Office of Internal Oversight Services

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

REPORT 2026/012

Audit of special investigations unit operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

UNMISS needed to strengthen the effectiveness of the special investigations unit operations by enhancing the case management system and training of the investigators

25 June 2026
Assignment No. AP2025-633-11

Audit of special investigations unit operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of Special Investigations Unit (SIU) operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of management of SIU operations. The audit covered the period from 1 January 2023 to 30 November 2025 and included a review of: (a) case reporting, evaluation and investigations approval; (b) case management; and (c) implementation of investigations findings.

UNMISS SIU was instrumental in conducting investigations into operational incidents and accidents involving United Nations personnel and property. However, the absence of an effective case management system and lack of systematic training of the investigators impeded the effectiveness of SIU operations.

OIOS made seven recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, UNMISS needed to:

- Periodically remind its personnel of their responsibility to timely report incidents and accidents to the SIU, and present damaged vehicles to Transport Section for physical inspections.

- Implement a mechanism to ensure all supporting documents for cases classified as "No Investigations Required" are uploaded in the case management system.

- Undertake a comprehensive review of the requirements definition and technical specifications of the case management system and accordingly undertake the needed systems enhancements.

- Implement periodic supervisory reviews of the case management system for validity of user access rights, deleted cases files and data completeness.

- Strengthen the specialist investigations training including refresher and continuous professional development trainings for all officers to maintain and strengthen investigative skills.

- Establish a quality management checklist for reviewing investigations case files that will assure the investigators collected all requisite evidence, and supporting documentation is uploaded in the case management system.

- Systematically follow-up with relevant Mission components to ensure action on investigation findings has been taken, and implement the functionality of the case management system to record investigations follow-up activities.

UNMISS accepted all recommendations and has initiated action to implement them. Actions required to close the recommendations are indicated in Annex I.

CONTENTS

Audit of special investigations unit operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of Special Investigations Unit (SIU) operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).

2. The SIU is an essential component of the UNMISS Security Section that is responsible for conducting investigations into operational incidents[1] and accidents[2] involving United Nations personnel and property. The investigations form part of a broader system designed to deter misconduct, ensure accountability and safeguard Mission interests against potential third-party claims.

3. In line with the United Nations Secretariat Administrative Instruction ST/AI/2017/1, OIOS retains ultimate authority to determine which cases warrants its direct action. When OIOS concludes that a matter is more appropriately addressed at the Mission level, it refers the case to the Head of Mission, who is responsible for conducting a preliminary assessment to determine whether an investigation is required. The Head of Mission may enlist the SIU or other staff members to conduct further enquiries or investigations as needed.

4. Between 1 January 2023 and 30 November 2025, SIU recorded 1,503 cases (1,122 incidents[3] and 381 accidents) summarized in figure 1. In addition, OIOS Investigations Division and the Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) referred 33 cases to SIU for investigations.

Figure 1: Summary of SIU cases (2023-2025)



5. The SIU operations are governed by the UNMISS SIU Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) promulgated in June 2021. The key activities of the SIU are (a) receiving accidents and incidents reports

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[1] An incident is an event that violates organizational policies and procedures, that result in actual or potential compromise to the safety and security of personnel and assets.
[2] An accident is an unintended or unexpected event that can cause harm or injury to personnel or damage to assets.
[3] Most cases or 754 (67 per cent) of incidents involved: 260 cases of missing/lost/stollen equipment, 287 cases of damaged vehicles and property, and 207 cases of lost identity cards and driving permits.

and making assessment if received reports warrant an investigation; (b) conducting investigations; and (c) preparing investigations reports for action by the Mission management.

6. The SIU is headed by a Chief of Unit at the FS-7 level who reports to the Principal Security Advisor. The Chief of Unit is supported by seven dedicated staff members (four international and three national) in Juba. Field offices do not have dedicated SIU staff, instead, security officers are tasked to investigate cases as needed. SIU has no dedicated operational budget.

7. Comments provided by UNMISS are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

8. The objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of management of SIU operations as a system of deterring misconduct, ensuring accountability and safeguarding Mission personnel interest against potential third-party claims.

