

Evaluation of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations

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INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

Function *“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organization. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organization;”* ([General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B](#)).

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Summary

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) evaluated the relevance, effectiveness, coherence and efficiency of United Nations Police (UNPOL) in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

UNPOL patrols were generally aligned with the security contexts and community needs across the three missions. Despite some localized gaps, patrols were largely deployed to areas with higher concentrations of incidents and were considered more responsive when they incorporated community engagement and Host State participation. Community sensitization, support to criminal investigations and threat management activities were also generally aligned with local priorities and evolving risks, although the depth and implementation of these activities varied across missions.

UNPOL contributed to improved community protection and trust through strengthened information flows and increased reporting of incidents, particularly where it maintained an active and engaged presence with communities. UNPOL modalities addressed the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly women and children, although gaps remained in integration of disability and environmental considerations. UNPOL effectiveness was supported by strong guidance and operational frameworks, with staffing, training, handover processes and other operational and institutional constraints limiting overall effectiveness.

UNPOL had strong coordination with Host State police and other mission components. However, limitations in Host State police capacity and political and operational restrictions affected the implementation of some joint activities. Additionally, UNPOL efficiency was affected by fragmented data and reporting systems, inflexibility in the use of Formed Police Units (FPU) and variation in resource levels, deployment models and operational outputs across missions.

OIOS makes five important recommendations to the three missions and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) to:

- i. strengthen patrolling strategies to maximize their contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives (all missions);
- ii. improve procedures for selection of UNPOL liaison officers and transition of personnel (all missions in coordination with DPO);
- iii. establish a community of practice to facilitate knowledge-sharing across missions (DPO);
- iv. review policies governing the use of FPU for greater flexibility and efficiency (DPO); and
- v. standardize data and reporting frameworks (DPO in coordination with all missions).

I. Introduction and objective

1. The objective of this Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) evaluation was to determine, as systematically and objectively as possible, the relevance, effectiveness, coherence and efficiency of United Nations Police (UNPOL) in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The evaluation was conducted in conformity with the norms and standards for evaluation in the United Nations System.¹

2. Management responses from the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS on the draft report are included in Annex I. OIOS wishes to acknowledge and thank the evaluation focal points who assisted with the conduct of the evaluation.

II. Background

Objectives and mandates

3. Since its first deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1960, UNPOL has been a central component of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The overarching objective of UNPOL is to support Host States to establish effective, efficient, representative and accountable police services that serve and protect the population.² The specific UNPOL mandates vary by peacekeeping mission but largely focus on two key areas: (a) supporting the protection of civilians,; and (b) supporting the reform, restructuring and long-term capacity development of Host State police services.

Governance, structure and resources

4. The Police Division (PD) in the DPO Office of Mine Action and Police (OMAP) provides overall strategic direction and guidance on all policing issues within DPO and to missions. In the missions, UNPOL components are headed by a Police Commissioner or Senior Police Adviser reporting to the heads of mission. In missions, UNPOL personnel are deployed in the following three categories:



Individual Police Officers (IPOs): officers serving in operational, advisory and mentoring roles, including with Host State police to build institutional capacity, uphold international human rights standards and support rule-of-law reforms.



Specialized Police Teams (SPTs): cohesive teams of IPOs that provide advanced expertise in areas such as investigations, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), forensics, organized crime and border security.



Formed Police Units (FPUs): cohesive formed units comprised of 140-160 officers that provide public order management, protection for United Nations staff and facilities and support for police operations.

5. As of February 2026, UNPOL deployed 4,392 seconded police officers from 71 Police-contributing Countries (PCCs) across six peacekeeping missions. The three large missions (MINUSCA,

¹ United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). Norms and Standards for Evaluation, 2016.

² S/2018/1183, para 48.

MONUSCO and UNMISS) together accounted for 97% of all UNPOL personnel in the field³ and 97% of the UNPOL budget. Most police were deployed as FPU, accounting for 73% of UNPOL personnel in the three missions as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: UNPOL personnel in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS by category as of February 2026


Mission	IPOs	FPU	Total
MINUSCA	414	1,844	2,258
MONUSCO	139	688	827
UNMISS	541	640	1,181
Total	1,094	3,172	4,266

Source: UN Peacekeeping public data

III. Scope and Methodology

6. The evaluation focused on four UNPOL modalities in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS with a protection and stabilization focus as presented in Figure 1. The UNPOL modality of capacity building to support the reform, restructuring and long-term development of Host State police was out of the scope of this evaluation. However, activities directly linked to support for criminal investigations and joint operations with the Host State police (e.g. joint patrols, community engagement and threat management) were included.

Figure 1: Key UNPOL modalities focusing on protection and stabilization



7. The evaluation covered the period from July 2021 to June 2025 and used a mixed-methods approach, incorporating the quantitative and qualitative data sources listed in Table 2.

³ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

Table 2: Evaluation data sources

	138 semi-structured interviews with Police Division, mission staff and stakeholders from the Host State police, United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and community organizations. A quarter of interviewees were women.
	Online survey administered in English and French to 1,140 IPOs; 741 responses were received (65% response rate), of which 29% were women.
	10 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with 93 representatives from local population (35% women), including internally displaced persons (IDPs), of which 27% were women.
	Secondary data from Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS), Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE), Unite Aware, Secretary-General's reports, UNPOL activity and daily situation reports.
	Document review of internal and external documents including Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General's reports, mission plans, UNPOL Concept of Operations, budget documents, workplans, bi-annual reports, external research and perception surveys.
	Case studies of UNPOL responses to three selected incidents in Damara (MINUSCA, 2025), Kinshasa (MONUSCO, 2024) and Malakal (UNMISS, 2025).
	Direct observations of Mission Leadership Team (MLT) meetings, patrols in MONUSCO (Kinshasa and Beni), MINUSCA (Bangui, Bria and Bangassou) and UNMISS (Juba and Malakal). Some of these patrols included observation of community engagement and visits to IDP camps.


IV. Evaluation Results

- A. UNPOL patrols were generally well aligned to the security context and community needs, although there were some gaps

UNPOL patrols were generally aligned with the security context and community needs

8. Across all three missions, UNPOL patrol planning was informed by available data and analysis, including crime statistics, incident reporting and local contextual information. Representatives of the Host State police, UNPOL personnel and other mission components interviewed broadly agreed that patrols were appropriately aligned with security contexts and community needs. A majority of survey respondents agreed, as shown in Figure 2. The perceived levels of alignment were consistently high, particularly in MINUSCA.

Figure 2: Significant majority of survey respondents agreed with statements regarding the alignment of patrols




Source: OIOS survey of IPOs

9. Geospatial analysis further confirmed a general alignment between the presence of UNPOL patrols and areas with higher concentrations of reported criminal incidents across all three missions. These deployment patterns suggested appropriate prioritization of high-risk locations.

10. In CAR, MINUSCA UNPOL patrols were generally concentrated in areas with higher reported incident levels although some regions received disproportionately higher patrol coverage compared to

the level of incidents. Greater Bangui accounted for approximately 14% of incidents and 26% of MINUSCA patrol coverage, as outlined in Figure 3. Likewise, Bouar accounted for 6% of total crime incidents and 16% of total patrol presence.


