflict setting which was defined by a strong ethnic dimension as repeatedly noted in United Nations reports.⁶ A civil war began in December 2013 when predominantly Dinka government forces fought with predominantly Nuer opposition forces. About 1.4 million people were displaced from their homes during the first five months of the war and thousands of civilians fled into UNMISS bases in several locations.⁷ The Mission opened its gates to save lives, creating what

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¹ ST/SGB/2016/6, p. 16, Regulation 7.1.
⁴ The state-building mandate encompassed support for peace consolidation; support to the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protection of civilians; establishment of rule of law; and strengthening of the security and justice sectors (S/RES/1996).
⁵ 2017-2018 financial period
⁶ The UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide reported in November 2016 to the Security Council that “there is a strong risk of violence escalating along ethnic lines with the potential for genocide.” (The full statement is available at: http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/our-work/Doc.8_2016-11-17%20AD%20Statement%20to%20SC%20South%20Sudan%20-%20%20final.pdf). The Secretary-General said that local reconciliation in South Sudan was vital “to reverse the ‘ethnicization’ that characterizes the current national crisis” (see S/2016/95, paragraph 33).
are now commonly referred to as protection of civilian (PoC) sites sheltering about 210,500 people within its compounds.\(^8\)

7. In response to the conflict, the Security Council revised the Mission mandate from state-building activities to protection of civilians in May 2014,\(^9\) and established four pillars of action for UNMISS:
   a. protection of civilians;
   b. monitoring and investigating human rights;
   c. creating the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance; and
   d. supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the warring parties (and, subsequently, the peace agreement signed in August 2015\(^{10}\)).

8. The peace agreement intended to end the conflict collapsed in July 2016, when government and opposition forces fought heavily in Juba, which also resulted in the relocation of non-essential United Nations staff. In February 2017, the United Nations declared a state of famine in parts of South Sudan, the first such declaration worldwide in six years.\(^{11}\) The number of people displaced since the start of the war had reached more than 4 million.\(^{12}\)

9. In late 2017, the Secretary-General initiated a mandate review of the Mission. Notably, it found that “the key factors for the success of the political process are not in the hands of the Mission,” and that “if no sustained progress is made on the political front, the Mission is likely to have to continue to implement the other three pillars of its mandate for a significant and indefinite period of time.”\(^{13}\) The review observed that the Mission had turned its attention to local level conflict.

10. Within UNMISS, CAD was the lead mission component that sought to reduce conflict at the local level. CAD in substantive civilian components is approximately 14 per cent (103 of 716).\(^{14}\) Among the largest civilian components, it was headed by a Director (D2) with permanent teams in ten field offices located in Wau, Aweil, Bentiu, Bor, Juba, Kuajok, Malakal, Rumbek, Torit, and Yambio. Personnel were distributed relatively evenly across these offices, averaging ten in each.

11. Special Expenditure Projects (SEPs) were the main programmatic initiatives proposed and undertaken by CAD field teams through the use of a discretionary fund of around USD $450,000 per budget year.

12. Aligned with the Security Council’s decision to shift the Mission mandate from state-building activities to the protection of civilians, CAD reprioritized its work to conflict management, reconciliation, and social cohesion activities. CAD supported the Mission’s PoC pillar by creating an “enabling environment” and engaging a variety of actors, including traditional chiefs, community

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\(^{8}\) UNMISS PoC Sites Update (3 July 2018)
\(^{9}\) S/RES/2155 (2014)
\(^{10}\) In August 2015, under the auspices of the “Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) plus,” parties to the conflict signed the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) in Addis Ababa. The Security Council endorsed the Agreement and mandated UNMISS to support its implementation, particularly regarding the establishment of transitional security arrangements; monitoring the separation, assembly and cantonment of force; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and security sector reform; and the constitution-making process.
\(^{11}\) Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) South Sudan Alert, Issue 6, 20 Feb 2017. Available at http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Alert_6_SouthSudan_Crisis_Feb2017_IB.pdf
\(^{13}\) S/2018/143, paragraph 40.
\(^{14}\) As of June 2018 Department of Mission Support records.
leaders, women, and youth and through providing senior Mission leadership with early warning and situational awareness.

13. CAD reported its expected accomplishments largely through the Results Based Budget (RBB) under three of the Mission’s four pillars (see Table 2). The fourth pillar, monitoring and investigating human rights abuses, was the responsibility of the Human Rights Division.

Table 2: CAD Contribution to UNMISS mandate as stipulated in the Results Based Budget (2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNMISS mandate pillar</th>
<th>CAD expected accomplishment</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
<td>● Enhanced PoC through political engagement.</td>
<td>● Increase in the number of initiatives undertaken by national, state and county level governments, and non-state actors to protect civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Improved PoC for civilians under threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of violence, with specific protection for women and children.</td>
<td>● Increase in the number of forums to support conflict transformation in all states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Secure environment for the safe and voluntary return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees.</td>
<td>● Increase in the proportion of inter-communal conflicts at state and county level mitigated by traditional mechanisms, including with the participation of women and youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating the conditions conducive for the delivery of humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>● A safe and secure environment to facilitate humanitarian access.</td>
<td>CAD does not report an indicator for this achievement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the implementation of the peace agreement</td>
<td>● Institutions established by the Agreement to monitor and coordinate is implementation are supported and fulfilling their role.</td>
<td>CAD does not report an indicator for this achievement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and investigating human rights</td>
<td>No significant role</td>
<td>No significant indicator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAD working context and challenges

14. The working environment of CAD was characterized by a series of complex and interrelated challenges including those related to geography, climate, insecurity, and the interplay between national and local conflict dynamics. The cultural milieu of the country was also relevant to its work. South Sudan ranked 187 out of 189 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2017. Demographically, 72 per cent of the population of South Sudan was under the age of 30.

15. In its work at the local level, CAD identified conflict drivers that included ethnic polarization; unregulated cattle migration; competition over natural resources (particularly grazing land and

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15 S/RES/2327 (2016)
16 UNDP Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update (South Sudan). Available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/SSD.pdf
pasture); lack of livelihood opportunities; and lack of effective governance (including traditional governing systems). These manifested themselves in specific ways linked to the broader pattern of conflict in the country.

16. Insofar as ethnic polarization was concerned, the United Nations Panel of Experts on South Sudan found that “ethnicity remains the main mobilizing tool for warring parties in South Sudan,” and noted “multiple United Nations bodies [have] expressed concern about the rising ethnic dimension of the conflict.”

18. The Dinka dominated the government and the Nuer led the opposition. Conflict with ethnic overtones also involved other groups, including the Equatorians, Shilluk, Murle, Fertit and Balanda.

17. Overall, the agro-pastoralist livelihood system predominant in CAD areas of operations was in crisis.

19. Cattle-related issues (including cattle raiding and pastoral migration) featured prominently in the work of CAD. While South Sudan had the highest livestock per capita holding in Africa, with a cattle population conservatively estimated at 11.7 million and an asset valued of at least USD $12 billion, it had an extremely small formal economy.

20. Widespread cattle raiding was a central aspect of recruitment into armed forces with several negative consequences. Actors who accumulated large herds gained power to broker deals and compensate militias. Cattle raiding caused and sustained cycles of revenge violence, depleted communities of wealth and livelihood, and destabilised social systems such as marriage dowry and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. Increasing bride price and cross-border small arms were linked as a trigger to cattle raids.

III. Methodology

18. The objective of the evaluation was to determine the relevance and effectiveness of CAD activities, and its plausible contribution to local conflict reduction in South Sudan between January 2015 and December 2017. In addition, it also sought to identify cross-cutting issues that helped or hindered the work of CAD.

19. The evaluation team undertook travel to field locations and sought to understand the process, rationale and impact of CAD interventions.