9. This audit was included in the 2025 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the operational and financial risks associated with UNMISS SIU operations.

10. OIOS conducted this audit from January to April 2026. The audit covered the period from 1 January 2023 to 30 November 2025 and included review of: (a) case reporting, evaluation and investigations approval; (b) case management; and (c) implementation of investigations findings.

11. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews of key personnel involved in SIU operations; (b) analytical review of SIU database reports to assess data completeness and accuracy and effective utilization of SIU resources; and (c) random sample testing of investigations case files to ascertain if the investigations were conducted in compliance with the SIU SOPs.

12. To assess the reliability of SIU data, OIOS analyzed user access rights and reviewed data extracted from the in-house developed spreadsheet-based system that is used to log incidents and accidents for completeness and accuracy. In addition, OIOS traced a random sample of data to source documents. Issues such as missing data, duplicate records, and data entry errors were brought to SIU attention. SIU is yet to develop a corrective action plan. The issues identified in this report raise concern about the reliability of the system for effective reporting and informed decision-making regarding SIU operations.

13. The audit was conducted in accordance with the Global Internal Audit Standards.

III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Case reporting, evaluation and investigations approval

Need for timely reporting of cases and initiation of investigations

14. The timely reporting of incidents and accidents is essential for effective evaluation and subsequent investigation. The United Nations Property Manual requires UNMISS personnel entrusted with property to promptly report the facts and details surrounding the damage, loss or theft of property to facilitate an investigation process. Similarly, the Surface Transport Manual requires Mission personnel to submit accident reports to SIU immediately, or within 24 hours if immediate reporting is not possible.

15. To support the timely reporting of incidents and accidents, SIU has a front desk that is open during working hours, while an on-call duty investigator handles case registration during non-working hours including weekends and holidays. However, OIOS analysis of 872 out of 1,121 reported incidents[4] with recorded incident and reporting dates showed that 381 cases (44 per cent) were reported after the 24 hours deadline. In some cases, damages to Mission vehicles were only reported to SIU after the Transport Section insisted on the need for SIU report. OIOS analysis of the cases also revealed data entry errors for 25 cases that were recorded in the system with incorrect dates.

16. Further analysis showed that as of 13 February 2026, SIU had not received Damage Discrepancy Reports from Transport Section for 27 accidents reported between September 2025 and January 2026. This represented an average delay of 72 days attributed mainly to Mission personnel not presenting the damaged vehicles to Transport Section for physical damage inspection.

17. The above happened because UNMISS did not periodically remind Mission personnel of their responsibility to report incidents and accidents involving personnel and property to SIU timely and presenting damaged vehicles to Transport Section for physical inspection. As a result, there was unmitigated risk of time sensitive information, such as incident scene examination and administration of breathalyzer test required to effectively investigate possible staff misconduct, being missed.

(1) UNMISS should periodically remind mission personnel of their responsibility to timely report incidents and accidents involving mission personnel and property to the Special Investigations Unit, and present damaged vehicles to Transport Section for physical inspections.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 1 and stated that SIU, in coordination with the Transport Section and the office of Director of Mission Support, will prepare and issue periodic broadcasts reminding all mission personnel of their responsibility to timely report incidents and accidents involving mission personnel and property to the SIU and to present damaged vehicles to the Transport Section for physical inspection. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation.

Need to strengthen controls over case evaluation and investigations approval

18. UNMISS SOPs require the SIU front desk to forward all reported cases to the Chief SIU or Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) for evaluation and decision. The Chief SIU or FSCO determines whether a reported case warrants investigations or not. As a standard procedure, traffic accidents that do not involve third parties, injuries, fatalities or damages costing less than $500 are classified as “No Investigations Required” (NIR). Any decision to close a case as NIR by the Chief SIU must be recorded in the database to enable the unit to respond clearly, should there be follow-up queries.