Figure 3: MINUSCA UNPOL patrols generally aligned well with areas of highest criminal incidents in CAR



Source: Unite Aware, 2021 - 2025

11. In DRC, the Eastern region accounted for approximately 70% of reported criminal incidents and 80% of MONUSCO UNPOL patrols in territories that collectively represented about 49% of total incidents, as shown in Figure 4. At a more localized level, Bunia recorded both the highest share of incidents (approximately 10%) and the highest patrol presence (around 24%).


Figure 4: MONUSCO UNPOL patrols generally aligned well with areas of highest criminal incidents in DRC



Source: MONUSCO SAGE and activity tracking spreadsheets

12. In South Sudan, patrols broadly aligned with incident patterns across key locations, as shown in Figure 4. Juba County recorded the highest share of incidents (11%) and a similarly high proportion of UNMISS UNPOL patrol coverage (18%), while other high-incident locations such as Malakal, which hosted the last remaining Protection of Civilians site, also had sustained patrol presence. Similarly, Rubkona accounted for 11% of total crime incidents and 16% of total patrol presence.

Figure 5: UNMISS UNPOL patrols generally aligned well with areas of criminal incidents in South Sudan



Source: UNMISS SAGE

There were localized gaps in coverage and limitations in the timing of patrols

13. Despite the overall patrol alignment discussed above, all three missions had some localized gaps in coverage. Some higher-incident locations received comparatively lower patrol coverage and vice versa. Examples of these gaps included:

- **MINUSCA:** In Bangui, Arrondissement 5 accounted for a higher proportion of incidents (40%) but lower patrols (18%), whereas Arrondissement 1 experienced the opposite (8% of incidents versus 27% of patrol coverage).
- **MONUSCO:** Kinshasa accounted for only 1% of reported incidents but 20% of patrols. Similar discrepancies were identified within the city where some higher-incident zones received comparatively lower patrol presence.
- **UNMISS:** Within Juba County, Juba Town accounted for 17% of incidents but 10% of patrol coverage. In contrast, Northern Bari accounted for 14% of incidents and 21% of patrols.

14. These discrepancies were often linked to operational constraints and planning considerations, including threat assessments, protection priorities, access limitations, security conditions, logistical challenges such as shortages of vehicles or fuel, and in some locations, Host State restrictions or sensitivities. UNPOL patrols were often concentrated in urban centres, with more limited presence in peripheral or high-risk locations at the times they were most needed. UNPOL leadership also noted that its patrols were sometimes planned to avoid areas where Force was already patrolling, which,

while reducing duplication, may also have translated to reduced policing-oriented engagement in some areas.

15. A more pronounced area of misalignment related to the timing of patrols. Across missions, a significant proportion of incidents occurred during nighttime hours (between 18:00 and 06:00), while most patrols were conducted during the day, as shown in Table 3. For example, in MINUSCA, approximately 52% of incidents occurred at night while only 9% of UNPOL patrols were conducted at night. Limited night patrol coverage was often driven by operational constraints, including Host State restrictions, force protection requirements, security considerations, inadequate road infrastructure and resource limitations.

Table 3: Most UNPOL patrols occurred during daytime despite higher crime incidents at night


Mission	Night Incidents (%)	Night Patrols (%)	Day Incidents (%)	Day Patrols (%)
MINUSCA	52	9	48	91
MONUSCO (Beni)	63	12	37	88
UNMISS	45	10	55	90

Source: MINUSCA Unite Aware (Jan 2021– Dec 2025; MONUSCO SAGE sample data for Beni (Aug 2023 – Feb 2024); and UNMISS SAGE (Jan 2021– Dec 2025).

Patrols incorporating community engagement and Host State participation were perceived as more responsive, though their use varied considerably across missions

16. Differences in the type and composition of patrols also affected their perceived alignment with community needs. Members of the local community who participated in focus groups reported that patrols incorporating community engagement and those conducted jointly with Host State police were more responsive to their needs since they supported trust building, better information exchange and informed response plans. Yet, there was variation across missions in the extent to which patrols incorporated community engagement and were conducted jointly with Host State police. MINUSCA had a higher rate of patrols involving community engagement while there was a decline in MONUSCO and mixed trends in UNMISS, as shown in Figure 6.


Figure 6: Community engagement during patrols was highest in MINUSCA and varied across other missions



Source: Mission Data

17. The use of joint patrols with Host State police varied considerably and was nearly absent in UNMISS and declining in the other two missions, as shown in Figure 7. While UNMISS primarily implemented coordinated patrols rather than joint patrols with Host State police, as with night patrols, these trends across the missions were influenced by UNPOL planning decisions and Host State police constraints, including limited personnel, equipment, logistical support and willingness to engage in joint operations and broader operational and political considerations in some contexts.

Figure 7: Joint patrols with Host State police declined in MINUSCA and MONUSCO and remained near zero in UNMISS



Source: Mission Data


18. High-visibility UNPOL patrols, which were intended to show presence with limited or no community interaction, were often perceived by community members as having lower alignment with local needs and addressing underlying security concerns. OIOS observed high-visibility patrols, which, in some cases, experienced limited movement due to traffic congestion in densely populated urban areas, likely constraining their intended visibility and deterrence effect. Furthermore, community members perceived such patrols as performative when the patrol purpose was not clearly understood by them.

B. UNPOL community sensitization, support to criminal investigations and threat management were also generally well aligned with local needs

Community sensitization activities were generally perceived as responsive to local needs

19. Community sensitization activities addressed a range of social and security concerns, including SGBV, drug abuse, suicide and trauma. SPTs played a central role in delivering these activities, reflecting adaptation to local contexts. This included SGBV-focused SPTs across all missions, a community policing SPT in MINUSCA and an anti-cattle raiding SPT in UNMISS. Through community sensitization activities, UNPOL engaged women and at-risk youth, and complemented its outreach through donations of food and non-food items and community events. Survey respondents agreed that community sensitization activities were responsive and generally aligned with local needs, as shown in Figure 8. While community members largely viewed these activities positively, there was a consensus among all interviewee groups that community expectations at times extended beyond UNPOL mandate or capacity.

Figure 8: Survey respondents reported high relevance of community sensitization, with variation across missions



Source: OIOS survey of IPOs


Support to criminal investigations were aligned with Host State police needs, though the depth of engagement varied across missions

20. Supporting criminal investigations was primarily delivered through mentoring, monitoring and advising (MMA) of Host State police via co-locations. This support typically focused on strengthening

technical capacities such as forensics, crime scene management and investigative techniques. Survey respondents generally reported that this support was aligned with Host State police needs, as shown in Figure 9. Host State police interviewed across the three missions largely agreed that UNPOL support regarding criminal investigations was helpful and aligned with their needs.

21. While aligned with Host State police priorities more generally, the scale and consistency of support differed across missions. In MINUSCA, UNPOL provided more direct operational support, including through a memorandum of understanding enabling intervention in specific cases and the use of a crime laboratory and database in Bangui. In MONUSCO and UNMISS, engagement was more limited, with co-location focused on narrower functions, such as the collection of crime statistics, rather than on case-based mentoring.

