Audit of the Joint Operations Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The Mission needed to improve the recording and reporting of incidents

14 December 2020
Assignment No. AP2020-672-06
Audit of the Joint Operations Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The objective of the audit was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of JOC in providing situational awareness and coordination, and crisis management support. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2018 to 31 March 2020.

UNIFIL implemented a geographical web-based Situational Awareness Tool (SAT) to facilitate situational awareness, and the Incident Management System (IMS) and Patrol Mapping and Reporting Tool (PMRT) that was embedded in SAT were the primary systems used for incident reporting and patrol monitoring respectively. UNIFIL also implemented effective measures to enhance coordination between JOC and other units and completed in January 2020 a project aimed at improving the facilities and equipment used by JOC, the Crisis Management Team and Crisis Coordination Body. However, the Mission’s crisis management structure was not functioning effectively, PMRT was not providing the accurate and near real time operational picture needed for effective situational awareness, and the management and documentation of incidents encountered during its operations needed to improve.

OIOS made four recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, UNIFIL needed to:

- Improve the categorisation of incidents in IMS;
- Standardise training on incident response provided at battalion level, review the Standardised Tactical Incident Reaction (STIR) for dealing with unauthorised carrying of arms in the area of operations to ensure its applicability, and configure IMS to include a mandatory field for documenting STIR when applied;
- Expand guidelines to include a requirement for Mission Headquarters to document in IMS actions taken to respond to incidents; and
- Configure PMRT to highlight patrols that have not updated for over 30 minutes directly on the face of the patrol positions map.

UNIFIL accepted the recommendations and has initiated action to implement them.
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APPENDIX I Management response
Audit of the Joint Operations Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

2. The Mission established JOC as the primary cross-functional mission element by which the Head of Mission and Force Commander (HoM/FC) and UNIFIL key leaders receive the necessary situational awareness to monitor and exercise command and control over current operations. The main functions of JOC are to: (a) achieve and maintain a common operational picture and provide situational awareness within the Mission and to United Nations Headquarters; (b) support the Mission’s crisis management and Mission leadership decision-making processes; and (c) facilitate operations coordination and planning within the Mission.

3. JOC is situated at Force Headquarters and is supported by Tactical Operating Centres (TOCs) at each Sector Headquarters namely Sector East and Sector West. The Sector TOCs coordinate with battalion TOCs to provide situational awareness to JOC. Other military units that conduct patrols such as the Force Commander Reserve and the Liaison Branch, report incidents directly to JOC.

4. The Chief JOC is a military officer with a one-year tour of duty. The officer reports to the HoM/FC through the Military Chief of Staff and is supported by 31 military officers who work in shifts to ensure provision of 24/7 situational awareness.

5. Comments provided by UNIFIL are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

6. The objective of the audit was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of JOC in UNIFIL in providing situational awareness and coordination, and crisis management support.

7. This audit was included in the 2020 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the importance of an effective JOC in supporting the Mission leadership to identify, prevent, mitigate and/or respond to threats and opportunities to enhance successful implementation of the UNIFIL mandate.

8. OIOS conducted this audit from February to August 2020. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2018 to 31 March 2020. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risks areas in JOC, which included: (a) situational awareness and coordination; and (b) crisis management support.

9. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews of key personnel; (b) reviews of relevant documentation; (c) analytical reviews of incident reports in the Incident Management System (IMS); and (d) sample testing of 223 incident reports, periodic situational awareness reports and after-action review reports.

10. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Situational awareness and coordination

The governance and staffing frameworks of JOC facilitated integrated situational awareness

11. In UNIFIL, JOC is a military unit that reports to the HoM/FC through the Military Chief of Staff. This structure is not in line with Organization-wide policy and guidelines, which consider JOCs as integrated entities comprising international civilian and uniformed personnel and led by a civilian chief. As a result of its militarised structure, JOC maintained a military operational focus primarily concentrated on the UNIFIL area of operation and lacked capacity for integrated reporting.