19. OIOS review of 93 out of 520 randomly selected accidents reports classified as NIR in the SIU database showed that: (a) 38 reports (41 per cent) were not supported by the Damage Discrepancy Reports prepared by the Transport Unit to confirm the damage repairs were less than $500; (b) 15 reports (16 per cent) had no evidence of endorsement by either the Chief SIU or FSCO as required; and (c) 29 reports (31 per cent) from the field offices did not have photographic evidence of vehicle damages to facilitate independent assessment of the damages to Mission vehicle as is a standard practice of case registration in UNMISS.

20. The investigators did not include remarks explaining the rationale for proposing to Chief SIU or FSCO to classify cases as NIR under “remarks by the investigating officer” in incident reports or prepare

[4] The remaining 249 incidents did not have reporting date

reports that explain the NIR classification. Furthermore, the Chief SIU did not conduct periodic monitoring reviews of NIR cases especially those from Field Offices to ensure compliance with SIU SOPs.

21. As a result of non-compliance with the Mission's SOPs and lack of monitoring oversight in the accident report evaluations, there was an increased risk that cases of staff misconduct or negligence may not be investigated and accordingly sanctioned as was noted in some cases reviewed. For instance, OIOS noted a case in which a staff member damaged a vehicle and building because he did not put the hand brake on. In another case, a staff member claimed to have handed over a laptop to the warehouse but was not requested to provide a handover voucher. Both cases were classified as NIR and concerned personnel were accordingly not sanctioned.

(2) UNMISS should implement a mechanism to ensure all supporting documents for cases classified as "No Investigations Required" are uploaded in the case management system including the damage discrepancy reports, photographs of damaged assets, investigators' justification and evaluation and endorsement by the Chief of the Special Investigations Unit or Field Security Coordination Officer.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the Chief of the SIU will ensure that all "No Investigations Required" cases are reviewed before they are uploaded in the case management system. A mechanism will be established to verify that supporting documentation is consistently uploaded. Compliance will be monitored through quarterly spot checks and reporting to Security Senior Management. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation.

B. Case management

Need for case management system enhancements and complete capture of case details

22. UNMISS SIU in collaboration with Field Technology Section developed a spreadsheet-based case management system that is used to record key details of the reported incidents and accidents and to generate management information needed to evaluate how investigations are conducted. However, OIOS review of the SIU case management system revealed significant design weakness.

- The system allowed entry of duplicated case numbers, deletion of cases by all users, successful registration of cases with missing key fields.
- The accident module lacked vital fields such as accident and final investigations report dates.
- In addition, the system did not support basic investigations workflow capabilities such as an investigator being able to submit cases to the Chief SIU or FSCO for evaluation, review and approval or filing a conflict-of-interest declaration in line with established investigations protocols.

23. Moreover, SIU did not conduct regular system user access reviews to assure investigations confidentiality and data security. For instance, as of 12 December 2025, ten former investigators and security officers, some of whom separated as far back as 2022, still had active system user access rights; and investigators that were reassigned from one field office to another still retained access to their former field office cases module.

24. The system design weaknesses led to significant data gaps, control, confidentially and reports integrity issues. As a result, SIU could not effectively manage key aspects of SIU operations as the system could not reliably generate management reports on timeliness of cases reporting and investigations, case statuses, deleted cases, investigators' workload or productivity, etc. For instance, investigations cases

allocated to investigators in Juba varied widely from 1 to 24 per cent of total cases processed by the Unit. Table 1 shows some of the issues and data gaps noted in the case system.

Table1: Issues and data gaps in SIU case management system

No	Nature of the issue	Incident Module	Accident Module	Total
1	Duplicated case numbers	19	19	N/a
2	Missing investigator name for cases not classified as NIR	38	55	93
3	Missing case report date	133	24	157
4	Missing incident date	122	N/a	122
5	Missing final report date for concluded or NIR cases	543	N/a	543
6	Missing case details/accident classification	99	8	107
7	Missing/blank case status	170	14	184
8	Missing name or identity number of complainant or driver	142	31	173

25. SIU management stated they were aware of the weakness of the existing case management system, and that a new and modern case management system was requested in the previous budget submission. However, due to the organization-wide financial constraints the request was not approved. UNMISS committed to liaise with the SIU at United Nations Department of Safety and Security and with other SIUs across peacekeeping missions to explore the feasibility of procuring a case management database through a shared cost arrangement. This initiative will be pursued with the aim of completion by the end of 2026.