Figure 9: Survey respondents reported high alignment between support to criminal investigations with the needs of the Host State police



Source: OIOS survey of IPOs

Threat management activities also aligned with local security needs


22. Lastly, threat management activities were also generally aligned with emerging risks. Across missions, UNPOL worked closely with other mission components (e.g. Civil Affairs, Force), Host State police and community watch groups to strengthen situational awareness, support early warning and respond to incidents within its mandate, including emergencies such as fires and other security-related events. Host State police and other mission components staff interviewed highlighted UNPOL contributions to threat management through information sharing on potential threats, supporting coordinated responses to crises. In general, UNPOL adapted its activities in anticipation of potential threats, such as through increased patrols and community sensitization prior to, during and after electoral periods. In MINUSCA, UNPOL strengthened threat management by deploying a camera surveillance system in Bangui, which assisted Host State police in monitoring and responding to criminal activity.

C. UNPOL contributed to improved community protection and trust

When UNPOL directly engaged the community, it had the most success in ensuring community safety and protection

23. Both community and UNPOL staff interviewed noted that all four UNPOL modalities contributed to community protection. Specifically, they mentioned that patrols, community sensitization and threat management modalities strengthened dialogue and early warning and were associated with improved outcomes, including increased reporting of crimes such as SGBV. Support to criminal investigations, delivered mainly through MMA via co-locations, was largely perceived by Host State police as effective, particularly in strengthening their capacity to conduct investigations and collect evidence. Survey respondents also broadly agreed with these perceptions, with high ratings across modalities, particularly in MINUSCA, as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Survey respondents perceived UNPOL modalities as generally effective in improving safety, with some variance across missions⁴



Source: OIOS Survey of IPOs

24. A key determinant of the UNPOL contribution to community protection was the level of community engagement in UNPOL modalities. During focus groups, communities widely perceived UNPOL presence as a stabilizing factor and reported feeling safer when UNPOL remained accessible, while drawdowns or reduced engagement were associated with increased feelings of insecurity. Where patrols involved limited engagement, many community members perceived UNPOL as distant and noted they felt UNPOL was “just driving around,” with having little impact on their sense of safety. During patrols, OIOS observed that interactive engagement facilitated information exchange and improved situational awareness even though engagement did not consistently translate to positive outcomes in all contexts. In UNMISS, both IPOs and community members noted that repeated community consultations without visible follow-up created fatigue and discouraged information-sharing in some locations. For example, during a patrol in Unity State, one IPO mentioned that chiefs and elders hesitated to speak openly, noting that repeated discussions over the years had not led to tangible change. In other instances, UNPOL staff reported that local authorities disrupted engagement by withholding information or interrupting activities, thus constraining open dialogue and reducing community willingness to speak freely.


UNPOL presence and engagement were associated with increased incident reporting, suggesting a high-level of community trust

25. Changes in UNPOL presence and engagement were associated with shifts in incident reporting patterns. For example, in Goma (MONUSCO), reported incidents declined significantly following the UNPOL drawdown in January 2025, as shown in Figure 11, which both internal and external interviewees attributed to reduced reporting capacity and weakened community trust. As UNPOL withdrew, both formal and informal reporting channels diminished, reducing the visibility of incidents. Conversely, in Yambio and Rumbek (South Sudan), increased UNPOL presence and targeted engagement on SGBV from mid-2024 were associated with a marked rise in reported cases, as shown in Figure 12. Taken together, these examples suggested that UNPOL presence and engagement influenced the reporting and visibility of incidents, which in turn informed protection responses or the lack thereof. These examples also illustrated that some effects of UNPOL activities, including strengthened community confidence and reporting practices, may not be fully reflected through

⁴ Patrols (MINUSCA n=238, MONUSCO n=80, UNMISS n=330); Community engagement (MINUSCA n=245, MONUSCO n=81, UNMISS n=249); Support for criminal investigations (MINUSCA n=82, MONUSCO n=25, UNMISS n=66); Threat management (MINUSCA n=98, MONUSCO n=32, UNMISS n=82).


incident statistics alone. While the Goma case reflected a sudden and context-specific drawdown, these patterns also highlighted risks to the sustainability of reporting mechanisms in the context of mission transition, particularly where systems and capacity remained closely tied to UNPOL presence.

Figure 11: Reporting of monthly incidents declined sharply following UNPOL drawdown (Goma)



Source: SAGE

Figure 12: Monthly SGBV incidents reporting trended higher in Rumbek and Yambio (South Sudan) following UNPOL presence and targeted engagement



Source: SAGE

UNPOL contributed to increased public trust in the missions

26. UNPOL strengthened public trust through its visible protection role, community engagement and responsiveness to community needs. Stakeholders interviewed emphasized that UNPOL presence was a stabilizing factor and contributed to a positive perception of the United Nations. Mission-level examples of trust-building included:

- **MINUSCA:** Rapid deployment following critical incidents such as an explosion at a school in Boganda in 2025 reinforced perceptions of UNPOL reliability and responsiveness.
- **MONUSCO:** Visible protection and engagement by UNPOL during high-profile incidents such as the M23 attacks in Goma in January 2025 contributed to increased public confidence in the mission.
- **UNMISS:** Increased reporting of crimes using UNPOL-supported emergency hotlines signaled growing public confidence in UNPOL and police procedures.

27. Across the three missions, both community respondents in focus groups and UNPOL staff interviewed reported that women UNPOL officers in particular contributed to building public trust by engaging with women's groups and community networks and fostering dialogue where security actors were distrusted. Their presence enabled more inclusive and accessible engagement, particularly on SGBV issues. Many IPOs interviewed also noted that communities generally welcomed these outreach efforts and that women officers helped build trust through visible, community-focused actions, including support to conflict-affected populations such as survivors of violence, women with disabilities, and refugee women.

All UNPOL modalities addressed vulnerable groups although integration of disability, environmental and UN 2.0 considerations was limited

28. Across the three missions, UNPOL demonstrated a focus on addressing the needs of women and children, including through community sensitization activities focused on gender and child protection. SPTs and gender officers played a central role in delivering these activities. Host State police also aligned with UNPOL approaches and, in some cases, established specialized SGBV units that worked jointly with UNPOL and other partners, strengthening coordination and response to SGBV cases. For example, UNPOL created women's networks in all the three missions, which served as important platforms for advocacy, support and improved understanding of protection concerns at local levels, including within IDP camps. In MONUSCO, SPTs collaborated with churches and communities to raise awareness on SGBV and strengthen engagement with authorities, contributing to the establishment of dedicated SGBV offices within the Congolese National Police. In UNMISS, initiatives such as Gender, Children and Vulnerable Persons Protection targeted issues including early marriage, rape prevention, and rights awareness through engagement in IDP camps and communities.

29. However, across the three missions, there was limited evidence of UNPOL activities explicitly targeting persons with disabilities. Integration of climate and environmental risks into UNPOL activities also remained limited except in UNMISS where UNPOL work plan included outreach with local communities on climate-related issues. Additionally, in terms of UN 2.0 priorities⁵, while UNPOL demonstrated relative strength in data and digital capabilities, there was limited evidence of advancement in innovation, strategic foresight, and behavioural science.

D. UNPOL effectiveness was strengthened by strong operational frameworks and early warning, but several operational and institutional factors limited its overall impact

Strong guidance and operational frameworks supported UNPOL effectiveness

30. UNPOL effectiveness discussed above was supported by clear guidance, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and operational frameworks, which enabled consistent operations and engagement with other mission components and Host State police across the three missions. Across the three missions, approximately 90% of survey respondents considered guidance and tools to be adequate. UNPOL interviewees further reported that these tools directly supported implementation by informing the development of concepts of operations, workplans, and training priorities, while also helping officers apply concepts like community-oriented policing and adapt activities to evolving operational contexts.