12. To compensate for this, JOC established a reporting cell, which coordinated with the Division of Political and Civil Affairs (DPCA), the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and the Security Information and Operations Centre for integrated reporting purposes. However, there was no designated head of the reporting cell as a request in UNIFIL’s 2017/18 budget proposal to reassign a post to cover this function was not supported by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/72/789/Add.5) or approved by the General Assembly. Therefore, DPCA assigned a dedicated Political Officer to review situational reports consolidated by JOC and, where necessary, include additional information to provide context to the incidents reported. The Mission was in the process of updating its standard operating procedures (SOP) on the Reporting System from UNIFIL to United Nations Headquarters for daily and weekly situational reports to provide relevant guidance.

13. Integrated operational coordination and planning within the Mission were undertaken by the recently appointed Principal Coordination Officer, and the Military Planning Unit and the Mission Support Centre, respectively. The role of the Principal Coordination Officer was approved in the Mission’s 2019/20 budget. This was after a previously unsuccessful proposal to create a post of civilian Chief of Staff to be established in the Office of the HoM/FC and tasked with coordinating the activities of JOC, JMAC, Military Intelligence Unit (J2), the Security Section and DPCA in information gathering and analysis activities. The Principal Coordination Officer is responsible to oversee, coordinate and streamline work processes and procedures of the various entities/pillars of the Mission in accordance with the relevant policies and priorities to ensure a coordinated and balanced approach to mandate delivery.

14. In light of measures implemented to compensate for its non-integrated nature, OIOS concluded that UNIFIL had made adequate arrangements on the governance, structure and staffing of JOC to enable it to carry out its functions effectively.

Incident categorisation in the Incident Management System needed better clarity

15. UNIFIL uses a geographical web-based Situational Awareness Tool (SAT) to record, store and disseminate operational information. Embedded in SAT is the Incident Management System (IMS) which is used to report incidents and events encountered by UNIFIL troops within the area of operation or alleged by the parties to the conflict (Lebanon and Israel). Incident and event statistics for the period July 2018 to March 2020 are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
UNIFIL Joint Operations Centre events and incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of cases recorded</th>
<th>Jul to Dec 2018</th>
<th>Jan to Jun 2019</th>
<th>Jul to Dec 2019</th>
<th>Jan to Mar 2020</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission sensitive</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>4,553</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road traffic accidents</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>320</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total incidents</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>2,516</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>7,156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total events and incidents</td>
<td>5,274</td>
<td>4,407</td>
<td>5,550</td>
<td>2,067</td>
<td>17,298</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMS

16. There were 68 predefined incident and 13 predefined event types in IMS that were used to indicate the nature of an incident being reported. A catalogue in IMS defined each incident and event type to guide users in recording them. Each incident type was assigned a severity level from one to five, where five is the highest severity level. Where the details of an incident were related to more than one incident type, the most severe incident type was to be selected. IMS sent email notifications to designated persons upon entry of an incident in the system, based on the incident type. The Report Working Group reviewed incident categorisations monthly.

17. OIOS review of incident reports showed the need for better mapping of incidents to the predefined incident types, as shown in the following examples:

- IMS did not allow selection of more than one incident category; hence, where incidents were related to more than one incident type, the categorisation did not reflect the full nature of the incident. For example, in 2 out of 33 cases relating to denial of freedom of patrol movements, the persons who denied access were armed with pistols, but this was not included in the Mission’s statistics on unauthorised carrying of arms in the area of operation. Similarly, 1 out of 40 cases of unfriendly behaviour towards UNIFIL reviewed involved an armed civilian but this was also not reported as part of statistics on carrying of arms in the area of operation.

- Some incident categories covered a wide range of incidents and hence did not reveal the exact nature of the occurrence. For example, incidents reported as unfriendly behaviour across the Blue Line comprised a range of incidents from verbal fallout to throwing of objects as well as aiming with heavy and mounted weapons, all of which were assigned the same severity level. Also, aggressive behaviour towards UNIFIL comprised varying incidents including pointing a weapon at UNIFIL troops or position, damaging UNIFIL property (vehicles), taking equipment from UNIFIL troops and breaking into a UNIFIL vehicle to steal items. As a result, the true nature and severity of incidents were concealed within the details of the reports.