20. Evaluation results were derived from rigorous data collection procedures and relied on triangulation from multiple sources and analyses. Data gathered included:

   a. **Structured content analysis**: selected samples of 720 CAD daily reports; 147 CAD weekly reports; 387 Special Expenditure Project (SEP) final reports; 11 Secretary-General’s reports; selected UNMISS strategic and programmatic documents (e.g. Results Based Budget) and work-plans; statements by UNMISS senior leadership; and previous studies.
reviews, evaluations; and the Civil Affairs Handbook which was consulted to better understand the generic roles, responsibilities, and best practices of CAD in peacekeeping;

b. **Secondary data analysis:** UNMISS programme and operational data, including budget performance reports and monitoring reports;

c. **Survey data:** a web-based survey was sent to 500 UNMISS civilian staff across all civilian Mission components, with 196 respondents (39 per cent);

d. **Semi-structured interviews** were conducted in person with staff at United Nations Headquarters in New York, Mission headquarters in Juba, various field locations (Juba, Bentiu, Yei, Bor, and Wau), and a range of external informant groups. A total of 83 interviews and focus group discussions were conducted. This included with Mission staff in the Office of the SRSG; Office of the Chief of Staff; Office of the Deputy SRSG-Political, Office of the Deputy SRSG/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator; Civil Affairs Division; Human Rights Division; Relief, Reintegration, and Protection (RRP); UN Police; Force; Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC); Joint Operations Centre (JOC); Gender Unit; Department of Mission Support and field offices; and additional interviews with NGOs, UN Country Team (UNCT) members, government officials, community leaders, church leaders and other stakeholders;

e. **Case studies** focused on specific CAD interventions in Bentiu, Yei, Bor, and Wau. These were selected using two criteria: a) areas of conflict or insecurity where incidents significantly affected the safety of civilians, as reported in data from the Secretary-General reports to the Security Council and the Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset (ACLED) database; and b) areas where CAD invested significant resources, measured in terms of the number of Special Expenditure projects implemented and activities reported in CAD daily reports.

21. **Specially constructed databases included:**

a. **Incident database:** extracted from ACLED. Incidents that were not directly related to violence against civilians were excluded. The resulting 1,050 incidents were reviewed to identify the corresponding conflict type. The conflict types, inter alia, included those related to cattle, targeted killings, and gender-based violence.

b. **SEP database:** constructed through a structured coding exercise of 387 SEP final reports that identified 423 unique activities. SEPs were planned interventions to address specific

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25 Several external studies analysed UNMISS work on PoC and support to the delivery of humanitarian assistance within the PoC sites. These included the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to the Crisis in South Sudan (2015), the Lessons Learned Study on the PoC sites requested by the Security Council (2016), and three reports by the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC).

26 The Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset (ACLED) is a disaggregated conflict collection, analysis and crisis mapping project based at the University of Sussex, UK. The ACLED codebook is available at [http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ACLED_Codebook_2017.pdf](http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ACLED_Codebook_2017.pdf) For the purpose of this evaluation, ACLED data pertaining to military action-related conflicts was excluded.

27 OIOS-IED analysed data from UNMISS Casualty Monitoring Database but decided not to use them for the selection of the case studies. The last data entries dated to June 2016, and the lack of dedicated focal points in some states appeared to have affected the quality/completeness of the dataset.

28 The data source for this database was a set of Special Expenditure Project (SEP) reports provided by CAD. The data was comprised of identifiable SEP activities with a distinct date, location and Field Office that carried out the activity. It included such information as amount spent in USD; type and theme of the activity; types and numbers of participants (affiliation and/or ethnic background wherever available); involvement of
issues. Information on intended outcome, type and theme of the activity was used to categorise activities into sub-tiers derived from operational concepts in the 2015 DPKO/DFS Policy on Protection of Civilians.29

c. **Daily activity database**: derived from structured content analysis of 720 CAD daily reports which CAD wrote on a daily basis to capture day-to-day work which included conflict status updates, early warning, and inter alia, information from different stakeholders. The coding exercise identified about 5,865 activities. To maintain consistency with the SEP database, day-to-day activities were recorded alongside a distinct date, location and field office that carried out the activity. The database also included the type of activity and stakeholder engaged along with their sub-tiers. It was not possible to identify the theme, category or other indicators given the nature of the activity.

d. **Human Resource database**: information obtained from the Department of Mission Support (DMS), which was used to analyse the level of human resources available to CAD.

22. The following approaches and definitions were used:

a. **Types and themes of activities from SEP final reports** were identified and categorized through a review of project titles given by CAD to SEP activities and objectives as mentioned in the final reports. A structured coding exercise of all the reports revealed various types of activities and topics of discussion which were further used to identify activity themes. Types of activities included workshops, conferences, forums, trainings, and roundtable discussions. Similarly, topics that were discussed during the activities included conflict management, social cohesion, peaceful coexistence and national identity, migration, peace dialogue, and civil-military relations. While, at times, multiple topics were discussed in an activity, the one mentioned in the project title and/or primarily identified as the core focus of the activity was tagged as the theme.

b. **Hotspots** were locations where a series of PoC incidents had occurred and where SEP expenditure was concentrated. Time series geographical maps were produced to illustrate the movement of hotspots over time.

c. **Grid analysis** included creating a geographical grid of 20-kilometre sectors placed over the map of South Sudan. The resulting 1,735 sectors were superimposed with the location of incidents from the incident database, and CAD activities from SEP and daily activities database.

23. The quantitative approach used in this evaluation had the following limitations:

a. It was assumed that activities mentioned in daily and SEP final reports constituted the full spectrum of CAD activities.

b. The level of fatalities enumerated in the ACLED dataset could not be verified on the ground. The evaluation relied upon the three-tiered institutional verification process of ACLED developers and researchers for quality control to avoid potential double-counting or bias.

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29 The DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (ref. 2015.07). The Policy identified responses under three tiers. The nature of activities performed by CAD largely fell under Tier 1 (protection through dialogue).
c. Identification of conflict drivers in ACLED was based on subjective interpretation of a brief description of incidents, which was insufficient to fully identify the actual conflict drivers on the ground.

d. The nature of the peace and security situation in South Sudan may have made any causal relationships erroneous. In the absence of robust conflict data, it was challenging to estimate the magnitude of any effect of causality and therefore not attempted.30

IV. Evaluation Results

A. The location and type of CAD activities were relevant, but their engagement with relevant parties to conflict could be improved.

24. To reiterate from above,31 the root causes identified were ethnic polarization, cattle-related issues, competition over natural resources, lack of livelihood opportunities, and lack of effective governance. In this context of multi-dimensional conflicts, the relevance of CAD activities was assessed in relation to three aspects: their geographic locations; types of work (i.e. daily and SEPs); and extent of engagements with relevant parties to the conflict.

Geographic relevance of CAD work

25. With respect to the geographic relevance of CAD activities, the ACLED conflict incident database identified Wau, Bentiu, Leer, Pibor, Juba, Yei and a zone across Lakes State and western Jonglei State as conflict hotspots.32 Grid analysis showed about 80 per cent of CAD daily activities and 59 per cent of SEPs occurred within a 20-kilometre radius of a conflict incident. CAD projects and activities were generally clustered in these areas and, therefore, relevantly located.

26. In this regard, CAD leadership noted that not all interventions were possible within this radius due to the need for activities to occur in a neutral location acceptable to all conflicting parties, accessible to UNMISS staff, and where basic facilities were available.

27. The 2017 mandate review had found that at least half of Mission resources were absorbed by the PoC sites.33 However, data analysis revealed that this was not the case for CAD, as the great majority of its projects (91 per cent) were conducted outside PoC sites and CAD spent more on projects outside PoC sites than inside them. This indicated utilization of CAD resources to support a greater coverage of mission conflict resolution work and avoided duplication of efforts with other Mission components largely focused on PoC sites, such as RRP and UNPOL.

Relevance of CAD work to the conflict

28. The primary day-to-day role of CAD was to engage with communities in the context of conflict management and promoting social cohesion and collect and report early warning and situational awareness in field locations to Mission headquarters which constituted about 60 per cent of its daily activities. In addition, CAD participated in joint patrols with other UNMISS components, including the military, for community engagements, advocacy, and the promotion of dialogue, reconciliation and social cohesion.

30 For example, reverse causality and persistent relationship between past and future conflicts.
31 See paragraph 15
32 For purposes of this evaluation, OIOS used the names of the 10 existing states at the time of the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 17 August 2015.
29. Furthermore, SEPs were formulated in response to the conflict on the ground, building upon the daily field activities of CAD. Many SEPs were implemented in locations following a conflict incident. Nearly half of projects (48 per cent) were dedicated to conflict management, usually in the form of workshops. SEPs most relevant with the reduction in level of fatalities were those conducted five to six months after the incident. This indirect evidence suggested that field teams needed time to strategically plan and implement the project. This also included the time to gain administrative approvals, which CAD reported generally took about 45 days.

30. Similarly, indirect evidence based on CAD day-to-day work over a 36-month period suggested their relevance to the reduction in level of fatalities with a lag of about three months.

Relevance to the parties to the conflict

31. As noted above, with ethnic polarization a marked feature of the conflict in South Sudan, CAD necessarily had to engage with a broad cross-section of involved ethnic groups to lessen intra- and inter-ethnic conflict at the local level.