31. Support from the DPO Police Division and mission leadership also served as important enablers of effective UNPOL deployment. Police Division staff interviewed reported that missions regularly drew on guidance to develop key operational documents and that weekly coordination meetings with police components supported joint problem-solving and adaptation to emerging challenges. In general, IPOs interviewed across the three missions described PD support as accessible and useful, highlighting regular communication, strategic guidance and technical expertise. Across the three missions, most survey respondents (approximately 70%) similarly considered Police Division support to be adequate.

⁵ UN 2.0 refers to the Secretary-General's vision for a modern, future-ready United Nations system, built on enhanced capabilities in data, digital, innovation, strategic foresight and behavioural science.

Material and operational support facilitated Host State police participation in joint patrols and operational activities, though oversight concerns were identified in some missions

32. UNPOL mandates to support Host State police rather than directly intervene meant that response effectiveness often depended on Host State police capacity, which remained limited across the three missions. For example, although UNPOL helped establish toll-free numbers in MONUSCO and UNMISS to report incidents, community members noted that Host State police frequently lacked the means to respond, limiting the overall effectiveness of UNPOL-supported interventions.

33. To address this, across the three missions, UNPOL provided material and infrastructure to Host State police to strengthen capacity and facilitate their participation in joint patrols, co-location and other operational activities. This assistance was more extensive in MINUSCA and MONUSCO, where UNPOL also provided fuel and equipment. Host State police interviewed in CAR and DRC emphasized that these contributions were critical for basic operational functioning. In MONUSCO and UNMISS, however, UNPOL interviewees cited isolated instances where donated equipment was not consistently maintained, retained at its intended location, or used for its intended purpose.

Case studies showed that early warning and well-functioning coordination mechanisms made UNPOL responses effective

34. Case studies in the three missions demonstrated how UNPOL early warning and response mechanisms functioned in selected instances, highlighting both strengths and limitations. Where mechanisms were effective, UNPOL responded rapidly and mitigated escalation. For example, in MINUSCA, the UNPOL response to the 2025 Damara accident where a UN vehicle fell into a river reflected strong operational coordination, adaptability and sustained follow-up. After local police alerted UNPOL to the incident, UNPOL activated a crisis cell, supported multi-component rescue and recovery operations, and coordinated with Force, engineers, divers, national authorities, and local communities over several days.

35. Similarly, intercommunal violence and looting within the Protection of Civilians site in Malakal in 2025 demonstrated effective use of early warning and rapid response by UNMISS. UNPOL acted promptly on alerts from community watch groups, deployed patrols and contained the situation before further escalation. The response prioritized civilian protection through evacuations, reinforced patrols, and coordination with mission leadership, while sustained presence and curfew enforcement helped stabilize the environment.


36. In contrast, gaps in situational awareness, coordination and implementation of lessons learned undermined effectiveness. For example, a 2024 attack on the MONUSCO INCAL camp in Kinshasa exposed gaps in UNPOL early warning and coordination. Indications of a deteriorating situation, including demonstrators equipped with materials for disruption, were not translated into timely threat mitigation. Limited surveillance coverage constrained situational awareness. UNPOL response was reactive, with coordination challenges limiting its ability to control the situation. DRC police, responsible for elements of site security, engaged passively and were perceived by some stakeholders as contributing to the escalation, raising concerns among UNPOL personnel about the accountability and reliability of Host State counterparts. Following the incident, UNPOL developed a lessons learned report with recommendations; however, there was no evidence that these were systematically implemented.

Several operational and institutional factors limited overall UNPOL effectiveness

37. Despite the generally positive enabling environment, staffing and capacity challenges constrained UNPOL operations. Across the three missions, some IPOs and other mission components noted that some IPOs lacked the required technical expertise or language proficiency, particularly in francophone contexts. While competency-based interviews included some questions on technical and mission-specific requirements, written examinations were generally not used except in limited cases, which made it difficult to fully assess competencies for specialized roles. Additionally, job openings to PCCs for IPOs deployed as liaison officers to other mission components (e.g. Force, Joint Operations Centre, Joint Mission Analysis Centre), which often require specialized skills, did not always target commensurate skills and expertise. These challenges were reflected in survey and interview feedback, with respondents pointing to variability in technical skills and language capacity across IPOs and mismatches between deployed personnel profiles and specific duties they were expected to perform. Interviewees further noted that language requirements for IPOs were not always sufficiently differentiated across positions based on operational needs.

38. Internal and external interviewees considered that the standard tour of duty of two years for IPOs and one year for FPU and the associated turnover at times disrupted continuity. UNPOL interviewees further noted that inconsistent handover processes reduced institutional memory and slowed the adaptation of incoming personnel to local contexts. Interviewees also noted gaps in training, and survey respondents, while largely positive regarding the adequacy of training, indicated uneven perceptions across missions, with higher ratings in MINUSCA, as shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13: IPOs reported positive views on training adequacy, with wide variations across missions



Source: OIOS survey of IPOs

39. Additional operational and political constraints further affected UNPOL effectiveness, including:

- **Internal movement restrictions:** United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)-imposed limitations on access to certain areas or temporary halts to movement were perceived by some UNPOL staff interviewed as overly cautious, at times limiting UNPOL deployment to locations where they might have been able to make an impact. Additionally, in some missions, UNPOL imposed restrictions on FPUs operating beyond specified distances (e.g. 25 kilometres) without special authorization. This further constrained reach, limiting UNPOL ability to deploy to more remote or peripheral areas.
- **External restrictions:** In some locations, particularly in South Sudan, despite provisions in the Status of Forces Agreement guaranteeing the mission freedom of movement, UNPOL

was sometimes prevented from patrolling and instructed by Host State authorities at checkpoints to return to mission camps.

- **Logistical and capacity constraints:** Difficult terrain (especially during rainy seasons), shortages of fuel and equipment in some locations and uneven availability and quality of language assistants further constrained engagement with communities.

E. UNPOL coordinated well with its key stakeholders, although operational collaboration with Host State police faced challenges

Coordination between UNPOL and Host State police was strong overall, although capacity and political constraints limited the depth of operational collaboration

40. Coordination between the Host State police and UNPOL was reported as strong across all the three missions by both UNPOL and Host State police interviewees, particularly in information-sharing, planning and operational engagement. Additionally, across the three missions, approximately 80% of survey respondents rated coordination with the Host state police as good or very good. Nevertheless, systemic constraints limited deeper collaboration between the two groups. Both Host State and IPO staff interviewed reported that Host State police often faced significant shortages in equipment, infrastructure and personnel, affecting their ability to engage in joint activities and creating expectations of UNPOL support that exceeded available capacity of missions. In MONUSCO, for example, Host State police noted that at times UNPOL workplans were developed without sufficient consultation, creating unrealistic expectations for national counterparts. Host State personnel further reported that political sensitivities, differing operational doctrines and perceptions around human rights compliance also sometimes constrained joint patrols. In UNMISS, UNPOL primarily implemented coordinated patrols rather than joint patrols with Host State police, with engagement more commonly undertaken through coordination and information-sharing arrangements.