(3) UNMISS Special Investigations Unit with the support of Field Technology Section and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security at United Nations Headquarters should undertake a comprehensive review of the requirements definition and technical specifications of the case management system and accordingly undertake the needed systems enhancements.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 3 and stated that the Security Section previously requested Field Technology Section (FTS) to assist with the implementation of the case management system like the one that was used in MINUSMA. However, implementation was not possible due to missing coding components. To address this, the Security Section has prepared comprehensive requirements and technical specifications, which will be submitted to FTS for review. In coordination with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security at Headquarters, FTS will develop implementation strategies and undertake the necessary system enhancements to ensure the case management system meets mission requirements. Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation.

(4) UNMISS should implement periodic supervisory reviews of the case management system for validity of user access rights, deleted cases files and data completeness.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the Chief of the SIU will work with the FTS to strengthen controls over user access rights, deleted case files, and data completeness. These improvements will be implemented within three months, with quarterly supervisory reviews thereafter to ensure compliance. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation.

Need to plan and conduct formal investigations training

26. The UNDSS SIU handbook requires security officers employed as investigators or those who would be assigned investigations duties to undergo formal specialist investigations training and to have working knowledge of United Nations rules, regulations and instructions related to staff conduct.

27. Review of SIU training activity reports showed that SIU, in collaboration with the OIOS Investigations Division and UNMISS Conduct and Discipline Team, Board of Inquiry, Police component, and Transport Section, conducted three training sessions for 24 officers. The trainings covered key topics such as evidence collection, incident scene management, interviewing techniques, use of breathalyzer, case file management, use of a case management system, and report writing. However, OIOS noted that 14 officers who investigated 242 cases during the audit period did not attend all the three sessions and no continuous professional development trainings were conducted for the officers that attended the specialist trainings.

28. Interviews with Security Section Management also confirmed that the officers that were assigned investigations duties lacked requisite formal training and experience. Furthermore, interviews also revealed that only the Chief of Unit was recruited and has a designation of an investigator, while all other officers including those permanently assigned to investigations duties were recruited as security officers. Security Section Management stated that the Section will review the job descriptions for SIU positions and seek the reclassification of these posts from Security Officer to Investigations Assistant at the FS-5 level. This reclassification will be implemented progressively as current Security Officers assigned to SIU retire or as positions become vacant. This approach will help ensure that personnel with appropriate investigative backgrounds, skills, and experience are assigned to the SIU.

29. In addition, 6 of 19 serving officers at the time of the audit that had been assigned investigations duties during the period under review had not completed information security awareness and disability inclusion mandatory trainings. One investigator had also not completed the prevention of fraud and corruption and gender training.

30. The above training gaps occurred because SIU did not prioritize the planning and conduct of the required training activities. As a result, OIOS noted shortcomings in the quality of investigations as detailed later in this report.

(5) UNMISS should: (a) identify all security officers currently assigned or likely to be assigned investigations duties that have not yet completed formal specialist investigations training and accordingly plan and conduct the trainings as required; and (b) provide refresher and continuous professional development trainings for all officers to maintain and strengthen investigative skills.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the Security Section conducted an SIU training/workshop in the first week of June 2026. The training provided specialist instruction for officers who had not received SIU training, while also serving as a refresher and professional development opportunity for those already assigned to investigative functions. Going forward, SIU training will be conducted annually, with OIOS investigators in the Mission actively involved in supporting and delivering the sessions. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation.

Need to implement robust investigations case files quality reviews

31. The SIU SOPs provides guidance on how investigations techniques should be employed to obtain evidence needed to substantiate or debunk the allegations against personnel. These techniques include how to examine the incident/accident scene and preserve its integrity, taking notes of statements of the victims or complainants or witness, rough sketch of incident scene, taking photos of the accident/incident scene, administering breathalyzer, etc. The SOPs require the investigators to maintain a case file that includes all documents collected and utilized during an investigation.