32. However, data indicated that two thirds (63 per cent) of CAD projects engaged with only one ethnic group, namely the Dinka in most cases. When CAD engaged with more than one ethnic group, which was the case in about one third of projects, the Dinka were represented 72 per cent of the time.

33. By way of explanation, CAD stated, and analysis of SEP projects confirmed, that most UNMISS field offices and CAD project locations were in government-controlled areas that are predominantly Dinka. This may have restricted the possible locations for engagement. In addition, it appeared that stark ethnic polarization in some areas was so great that it was not possible to engage more than one group in the absence of UN force protection in some CAD field offices. This may have created a disincentive for ethnic groups opposed to the government to participate. This was best illustrated in PoC sites and contested areas where, according to five key informant interviews with community and women leaders in Juba, Bor, Yei, Wau, and Bentiu, an ethnic group perceived to oppose the government found it difficult to move freely in surrounding areas under government control.

34. Dynamics around cattle migration/raiding were a key conflict driver identified by CAD and of widespread concern to CAD team leaders based in the field. Several Secretary-General reports indicated that the movement of cattle herds into Western Bahr el Ghazal and Greater Equatoria by Dinka pastoralists generated conflict. Cattle were important as assets that could be used as a form of cash in a barter economy, constituted wealth, and cattle had social significance. A CAD team leader based in Greater Upper Nile reported the importance of cattle for young men involved in conflict, stating: “If you are a young man of 18 or 19 years and don’t have cattle, you can’t marry. You must

B. CAD invested resources to address cattle-related issues near the Sudan border, but the relevance of these efforts was reduced as most cattle-related conflict fatalities were in the interior.

34. Many SEPs were implemented in locations following a conflict incident. Nearly half of projects (48 per cent) were dedicated to conflict management, usually in the form of workshops. SEPs most relevant with the reduction in level of fatalities were those conducted five to six months after the incident. This indirect evidence suggested that field teams needed time to strategically plan and implement the project. This also included the time to gain administrative approvals, which CAD reported generally took about 45 days.

30. Similarly, indirect evidence based on CAD day-to-day work over a 36-month period suggested their relevance to the reduction in level of fatalities with a lag of about three months.

Relevance to the parties to the conflict

31. As noted above, with ethnic polarization a marked feature of the conflict in South Sudan, CAD necessarily had to engage with a broad cross-section of involved ethnic groups to lessen intra- and inter-ethnic conflict at the local level.

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34. Analysis showed a moderately strong correlation of 0.4 between CAD SEPs and wider CAD engagement in the field area, including information collection and verification, patrolling and other activities.

35. Logit regression of CAD daily activities on conflict fatalities over a 36-month period.

37. Key informant interviews conducted in South Sudan, May 2018.

join the SPLA or an armed group to raid cattle to get married.” Cattle raiding was reported to enable the payment of dowry.⁽³⁹⁾ ACLED conflict data showed cattle-related incidents were concentrated in Jonglei and Lakes (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Cattle-related conflict fatalities; ACLED 2015-2017](image)

- All ten states experienced cattle-related fatalities, but with notable differences;
- The number of cattle-related fatalities grew each year, with a 171 per cent increase from 2016 to 2017;
- Hotspots of recurring cattle-related incidents appeared in Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria in 2015 and in Lakes and Jonglei in 2015, 2016 and 2017;
- The overall worst-affected states were Jonglei and Lakes;
- Geographically, the emergence of multiple hotspots in Jonglei led to a significant increase in fatalities in 2017;
- Although the situation appeared to have improved in Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria based on the decreased number of fatalities after 2015, this was misleading as the reduction was linked to the mass displacement of approximately one million people from the area to Uganda.⁽⁴⁰⁾

There was a disconnect between the areas of conflict and SEP expenditure when the level of fatalities in cattle-related conflicts and amount of expenditure (in USD) were compared (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2: Cattle-related conflict hotspots and SEP expenditure; period 2015-2017](image)

⁽⁴¹⁾ Double click on the map to see annual changes in conflict hotspots and SEP expenditure locations during the 2015 to 2017 period.
A further analysis to determine the geographic proximity of CAD efforts to address cattle-related conflict was done which showed the following patterns (see Figure 3):

**Figure 3: Cattle-related fatalities and SEP expenditure by CAD field offices**

- a. The most significant hotspots were not the areas where the most SEP expenditure occurred;
- b. Despite Jonglei having the highest cattle-related fatalities, it received the second lowest amount of funding; and
- c. Northern Bahr el Ghazal experienced a low number of cattle-related fatalities but received the most funding.
A year-by-year analysis of SEPs between 2015 and 2017 related to cattle in the form of migration workshop/dissemination and border peace activities showed that CAD both diversified its geographic coverage and increased its investment fourfold from USD $12,500 to USD $51,000. This amounted to about six per cent of overall SEP expenditure.\textsuperscript{42}

However, the disconnect between areas of conflict and SEP expenditure persisted, especially with respect to Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap (see Figure 3).

In terms of explanation, CAD reported that Northern Bahr el Ghazal received significant funding by another donor, which began drawing down resources in 2017, and that CAD subsequently increased funding there to support regular seasonal migrations of nomadic pastoralists across the Sudanese border to prevent the emergence of conflict there. In Jonglei, CAD reported that many activities were conducted in partnership with other actors (VISTAS, Oxfam) and most of the Mission support was through the provision of air assets and technical support.

CAD further stated that since February 2017, it had replicated the work and best practices from its Northern Bahr el Ghazal field office to address internal migration between Lakes state and Greater Equatoria, mostly with financial and technical support.\textsuperscript{43} While ACLED data showed that Greater Equatoria did not have notable cattle-related conflict hotspots in 2017, it did have such conflict in 2015 and multiple Secretary-General’s reports\textsuperscript{44} identified the corridor as prone to cattle-related conflict.

Overall, available evidence suggested some misalignment of resources in addressing cattle-related conflict hotspots.

One explanation provided by interviewees was the presence of experienced, well-funded partners such as the USAID/VISTAS program engaged in similar activities in the same area. The perceived success\textsuperscript{45} of those activities may have influenced CAD to replicate model cattle migration projects in these locations.

In terms of addressing other cattle-related issues, CAD chaired the Cattle Migration Working Group to coordinate support of United Nations and non-United Nations actors to seasonal migrations across the Sudan borderland. However, respondents had informed that the group was not fully functional.

CAD field staff pointed out that dealing with the issue of cattle required a more horizontal, collaborative approach between field office areas than customarily occurred in the Mission.

C. Communities in conflict, including women, highly valued the long-term field presence, contributions and work of CAD.

The evaluation team engaged with a wide range of local stakeholders to better understand their experience and perceptions of CAD work, to supplement data analysis.

\textsuperscript{42} Themes of major expenditure included conflict management, social cohesion, peace dialogues, sports and drama.

\textsuperscript{43} CAD specifically reported undertaking these initiatives in Amadi, Terekeka, Gok, Western and Eastern Lakes, new states created by presidential decree in October 2015, but which are contested by the opposition.

\textsuperscript{44} See footnote 38.

\textsuperscript{45} The perceived success was reported by CAD and partners.
CAD engaged a wide range of civilians, and 48 per cent of its special projects exclusively involved civilians. Civilians included traditional and religious leaders, women’s groups, youth unions, civil society and community-based organizations. This also included representatives of groups involved in cattle-related conflicts, such as chiefs, pastoralist leaders, and host community members.

During focus group discussions with approximately 300 community leaders, women leaders, government officials, and youth at four field locations (Yei, Bor, Bentiu, and Wau) outside the capital, community perceptions of CAD were unanimously positive. Stakeholders saw CAD as peace builders; the “eyes and ears” and “peacemakers” of the Mission; and a stabilizing influence due to the possible restraining effect of routine CAD field monitoring and reporting may have on belligerents. A community leader in Bor belonging to one ethnic group said of members of another ethnic group: “If there was no [CAD] to intervene with them, they would have lost their lives.”

At the same time in all field locations visited, community members recognized the limitation of CAD work in their lives. They expressed anger and frustration with what they perceived to be the failure of the United Nations and international community’s lack of progress in bringing about lasting peace in the country, including “many delegations coming from New York.” There was also a desire expressed for the United Nations to hold South Sudanese leaders at the national level accountable. A religious leader stated: “Children of the leaders are in Uganda, Kenya, Khartoum. We have nothing here. What do they care about peace if their children are not here?”

In terms of responding to the wider concerns raised by interviewees mentioned above, it was established that UNMISS had no community engagement strategy which would strengthen the link between the Mission’s strategic efforts and the daily conflict reduction work of CAD.

