



INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

REPORT 2019/151

Audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

**The Mission needed to strengthen its
operational readiness assessment and
evaluation of patrolling activities to improve
their effectiveness**

**30 December 2019
Assignment No. AP2018/641/04**

Audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of military patrolling operations in MINUSMA. The audit covered the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2018 and included a review of: (a) oversight and operational readiness; and (b) planning, reporting and evaluation of patrols.

The MINUSMA Force leadership had established an effective command and control mechanism and provided guidance to its subordinate units on patrolling operations. However, the Mission needed to strengthen its operational readiness assessment and evaluation of patrolling activities to improve their effectiveness.

OIOS made six recommendations. To address the issues identified in the audit, MINUSMA needed to:

- Task the responsible personnel from the Force and Sector headquarters to appropriately schedule and assess operational readiness of its battalions, taking into consideration applicable standards and issues raised in previous assessments and reviews;
- Provide necessary guidance to enable the Force to properly estimate the planned number of military patrols to support the resources being requested in the results-based submissions;
- Provide necessary guidance to the Force to enable improved capturing and archiving of data related to military patrolling to adequately support accurate performance reporting;
- Analyze all relevant risks and operational advantages of daytime and night-time patrols, and systematically plan and conduct night-time patrols;
- Improve communication procedures between patrol teams and operation centres and address shortfalls in communication equipment in remote operating bases to enable monitoring of patrols on a “close-to-real-time” basis; and
- Ensure that the Force adequately evaluates the performance of patrolling operations to assure that patrols are effectively and safely conducted.

MINUSMA accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement them.

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Audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
2. Military patrolling is one of the key operational activities performed by the MINUSMA military component (hereafter referred to as the Force) towards achieving the Mission's mandated objective of ensuring long-term peace and stability in Mali. Military patrols enable the Mission to promote United Nations' visibility and act as a deterrent to all parties to the conflict by robust posturing, generating confidence in the peace process by establishing rapport and bridging the gap with the local population, providing security and protection, identifying threats to civilians, facilitating freedom of movement, and supporting the implementation of the Mission's mandate.
3. The Force was responsible for conducting patrolling operations in the Mission's area of responsibility (AOR) through 13 battalions comprising 12 in the East, West and North Sectors¹ and one at the periphery of the Mission's Headquarters in Bamako. The battalions conducted three main types of patrols: (a) daily local patrols in the vicinity of their compounds; (b) medium range patrols stretching to rural areas and increasing the battalions' zone of influence without having to set up temporary camps; and (c) long range patrols necessitating the setting up of temporary camps aimed at ensuring a regular presence of MINUSMA in remote areas. Some patrolling activities were conducted in coordination with patrols undertaken by the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) and other international security actors. The Force also played a supportive role in the southern part of Mali.
4. The Force is headed by the Force Commander who reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MINUSMA and is assisted by a Deputy Force Commander and three Sector Commanders. As of 30 June 2019, the Force had 12,144 personnel representing 91 per cent of the authorized strength of 13,289. For 2016/17 and 2017/18, the Force had approved budgets of \$329 million and \$391 million, respectively.
5. Comments provided by MINUSMA are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

6. The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of military patrolling operations in MINUSMA.
7. This audit was included in the 2019 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the risk that potential weaknesses in military patrolling may have a negative impact on the achievement of the Mission's mandate.
8. OIOS conducted this audit in May and June 2019. The audit covered the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2018 as well as events prior to and subsequent to this period, as deemed necessary. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risk areas in the management of patrolling operations which included: (a) oversight and operational readiness; and (b) planning, reporting and evaluation of patrols.

¹ With effect from 24 June 2019, a fourth sector (Sector Central) was established.

9. The audit methodology included interviews with key personnel, review of relevant documentation, analytical review of data and field visits to 3 Sector headquarters and 7 of the 13 battalions.

10. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Oversight and operational readiness

Force leadership established adequate command and control mechanism and provided guidance for patrolling operations

11. To ensure effective military patrolling operations, it is essential for the Force leadership to establish an adequate command and control mechanism and provide necessary guidance to its subordinate units.