- Additionally, severity levels assigned to some incidents were not consistent with the incident type. For example, stone throwing at UNIFIL was rated a severity two incident whereas unfriendly hand gestures at UNIFIL were reported under unfriendly behaviour towards UNIFIL with severity level three.

18. In addition to the above, the incident types in IMS did not match the incidents listed in the Standard Tactical Incident Reaction (STIR i.e., rules of engagement for military components translated into 22
incidents that military units could face and recommended courses of action for each incident). Further details on this are provided in paragraph 21.

19. Incidents were inadequately categorised partly because the Mission had not updated the list of incidents in the 2013 SOP on Operational Reporting. In June 2020, JOC revised incident categorisations and released an updated catalogue of incidents which partly addressed the above observations; however, there was still the need to improve clarity of categorisation, especially in relation to incidents that fall under more than one incident type.

(1) UNIFIL should improve the categorisation of incidents in the Incident Management System by expanding the catalogue to include scenarios that currently fall under more than one incident type and assigning appropriate severity levels to them.

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the Chief JOC, in coordination with DPCA, would determine the scenarios to expand the catalogue of incidents, notably to include scenarios that encompass more than one incident type and assign corresponding severity levels to them. Subsequently, the Geographic Information Systems Unit would modify and insert these into IMS. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence of update of incident categories in IMS, with a revised catalogue of incidents.

Handling and reporting of incidents needed to be improved

20. Battalions and sector personnel regularly trained patrol teams on applying STIRs. OIOS review of the STIRs and the Mission’s response to incidents as documented in IMS indicated the following:

- While there were 68 incident types listed in IMS, only 24 of them were addressed by the STIRs. Hence, there were no laid down procedures to guide troops on the appropriate course of action for 44 incident types. These included significant incident types such as direct and indirect fire across the Blue Line and some recurring incidents such as road traffic accidents, unfriendly or aggressive behaviour towards UNIFIL and hearing of explosions.

- A total of 4,912 out of 7,156 incidents that occurred during the audit period, including rockets launched across the Blue Line, did not have laid down procedures to guide the Mission’s response. While military officers were trained to apply good common sense in responding to these incidents, Mission-wide guidelines would ensure consistent response by troops. The SOP on Tactical Procedures, which serves as the Mission’s guide to training battalions, did not provide adequate guidance to standardise the training on incident response provided to troops by the various battalions.

- There were 10 instances of unauthorised carrying of weapons in the area of operation from July 2018 to March 2020. In all cases, contrary to the STIR, UNIFIL did not order the armed elements to stop on the spot. Reasons for not applying the STIR were not documented in any of the IMS reports.

21. Additionally, there was a mismatch between incident types in IMS and the STIRs. For example, the STIRs made a distinction between the Mission’s reaction to armed hunters beyond 200 metres of the Blue Line and those within 200 meters of the Blue Line. UNIFIL troops were expected to monitor and report incidents of the former, and in the case of the latter, order hunters to stop on the spot and wait for the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces. This distinction was however not clear in IMS reports as all armed hunter incidents were recorded under the broad header “armed hunters” without subclassification according
to distance from the Blue Line. While efforts were made to specify the location of armed hunters, their proximity to the Blue Line was usually not reported. Also, the documentation of actions taken by the troops only referred to the STIR applied in 77 out of 234 incidents reviewed. As a result, it could not be determined whether the Mission had adequately dealt with incidents of armed hunters. Furthermore, while the STIRs made a distinction between denial of freedom of movement with and without arms, there was no such distinction in IMS. An improvement to the categorisation of incidents as indicated in recommendation 1 above is needed to improve clarity of incident reporting.