Overall, 11 out of 12 community focus groups in all field locations visited expressed a desire for CAD to increase its efforts to improve relations between civilians and national security actors. However, notwithstanding the high community demand, particularly from women, for civilian-military engagement, analysis showed that only two per cent of SEP activities specifically addressed this issue.

Women participants’ feedback was also positive with specific suggestions for CAD work

CAD leveraged women’s participation to promote inter-communal dialogue. Consequently, CAD ensured that women’s participation in its projects was high, with about 80 per cent of projects involving women. In focus group interviews with four women’s associations in three field locations, participants reported that the engagement of women by CAD allowed them to express their concerns, which primarily related to restrictions on freedom of movement (especially while collecting firewood or accessing markets to engage in income generating activities); fear of gender-based violence; and forced recruitment of their husbands and sons into armed groups.

Women interviewees saw CAD as a primary vehicle available to them to convey their concerns to UNMISS because CAD routinely worked outside Mission bases. These were seen as difficult to access because of physical security measures. The inaccessibility of the Mission was also noted by religious leaders in Bentiu, who said that official entry to Mission offices was bureaucratic and cumbersome.

Women participants reported readiness to engage in dialogue across ethnic divisions. “Women have no tribe in this fight,” one woman stated. However, women were simultaneously

46 As of September 2018, a draft community engagement strategy had been proposed by CAD, which included a risk analysis, but had not been approved by the UNMISS senior leadership. The existing zero draft was not taken into consideration as it fell outside the time period of the evaluation.
47 While about 80 per cent of SEPs involved participation of women and community leaders, 64 per cent had youth.
constrained in doing so because of attitudes reported of men that disapproved of their participation in political processes and engaging in dialogue with members of perceived opposing ethnic groups. One limitation reported by CAD was a preponderance of the same women leaders as participants in organized events.

D. In its day-to-day interaction with local stakeholders, CAD appeared to have relied on engagement with government officials for information collection.

55. Contextually, it was important to note that the UNMISS mandate shifted markedly from a government-centric and state-building one to primarily protecting civilians. This change in mandate prompted CAD to deepen and broaden its relationships with local communities rather than engaging primarily with government authorities for the earlier state-building mandate. The Civil Affairs Handbook underscored the importance of CAD direct outreach to local populations, describing them as “the link between the United Nations mission and local authorities and communities” and “enablers, facilitators, and problem-solvers.”

56. When measured against this criterion, while it was reasonable to assume a level of continuous engagement with the government, and notwithstanding the positive value of CAD field work, certain drawbacks in its community engagement were noted. Data from daily CAD work and SEPs showed an imbalance in this respect, as:

a. CAD relied on government officials for information seeking purposes approximately 85 per cent of the time. The government officials most frequently engaged were local executive branch officials, namely governors, county commissioners, and legislative assembly staff.

b. Fifty-two per cent of SEPs involved government officials. The type of government officials involved included governors, county commissioners, and state-level parliamentarians.

57. Perceptions within Mission headquarters in this regard were divergent. One component saw CAD as overly close to the government while another appreciated CAD input as “ground truthing” and complementary to its work. CAD believed that it was necessary to engage with government officials to sustain the outcomes of activities and was part of the Mission’s mandate.

58. As CAD was primarily required to address areas that affected either relationships between citizens, or relationships between citizens and the state, and was responsible for conflict management, reconciliation and social cohesion, the level of its involvement with the government as demonstrated by the data appeared disproportionate.

48. S/RES/2155, paragraph 5: The Security Council “Emphasizes that protection of civilians…must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources within the Mission.”
50. In addition to government officials, CAD met with civil society organizations, NGOs, religious and traditional leaders, youth and women groups.
51. UN DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook, p. 23.
E. With one exception, CAD developed positive and collaborative relationships with relevant civilian Mission components, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and external partners.

59. Evidence collected from interviews showed CAD had developed productive partnerships with all relevant civilian Mission components, with one exception.

60. CAD had a limited but positive relationship with the Mission police component, which was primarily focused within PoC sites, while the majority of CAD activities occurred outside PoC sites. Cooperation in UNMISS between civilian components (including CAD) and the military was institutionalized at field level through the Field Integrated Operations Centre (FIOC). However, knowledge of the work of CAD at the senior military level was weak, although the importance of a close working relationship between CAD and the military was emphasized in the Civil Affairs Handbook.\(^5\)

61. There was a synergistic relationship between CAD and the Political Affairs Division (PAD). PAD reported that it heavily depended on CAD to inform its work with ground realities regarding significant events. For example, in one instance CAD provided PAD with a critical and more realistic picture about a regional disarmament process that had been inaccurately characterized by a national leader as positive.

62. The Gender Section reported that CAD regularly and proactively sought their technical advice on gender issues. Other notably positive relationships included JOC, RRP, Public Information Office (PIO), and Human Rights.

63. Key informants reported that CAD (and other civilian components) had a problematic relationship with JMAC. The main reason for this related to information flow. Stakeholders in CAD, JMAC and other sections agreed that CAD was a significant source of field information to JMAC. However, the perception among CAD stakeholders was that there was no reciprocity in information flow from JMAC to CAD. JMAC justified this on grounds of confidentiality and the risk of leakage of sensitive information given the large number of national staffs in CAD. In general, CAD field teams reported that they conveyed information upward into a one-way Mission reporting system, but rarely received analytical products from this system to support their work in field offices.

64. The merits of the respective positions of JMAC and CAD were not evaluated. However, organizational policy allocated the responsibility for establishing protocols for sharing information with JMAC through an access matrix and made it incumbent upon CAD to work with JMAC to identify types of products and information that JMAC may produce for the benefit of CAD.\(^5\)

65. The pattern of CAD positive relationships within UNMISS was replicated with external partners. United Nations entities outside the Mission reported constructive working relationships with CAD. The Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO) commended CAD as a particularly strong UNMISS partner for the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). While lacking a comparative advantage in project funding and management, CAD had access to the logistical assets of the Mission that was valued.

66. More broadly, the RCO noted United Nations system-wide obstacles to integration between the UNCT and UNMISS: different mandates, funding streams, ways of working, and UNCTs which implemented programs and peacekeeping missions which largely did not.

\(^{52}\) UN DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook, p. 41.

\(^{53}\) PK/G/2015.03, paragraphs 13 and 37.
A systematic review of final SEP reports revealed that about 23 per cent of projects were implemented with the help of non-United Nations partners (e.g. USAID/VISTAS). This may have been a conservative estimate given that the presence of partners was not consistently documented in SEP final reports.

F. CAD was known and recognized as a primary contributor of information in the field, but knowledge about its work and contribution became progressively weaker up the hierarchical chain with some members of senior leadership being the least aware.

All Heads of Field Offices (HoFOs) interviewed expressed appreciation for CAD input to early warning mechanisms. Communication between CAD and HoFOs was open, prompt and constructive. HoFOs reported that they strongly depended upon CAD as a de facto political affairs field office that provided them with early warning, analysis and advice. The Office of the Chief of Staff, which managed the HoFOs, also credited CAD with providing early warning and situational awareness to HoFOs.

In addition, in separate interviews with 15 senior-level officials in Mission headquarters, CAD was acknowledged as significantly contributing to the Mission’s situational awareness.

However, some members of the Senior Management Team in Mission headquarters had the least awareness of CAD contribution, work, and impact. This was despite CAD participation in regular Mission management meetings and briefings.

G. CAD reported to be constrained by a number of cross-cutting factors that hindered its efficiency.

A major constraint reported by CAD as well as other Mission components was access restrictions in the country. The 2017 mandate review found that access restrictions imposed by state security forces posed “significant constraints” on Mission operations. More than 300 of the 530 violations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) during the reporting period related to restrictions of movement. Field teams reported that this hindered the ability of CAD to conduct timely field activities by limiting the mobility of staff in key regions. For example, approximately six months elapsed before CAD engaged on the ground in Yei following the July 2016 crisis, when access restrictions were imposed by both the government and opposition. One field office reported returning SEP funds due to access restrictions.

In addition to the aforementioned security issues, many areas in South Sudan had limited road access during the months-long wet season, which increased the necessity of travel by helicopter. A senior CAD staff member, supported by the field team, raised the issue of ground time during field visits by helicopter that was considered insufficient to engage all relevant parties on the ground. This presented the risk of being counterproductive by making CAD appear partial from the point of view of the parties they did not have time to engage. One CAD official noted: “Communities feel betrayed that they don’t have enough face time with us when they need us most.”