UNPOL coordinated well with other mission components and United Nations Country Team (UNCT) members

41. UNPOL maintained strong coordination with other mission components. In all three missions, UNPOL participated within integrated mission working groups, with many interviewed mission components noting that they relied on UNPOL as their “eyes and ears” due to its proximity to communities. This enabled timely situational awareness across all mission components. Additionally, across the three missions, approximately 90% of IPO respondents rated coordination with other mission components as good or very good. Examples of strong collaboration within the mission included:

- **MINUSCA:** UNPOL worked with other mission components supporting electoral processes through joint planning, route coordination and secure ballot transportation.
- **MONUSCO:** UNPOL worked with Force, substantive sections and humanitarian actors to respond to rising sexual violence in IDP camps.
- **UNMISS:** UNPOL and Force established regular coordination platforms, including bi-weekly meetings and daily information-sharing.

42. UNPOL assigned liaison officers to other mission components (e.g. Joint Operations Centre, Joint Mission Analysis Centre, Force) to meet operational requirements. Involvement of the receiving components in such deployment decisions was widely recognized as helpful in ensuring the deployment of officers with appropriate skills and experience. However, interviewees noted that this

involvement did not occur consistently across missions or positions, which at times contributed to mismatches between the technical expertise or language capabilities of liaison officers and the operational requirements of these positions.

43. Additionally, some coordination challenges within the mission were reported. Turnover among IPOs at times disrupted continuity and weakened institutional memory, requiring repeated rebuilding of relationships. Additionally, in some locations, other mission component staff reported that UNPOL field offices shared unverified information directly with mission headquarters prior to field-level validation, resulting in inaccuracies, confusion and duplication of effort.

44. In general, UNPOL established strong partnerships with UNCT members through joint capacity building, information sharing and community engagement initiatives. This included multi-stakeholder activities with NGOs and UNCT partners, such as training programmes and the establishment of reporting and referral mechanisms for human rights violations.

F. UNPOL efficiency was affected by inadequate data and reporting systems, inflexibility in the use of FPU and variation in inputs and outputs across missions

Inadequate data systems and reporting limited the ability to track UNPOL performance and optimize resource use

45. UNPOL generated a substantial volume of data through various reporting mechanisms, including CPAS, SAGE, Unite Aware, daily, weekly and monthly situation reports, flash reports, biannual reports, and locally maintained spreadsheets. While these systems provided extensive data, across all missions:

- they were fragmented, implemented inconsistently across missions, and focused on outputs, with limited data availability to assess outcomes;
- reporting categories and definitions varied considerably as similar activities were often classified differently across missions and over time, limiting comparability; and,
- patrol categories frequently combined multiple dimensions (e.g. purpose, composition, duration, mode of transport) resulting in inconsistent and non-comparable classifications across missions, with 24 different categories in UNMISS and 9 and 7 in MINUSCA and MONUSCO, respectively.

46. Data quality issues further constrained the ability to assess performance and operational efficiency. These included: missing data and gaps in key systems (for example, in some cases SAGE and Unite Aware did not capture the full range of UNPOL patrols); reliance on parallel reporting tools such as spreadsheets; inconsistent data entry practices; and varying interpretations of reporting categories. These gaps limited the completeness and comparability of data within and across missions.

47. There was also limited evidence of systematic sharing of operational practices and lessons learned across missions, limiting opportunities to identify and apply effective and efficient approaches across contexts. UNPOL staff interviewed also reported spending significant amount of time producing, reconciling and reporting data across multiple systems, reducing the time available for operational activities and engagement in the field, as illustrated by the quote below:

“We're producing too many reports attached to all these activities. We spend more time in the office drafting reports than in the field — and those reports have to be submitted before a specific time so that New York receives them at a convenient hour.” — IPO, MINUSCA

Overlap between UNPOL and Force and inflexibility regarding the use of FPU further reduced operational efficiency

48. While UNPOL and Force generally maintained positive collaborative working relationships, in some locations, mission interviewees acknowledged overlaps between UNPOL and Force patrols. For example, in UNMISS, patrol activities overlapped, particularly between UNPOL high-visibility patrols and Force patrols, such as ‘city domination’ or ‘town patrols’. In these contexts, limited joint planning further reduced opportunities to coordinate deployments and maximize coverage.

49. Furthermore, the policies governing the use of FPUs introduced efficiency constraints. Although FPUs represented a significant share (73%) of UNPOL resources in the three missions, constraints on adapting roles or coverage areas and on deploying FPUs in smaller or more flexible configurations reduced UNPOL ability to respond to emerging or localized needs in some locations.

There was limited evidence of a clearly articulated rationale for determining the mix and level of operational activities

50. There was significant variation in operational outputs across missions, as shown in Table 4. This appeared to suggest differing priorities of missions, with UNMISS focusing more on patrol activity, MINUSCA placing greater weight on MMA and community sensitization activities and MONUSCO showing more mixed outputs. While some variation was expected given differences in mandates and operating contexts, available documentation and interview evidence did not provide a clear explanation for the extent of observed variation in operational outputs across missions. Instead, UNPOL interviewees reported pressure to operate more efficiently, particularly in the context of reform initiatives; however, administrative burdens reduced the time available for operational activities. This, combined with limitations in data quality and comparability, made it difficult to determine whether observed variations in operational activities between the three missions reflected deliberate strategic choices, contextual factors, and/or inconsistencies in reporting.

Table 4: UNPOL outputs per 100 personnel varied across missions in 2024

Mission	# of IPOs	# of FPUs	Patrols/Day/100 UNPOL personnel (IPOs and FPUs)	Community Sensitization Sessions/Day/100 UNPOL personnel (IPOs only)	MMA to Host State police/Day/100 UNPOL personnel (IPOs only)
MINUSCA	570	2,413	3.3	5.6	5.7
MONUSCO	288	1,046	4.1	3.7	5.1
UNMISS	700	850	7.2	2.4	2.6*

Source: Budget Performance Reports, UNPOL Biannual Reports, mission data

* Data from 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024


UNPOL personnel and stakeholders identified several areas for improvements in their operations

51. IPOs and other stakeholder groups surveyed and interviewed identified several suggestions to strengthen UNPOL operational activities. Survey respondents across the three missions most frequently identified patrols as a key area for improvement, as shown in Figure 14, although mission-specific priorities varied. These included:

- **MINUSCA:** Patrols (adjusting coverage areas and the types of patrols deployed as well as increasing coordination with other actors during patrols), followed by adjustments to increase the number of IPOs and recruitment to align more with competencies and language.

- **MONUSCO:** Patrols (adjusting coverage areas and the timing and types of patrols deployed), followed by increased overall joint planning and coordination with Host State police, other mission components and local organizations.
- **UNMISS:** Community engagement, including greater targeting of specific groups and local organizations, followed by the provision of equipment and supplies to the Host State police.