12. The Operation Orders (OPORDs) issued by the Force Commander provided overall guidance for the command and control mechanism and the military patrolling operations of the Mission. Sector Commanders were responsible for tasking and overseeing the patrols within their respective AOR and for submitting daily situation reports to Force headquarters. Based on the Force-level OPORDs, the Sector Commanders issued Sector-specific OPORDs which indicated the operational requirements to be carried out by the battalions within their respective Sectors. Sector OPORDs were complemented by specific operation/task orders and weekly patrol plans, which were regularly updated and issued to battalions. Taking into account available resources, the Force-level and Sector OPORDs identified 11 top priority population areas for patrols to protect civilians. The Force headquarters' intelligence cell regularly updated information on hot spots and threat assessments based on factors such as activities of armed groups, identification of improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordinances in the AOR and shared them with Sectors and battalions. OPORDs also provided instructions and mechanisms for coordination with the Mission's police component, MDSF and other international security actors.

13. The Force also formulated an action plan to implement the recommendations of high-level reviews impacting its patrolling operations, such as the December 2017 report on improving the security of United Nations peacekeepers (known as "the Santos Cruz report") and the May 2019 report of the Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peace Operations on current and emerging uniformed capability requirements for United Nations peacekeeping. Based on the above, OIOS concluded that the Force leadership had established an effective command and control mechanism and provided guidance to its subordinate units on patrolling operations.

There was a need to improve the assessment of operational readiness of battalions

14. To ensure effective and safe military patrolling, it is essential that the Force periodically assesses the capabilities and performance of all subordinate units and addresses any identified gaps. Initial and subsequent comprehensive operational readiness assurance (ORA) should be conducted within two to three months of a unit's arrival and during the remaining 9 to 10 months.

15. The Force did not consistently conduct ORAs during the audit period. The required initial ORA had not been conducted for any of the 13 battalions, and the subsequent comprehensive ORAs were conducted for only 9 of the 13 battalions. Also, the scheduling for ORAs was not adequate. Due to an

oversight, assessments conducted on four battalions that had been rotated were erroneously attributed to their successor battalions, which were never assessed for operational readiness.

16. Moreover, the nine ORAs did not assess the 11 task specific capabilities and 29 capability standards required in the Infantry Battalion Manual, such as: (a) availability of quick reaction teams to support patrol teams; (b) rehearsal of established defence and evacuation procedures by patrol teams; and (c) use of appropriate formation and movement techniques. Additionally, ORAs did not consider the relevant issues from the high-level reviews, reports of the Mission's Contingent-owned Equipment Unit and previous ORAs. As a result, the nine ORAs were not fully useful for assessing the readiness of the battalions for their patrolling activities.

17. Force leadership explained that the capabilities and standards contained in the Infantry Battalion Manual were functionally generic and did not provide a good measure for evaluating its battalions, so the OPODs were used instead. However, the OPODs did not provide distinctive criteria against which operational readiness of a battalion could be fully assessed, and the Force could not obtain assurance on the adequacy and effectiveness of the military patrolling capability of its battalions.

(1) MINUSMA should task the responsible personnel from the Force and Sector headquarters to appropriately schedule and conduct operational readiness assurances of its battalions, taking into consideration applicable standards and issues raised in previous assessments and reviews.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the Force was undergoing an overall review of training, inspection and evaluation procedures and their timelines in a holistic manner under the direction of the Deputy Force Commander. A training evaluation and contingent inspection/review work plan, incorporating requirements from the Infantry Battalion Manual, standard operating procedures and previous assessments, was being developed to be part of the procedures of the Force Headquarters Training Unit (U-7). Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence that ORAs are being conducted in a timely and effective manner.

B. Planning, reporting and evaluation of patrols

Need to report planned and actual patrols and include night-time patrolling in patrol plans and task orders

18. The Force is required to estimate the planned number of patrols corresponding to the requested resources in the Mission's annual results-based budgeting (RBB) framework. All units are required to develop adequate patrol plans to ensure that patrols are conducted in a safe and effective manner.

19. In developing its 2017/18 and 2018/19 RBB performance plans, the Force did not estimate the number of local and medium range patrols. It also did not indicate the number of patrols by Sectors; instead, the number of planned patrols was estimated for the entire Mission which made it difficult to hold the Sector Commanders accountable for the number of patrols under their responsibility. Furthermore, the number of troops deployed and the nature of their operations were different for each Sector. The planned number of local patrols for 2016/17 inexplicably dropped to 1,095 from 11,712 in 2015/16. The Force planned 700 long range patrols for 2018/19, even though actual performance in 2017/18 was 1,705 patrols.