54 The total number of SOFA violations reported in the reports of the Secretary-General for the period was 531. Of these, 304 were movement restrictions. However, these numbers were lower than the actual figures due to incomplete coverage by Secretary-General reports of the evaluation time period. The 2017 mandate review found these SOFA violations had “not elicited any collective response from the [Security Council].”
73. CAD leadership raised the issue of cuts to its travel budget. CAD reported it had already exhausted its 2017/18 budget within seven months in response to conflict situations on the ground. With a further expected cut in the next budget period, CAD leadership believed it was at risk of consuming its travel budget within a few months and having no resources with which to execute day-to-day activities and/or pursue appropriate training opportunities. DMS stated that budget cuts were made across the Mission and not only directed at CAD.

74. Concerns related to travel and security processes in Umoja were also raised. Senior CAD field staff reported that centralization of processes in Mission headquarters, rather than being handled at the field office level, inhibited the ability of field staff to quickly and flexibly respond to developments on the ground.

H. Notwithstanding the lack of data on programmatic outcomes, CAD appeared to have made a plausible contribution to the reduction in occurrence of local conflict in areas where it had engaged.

75. In terms of the situation on the ground, analysis of the Secretary-General’s reports showed no improvement in the conflict in South Sudan during the 2015-2017 study period. The February 2016 Secretary-General’s report noted that although the greater Upper Nile region was previously the centre of violence, the conflict had spread to Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal. A lack of overall improvement was also reflected in the ACLED dataset for the reporting period. Determining the plausible contribution of CAD to the reduction of local conflict, or the lack thereof, had various challenging aspects.

76. First, at the strategic level, the Security Council had assigned the lead role for the resolution of the national conflict to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with a support role for UNMISS. The absence of a wider Mission role in the political efforts to resolve the conflict appeared to limit the sustainability of CAD initiatives to reduce local conflict, owing to the linkages between national and local levels where grievances and conflict actors could be manipulated and mobilized as spoilers. A senior UNMISS official referred to specific examples of ethnic rivalry stoked by elite competition for power and resources exacerbating cattle raiding and population displacement. A member of the senior management team and respondents to the staff survey noted the difficulty of achieving a durable peace without a link and continuity of effort between the national and local levels. Survey respondents also questioned whether the Mission pursued any political strategy to engage key leaders.

77. Second, in terms of the Organization’s instruments designed to capture outcomes under the Results Based Budget (RBB), CAD reported achievements in the pillars of the Mission mandate that it supported.

78. However, as the RBB emphasized the numerical aspect of outputs, evidence of effectiveness was scattered across a wide portfolio of evidence and therefore not amenable to outcome analysis. For example, the 2016/2017 RBB committed CAD to conduct “12 preparatory meetings and eight workshops to assist state authorities, traditional leaders, including women and youth” to combat

55 Umoja is an online administrative platform that the United Nations established to streamline business processes.

56 The Secretary-General reports covering the review period are as follows: S/2015/118 (17 February 2015); S/2015/296 (29 April 2015); S/2015/902 (23 November 2015); S/2016/138 (9 February 2016); S/2017/224 (16 March 2017); S/2018/163 (28 February 2018).

57 S/2016/138
intercommunal and migration-related conflicts, but it did not include assessments of the impact of these activities. Senior-level interviewees in the Mission, while aware of CAD activities, wished to know more about the concrete outcomes of its work.

79. In this respect, prior OIOS evaluations had pointed out the generic limitations of the RBB as a reporting tool, and a thematic review of RBM in the Secretariat had found that “results-based management has been an administrative chore of little value to accountability and decision-making.”

This observation also appeared pertinent to the CAD RBB report which was of limited value in assessing impact for the purposes of this evaluation.

80. Determination of outcomes was also affected by sparse baseline data. For example, field staff interviewed in Bor reported that large-scale cattle raiding seen in 2012 and 2013 had subsided but verifying trends over time was challenged by an absence of systematic documentation. In this regard, while UNMISS adopted the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) incident tracking system, its use by CAD and other substantive sections was limited during the evaluation period.

81. With the above-mentioned limitations, conclusions about the plausible contribution of CAD to reduction of local conflict were drawn using indirect methods and analyses.

82. Several key interviewees referred to a reinvigorated and more strategic CAD leadership during the second half of the evaluation period. Analysis of SEPs and CAD daily reports indicated a continuous increase in SEP expenditure and CAD activities (see figure 4), despite the relocation of nearly the entire Division following the July 2016 crisis.

83. A purposive sample of 50 SEP final reports from 2015-2017 reflected varying degrees of specificity to the conflict and mixed results in follow-on activities leveraging participants’ knowledge, suggestions and specific concerns raised during engagements and the application to the prevailing local conflict dynamics.

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58 A/63/268, paragraph 45.
59 As reported by CAD.
Community members in 11 of 12 focus group discussions across four field locations, including women leaders, strongly noted CAD engagement on civilian-military relations that had concrete outcomes, such as the opening of roads; the drawdown of military forces from towns and replacing them with police; and decreasing hostility between military and local communities. Such work was also considered notable by respondents in a staff survey of all substantive Mission components.

Given the CAD focus on local conflict management, specific examples of agreements cited in focused group discussions and the staff survey included:

a. Southern Unity Memorandum of Understanding: Negotiated by the local CAD field office in December 2015, this agreement established security guarantees and freedom of movement for civilians and their livestock between government- and opposition-controlled areas of Unity state. Following its signing, the body of a deceased “Paramount Chief” was repatriated from abroad and laid to rest with government and opposition military delegations in attendance. It was the first funeral in the area attended by both sides since the start of the civil war in December 2013. However, external factors intervened, and the agreement was annulled following the July 2016 crisis in Juba.

b. Wangkei Agreement: This accord was agreed in March 2017 with CAD facilitation. It reconciled the Leek Nuer and Bul Nuer in the areas of Rubkona and Mayom in the north of former Unity state. The two groups had been on opposing sides in the war. It allowed for blood compensation, the return of stolen cattle, and permitted trade between the areas of the two groups. However, as of September 2018 the Agreement had not been ratified by the State Legislative Assembly.

c. Yei security reforms: Following a series of forums convened by CAD in December 2016 that involved local youth and the national army, the government agreed to several measures that improved the security climate in Yei. These included the government releasing prominent local youths held in detention, partly opening regional transport routes, and partially replacing predominantly Dinka SPLA military units with ethnically-mixed National Security Service (NSS) units in Yei town.

Seventy-one per cent of staff in substantive Mission components believed dialogue initiatives contributed to the prevention of inter- and intra-communal conflict to some (46 per cent) or a significant (25 per cent) extent.

Finally, analysis of ACLED casualty data and records of CAD activities over time suggested that CAD activities appeared to have a positive effect on preventing the recurrence of conflict incidents, although it was not possible to establish the magnitude of the effect.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, the evaluation found that CAD, the most geographically dispersed Mission civilian component, played a pivotal role to report on early warning at the sub-national level.

As the only substantive section serving as the link between UNMISS and local authorities and communities, CAD availability, accessibility and service as a channel of communication was greatly...

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60 OIOS-IED field interviews, Bentiu, May 2018.
61 Blood compensation is a traditional form of restitution to compensate for loss of life in the course of a conflict between communities.
62 UNMISS staff survey conducted in July 2017.
63 See paragraph 23(c).
valued by local populations, and who were largely complimentary of its work. Local communities also substantiated the effectiveness of some aspects of CAD work on the ground, albeit temporarily.

90. Within the Mission, CAD effectively served as the “eyes and ears” of UNMISS and was recognized as a primary contributor of early warning and “ground truth.” There was evidence that senior CAD leadership had provided more strategic and focused direction and increased CAD initiatives on the ground, often exhibiting an enterprising use of SEPs.

91. Still, numerous difficulties and challenges remained: a fragmented and dynamic conflict environment with poor to non-existent communications infrastructure; harsh working conditions; the Mission’s limited role in the process to reach a political solution to the conflict; government-imposed movement restrictions; recurring insecurity; and inaccessibility during wet seasons, to name a few.

92. Notwithstanding the above, several areas that require improvement emerged. Some of them included a more proactive effort by CAD and the Mission leadership to use the information and analysis generated by CAD to consciously set strategic priorities; refocusing CAD work to better align with ground realities; and more efforts to better capture the results of CAD work.

93. Action on these will assist in CAD becoming more field-focused, people-centred, and ultimately, more relevant and effective.