22. The issue of UNIFIL deviating from the STIR in its reaction to unauthorized carrying of arms within the area of operation without documenting the reason for deviation was raised in the OIOS report on the audit of military patrolling operations in UNIFIL (report number 2017/090). The report indicated that in all 59 cases reviewed of unauthorised carrying of weapons in the area of operations, UNIFIL did not order the armed elements to stop on the spot, and only documented the reasons for not doing so in 19 cases. OIOS therefore recommended that UNIFIL establish requirements for reporting deviations from guidance given in the STIR and update the STIR based on experiences encountered during operations. Following this recommendation, the Military Operations branch (J3) issued a tasking order in January 2018, stating “All UNIFIL troops will mention the STIR followed while dealing with an incident [by] filling the box “action taken” in the incident report form. In case of STIR not being referred/adhered, specific reasons to explain the same must be provided”. The Mission’s action in implementing the recommendation needed to be enhanced by making the STIR box a mandatory field in completing incident reports in IMS.

| (2) UNIFIL should: (a) include in the training provided at the battalion level, standardised best courses of action to respond to incidents that are not covered by the Standardised Tactical Incident Reactions (STIRs); (b) review its STIR for dealing with unauthorised carrying of arms within the area of operation to ensure that it is implementable; and (c) configure the Incident Management System to include a mandatory field for documenting that STIR was applied. |

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the Mission would review and update battalion-level trainings to include standardised reactions to general incident types, including those not covered by STIRs. UNIFIL would also review the applicability of the STIRs and update and embed them in battalion level training to ensure their utilisation. Additionally, UNIFIL would make the existing “action taken” field within IMS mandatory to document the STIR applied, where relevant. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence of update of battalion level training with standardised reactions, review and update of the STIRs and consistent documentation of the STIR applied in the “action taken” field in IMS.

**Need to improve documentation of Mission Headquarters response to incidents in IMS**

23. Incidents, events and allegations were reported in IMS by battalions or military units, verified by TOCs at the sectors, and finalised by JOC by completing the relevant sections of the incident report as required by the SOP on Operational Reporting. Overall, 955 of the 1,024 incidents reviewed for timeliness were opened within two hours of incident occurrence. The remaining 69 incidents were opened within three to eight hours of incident occurrence. New guidelines released on 15 May 2020 in the revised SOP on Operational Reporting required completion of the Summary of Incident within 20 minutes after the end of an incident. This change was yet to be reflected in the SOP on reporting at the sector level, and adequate information provided in reports generated by IMS to enable the Mission to track compliance with the new guidelines. UNIFIL has undertaken to align the SOPs and monitor compliance with the new reporting requirements.
24. While incident reports in IMS provided detailed information pertaining to events that transpired on the ground and actions taken at battalion/military unit and sector levels, actions taken at Mission Headquarters were largely undocumented. A review of all 144 incidents categorised as severity three, four and five that occurred during the audit period showed missing information on key actions such as information shared with Mission leadership, directives given and outcomes from their implementation. For example, the IMS report on a Blue Line ground incident in December 2018 indicated that the incident was reported to JOC, and that “UNIFIL immediately intervened by mediating the situation between the parties”. Details of action taken by JOC were not documented. This occurred because the guidelines for reporting incidents in IMS did not encompass documentation requirements for incident management by Mission Headquarters. Therefore, it was not possible to obtain a more comprehensive picture of incident management at Mission level, especially in relation to significant incidents, from the IMS reports.

25. Following this incident, JOC established a logbook system for recording responses to some incidents, which was updated with details of actions taken by all participants such as reporting to Mission Leadership and other unit heads, feedback received, and approvals obtained to carry out additional measures as needed. This is a good practice and JOC is encouraged to define and document specific criteria for use of the logbooks to ensure consistency. These details also needed to be recorded in IMS.

(3) **UNIFIL should expand guidelines on incident documentation in the Incident Management System to include requirements for documenting actions taken at Mission Headquarters.**

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 3 and stated that UNIFIL would configure IMS with a mandatory field to specify the ‘action taken at Mission HQ level’. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence of documentation in IMS of actions taken at Mission Headquarters in response to incidents.