20. Additionally, the data included in MINUSMA's RBB performance reports was inaccurate. For example, the number of local patrols reported in 2016/17 was 3,320 although the actual number of local patrols was 9,716 based on OIOS' analysis of the Force's monthly operations reports. Also, task orders

and patrol plans were not systematically retained for subsequent monitoring and evaluation. The patrol plans for 4 of the 24 months in Sector North and 22 of the 24 months in Sector East were not available.

21. The Force explained that the use of the RBB framework to estimate patrol numbers of far-future dates under their geographical and operational environment was not a realistic way to plan and assess the unpredictable nature of military operations. While OIOS acknowledges the dynamic nature of military operations, it is necessary to conduct advance planning to properly support the request for resources in the RBB budget submissions. Also, the Mission had not provided adequate guidance to the Force on the RBB framework and on maintaining the portfolio of evidence to support performance reporting. As a result, the Force could not demonstrate the progress made to achieve the objectives stated in the budget documents, and there was lack of assurance that the Force's requested resources were adequately justified or effectively utilized.

22. OIOS' review of 50 sector weekly patrol plans and 25 operation specific task orders showed that they appropriately included relevant information such as background and historical perspectives, recent security events, threat assessments, activities of known spoilers, intent and nature of patrols to be conducted, coordination protocol with the Mission's police component, MDSF and other international security actors, maps, rules of engagement and reporting requirements. However, the task orders were not always specific as to the expected frequency of the patrols. For instance, 18 of the operation specific task orders reviewed by OIOS indicated that local patrols should be conducted daily, while 7 did not specify the frequency.

23. Furthermore, there were unexplained variances in the ratio of daytime to night-time patrols conducted over the 24 months. From 2017 to March 2018, there were about five night-time patrols for each daytime patrol. From April 2018 to January 2019, for every 15 daytime patrols there was only one night-time patrol. Since February 2019, the Force reported a five to one ratio of daytime to night-time patrols. This happened because the Force leadership did not require the Sector Commanders to analyze the operational advantages and related risks of their respective daytime and night-time patrols, and systematically plan, conduct and report on night-time patrols. As a result, the Force could not systematically address security threats during night-time.

(2) MINUSMA should provide necessary guidance to enable the Force to properly estimate the planned number of military patrols to support the resources being requested in the results-based budget submissions.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 2 and stated that within the last 12 months a military long-term planner has been embedded with the Mission's Strategic Planning Unit primarily responsible to monitor and develop MINUSMA's input to the RBB process. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that properly supported estimates of planned patrols are included in the Mission's budget submissions.

(3) MINUSMA should provide necessary guidance to the Force to enable improved capturing and archiving of data related to military patrolling to adequately support accurate performance reporting.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 3 and stated that the Force would continue to refine its input to RBB using improved analytical procedures with other initiatives. Additionally, the Force was instituting monthly data collection procedures for the RBB process to improve the data collection and reduce loss of data during rotation of staff or units. The Military Force Information Cell was also working closely with the Force Headquarters to streamline reporting formats and information archiving and retrieval. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence of accurate reporting and archiving of patrolling data.

(4) MINUSMA should analyze all relevant risks and operational advantages of daytime and night-time patrols, and systematically plan and conduct night-time patrols.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the Force would continue to refine and reinforce its decision-making processes into overall planning efforts through a variety of required inputs from various sources, such as Commander's Guidance at Force and Sector level, campaign assessments, continued refinement of intelligence inputs increasing understanding of the operational environment, civilian pillars and Mission senior leadership. This would include reporting distinctions between night and day patrols as determined by the operational situation on the ground. It remains imperative that the discretion of military experts and subordinate commanders not be restricted or overridden. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of the results of analysis of operational advantages of night-time patrols with associated risks and measures.

Patrol team briefings were conducted adequately

24. Patrol team leaders are required to brief their team members on operational and safety requirements. During the actual and simulated activities observed by OIOS, team leaders provided briefing to their patrol teams on the background, situational awareness, threat assessment, patrol plans with purpose and intent of operation, communication protocol, patrol routes and actions to be taken in response to unusual occurrences. All patrol team members had the rules of engagement pocket cards as required. The briefings also included the need to report on patrol results. Accordingly, weekly and daily situation reports showed incidents, unusual events and developments noticed during patrols reported by patrol teams. OIOS concluded that patrol team leaders adequately conducted the required patrol briefing.