32. OIOS detailed review of 60 out of 191 randomly selected case files concluded with the Chief SIU's sign off and analysis of 33 Conduct and Discipline Team referrals revealed systemic shortcomings in the quality of investigations. For instance, the following were noted:

- **Issuance of interim reports only:** In 16 cases, only interim reports that merely repeated the complainants' or drivers' account of events were issued. The responsible investigators stated these cases were later classified as NIR but could not provide evidence of evaluation and approval of the cases as required. OIOS reviews of the incident reports and technical reports prepared by Transport Section showed elements of staff negligence. These cases were, nonetheless, reported in the case management system as if they were investigated and concluded.
- **Key witnesses not interviewed:** Key suspects cited in theft cases by the complainants were not interviewed to have a logical conclusion of the matter. For instance, spare keys custodians for staff accommodations were not interviewed in two cases of thefts without evidence of forced entry.
- **Errors and inconsistencies:** There were inconsistencies in the dates between the incident and investigations reports. Also, an investigation report for a case was issued twice first on 24 April 2025 and again on 19 February 2026.
- **Delayed or non-administration of breathalyzer tests:** There were delays or non-administration of breathalyzer tests on the drivers in six accident cases that clearly required such a test as key evidence gathering technique. For instance, in one accident, the contracted security guard in a sworn statement stated that there were alcohol bottles in the vehicle that hit into the security boom gate and that the driver was visibly intoxicated, yet no alcohol breathalyzer test was administered.
- **Investigations ignored systemic weaknesses that resulted in asset loss:** For instance, a thief stole three computer screens but was caught when he tried to steal the second time. The investigations established poor perimeter security, inadequate lighting and non-deployment of night guards around the offices had enabled the thief to gain unhindered or easy access to the UNMISS camp twice, but these weaknesses were not brought to the attention of responsible officials for resolution. Also, contrary to Mission Directive 2016/003, staff members did not get approval before taking laptops outside the Mission area, yet the investigation reports on lost laptops outside the Mission area did not address the need to sensitize staff members on the requirements of the Mission Directive.
- **Delays in concluding investigations:** Contrary to SIU SOPs that require all complex cases involving conduct and discipline of personnel and substantial loss of assets to be concluded within 30 working days, SIU took an average of: (a) 122 days to conclude 29 Conduct and Discipline Team-referred cases, (b) 92 days to conclude incidents cases, and (c) 65 days to conclude accident cases.
- **Lack of supporting documents:** The supporting documents for 14 of 60 sampled case files were not uploaded in the case management system and the physical copies could not be availed for audit review.

33. The above shortcomings were due to inadequate training of investigators as mentioned above, lack of robust and well-documented quality review of investigations case files, staffing constraints and unavailability of key witnesses and investigators due to leave and rest and recuperation. As a result, investigations did not always establish all the relevant facts thereby limiting accountability for staff negligence and misconduct.

(6) UNMISS should establish a quality management checklist for reviewing investigations case files that will assure the investigators collected all requisite evidence, and supporting documentation is uploaded in the case management system before final investigation reports are signed off by the Chief of the Unit.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 6 and stated that the Chief of the SIU will prepare a standardized checklist by September 2026 for all SIU staff to use when conducting investigations and collecting evidence. This will ensure that requisite evidence is collected and supporting documentation is uploaded into the case management system before final reports are signed off. Supervisory reviews will confirm compliance. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation.

C. Implementation of investigations findings

Need to systematically follow-up on the implementation of investigations findings

34. UNMISS SIU SOPs require investigation reports to state clearly whether the allegations against Mission personnel are substantiated and to cite specific rules and regulations contravened. Based on investigations conclusions, relevant Mission components are responsible for applying administrative or financial sanctions.