Need to improve accuracy of common operational picture for ongoing patrols

26. PMRT was implemented to provide visibility of ongoing mobile and static activities on a digital map, to update all levels of Mission leadership on a common operational picture and situational awareness and enhance prompt and efficient operational response as may be required. In January 2019, the Mission adopted PMRT as the only reporting tool for activities at the troop contributing countries operational level. A fragmentary order issued by J3 directed Sector Headquarters and other military units to update operational activities in PMRT every 30 to 45 minutes to establish a “near-to-real-time” operational picture. This requirement is also stated in the UNIFIL SOP on Operational Reporting.

27. Even though the system has improved the visibility of patrols, there have been delays in updating operational activities in PMRT as shown in activity reports generated from the system. Activity reports generated from 8th to 12th June 2020 (one report a day) indicated that 150 out of 499 active patrols had not been updated in PMRT for periods ranging from 1 to 18 hours. Forty-seven of these patrols were static, while the remaining 103 were mobile. This occurred because although the above-mentioned fragmentary order and SOP provided adequate guidance to ensure availability of a “near-to-real-time” operational picture, there was no follow-up of non-compliance.

28. Additionally, patrols with overdue updates could only be viewed on PMRT after selecting the “patrols-update due” layer from a list of available layers. Once selected, patrols that had not been updated in an hour or more were highlighted. This information needed to be displayed on the face of the patrol positions map to make it more visible.

29. Delays in updating operational activities including patrol positions in PMRT creates an inaccurate operational picture that could lead to adverse consequences when used as a basis for decision-making.
UNIFIL should: (a) configure the Patrol Mapping and Reporting Tool (PMRT) to highlight patrols that have not been updated for over 30 minutes directly on the face of the patrol positions map, rather than as a separate layer of the Tool that requires selection; and (b) follow up non-compliance with existing guidance on PMRT updates.

UNIFIL accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the PMRT system had been configured so that patrols that had not updated their position after 30 minutes would appear clearly. UNIFIL would address non-compliance of PMRT updates during monthly operational meetings of the Tactical Operation Centre and J3 Branch. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence of timely PMRT updates and improved compliance with existing guidance on PMRT.

### B. Crisis management support

UNIFIL improved utilisation of its crisis management function

30. The Mission’s crisis management structure comprises a Crisis Management Team (CMT) and a Crisis Management Working Group/Operations Coordination Body (CMWG/OCB), which recently replaced the Crisis Coordination Body (CCB). The CMT is the senior leadership team that supports the Crisis Manager (the HoM/FC) in decision-making, while the CMWG/OCB is a working level, cross-component body responsible for supporting the Crisis Coordinator in all relevant tasks. CMWG/OCB is headed by the military Chief of Staff for military-related crises and the Principal Coordination Officer for significant cross-cutting matters.

31. JOC is responsible for providing crisis management support to the Mission, including maintenance of the Mission’s crisis response facilities. The facilities, which are co-located with JOC, are equipped with computers, telephones, televisions and large screens maintained in a state of readiness. JOC also bears responsibility for recommending activation of the crisis management bodies in the event of a crisis, subject to approval of the HoM/FC.

32. During the audit period, UNIFIL encountered several significant incidents. Key among these were a brief exchange of indirect fire across the Blue Line on 1 September 2019, which followed increased tensions between the parties to the conflict; and weeks of civil unrest due to anti-government protests that began on 17 October 2019. Despite the significance of these incidents, JOC did not recommend activation of the crisis management bodies and lost the opportunity to coordinate the UNIFIL response with relevant entities within the Mission. While UNIFIL, through its Military Training Branch (J7), carried out simulation and table-top exercises to test contingency plans and train UNIFIL personnel, the crisis management bodies were also not activated during those exercises and hence did not actively participate.