Need to strengthen "close-to-real-time" monitoring of patrols

25. It is essential for patrol teams to maintain continuous contact with operation centres on a "close-to-real-time" basis to monitor ongoing patrols and enable appropriate response in the event of serious security situations on the ground.

26. OIOS' visits to eight operation centres indicated that the centres were equipped with the required equipment such as radio, telephones, maps, satellite imagery hotline communication channel to ensure appropriate communication with patrol teams. However, such communication equipment was either lacking or inadequate in remote operating bases such as Aguelhoc and Tessalit, which affected the "close-to-real-time" monitoring of patrols. Also, communication procedures between patrol teams and their operation centres were not uniform. For example, of the three Sectors reviewed, two Sector OPORDs required teams to report their status every 30 minutes while one OPORD did not mention the reporting frequency. Also, 25 task orders made available to OIOS indicated that the patrol teams must notify their operation centres only upon arrival and departure.

27. The above resulted because the Force did not: (a) establish standard procedures that enabled "close-to-real-time" tracking of patrols in progress; and (b) properly address communication equipment shortfalls of patrolling units by upgrading the radio frequency and providing other communication devices. As a result, the Force may not be able to adequately respond to unforeseen events during patrols.

(5) MINUSMA should take action to improve communication procedures between patrol teams and operation centres and address shortfalls in communication equipment in remote operating bases to enable monitoring of patrols on a "close-to-real-time" basis.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 5 and stated that military equipment and procedures were constantly under review as an inherent part of the improvement and self-assessment that all national military forces undergo periodically. The Force Communication and Information Unit (U-6) and MINUSMA Field Technology Section would continue to collaborate to ensure proper use and availability of radio frequency and spectrum management as well as other upgraded equipment and capabilities. Additionally, efforts by the Force and Sector headquarters to streamline and effectively manage the proper level of periodic reporting of patrols were ongoing. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of streamlined communication procedures between patrol teams and their operation centres and evidence of actions taken to strengthen communication equipment capabilities.

There was a need to improve the evaluation of military patrol operations

28. Sector Commanders must assess the effectiveness of their operations, including patrols, based on OPODs and submit self-evaluation reports to the Force headquarters periodically.

29. Due to other operational priorities, the Force headquarters did not require the Sectors to submit monthly self-evaluation reports. During the audit period, the Sectors prepared and submitted to the Force headquarters only 2 of the 24 required monthly self-evaluation reports. This was attributed to weaknesses in record retention and the lack of proper handover procedures during staff rotations. The two monthly self-assessments appropriately assessed their operations using the pre-established rating scales of “not started”, “unmet”, “partially achieved”, “mostly met” and “achieved”. However, there was no mechanism in place to track the required follow-up actions to improve the ratings. Also, the Force headquarters’ quarterly evaluation reports did not provide a comprehensive assessment of patrolling. As a result, the mission leadership did not have adequate means for evidence-based decision-making regarding the effectiveness of patrolling operations.

(6) MINUSMA should ensure that the Force adequately assesses the performance of patrolling operations as part of the established performance evaluation mechanism to assure that patrols are effectively and safely conducted.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 6 and stated that the Force was undergoing an overall review of training, inspection and evaluation procedures and their timelines in a holistic manner. The review would include the use of the Commander’s Performance Evaluation System (CPES) of the Department of Peace Operations. Additionally, the Force was finalizing the concept for convening a Force Headquarters’ Board of Review to review all contingent assessments and inspections, and timely submit relevant recommendations to United Nations Headquarters through CPES. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence of action taken to monitor and ensure timely and systematic self-evaluations conducted by the Sectors.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

30. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MINUSMA for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX I