35. OIOS review of a sample of 15 case files revealed that investigations findings cited the appropriate rules and regulations that were breached and the sanctions were promptly applied where necessary by the relevant Mission components. For instance, 10 cases related to vehicle accidents for which the investigations established that Mission personnel committed various traffic violations under the Surface Transport Manual, and the sanctions applied included written warning, suspension of driving permits for varying periods of time, disqualification from holding the Mission driving permit, repatriation and financial assessments. The other five cases related to malicious damage to property, theft of inventory and money, and loss of Mission assets for which appropriate financial assessments and recoveries were applied.

36. While OIOS noted evidence of sanctioning against substantiated investigation results, there was no assurance that it was systematic and complete, due to the data quality issues in the case management system. Furthermore, although the SIU case management system had a functionality to record investigations follow-up activities (i.e. conclusions, recommendations and actions taken by responsible officials), it was not used to document the required information and no follow-ups were conducted. SIU Management explained that tracking implementation of its own findings could create a conflict of interest, an explanation which OIOS does not endorse. SIU further stated that the Unit relied on the Conduct and Discipline Team and OIOS to follow-up on the implementation of its findings for their respective referred cases.

37. Tracking of the status of actions in respect of investigations recommendations/findings is a normative investigation step that the Mission needed to ensure is appropriately and systematically done. The absence of a system to follow-up on SIU investigations findings precluded the Mission from knowing whether all investigations findings were acted on. This gap creates a risk that SIU operations as a system aimed at deterring misconduct, ensuring accountability and safeguarding of Mission assets may not be effective.

(7) UNMISS should systematically follow up with relevant Mission components to ensure action on all investigation findings has been taken and implement the functionality of the case management system to record investigations follow-up activities.

UNMISS accepted recommendation 7 and *stated that this recommendation will be implemented when the new case management system is created. The system will include functionality for relevant Mission components to record their inputs on actions taken in response to investigation findings. These follow-up entries will be incorporated into the case management reports to ensure systematic tracking and accountability.* Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of evidence of implementation.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

38. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the Management and staff of UNMISS for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

ANNEX I

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of special investigations unit operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical[5]/ Important[6]	C/ O[7]	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date[8]
1	UNMISS should periodically remind mission personnel of their responsibility to timely report incidents and accidents involving mission personnel and property to the Special Investigations Unit, and present damaged vehicles to Transport Section for physical inspections.	Important	O	Receipt of further evidence that mission personnel are periodically reminded of their responsibilities to timely report incidents and accidents to Special Investigations Unit and present damaged vehicles to Transport Section	31 December 2026*
2	UNMISS should implement a mechanism to ensure all supporting documents for cases classified as "No Investigations Required" are uploaded in the case management system including the damage discrepancy reports, photographs of damaged assets, investigators' justification and evaluation and endorsement by the Chief of the Special Investigations Unit or Field Security Coordination Officer.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of implementation of controls that assure that cases classified as "No Investigations Required" are appropriately supported and approved.	31 March 2027*
3	UNMISS Special Investigations Unit with the support of Field Technology Section and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security at United Nations Headquarters should undertake a comprehensive review of the requirements definition and technical specifications of the case management system and accordingly undertake the needed systems enhancements.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of case management system enhancement.	1 January 2027
4	UNMISS should implement periodic supervisory reviews of the case management system for validity of user access rights, deleted cases files and data completeness.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of periodic review of case management system for validity of user access rights, deleted case files and data completeness.	31 January 2027*
5	UNMISS should: (a) identify all security officers currently assigned or likely to be assigned investigations duties that have not yet completed formal specialist investigations training and accordingly plan and conduct the trainings as required, and (b) provide refresher and continuous	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of training of security officers assigned or likely to be assigned investigations duties.	31 July 2026*

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of special investigations unit operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical[5]/ Important[6]	C/ O[7]	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date[8]
	professional development trainings for all officers to maintain and strengthen investigative skills.				
6	UNMISS should establish a quality management checklist for reviewing investigations case files that will assure the investigators collected all requisite evidence, and supporting documentation is uploaded in the case management system before final investigation reports are signed off by the Chief of the Unit.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of establishment and use of investigations checklist.	30 September 2026
7	UNMISS should systematically follow up with relevant Mission components to ensure action on all investigation findings has been taken and implement the functionality of the case management system to record investigations follow-up activities.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of systematic follow-up of implementation of investigations findings.	31 January 2027

[5] Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.
[6] Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.
[7] Please note the value C denotes closed recommendations whereas O refers to open recommendations.
[8] Date provided by UNMISS in response to recommendations (except * provided by OIOS).