**VI. Recommendations**

94. OIOS-IED makes one critical and six important recommendations.

**Critical recommendation:**

**Recommendation 1 (Results A and B)**

UNMISS leadership should ensure that CAD:

- a. incorporates a risk and evidence-based methodology into its planning of activities so that local conflicts that are material, persistent and problematic, especially those related to cattle, are effectively addressed.
- b. ensure adequate inclusivity of its local conflict reduction efforts through engagement with all relevant conflicting communities involved

Indicators: Documented evidence that planned activities are risk-based and make specific reference to the local conflicts they seek to address and the different communities they seek to engage.

**Important recommendations:**

**Recommendation 2 (Result E)**

UNMISS leadership should:

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64 The 2017 mandate review concluded that South Sudan, in the absence of a political solution, “is very likely to see a resumption of violence; a dire human rights situation, where impunity for violations against civilians in general and against women and children in particular will continue; and a humanitarian situation, which is likely to worsen.” (S/2018/143, paragraph 51)
a. resolve issues related to information sharing between JMAC and Mission components and sections, in accordance with the Organization’s policy in PK/G/2015.03.65

b. improve community engagement through adoption of a clear Mission-wide and holistic strategy to deepen interactions and engagements with all relevant community stakeholders for achieving durable peace at sub-national and national levels.

Indicators: Documented evidence of the resolution of the information sharing issue by UNMISS leadership and of improvement of community engagement including the adoption of a Mission-wide community engagement strategy.

**Recommendation 3 (Result C)**

UNMISS leadership should ensure that CAD:

a. enhance the cooperation and communication between civilians and South Sudanese military and armed groups to respond to and reduce the security concerns raised by the civilian population, especially women.

b. enhance its efforts to accurately and immediately relay security concerns raised by women (such as those related to freedom of movement, collection of firewood, etc.) to appropriate Mission components, especially UNMISS leadership and military, and duly followed up.

c. collaborate with the Gender Unit and/or Gender Protection Advisor, to further promote women’s meaningful participation in local conflict resolution mechanisms, especially encouraging a supportive attitude in men towards such participation.

Indicators: Documented evidence of the inclusion and implementation of the issues noted above in CAD activities.

**Recommendation 4 (Result D)**

UNMISS leadership should ensure that UNMISS CAD improves its information gathering efforts by further widening its sources of information including the government and a cross-section of society.

Indicators: Documented evidence of increased engagement with diverse, non-government sources for information gathering.

**Recommendation 5 (Result F)**

UNMISS leadership should ensure that CAD enhances communication of its knowledge on local conflicts, dynamics, results and impact to Mission leadership in a regular and proactive manner, in order to better apply and integrate the work, role, and strategic value of CAD into the Mission’s wider mandated responsibilities.

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65 Paragraph 13: “The JMAC shall also establish protocols through which it can provide information and share relevant products with mission components and, where applicable, with the UNCT.” Paragraph 37: “Heads of components shall work with the Chief JMAC to identify types of products and information that the JMAC may produce and/or share for the benefit of their specific component. Relevant information exchange and security protocols are to be agreed upon.”
Indicators: Documented evidence of appropriate actions by UNMISS and CAD leadership to address these concerns.

**Recommendation 6 (Result H)**

UNMISS leadership should:

a. ensure that information and data systems, including SAGE, are optimally configured to report on the results and outcomes achieved.

b. strengthen the capacity of CAD to better monitor, assess and report on the results of their daily work.

c. increase its efforts in following up on the relevant and specific local conflict issues and challenges raised by participants and communities.

d. use all possible channels to deliver messages for reducing local conflict, including radio, churches, sports and cultural events, town hall meetings, and creating content for UNMISS Public Information Office.

Indicators: Documented evidence of appropriate action by CAD to address these issues.
Annex I

In this Annex, OIOS presents the full text of the comments received from DPO and DOS on the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of the contribution of the UNMISS Civil Affairs Division to the reduction of local conflict in South Sudan. This practice has been instituted in line with the General Assembly resolution 64/263, following the recommendation of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee.

UNITED NATIONS
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED
Immediate

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TO Mr. Yee Woo Guo, Director,
A/Inspection and Evaluation Division, OIOS

THROUGH
S/DE

FROM Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations

SUBJECT Draft Report on the Evaluation of the contribution of the UNMISS Civil Affairs Division to the reduction of local conflict in South Sudan

1. I refer to your memorandum, dated 20 December 2018, regarding the above-mentioned report. Please find attached DPO’s response on the findings and the recommendations contained in the draft report as Annex I, as well as the Recommendation Action Plan.

2. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. We stand ready to provide any further information that may be required.

CC: Mr. Rahul Sur
ANNEX 1

Draft report on the Evaluation of the contribution of the UNMISS Civil Affairs Division to the reduction of local conflict in South Sudan

Paragraphs 32 and 33

1. UNMISS disagrees with the assessment made in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the report implying that the Mission chose to operate only in the government-controlled areas, which resulted in the restriction of engagement with multiple communities. There is a need for adequate contextualization of the conclusion based on realities as follows:

- The UNMISS Civil Affairs Division (CAD) focused on addressing a wide range of conflicts at the sub-national level, including protracted communal conflicts, pastoral migration dynamics, ethnic tensions and violence following the events of 2013 and 2016, disputes over state and county boundary demarcations, as well as negative implications of the national politics on communal relations at the sub-national level. The interventions were informed by the multi-faceted conflict dynamics on the ground. According to the Mission's assessment, intra-communal violence between different Dinka sub-sections has been one of the key contributors to casualties and displacements among civilians. Also, the Dinka being the largest by population and pastoralist community, has presence across the regions and often become one of the parties to the cattle-related conflicts. We observe less intra-communal violence within other ethnic groups. Therefore, it would be misleading to assume that insecurity at the sub-national level is driven exclusively by the inter-ethnic divisions, for instance, between the Nuer and the Dinka.

- Decisions on UNMISS presence, including CAD project locations, is informed by the assessment of the conflict dynamic, potential impact that the Mission might achieve, the presence of partners, security conditions, including on account of active military operations, and logistical constraints due to poor road conditions, and not solely dependent on the location of the field offices. The field offices are established in the state capitals (in the context of the former 10 state structure), and the government subsequently maintained the control over those locations following the outbreak of the armed conflict in 2013 and 2016. In the meantime, due to the ongoing conflict and insecurity, the Mission was not able to reach most of the opposition-controlled areas on a regular basis to implement projects during the period under review.

2. The statement in paragraph 33 that "...stark ethnic polarization in some areas was so great that it was not possible to engage more than one group in the absence of active military operations in some CAD field offices" refers, UNMISS does not see the linkage between the inability to engage more than one group due to stark ethnic polarization and the absence of active military operations.

Paragraphs 39 — 43

3. The report concluded in paragraph 39 that "... the disconnect between areas of conflict and SEP expenditure persisted, especially with respect to Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap". The report also concluded in paragraph 42 that "Overall, available evidence suggested some misalignment of resources in addressing cattle-related conflict hotspots."
UNMISS wishes to clarify that there are multiple factors involved in determining the allocation of Special Expenditure Projects (SEPs) funds. Therefore, a simple comparison with the number of fatalities would be misleading and would not capture the success in preventing the escalation of tensions that leads to more fatalities.

4. In addition, CAD works in collaboration with other partners in addressing communal/cattle-related conflicts by mobilizing resources and avoiding duplication of efforts/funding. In Jonglei, CAD has extensively collaborated with USAID funded VISTAS and other partners such as UNDP, Norwegian Church Aid, Finn Church Aid and OXFAM. OIOS, however, appears to conclude that CAD did not prioritize Jonglei as it allocated lesser funds from its SEP budget when it needed it the most. It should be noted that VISTAS and other partners had heavily invested in the Jonglei region, in collaboration with UNMISS, in which the Mission contributed through provision of air assets, technical and facilitation support, among others. CAD leveraged on the partners' funding/resources and avoided duplication of initiatives. The totality of the CAD and the partners' investments through its collaborative efforts ought to be taken into account as a basis for determining whether Jonglei region was prioritized or not and whether CAD SEP funds were appropriately allocated. With a limited SEP budget, the CAD's collaborative efforts to mobilize programmatic resources of partners should be acknowledged in this evaluation. Furthermore, the very high fatalities in Jonglei in 2017 despite high investments by CAD and its partners was due to several factors, including non-implementation of the government-brokered local peace agreements between the communities of the Jonglei and Boma states signed in December 2016 and May 2017, intraMurle political divisions, the deteriorating economic situation, and the role of militia elements who took advantage of the situation. It should, however, be noted that the seasonal pastoral migration from the opposition-controlled areas of Yuai, Uror and Ayod to the Duk area largely remained peaceful during this period due to extensive political engagement and peace initiatives undertaken by CAD and its partners.

5. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal, VISTAS was the lead funding partner while CAD provided technical and logistics support over the years. The Northern Bahr el Ghazal region remained the hotspot with active military operations during the height of the national conflict as well as during the liberation struggle. Migration from Sudan to South Sudan was therefore most complex and problematic. In this context, the sustained investments by VISTAS and CAD and other partners, such as UNDP, to prevent cattle-related violence and fatalities through negotiated agreements on cattle movement resulted in the cumulative impact that the pastoral migrations remained peaceful with minimum fatalities. This may be seen as an impact of sustained efforts rather than mis-alignment of resources. In other words, the lesser number of fatalities over the past few years should not be considered to imply that there was no need for such investments. In addition, while CAD provided minimum funding during 2015 and 2016, CAD and UNDP stepped up their support in 2017, following VISTAS' withdrawal of funding in the same year.

6. In Warrap, following a significant spike in the intercommunal violence related fatalities in 2016, CAD had prioritized SEP intervention in the area, resulting in a notable reduction in fatalities in 2017. Similarly, CAD prioritized SEP allocations in the neighboring Lakes in 2017, where cattle raids and communal violence remained high. CAD also developed synergies with a range of partners, and mobilised resources to address communal violence in both the Lakes and the Warrap regions. Meanwhile, during the evaluation period, programmatic intervention in the Upper Nile was not feasible due to continuing insecurity, active military conflict and lack of access.
Accordingly, there is a need to revisit the assumption in the evaluation report that SEP expenditure is the only available resource and indicator that determines CAD investment towards addressing the cattle-related conflicts. As such, activities carried out in partnership with other actors, non-funded interventions, including regular patrols in the conflict areas, meetings with stakeholders and political engagement at the sub-national and national levels should also be considered as part of CAD investment towards preventing, mitigating and resolving communal conflicts and tensions. UNMISS therefore requests that the conclusions made in this section of the report be amended accordingly.

**Recommendation 5**

8. With regards to recommendation 5(a), UNMISS believes that CAD’s work, role and strategic value have been fully acknowledged and integrated at the strategic level. The existing strategic guidance of the Mission, including Mission Concept and the results-based budget clearly identifies community level engagement for conflict management, reconciliation and social cohesion as one of the key priorities. UNMISS therefore requests that the recommendation be reworded to read: "UNMISS leadership should ensure that CAD enhances communication of its knowledge on local conflicts, dynamics, results and impact to Mission leadership in a regular and proactive manner, in order to better apply and integrate the work, role, and strategic value of CAD into the Mission’s wider mandated responsibilities."

**Recommendation 7**

9. As earlier communicated to OIOS in response to the informal draft report, the issues addressed in the recommendation are widespread and the recommendation is not specific and clear on what action is required by whom. UNMISS clarifies that the issue of "limited ground time of the helicopters" is mainly caused by the limit in helicopter crew time on the ground during a mission. When shelter cannot be provided to the crew on the ground at the destination and the crew is confined to the aircraft for the duration of the visit, the crew time on the ground is limited to a maximum of two hours. This is a requirement based on the aviation safety regulations on the stress and fatigue of the crew and should not be compromised. Unfortunately, such shelter is not often available in the destinations where CAD visits. Other factors are daylight time and weather, which are external to UNMISS, and cannot be compromised. An alternative is to stay overnight in the location, but there is usually no accommodation available in those locations that are compliant with the minimum operating security standards, requiring additional security measures to be put in place. In light of these challenges, UNMISS continues to enhance its integrated field visit/patrol planning involving all relevant components of the Mission in order to maximize the use of the limited ground time. It also seeks to identify partners who can assist CAD’s work on the ground where UNMISS personnel cannot visit frequently or stay for long hours.

10. With regards to Umoja processes, it is inaccurate to state that the process is centralized at the Mission headquarters. The issue is that in order for a staff to join a field visit, particularly overnight missions, it requires multiple approving processes through Umoja, the Field Support Suite and the Travel Request Information Processing systems with different certifying officers and approvers located in the field offices, Mission headquarters and sometimes the RSCE, which results in delays.

11. Based on the above comments, UNMISS requests that the recommendation be deleted from the report.
**Recommendation Action Plan**

Evaluating the contribution of the UNMISS Civil Affairs Division to the reduction of local conflict in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IED Recommendation</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Responsible Entity(ies)</th>
<th>Target date for completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation 1</strong></td>
<td>UNMISS CAD has taken the following measures:</td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Conflict assessment completed. Update of the conflict analysis will continue as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS leadership should ensure that CAD:</td>
<td>a) CAD has developed a comprehensive conflict analysis of 38 major communal conflicts across South Sudan, which has been shared with the Mission Leadership and Heads of Divisions/Sections. This analysis is a living document that is regularly updated to reflect the change in existing conflict dynamics or to include new conflict dynamics for which conflict analysis will be developed, as necessary.</td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Completed. The Vetting Committee is fully functional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) In designing programmatic interventions, including proposal development and the project vetting and reporting processes, CAD will revise project templates (Concept Notes and Final Project Reports) of programmatic activities to reflect inclusion of all the relevant conflicting</td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Second quarter of 2019</td>
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</table>

Indicators: Documented evidence that planned activities are risk-based and make specific reference to the local conflicts they seek to address and the different communities they seek to engage.
parties/communities, including women and youth, and reference these to the specific conflict hotspot each addresses. The significant hotspots will be prioritized based on the intensity and fatalities due to local conflicts. An improved reporting template will be developed for the Final Project Reports to reflect the above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 2</th>
<th>UNMISS leadership should:</th>
<th>Indicators: Documented evidence of the resolution of the information sharing issue by UNMISS leadership and of improvement of community engagement including the adoption of a Mission-wide community engagement strategy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) resolve issues related to information sharing between JMAC and Mission components and sections, in accordance with the Organization's policy in PK/G/2015.03.1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) improve community engagement through adoption of a clear Mission-wide and holistic strategy to deepen interactions and engagements with all relevant community stakeholders for achieving durable peace at sub-national and national levels.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) UNMISS will formulate internal guidance on information sharing between the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and other mission components, based on consultations between JMAC and the relevant components.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) CAD has initiated the mission-wide consultation of the first draft of the Community Engagement Strategy. Consultations with Heads of Field Offices (HOFOs), the United Nations Country Team, international non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) will be undertaken, and validation consultation will also be held with the communities before the draft strategy document is finalized. The Strategy document will be presented to the Programme Management Meeting for its approval and adoption as a mission-wide strategy.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Second quarter of 2019</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Fourth quarter of 2019</td>
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66 Paragraph 13: "The JMAC shall also establish protocols through which it can provide information and share relevant products with mission components and, where applicable, with the UNCT." Paragraph 37: "Heads of components shall work with the Chief JMAC to identify types of products and information that the JMAC may produce and/or share for the benefit of their specific component. Relevant information exchange and security protocols are to be agreed upon."
**Recommendation 3**

UNMISS leadership should ensure that CAD:

a) enhance the cooperation and communication between civilians and South Sudanese military and armed groups to respond to and reduce the security concerns raised by the civilian population, especially women.

b) enhance its efforts to accurately and immediately relay security concerns raised by women (such as those related to freedom of movement, collection of firewood, etc.) to appropriate Mission components, especially UNMISS leadership and military, and duly followed up.

c) collaborate with the Gender Unit and/or Gender Protection Advisor, to further promote women's meaningful participation in local conflict resolution mechanisms, especially encouraging a supportive attitude in men towards such participation.

Indicators: Documented evidence of the inclusion and implementation of the issues noted above in CAD activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The following actions will be undertaken:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) CAD programming will be enhanced to support improving relations and building confidence between communities and organized forces/armed groups through its political engagements and programmatic activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) CAD will enhance efforts to accurately and immediately report on security concerns, particularly of women, through the Field Integrated Operations Centre (FIOC) reporting and through weekly coordination meetings at the Field Office level in order to support HOFOs to coordinate and follow up on the mission's response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) CAD, in consultation with the Gender Affairs Unit, will share progress reporting on peace and security indicators relating to women, particularly regarding participation of women in local conflict/peace negotiations, as well as capacity building of women CSOs on their role in conflict management. In addition, the Division will promote at least 30 per cent participation of women in conflict management programmatic activities. CAD will organize activities with the object of encouraging a supportive attitude in men towards women's participation in local conflict management.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cad</th>
<th>Fourth quarter of 2019</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cad, FIOCs</td>
<td>Fourth quarter of 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cad</td>
<td>Fourth quarter of 2019</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Recommendation 4**

UNMISS leadership should ensure that UNMISS CAD improves its information gathering efforts by further widening its sources of information including the government and a cross-section of society.