Figure 14: Survey respondents identified key areas for improving UNPOL operational activities



Source: OIOS survey of IPOs

52. Staff and stakeholders interviewed also broadly identified similar areas for improvement, as outlined in Table 5.

Table 5: Interviewees identified several areas of improvement for UNPO

Interviewee type	Suggestions for improvement identified
UNPOL mission personnel	Deploying personnel with the appropriate skillsets, increasing staffing levels and improving reporting systems
Host State police	Material and operational support, including the provision of equipment and infrastructure as well as stronger coordination with UNPOL
Community members	Augmented UNPOL engagement and presence, increased community policing activities, humanitarian support and extending operations beyond urban centres
Other mission components	Expanded coordination with UNPOL, increasing patrols beyond urban areas and ensuring that personnel are deployed with appropriate skillsets

V. Conclusion

53. Across all three missions, UNPOL modalities of patrols, community sensitization activities, support to criminal investigations and threat management have contributed to improved protection of civilians, public safety and trust. This contribution was strongest where UNPOL maintained an active and engaged presence, coordinated effectively with Host State police and other mission components, and supported community-level information flows and early warning. While UNPOL remains a cornerstone of mission-led protection, sustaining and strengthening its contributions will require a strategic and coherent approach to addressing its key constraints, including: restrictions affecting operational reach and responsiveness; collaboration challenges with Host State police; variations in operational approaches across missions; and fragmented data and reporting systems.

54. Furthermore, by recalibrating its patrolling strategies within the current operating environment to bridge gaps in nighttime coverage and underserved high-risk zones, including harmonizing patrolling with Force and deepening joint operations with Host State police, UNPOL can be an even more effective deterrent against threats to protection of civilians. Strengthening community engagement, building the resilience of Host State incident reporting and advocating for greater flexibility in FPU deployment will further transform UNPOL into a more agile, accountable actor capable of delivering tangible security outcomes in increasingly volatile environments. Importantly, as missions navigate drawdowns and transitions, UNPOL must proactively institutionalize incident reporting and investigative capacities within national frameworks to ensure protection gains are not lost when the missions leave.

VI. Recommendations

55. OIOS makes five important recommendations, all of which were accepted.

Recommendation 1: (Results A, D and E)

56. **UNPOL in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS should strengthen their patrolling strategies to maximize their contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives.** While taking into account operational realities in each mission, this may include:

- a. prioritizing patrol deployment in high-risk and underserved areas and during higher-risk periods;
- b. increasing community engagement during patrols;
- c. strengthening coordination and joint patrols with Host State police, including provision of targeted logistical support to Host State police toward the most critical operational needs;
- d. ensuring continuity of critical policing functions, including incident reporting, during mission drawdown and transition; and
- e. ensuring coordination with other mission components, especially the Force (Military component) to reduce overlap.

Indicator of implementation: Strengthened Mission-level patrolling strategies.

Expected change(s): Improved reach and responsiveness of UNPOL patrols supporting greater UNPOL contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives.

Recommendation 2: (Results D and E)

57. **UNPOL in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS, in coordination with the DPO Police Division, should improve the standard procedures for the selection of UNPOL liaison officers and the transition of UNPOL personnel.** These procedures should:

- f. incorporate inputs from receiving mission components when selecting and assigning UNPOL liaison officers; and
- g. ensure handovers are timely, standardized and implemented consistently across missions.

Indicator of implementation: Standardized procedures for liaison officer selection and personnel transition are established and applied.

Expected change(s): Improved continuity, institutional memory and alignment of personnel profiles with operational needs.

Recommendation 3: (Result F)

58. DPO Police Division should establish a community of practice to facilitate systemic sharing of lessons learned, good practices and specialized expertise on policing in peacekeeping across missions.

Indicator of implementation: Community of practice established and operational.

Expected change(s): Improved knowledge-sharing and dissemination of good practices.

Recommendation 4: (Result F)

59. DPO Police Division should conduct a review of policies governing the use of Formed Police Units. This may include proposing revisions regarding:

- a. more flexible geographic and distance parameters;
- b. adaptable deployment configurations (e.g. smaller units) when certain conditions are met; and
- c. expanded support to selected operational functions.

Indicator of implementation: Proposed revisions to FPU policy submitted to Member States.

Expected change(s): Increased flexibility and more efficient use of FPU resources.

Recommendation 5: (Result F)

60. DPO Police Division, in partnership with missions, should standardize UNPOL data and reporting frameworks and platforms to improve consistency, comparability and operational decision-making.

Indicator of implementation: Standardized data and reporting frameworks are implemented.

Expected change(s): Improved consistency, reliability and use of UNPOL data for decision-making.

Annex I: Management responses from DPO, MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS

DPO Management Response

DPO welcomes the report on the Evaluation of United Nations Police (UNPOL) in Peacekeeping Operations, and thanks the OIOS evaluation team for its constructive engagement throughout the process with the department, specifically the Police Division, and with the peacekeeping operations evaluated.

DPO notes with satisfaction the key findings of the report, notably that UN police patrols were responsive to security contexts and community needs, that UNPOL contributed to improved community protection and trust, that UNPOL effectiveness was supported by strong guidance and operational frameworks and, finally, that UNPOL had strong coordination with Host State police and other mission components.

DPO has also taken note of the areas for improvements identified and accepts the related recommendations addressed to the Department. An action plan has been developed to support their implementation within available resources.

DPO Recommendation Action Plan

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations

Date: 22 June 2026

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
<u>Recommendation 3</u> DPO Police Division should establish a community of practice to facilitate systematic sharing of lessons learned, good practices and specialized expertise on policing in peacekeeping across missions. <i>Indicator of implementation:</i> Community of practice established and operational. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Improved knowledge-sharing and dissemination of good practices.	☒ Accepted ☐ Not accepted (please provide justification)	Enhancement of a community of practice comprising the 15 entities that form the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Policing to formalize the sharing of lessons learned, good practices and expertise. Organization of quarterly meetings convened by the Police Division Strategic Policy and Development Section.	SPDS	30 June 2027
<u>Recommendation 4</u> DPO Police Division should conduct a review of policies governing the use of Formed Police Units. This may include proposing revisions regarding: - more flexible geographic and distance parameters; - adaptable deployment configurations (e.g. smaller units) when certain conditions are met; and - expanded support to selected operational functions.	☒ Accepted ☐ Not accepted (please provide justification)	Review of the Policy on Formed Police Units to take into consideration recommendations from the review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations, including new and different modalities for the deployment of individual police officers, formed police units and specialized police teams.	SPDS	30 June 2028

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
<i>Indicator of implementation:</i> Proposed revisions to FPU policy submitted to Member States. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Increased flexibility and more efficient use of FPU resources.				
Recommendation 5 DPO Police Division, in partnership with missions, should standardize UNPOL data and reporting frameworks and platforms to improve consistency, comparability and operational decision-making. <i>Indicator of implementation:</i> Standardized data and reporting frameworks are implemented. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Improved consistency, reliability and use of UNPOL data for decision-making.	☒ Accepted ☐ Not accepted (please provide justification)	PD will review and standardize patrol categories across peacekeeping operations (taking into account their specific mandate and context), harmonize data and reporting frameworks (content and frequency of reports) and ensure the systematic use of Unite Aware (where deployed).	MMSS	30 June 2027

United Nations

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic



Nations Unies

Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies
pour la Stabilisation en République centrafricaine

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Ms. Demetra Arapakos
A: Director, Inspection and Evaluation Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

DATE: 24 June 2026

REFERENCE: MINUSCA/OSRSG/104/2026
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

FROM: Valentine Rugwabiza
DE: SRSG and Head of MINUSCA

SUBJECT: **Management Response – OIOS Evaluation of United Nations Police in**
OBJET: **Peacekeeping missions**

1. Reference is made to your inter-office memorandum transmitting the draft report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations (Ref.: OIOS-2026-01172) dated 11 June 2026.
2. MINUSCA has taken note and accepted the recommendations relevant to MINUSCA and has proposed actions in the attached Action Plan.
3. We express our sincere appreciation to OIOS for the constructive collaboration throughout the evaluation process and MINUSCA will work closely with Inspection and Evaluation Division, OIOS to ensure the full implementation of the recommendations.