Audit of implementation of security measures in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ² / Important ³	C/ O ⁴	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁵
1	MINUSMA should task the responsible personnel from the Force and Sector headquarters to appropriately schedule and conduct operational readiness assurances of its battalions, taking into consideration applicable standards and issues raised in previous assessments and reviews.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that ORAs are being conducted in a timely and effective manner.	31 March 2020
2	MINUSMA should provide necessary guidance to enable the Force to properly estimate the planned number of military patrols to support the resources being requested in the results-based budget submissions.	Important	O	Receipt of Mission's budget submissions with properly supported estimates of planned patrols.	31 March 2020
3	MINUSMA should provide necessary guidance to the Force to enable improved capturing and archiving of data related to military patrolling to adequately support accurate performance reporting.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of accurate reporting and archiving of patrolling data.	31 March 2020
4	MINUSMA should analyze all relevant risks and operational advantages of daytime and nighttime patrols, and systematically plan and conduct nighttime patrols.	Important	O	Receipt of the results of analysis of operational advantages of nighttime patrols with associated risks and measures.	31 March 2020
5	MINUSMA should take action to improve communication procedures between patrol teams and their operation centres and address shortfalls in communication equipment in remote operating	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of streamlined communication procedures between patrol teams and their operation centres and evidence of actions taken to strengthen communication equipment capabilities.	30 June 2020

² Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

³ Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

⁴ C = closed, O = open

⁵ Date provided by MINUSMA in response to recommendations.

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX I

**Audit of implementation of security measures in the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali**

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical²/ Important³	C/ O⁴	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date⁵
	bases to enable monitoring of patrols on a “close-to-real-time” basis.				
6	MINUSMA should ensure that the Force adequately assesses the performance of patrolling operations as part of the established performance evaluation mechanism to assure that patrols are effectively and safely conducted.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of action taken to monitor and ensure timely and systematic self-evaluations conducted by the Sectors.	31 March 2020

APPENDIX I

Management Response



MINUSMA

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

REF: 20191120-1904-FCO

DATE: 13 December 2019

TO: Daeyoung PARK
Chief Peacekeeping Audit Service
Internal Audit Division, OIOS

FROM: Lt Gen Dennis GYLLENSPORRE
Force Commander
MINUSMA



SUBJECT: **Draft Report of an Audit of Military Patrolling in the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(Assignment No. AP2018/641/04)**

1. We refer to your memorandum of the above subject, reference no. OIOS-2019-641/04 dated 12 November 2019. Please find attached, MINUSMA's response to the recommendations contained in the subject Draft Report with requested target dates and the titles of responsible officers.
2. In following the usual procedure, copies of any supporting documents are not transmitted to with this Mission's response.

Best Regards,

cc: Brig Gen François-Marie GOUGEON, Force Chief of Staff, MINUSMA
Col Thomas James SIEBOLD, Command Group Advisor, MINUSMA
Col Lutz MUEHLHOEFER, Deputy Chief of Staff – Operations, MINUSMA
Col Lars HELMRICH, Military Assistant to Force Commander, MINUSMA
Mr. Seydou SIRPE, Chief Resident Auditor, MINUSMA, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
Ms. Rebecca KAMUDE Resident Auditor, MINUSMA, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
Ms. Rosa HERNANDEZ, Resident Auditor, MINUSMA, Internal Audit Division, OIOS

Management Response

Audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	MINUSMA should task the responsible personnel from the Force and Sector headquarters to appropriately schedule and conduct operational readiness assurances of its battalions, taking into consideration applicable standards and issues raised in previous assessments and reviews.	Important	Yes	MINUSMA Force Headquarters - Chief Readiness	31.03.2020	MINUSMA concurs with the spirit of the recommendation but contends that the Force should conduct operational readiness confirmations and evaluations (as per page 44 of the United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook) of its battalions vice operational readiness assessments. MINUSMA Force is undergoing an overall review of training and evaluation procedures, inspections, and timelines in a holistic manner under the guidance and direction of the Deputy Force Commander. A training evaluation and contingent inspection/review workplan is being developed and will be integrated into the Force Training and Evaluation Unit (U7) training plans and procedures. This review includes the review of the evaluation checklist, workplan, contingent recommendations, incorporation into updated contingent training plans. A review of the Infantry Battalion Manual, as well as other related and relevant document, manual, standard