33. UNIFIL improved its coordinated response to crisis management at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the HoM/FC established an operational level COVID-19 Crisis Working Group as an integrated team responsible to ensure a fully comprehensive approach to the pandemic on behalf of the Mission. A COVID-19 Crisis Cell, headed by the Chief JOC, was also formed as a focal point at the tactical level for dissemination of information, situational awareness and tactical level decision-making. The CMT was not officially activated until August 2020, when the HoM/FC issued an inter-office memorandum to revise the COVID-19 Crisis Management Framework in line with guidance received from the United Nations Headquarters in March 2020. The revised framework clearly defined the composition of the CMT and CMWG, and assigned the roles of Crisis Manager, Crisis Coordinator and Crisis Secretariat to the HoM/FC, Chief of Staff and JOC, respectively.
34. UNIFIL also activated the crisis management framework following the tragic explosion at the Beirut Port on 4 August 2020. The CMT and CMWG met regularly to address the impact of the explosion, as well as design and implement an effective course of action to assist the Country Team and the Government of Lebanon in their response to the crisis. In addition, UNIFIL advised OIOS of the inclusion of the crisis management structure in a table-top exercise conducted in September 2020. Considering these improvements, OIOS did not make a recommendation on this issue.

UNIFIL started testing multiple contingency plans simultaneously

35. The Mission, through its Military Training Branch (J7) and in coordination with JOC, conducted regular exercises to test various aspects of the military function, such as the Military Support to UNIFIL Security Plan (MSUSP). The MSUSP was tested at least once annually in conjunction with battalions across the area of operation to assess crisis response preparedness by simulating movement of staff and their dependents from their respective residences to concentration points for further relocation or evacuation.

36. In the after-action review conducted after the rocket launch and brief exchange of indirect fire between Lebanon and Israel on 1 September 2019, JOC recommended the conduct of combined exercises to evaluate the Mission’s response to a complex crisis as some contingency plans, such as the Escalation of Tensions, MSUSP and Mass Casualty plans, are interlinked. Again, a final exercise report on an MSUSP exercise conducted on 7 September 2019, signed by the Chief of Staff on behalf of the HoM/FC recommended that the exercise be conducted simultaneously in all locations to test the capacity and efficiency of the system to deal with crisis on a large scale. However, during the audit period, the Mission continued to conduct the MSUSP at battalion, unit and sector levels in order to avoid a perceived risk of panic among the local population that a large-scale relocation and evacuation exercise could cause. In response to the detailed audit results, UNIFIL advised that it had successfully conducted the “Quadriga” exercise in September 2020, which was based on a complex scenario activating the protection of civilians, MSUSP and intervention of reserves at the same time and across multiple locations. Therefore, OIOS did not make a recommendation in this issue.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

37. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of UNIFIL for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services
## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of the Joint Operations Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical(^1)/Important(^2)</th>
<th>C/ O(^3)</th>
<th>Actions needed to close recommendation</th>
<th>Implementation date(^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNIFIL should improve the categorisation of incidents in the Incident Management System by expanding the catalogue to include scenarios that currently fall under more than one incident type and assigning appropriate severity levels to them.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of update of incident categories in IMS, with a revised catalogue of incidents.</td>
<td>1 April 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNIFIL should: (a) include standardised best courses of reaction to the general incident types identified in the training provided at battalion level, especially for incidents that are not covered by the Standardised Tactical Incident Reactions (STIRs); (b) review its STIR for dealing with unauthorised carrying of arms within the area of operation to ensure that it is enforceable; and (c) configure the Incident Management System to include a mandatory field for documenting STIR applied.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of update of battalion level training with standardised reactions, review and update of the STIRs and consistent documentation of STIR applied in the “action taken” field in IMS.</td>
<td>1 April 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNIFIL should expand guidelines on incident documentation in the Incident Management System to include requirements for documenting actions taken at the Mission Headquarters.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of documentation in IMS of actions taken at Mission Headquarters in response to incidents.</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNIFIL should: (a) configure the Patrol Mapping and Reporting Tool (PMRT) to highlight patrols that have not been updated for over 30 minutes directly on the face of the patrol positions map, rather than as a separate layer of the Tool that requires selection; and (b) follow up non-compliance with existing guidance on PMRT updates.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Receipt of evidence of timely PMRT updates and improved compliance with existing guidance on PMRT.</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.
\(^2\) Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.
\(^3\) Please note the value C denotes closed recommendations whereas O refers to open recommendations.
\(^4\) Date provided by UNIFIL in response to recommendations.
APPENDIX I