Thank you.

cc: Ms. Li Fang, PC
Mr. Renner Onana, COS
Ms. Tiphaine Dickson, CRMCU

Recommendation Action Plan

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations

Date: 20 June 2026

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
<u>Recommendation 1</u> UNPOL in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS should strengthen their patrolling strategies to maximize their contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives. While taking into account operational realities in each mission, this may include: a. prioritizing patrol deployment in high-risk and underserved areas and during higher-risk periods; b. increasing community engagement during patrols; c. strengthening coordination and joint patrols with Host State police, including provision of targeted logistical support to Host State police toward the most critical operational needs; d. ensuring continuity of critical policing functions, including incident reporting, during mission drawdown and transition; and	☒ Accepted ☐ Not accepted (please provide justification)	<u>MINUSCA accepts this recommendation</u> UNPOL will strengthen intelligence-led targeting and planning, and will direct patrols toward high-risk areas and periods based on MINUSCA intel integrated analysis, while reinforcing the ownership and use of UA SAGE across all UNPOL components particularly Co-location Units and FPU as a central operational planning tool, shifting from an intuitive approach to one that is analytical, targeted, and proactive. UNPOL will strengthen community engagement, with support from the Community Policing SPT, and will enhance joint patrols with the ISF, accompanied by targeted logistical support. UNPOL will enhance coordination with the Force and other Mission components by consolidating existing mechanisms (MICM, Field Office Heads meetings, Integrated operational planning during long-range patrols), while ensuring the continuity of critical functions and progressively transferring responsibilities to the ISF.	Development and Operations Pillar Chiefs	2026/2027

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
e. ensuring coordination with other mission components, especially the Force (Military component) to reduce overlap. <i>Indicator of implementation:</i> Strengthened mission-level patrolling strategies. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Improved reach and responsiveness of UNPOL patrols supporting greater UNPOL contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives.		Comment: However, the effectiveness of patrols remains significantly constrained by several interrelated challenges. On one hand, structural and logistical shortcomings within the Internal Security Forces (ISF) including the uneven distribution of personnel (with a high concentration in Bangui) and weak equipment management systems limit the development of effective and sustainable joint patrols. On the other hand, the isolation of certain areas and mobility constraints caused by poor road and infrastructure conditions reduce the operational reach of patrols, particularly in the most vulnerable regions. These constraints are further exacerbated by the risk of a continued depletion of UNPOL personnel, despite the ongoing transition from the stabilization phase to the consolidation phase of the CONOPS, which could undermine the overall capacity to sustain field presence and operational effectiveness.		
<u>Recommendation 2</u> UNPOL in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS in coordination with the DPO Police Division, should improve the standard procedures for the selection of UNPOL liaison officers and the transition of UNPOL personnel. These procedures should:	☒ Accepted ☐ Not accepted (please provide justification)	<u>MINUSCA accepts this recommendation.</u> The recommendation is accepted, as it: reinforces and formalizes existing practices within the MINUSCA Police component;	MINUSCA UNPOL Chief of Staff/ UNPOL Human Resources	December 2026

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
a. incorporate inputs from receiving mission components when selecting and assigning UNPOL liaison officers; and b. ensure handovers are timely, standardized and implemented consistently across missions. <i>Indicator of implementation:</i> Standardized procedures for liaison officer selection and personnel transition are established and applied. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Improved continuity, institutional memory and alignment of personnel profiles with operational needs.		• improves the alignment between UNPOL officers' profiles and operational requirements in the field; • ensures a more structured, consistent, and effective management of personnel transitions, particularly through standardized handover procedures; • contributes to the continuity of operations and the preservation of institutional memory; • fully aligns with DPO strategic guidance aimed at harmonizing procedures across peacekeeping missions.		



Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la
Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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Kinshasa, RD Congo - BP 8811


Tél. +243 81 890 5000
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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 26 June 2026

Ref.: SRSG.DMS.MONUSCO-2026-00341

To: Ms. Demetra Arapakos
Director Inspection and Evaluation Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

From:  James Swan
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO

Subject: **Management Response to the draft report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the evaluation of the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations – MONUSCO Police Component.**

1. I would like to thank OIOS-IED for the draft report on the Evaluation of the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations including the Police Component in MONUSCO.

2. The Mission concurs with the recommendations made by OIOS-IED and is committed to their implementation, subject to the availability of the requisite resources. The enclosed Action Plan sets out the planned actions and the anticipated timelines for their completion.

Best regards.

Annex:

- Action Plan

MONUSCO Recommendation Action Plan

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations

Date: 19 June 2026

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
<u>Recommendation 1</u> UNPOL in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS should strengthen their patrolling strategies to maximize their contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives. While taking into account operational realities in each mission, this may include: a. prioritizing patrol deployment in high-risk and underserved areas and during higher-risk periods; b. increasing community engagement during patrols; c. strengthening coordination and joint patrols with Host State police, including provision of targeted logistical support to Host State police toward the most critical operational needs; d. ensuring continuity of critical policing functions, including incident reporting, during mission drawdown and transition; and	Accepted	In collaboration with the PNC, the Force, POC, UNDSS and other relevant sections, MONUSCO UNPOL will: -Identify and evaluate high-risk areas to plan targeted patrols and actions necessary for strengthening protection of Civilians (POC). -Enhance early-warning mechanisms and reinforce security-based intelligence gathering and analysis to anticipate potential threats. -Engage community leaders, including women and youth, as essential partners for public awareness and security assessments through Local Security Committees (CLS). -Coordinate with the Force and substantive sections to ensure integrated planning and the successful execution of joint patrols and other activities. -Conduct community policing awareness sessions and campaigns promoting collaboration/partnership from communities within the SOLI framework. -Organize training on Public Order Management (POM) with a mandatory focus on respect for human rights,	ODSRSG Protection and Operations Pillar, through UNPOL PC, Chief of sectors, SOLI and FPU coordination.	June 2027

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
e. ensuring coordination with other mission components, especially the Force (Military component) to reduce overlap. <i>Indicator of implementation:</i> Strengthened mission-level patrolling strategies. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Improved reach and responsiveness of UNPOL patrols supporting greater UNPOL contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives.		directly addressing tactical challenges identified in the field including the use of force. -Strengthen the monitoring and analysis of security trends to support timely operational decision-making and the deployment of the Congolese National Police (PNC).		
<u>Recommendation 2</u> UNPOL in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS in coordination with the DPO Police Division, should improve the standard procedures for the selection of UNPOL liaison officers and the transition of UNPOL personnel. These procedures should: - incorporate inputs from receiving mission components when selecting and assigning UNPOL liaison officers; and - ensure handovers are timely, standardized and implemented consistently across missions.	Accepted	- Continue the consultations and periodic meetings with SRS for ensuring that MONUSCO's Police Component operational requirements are considered during the selection and rotation process; - Provide refresher capacity building training and awareness sessions for Human Resources personnel on the selection and recruitment procedures. - Strengthen knowledge management and institutional memory through the systematic archiving of handover reports and key reference documents; - Monitor compliance of the established standardized handover mechanism through periodic reviews and oversight mechanisms; - Reorganize the UNPOL archive platform and develop standardized archiving guidelines to strengthen records management and ensure institutional memory.	- Office of the Head of the Police Component	June 2027

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
<i>Indicator of implementation:</i> Standardized procedures for liaison officer selection and personnel transition are established and applied. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Improved continuity, institutional memory and alignment of personnel profiles with operational needs.				