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

Management Response

Audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						operating procedures, previous assessments will be included during this holistic review.
2	MINUSMA should provide necessary guidance to enable the Force to properly estimate the planned number of military patrols to support the resources being requested in the results-based budget submissions.	Important	Yes	MINUSMA Force Headquarters– Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations	31.03.2020	MINUSMA concurs with the recommendation. Within the past twelve (12) months, a military long-term planner has been embedded with the Mission’s Strategic Planning Unit primarily responsible to monitor and develop MINUSMA’s inputs to the Results Based Budget (RBB) process. MINUSMA Force will continue to refine its inputs to the RBB using improved analytical procedures in conjunction with the actions and initiatives listed for other recommendations as expressed by this audit.
3	MINUSMA should provide necessary guidance to the Force to enable improved capturing and archiving of data related to military patrolling to adequately support accurate performance reporting.	Important	Yes	MINUSMA Force Headquarters– Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations	31.03.2020	MINUSMA Force is currently in the process of instituting monthly data collection procedures for the annual Mission RBB process, Mission quarterly Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) context analysis assessments, and development of the quarterly MINUSMA Force Assessment and Guidance. Monthly data collection will significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the data, reduce overall workload on both

Management Response

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Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						<p>Sector and the Headquarters' staff, assist in improved historical record-keeping, and reduce the loss of data quality during transition of contingents or military staff officers.</p> <p>The MINUSMA Force Information Management Cell (IMC) is also working closely with the Force Operations Unit (U3) to streamline reporting formats and information archiving and retrieval.</p>
4	MINUSMA should analyze all relevant risks and operational advantages of daytime and night-time patrols, and systematically plan and conduct night-time patrols.	Important	Yes	MINUSMA Force Headquarters– Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations	31.03.2020	<p>The MINUSMA Force concurs with this recommendation. Force operation order 004 (OPORD) and subsequent Quarterly Guidance provides the overarching framework for the prioritization of military operations which includes as a part, military patrols.</p> <p>MINUSMA Force continues to refine and reinforce decision-making processes through a variety of required inputs including Commander's Guidance (both Force Headquarters and Sector level), campaign assessments, continued refinement of intelligence inputs and increased understanding of the operational environment, and the integration of civilian pillars and Heads of Office inputs into overall</p>

Management Response

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Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						operational planning efforts. This will include reporting distinctions between day- and night- patrols as determined by the operational situation on the ground. It remains imperative that the discretion of military experts and subordinate commanders not be restricted or overridden. MINUSMA Force Planning Unit (U5) continues to work with the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) to develop a more explicit strategy in order to provide guidance related to combined (and joint) military operations, patrols, and security across Mali.
5	MINUSMA should take action to improve communication procedures between patrol teams and their operation centres and address shortfalls in communication equipment in remote operating bases to enable monitoring of patrols on a “close-to-real-time” basis.	Important	Yes	MINUSMA Force Headquarters– Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations	30.06.2020	MINUSMA Force concurs with this recommendation. Military equipment and procedures are constantly under review as an inherent part of the improvement and self-assessment that all National Military Forces undergo periodically. These reviews generally occur on an annual basis, during life-cycle replacement analysis, and in an attempt to incorporate technological and innovative upgrades being developed in commercial markets.

Management Response

Audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						MINUSMA Force Communication and Information Unit (U6) and MINUSMA Field Technology Support Section (FTS) will continue to collaborate to ensure proper use and availability of radio frequencies and spectrum management as well as other upgraded equipment and capabilities (GPS trackers). Additionally, a concentrated effort between the Force Headquarters and Sector Headquarters to streamline and effectively manage the proper level of periodic reporting of patrols (departure/return reports, interim status, and close-out reports) is currently on-going.
6	MINUSMA should ensure that the Force adequately assesses the performance of patrolling operations as part of the established performance evaluation mechanism to assure that patrols are effectively and safely conducted.	Important	Yes	Force Headquarters - Chief Readiness	31.03.2020	MINUSMA concurs with the recommendation. MINUSMA Force is undergoing an overall review of training and evaluation procedures, inspections, and timelines in a holistic manner. A training evaluation and contingent inspection/review workplan is being developed and will be integrated into the Force Training and Evaluation Unit (U7) training plans and procedures. This review will include the use of the Commander's Performance Evaluation System (CMPS), an automated reporting system.

Management Response

Audit of military patrolling in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						<p>MINUSMA Force is also finalizing the concept for convening a Force Headquarters Board of Review to review all U7 contingent assessments and inspections for completeness, analysis, incorporation of required elements into other staff processes, review of recommendations, and timely submission to UNHQ through the CMPS.</p>