Indicators: Documented evidence of increased engagement with diverse, non-government sources for information gathering.

In support of the Mission's early warning strategy, JMAC will formulate internal guidance to facilitate synchronizing of information requirements to guide the collection of information throughout the Mission to ensure optimized utilization of all UNMISS sensors and sources available.

As part of JMAC’s initiative above, CAD staff will be sensitized through suitable instructions to engage with cross-sections of the society, such as the civil society, including faith-based organizations, community leaders, women and youth, apart from the government authorities for information gathering while protecting their identities.

| JMAC | Third quarter of 2019 |
| CAD | Third quarter of 2019 |

**Recommendation 5**

UNMISS leadership should ensure that:

a) it better applies and integrate the work, role, and strategic value of CAD into the Mission’s wider mandated responsibilities.

b) CAD leadership enhance communication of the Division’s knowledge on local conflicts, dynamics, CAD results and impact to Mission leadership in a regular and proactive manner.

Indicators: Documented evidence of appropriate actions by UNMISS and CAD leadership to address these concerns

CAD has shared with Mission Leadership and Heads of Sections the summary documents on conflict assessment of significant communal conflicts/hotspots across South Sudan.

The Summary Action Reports, which captures key CAD interventions (context-action-outcome), and other CAD information products will be regularly shared with mission leadership and section heads.

Monthly code cables on civil affairs will be reintroduced focusing on providing analysis and assessments made by CAD. Topics of the cables will be selected from emerging issues and trends, as well as impact achieved through CAD operations.

| CAD | Completed |
| CAD | Fourth quarter of 2019 |
| CAD | Fourth quarter of 2019 |
CAD's monthly meeting with the Head of Mission will be institutionalized to brief on civil affairs work and their impact, in addition to regular meetings such as Heads of Sections meetings.

CAD's weekly political pillar meeting and one-to-one meeting with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General-Political will be continued in which civil affairs work and their impacts will be shared.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 6</th>
<th>UNMISS leadership should:</th>
<th>The following measures are planned/have been taken:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) ensure that information and data systems, including SAGE, are optimally configured to report on the results and outcomes achieved.</td>
<td>a) CAD SAGE interface has been optimally configured since July 2018. SAGE was implemented in UNMISS in December 2016. The necessary steps were taken to optimize its use, such as the directive from the Mission Chief of Staff and training of mission staff members on SAGE usage by the Joint Operations Centre. Since May 2018 the usage has risen, and some benefits have been realized because sections can now obtain trends of incidents and activities by querying the system. Further efforts will be</td>
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<td>b) strengthen the capacity of CAD to better monitor, assess and report on the results of their daily work.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c) increase its efforts in following up on the relevant and specific local conflict issues and challenges raised by participants and communities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d) use all possible channels to deliver messages for reducing local conflict, including radio,</td>
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| CAD              | Fourth quarter of 2019 | Completed |

JOC | Completed |
churches, sports and cultural events, town hall meetings, and creating content for UNMISS Public Information Office.

Indicators: Documented evidence of appropriate action by CAD to address these issues

b) CAD will hire an international consultant during the 2018/19 period to assess ways to improve the efficiency and impact of CAD programmatic activities (formerly SEPs). The resulting recommendations will be incorporated in CAD work planning.

Training of the CAD staff in impact assessment, reporting, monitoring and evaluation will be planned every financial year.

c) Follow up actions on the relevant resolutions and specific local conflict issues and challenges raised by participants and communities in the programmatic activities will be reflected in the final project reports and a follow up mechanism will be established to track the progress.

d) Peace messages will be delivered, including through radio, churches, sports events, cultural events and townhall meetings. CAD will also create content for the UNMISS Public Information Office for their further action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace messages will be delivered, including through radio, churches,</td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Fourth quarter of 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>sports events, cultural events and townhall meetings. CAD will also</td>
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<tr>
<td>create content for the UNMISS Public Information Office for their</td>
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<td>further action.</td>
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**Recommendation 7**

DPKO/DFS should ensure that UNMISS takes note of the constraints reported by CAD with respect to limited helicopter ground time, and travel and security processes in Umoja, and address them in ongoing improvement efforts in peace operations.

Indicators: Documented evidence of appropriate consideration by UNMISS to address these issues.

| This recommendation is not accepted. Please refer to UNMISS' comments reflected in paragraphs 9 to 11 of Annex I. | N/A |
Annex I

Comments by the Office of Internal Oversight Services – Inspection and Evaluation Division in response to the management response provided by DPO and DOS dated 05 February 2019.

1. With respect to the paragraph 1 of Annex I, while OIOS notes UNMISS’ disagreement with the implication that the Mission chose to operate only in government-controlled areas, the points raised in the UNMISS response only reinforces this assertion; i.e. the first bullet point emphasized that the Dinka, being the largest by population and pastoralist community, has presence across the regions, and this is exactly the point raised in the report – that the Dinka were represented in 72 per cent of the one-third of projects involving more than one ethnic group. The report also clearly stated the data showing that, in two-thirds of projects, UNMISS Civil Affairs Division (CAD) engaged with only one ethnic group, the Dinka, and that most of the project locations appeared to be in government-controlled areas that were predominantly Dinka.

• With reference to the last sentence in paragraph 1, bullet point 1, OIOS would like to clarify that the report did not assume, as asserted by UNMISS, that “… insecurity at the sub-national level is driven exclusively by the inter-ethnic divisions, for instance, between the Nuer and the Dinka.” There is no mention of this assumption anywhere in the report.

• The evaluation considered the record of CAD efforts to address communal conflicts. It found that two-thirds of CAD projects engaged only one ethnic group that had a major participation in the government. The evaluation also observed that most of the Mission field offices were in government-controlled areas, and the ethnic group most engaged by CAD was prevalent in these areas. The evaluation made no determination against the engagement of this group or its sub-groups but rather found an imbalance with other groups. The evaluation readily acknowledged that access and security challenges were likely to be among the reasons for the imbalance.

Thus, overall, there appears to be little disagreement between what the report states and what UNMISS asserts in its comments.

2. With respect to paragraph 2 in Annex I, OIOS would like to clarify that the reference in paragraph 33 of the report was made to the presence of UN military or UN force protection and did not imply host government military operation. The same is now amended to remove this ambiguity.

3. With respect to the statement in paragraph 3 of Annex I, while OIOS notes that UNMISS need to consider multiple factors in determining the allocation of SEP funds, the level of fatalities in an area should be amongst the key factors, if not the most important, considered, as protection of civilians is a whole-of-mission responsibility.

4. With respect to paragraph 4 of Annex I, and the explanation of the need to take the totality of CAD and partners’ investments into account, the report has acknowledged this in paragraph
40, and further, in paragraph 43, provides interview data to support this rationale for the resultant allocation of resources.

5. With respect to the level of SEP expenditure in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, it is acknowledged that it was a hotspot during national conflict and liberation struggle between 2011 and 2013. However, the number of fatalities remained consistently low from early 2014 onwards. While the prevention efforts of UNMISS work in this respect may have borne fruit, the fact remains that, simultaneously, fatalities had dramatically increased in Jonglei (2017). OIOS notes and welcomes the Mission’s acceptance of recommendation 1 and its proposed revision of programmatic activities such that “significant hotspots will be prioritized based on the intensity and fatalities due to local conflicts”. The agility and responsiveness to the ever-evolving situation at the ground are a critical aspect of mission effectiveness.

6. Please see the response in paragraph 1 and 5 above.

7. With respect to paragraph 7 of Annex I, OIOS would like to clarify that the evaluation did not make the assumption that SEP expenditure was the only available indicator to determine CAD investment towards addressing cattle-related conflicts. Paragraph 21(c) described the construction of a database based on 720 CAD daily reports that identified 5865 distinct daily activities. References to CAD regular or daily activities were made in paragraph 25, 28, 30, and 56 of the report. Multivariate regression on indicators from daily activities and SEPs, including the time dimension, was conducted to ascertain the direction of plausible impact. Paragraph 88 summarized the analysis by suggesting a positive impact of CAD work on the recurrence of conflict.

8. Recommendation 5 has been amended accordingly.

9. Recommendation 7 has been deleted.