UNITED NATIONS

United Nations Mission
in South Sudan



NATIONS UNIES

Mission des Nations Unies
au Soudan du Sud

United Nations Mission in South Sudan


(UNMISS)

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Ms. Demetra Arapakos

TO: Director, Inspection and Evaluation Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

DATE: 22 June 2026

Ms. Anita Kiki Gbeho, 

FROM: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and
Head of Mission, UNMISS

SUBJECT: **Management Response to the Draft OIOS Report on the Evaluation of
United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations**

1. UNMISS acknowledges receipt of the draft OIOS report on the *Evaluation of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations* (IED-25-023) and appreciates the opportunity to provide its formal management response.
2. The Mission welcomes the report's recognition of UNPOL's contribution to community protection, incident reporting, trust-building, criminal investigations and threat management. UNMISS also notes the areas identified for further improvement, including patrol coverage and timing, community engagement, coordination with the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) and other Mission components, continuity of reporting, liaison officer selection and personnel handovers.
3. UNMISS accepts Recommendations 1 and 2 and has identified corresponding implementation measures.
4. Under Recommendation 1, UNMISS will:
 - a.) update the 2024 UNPOL Patrol SOP to reflect UNSCR 2820 (2026) and current operational priorities;
 - b.) strengthen risk-based deployment to high-risk and underserved areas and, where feasible, during higher-risk periods;
 - c.) continue engagement with the SSNPS and relevant Government mechanisms on coordinated and night patrols and access constraints;
 - d.) increase community engagement during patrols;
 - e.) strengthen coordination with Force, OCOS, JOC, JMAC, UNDSS and Field Offices; and
 - f.) improve patrol and incident reporting, including through knowledge-sharing and centralized reporting arrangements.
5. Under Recommendation 2, UNMISS will:
 - a.) periodically review operational requirements and update the UNPOL skillset table;
 - b.) provide the DPO Police Division with revised liaison officer competency requirements;



United Nations Mission in South Sudan

(UNMISS)

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

- c.) seek inputs from receiving Mission components when assigning liaison officers;
 - d.) strengthen assessment of liaison competencies during selection and deployment;
 - e.) promote greater operational exposure of liaison officers through field activities; and
 - f.) standardize and strengthen personnel handover arrangements.
6. Recommendation 1 will be implemented through coordinated action by UNPOL and relevant Mission and national counterparts, with completion targeted by the end of the second quarter of FY 2026/27. Recommendation 2 will be led by UNPOL Operations and Administration, in coordination with the DPO Police Division, and reviewed biannually.
7. Please find attached the completed Recommendation Action Plan, setting out the agreed actions, responsible entities and implementation timelines.
8. UNMISS appreciates the constructive engagement of OIOS and remains committed to timely and coordinated implementation of the agreed recommendations.

Thank you.

Attachment:

- 1. Recommendation Action Plan – Evaluation of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations

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Recommendation Action Plan

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations

Date: 20 June 2026

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
Recommendation 1 UNPOL in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS should strengthen their patrolling strategies to maximize their contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives. While taking into account operational realities in each mission, this may include: a. prioritizing patrol deployment in high-risk and underserved areas and during higher-risk periods; b. increasing community engagement during patrols; c. strengthening coordination and joint patrols with Host State police, including provision of targeted logistical support to Host State police toward the most critical operational needs; d. ensuring continuity of critical policing functions, including incident reporting, during mission drawdown and transition; and	☒ Accepted ☐ Not accepted (please provide justification)	1. Amend UNPOL Patrol SOP 2024 to deliver the current mission dynamics and enhance alignment to the SCR 2820 (2026) 2. Continue with strategic engagement with NPS to plan for night patrols and minimize access denials through the Integrated Liaison Office (ILO) and the Joint Verification Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) through the Movement Restriction Committee (MRC) 3. Conduct knowledge sharing on reporting mechanisms across the field offices. The target group shall be the reporting officers to improve the quality of reports. 4. Enhance the current synergy between Force and UNPOL collaboration through the various LNO to Force at the FHQ and the three (3) Sector HQs 5. Continuity of critical policing functions during mission drawdown and transition shall be secured through a centralized incident reporting mechanism under the planning and	UNPOL Force OCOS JOC JMAC UNDSS SSNPS UNPOL-CBD	End of 2 nd quarter for FY 2026/27

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
e. ensuring coordination with other mission components, especially the Force (Military component) to reduce overlap. <i>Indicator of implementation:</i> Strengthened mission-level patrolling strategies. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Improved reach and responsiveness of UNPOL patrols supporting greater UNPOL contributions to missions' protection and stabilization objectives.		budget framework. Centralization will ensure consistent procedures, efficient data management, preserved institutional memory, and reinforced accountability, sustaining protection and stabilization objectives throughout transition. 6. Through recurring participation of MHQ team members in patrols engagement with various community groups can be strengthened, as it results in a greater number of patrols being deployed on the ground. Furthermore, this allows for the timely and direct incorporation of the communities' actual needs into UNPOL's strategic planning and ensures that MHQ activities are tailored as effectively as possible to those needs.		
Recommendation 2 UNPOL in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS In coordination with the DPO Police Division, should improve the standard procedures for the selection of UNPOL liaison officers and the transition of UNPOL personnel. These procedures should: - On mid-term basis, updating skillset table and submitting it to PD (requesting liaison function experienced officers) - incorporate inputs from receiving mission components when selecting	☒ Accepted ☐ Not accepted (please provide justification)	1. In collaboration with the Operations Crime Analysis and Intelligence Unit, UNPOL to review the trends of crime and security dynamics to anticipate the potential or likely skillsets to match the Mandate tasks. 2. The DPO Police Division, in collaboration with Member States of Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), should identify police personnel with liaison function experience or relevant background. In this regard, the Assessment for Mission Service (AMS) Teams, during the selection process of	UNPOL – OPS UNPOL – Administration	Bi-annually

IED Recommendation	Acceptance status	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
and assigning UNPOL liaison officers; and - ensure handovers are timely, standardized and implemented consistently across missions. <i>Indicator of Implementation:</i> Standardized procedures for liaison officer selection and personnel transition are established and applied. <i>Expected change(s):</i> Improved continuity, institutional memory and alignment of personnel profiles with operational needs.		Individual Police Officers (IPOs), should systematically assess candidates for such competencies and recommend suitably qualified personnel for deployment to United Nations Missions. 3. UNPOL liaison officers play a critical role as connectors between mission leadership, host-state institutions, and the public. To maximize their effectiveness, liaison functions should extend beyond desk-based coordination. Officers should regularly accompany patrols and field visits, allowing them to gain firsthand situational awareness and foster trust with communities. Embedding liaison officers in operational activities ensures that institutional linkages are grounded in real-time mission realities, thereby strengthening continuity and credibility across missions	UNPOL-CBD	