Management Response
25 November 2020

To: Ms. Eleanor T. Burns, Director
   Internal Audit Division, OIOS

From: Major-General Stefano Del Col,
      Head of Mission and Force Commander
      UNIFIL

Subject: Draft report on an audit of the Joint Operations Centre in UNIFIL
         (Assignment No. AP2020/672/06)

1. We refer to your memorandum on the above subject, reference No. OIOS-2020-O1672
dated 10 November 2020. Please find attached, UNIFIL’s response to the recommendations
contained in the subject Draft Report.

2. In following the usual procedure, copies of any supporting documents will only be
   provided to MERAO based at UNIFIL HQ and will not be transmitted to you with this Mission’s
   response.

Best regards.

Cc: Mr. Effendi Syukur, Audit Focal Point, UNIFIL
    Mr. Ibrahim Bah, Chief, MERAO, Internal Audit Division, OIOS
    Ms. Cynthia Avena-Castillo, Professional Practices Section, Internal Audit Division,
    OIOS
## Management Response

**Audit of the Joint Operations Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical/ Important</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>UNIFIL should improve the categorisation of incidents in the Incident Management System by expanding the catalogue to include scenarios that currently fall under more than one incident type and assigning appropriate severity levels to them.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Chief JOC</td>
<td>01 April 2021</td>
<td>The Chief JOC, in coordination with DPCA, will determine the scenarios to expand the catalogue of incidents, notably to include scenarios that encompass more than one incident type and assign corresponding severity levels to them. Subsequently, GIS will modify and insert these into the IMS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNIFIL should:</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(a) include standardised best courses of reaction to the general incident types identified in the training provided at battalion level, especially for incidents that are not covered by the Standardised Tactical Incident Reactions (STIRs);</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>a) YES</td>
<td>Chief J7</td>
<td>01 April 2021</td>
<td>a) UNIFIL will review and update battalion-level trainings to include standardized reactions to general incident types including those not covered by the STIRS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(b) review its STIR for dealing with unauthorised carrying of arms within the area of operation to ensure that it is enforceable;</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>b) YES</td>
<td>Chief J3</td>
<td>01 April 2021</td>
<td>b) UNIFIL will review the applicability of the STIRs and update them as required, ensuring utilization of the STIR by embedding in battalion-level training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(c) configure the Incident Management System to include a mandatory field for documenting STIR applied.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>c) YES</td>
<td>Chief JOC</td>
<td>01 April 2021</td>
<td>c) Within the IMS system, UNIFIL will make the ‘existing action taken’ field mandatory for data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.

2. Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.
## Management Response

### Audit of the Joint Operations Centre in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. no.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Critical¹/Important²</th>
<th>Accepted? (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Title of responsible individual</th>
<th>Implementation date</th>
<th>Client comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNIFIL should expand guidelines on incident documentation in the Incident Management System to include requirements for documenting actions taken at the Mission Headquarters.</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Chief JOC</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>UNIFIL will configure the IMS with a mandatory field to specify the ‘action taken at Mission HQ level’, as required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4        | UNIFIL should:  
(a) configure the Patrol Mapping and Reporting Tool (PMRT) to highlight patrols that have not been updated for over 30 minutes directly on the face of the patrol positions map, rather than as a separate layer of the Tool that requires selection;  
(b) follow up non-compliance with existing guidance on PMRT updates. | Important | a) YES  
b) YES | Chief GIS  
Chief J3 | Implemented | a) The PMRT system has been configured so that the patrols that have not updated their position after 30 min appear clearly.  
b) UNIFIL will implement a follow up mechanism during monthly TOC operational meetings with the J3 Branch regarding non-compliance of PMRT updates. |