APPENDIX I

Management Response

UNITED NATIONS | NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Mission in South Sudan | Mission des Nations Unies au Soudan du Sud

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

(UNMISS)

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Byung-Kun Min
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

DATE: 22 June 2026

FROM: Ms. Anita Kiki Gbeho,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and
Head of Mission, UNMISS

SUBJECT: **Management Response to the Draft OIOS Report on an Audit of Special Investigations Unit Operations in UNMISS**

1. UNMISS acknowledges receipt of the draft OIOS report on the audit of Special Investigations Unit operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Assignment No. AP2025-633-11.

2. The Mission appreciates the opportunity to provide its formal management response and acknowledges the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of Special Investigations Unit operations, including through improved case management, enhanced documentation, strengthened supervisory review mechanisms, and continued training and professional development for personnel assigned to investigations functions.

3. UNMISS accepts all seven recommendations and has initiated actions to address the issues identified by OIOS. Implementation will be led primarily by the Chief of the Special Investigations Unit, with coordinated support from the Security Section, Transport Section, Field Technology Section, the Office of the Director of Mission Support and, where applicable, UNDSS Headquarters.

4. The Mission has initiated, or will take forward in accordance with the timelines set out in Appendix I, the recommended actions, including periodic reminders to personnel on timely reporting of incidents and accidents; strengthened documentation and review of cases classified as "No Investigation Required"; enhanced case management system requirements and controls; periodic supervisory reviews of user access, deleted case files and data completeness; strengthened specialist investigation training; establishment of a quality management checklist for case files; and systematic follow-up with relevant Mission components on actions taken in response to investigation findings.

5. Please find attached the completed Appendix I, setting out UNMISS' detailed comments, responsible individuals and implementation timelines, for your consideration.

6. UNMISS appreciates the constructive engagement of OIOS throughout the audit process and remains committed to implementing the agreed actions in a timely and coordinated manner.

Thank you.

Attachment:

1. Appendix I – Management Response: Audit of Special Investigations Unit Operations in UNMISS

CC:
Mr. Emmanuel Monjimbo, UNMISS
Mr. Erich Karnberger, UNMISS
Mr. William Blanchard, UNDSS
Ms. Florence Poussin, UNDSS
Mr. Philip Ackatia-Armah, UNDSS
Mr. Aggrey Kedogo, UNMISS
Ms. Tina Pihl, UNMISS
Mr. Joel Beasca, UNMISS
Ms. Sintija Steinite, UNMISS

APPENDIX I

Management Response

Audit of special investigations unit operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical[1]/ Important[2]	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	UNMISS should periodically remind mission personnel of their responsibility to timely: (a) report incidents and accidents involving mission personnel and property to the Special Investigations Unit, and (b) present damaged vehicles to Transport Section for physical inspections.	Important	Yes	Chief SIU	Implemented, first Broadcast advertised and will be repeated periodically	This recommendation will be implemented within two months. SIU in coordination with the Transport Section and the DMS Office, will prepare and issue periodic broadcasts reminding all mission personnel of their responsibility to: • Timely report incidents and accidents involving mission personnel and property to the Special Investigations Unit. • Present damaged vehicles to the Transport Section for physical inspection.
2	UNMISS Special Investigations Unit should implement a mechanism to ensure all supporting documents for cases classified as "No Investigations Required" are uploaded in the case management system including the damage discrepancy reports, photographs of damaged assets, investigators' justification and evaluation and endorsement by the Chief of the Special Investigations Unit or Field Security Coordination Officer.	Important	Yes	Chief SIU	Ongoing work in Progress	The Chief of the Special Investigations Unit will ensure that all "No Investigation Required" cases are reviewed prior to upload in the case management system. A mechanism will be established to verify that supporting documentation—including damage discrepancy reports, photographs, investigators' justification and evaluation, and endorsements—is consistently uploaded. Compliance will be monitored through quarterly spot

[1] Critical recommendations address those risk issues that require immediate management attention. Failure to take action could have a critical or significant adverse impact on the Organization.
[2] Important recommendations address those risk issues that require timely management attention. Failure to take action could have a high or moderate adverse impact on the Organization.

Management Response

Audit of special investigations unit operations in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical[1]/ Important[2]	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
						checks and reporting to senior management.
3	UNMISS Special Investigations Unit with the support of Field Technology Section and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security at United Nations Headquarters should undertake a comprehensive review of the requirements definition and technical specifications of the case management system and accordingly undertake the needed systems enhancements.	Important	Yes	Chief SIU in cooperation with FTS	Initial meetings with FTS held. The existing Database will be upgrade and by November 26 a two-month test period will start. System should be fully functional by 1 January 2027	The Security Section previously requested the implementation of the case management system used by MINUSMA (Mali) in 2024-2025 from the Field Technology Section (FTS). However, implementation was not possible due to missing coding components. To address this, the Security Section has prepared comprehensive requirements and technical specifications, which will be submitted to FTS for review. In coordination with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) at Headquarters, FTS will develop implementation strategies and undertake the necessary system enhancements to ensure the case management system meets mission requirements. Discussion with FTS commenced via E-Mail on 20 May 2026
4	UNMISS, through the Special Investigations Unit should implement periodic supervisory reviews of the case management system for validity of user access rights, deleted cases files and data completeness.	Important	Yes	Chief SIU in cooperation with FTS	This is part of the Database update, see comments at Par. 3	The Chief of the Special Investigations Unit will work with the Field Technology Section to strengthen controls over user access rights, deleted case files, and data completeness. These improvements will be implemented within three months, with quarterly supervisory reviews thereafter to ensure compliance.

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5	UNMISS should: (a) identify all security officers currently assigned or likely to be assigned investigations duties that have not yet completed formal specialist investigations training and accordingly plan and conduct the trainings as required, and (b) provide refresher and continuous professional development trainings for all officers to maintain and strengthen investigative skills.	Important	Yes	Security Section and Chief SIU	A workshop for new SIU Focal points was delivered in June 2026. This will be held annually. Review of Job description is ongoing and will be implemented with new recruitments	The Security Section has scheduled a Special Investigations Unit (SIU) training/workshop for the first week of June 2026. The training will provide specialist instruction for officers who have not yet received SIU training, while also serving as a refresher and professional development opportunity for those already assigned to investigative functions. Going forward, SIU training will be conducted annually, with OIOS investigators in the Mission actively involved in supporting and delivering the sessions. In addition, the Security Section will review the job descriptions for SIU positions and seek the reclassification of these posts from Security Officer to Investigations Assistant at the FS-5 level. This reclassification will be implemented progressively as current SIU Security Officers retire or as positions become vacant. This approach will help ensure that personnel with appropriate investigative backgrounds, skills, and experience are assigned to the SIU.
6	UNMISS should establish a quality management checklist for reviewing investigations case files that will assure the investigators collected all requisite	Important	Yes	Chief SIU	September 2026	The Chief of the Special Investigations Unit will prepare a standardized checklist by September 2026 for all SIU staff to use when

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	evidence, and supporting documentation is uploaded in the case management system before final investigation reports are signed off by the Chief of the Unit.					conducting investigations and collecting evidence. This will ensure that requisite evidence is collected and supporting documentation is uploaded into the case management system before final reports are signed off. Supervisory reviews will confirm compliance.
7	UNMISS should systematically follow up with relevant Mission components to ensure action on all investigation findings has been taken and implement the functionality of the case management system to record investigations follow-up activities.	Important	Yes	Chief SIU	This will be operational with the updated Database by January 2027	This recommendation will be implemented once the new case management application is created. The system will include functionality for relevant Mission components to record their inputs on actions taken in response to investigation findings. These follow-up entries will be incorporated into the case management reports to ensure systematic tracking and accountability.