



INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

REPORT 2019/028

Audit of movement control operations
in the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali

The Mission needed to develop key
performance indicators to measure
performance and strengthen controls over
processing of passengers and cargo on
United Nations aircraft

29 April 2019
Assignment No. AP2017/641/10

Audit of movement control operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of movement control operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MINUSMA movement control operations. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2016 to 31 July 2018 and included a review of work planning, performance management and procedures over passengers and cargo movement.

MINUSMA properly planned and managed troop rotations. However, it needed to develop key performance indicators to measure its performance and strengthen controls over processing of passengers and cargo on United Nations aircraft.

OIOS made five recommendations. To address issues identified in the audit, MINUSMA needed to:

- Develop mission-specific standard operating procedures and key performance indicators to monitor and report on the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of major movement control operations;
- Strengthen controls over passenger and cargo movement including: maintaining records of movement of personnel forms for passengers traveling on United Nations flights, regularly calibrating weighing scales and consistently weighing luggage to ensure the allowable aircraft weight is not exceeded, and ensuring that arms and ammunitions carried on board United Nations aircraft are properly authorized;
- Revise cost recovery procedures for transporting non-MINUSMA passengers and cargo and ensure they are complied with and related costs are recovered in a timely manner;
- Promulgate the list of staff authorized to approve cargo movement requests and ensure that only duly authorized cargo is transported by MINUSMA; and
- Improve security of cargo storage facilities and enhance controls over the cargo screening process.

MINUSMA accepted the recommendations and initiated action to implement them.

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Audit of movement control operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of movement control operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
2. The Movement Control Manual of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support DPKO/DFS¹ (hereafter referred to as the Manual) guides movement control operations in the Mission. The MINUSMA Movement Control Section (MovCon) is responsible for planning, managing and controlling the movement of passengers and cargo to assist the Mission in effectively achieving its mandate. During fiscal years 2016/17 and 2017/18, MINUSMA MovCon coordinated 117 rotations from troop/police contributing countries (T/PCCs) and moved 189,942 passengers and 40,149 tons of cargo.
3. MovCon was headed by a Chief at the P-5 level reporting to the Chief of Supply Chain Management and had 78 staff comprising 21 international and 45 national staff and 12 United Nations Volunteers. MovCon operated from six locations: Bamako, Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou, Kidal and Tessalit. The approved operational budget of MovCon for 2016/17 and 2017/18 was \$4.9 million and \$6.9 million, respectively. The approved staffing costs of MovCon for 2016/17 and 2017/18 were \$4 million and \$5 million, respectively.
4. Comments provided by MINUSMA are incorporated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

5. The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MINUSMA movement control operations.
6. This audit was included in the 2018 risk-based work plan of OIOS due to the operational and financial risks associated with movement of passengers and cargo.
7. OIOS conducted this audit from July to October 2018. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2016 to 31 July 2018. Based on an activity-level risk assessment, the audit covered higher and medium risk areas in MovCon operations, including work planning and performance management, and controls over passengers and cargo movement.
8. The audit methodology included: (a) interviews of key personnel, (b) review and analyses of relevant documentation, (c) analytical reviews and testing of data, and (d) physical observation during field visits to Gao, Mopti, Kidal and Bamako.
9. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

¹ Although these departments have been rebranded as part of ongoing reforms, the guidelines are referred to by the names of the departments when the guidelines were issued.

III. AUDIT RESULTS

A. Work planning and performance management

The Mission was effective in planning the movement of troops

10. MINUSMA should effectively plan and organize the movement of troops. The Joint Movement Control Center Unit of MovCon held weekly meetings to plan and coordinate troop rotations, movement of cargo and other non-routine movements. OIOS review of minutes of 20 out of 98 meetings convened during the audit period indicated that in those meetings, the Unit and other Mission components including representatives from the military, Air Operations and Transport Sections discussed the required actions and coordinated the necessary activities to ensure effective movement of passengers and cargo. A review of 30 out of 117 troop rotations conducted showed that MovCon had effectively implemented its annual rotation plan, which enabled the Mission to deploy, rotate and repatriate troops in a timely manner. OIOS concluded that the Mission was effective in planning and organizing the movement of troops.

There was a need to strengthen performance management and develop mission-specific standard operating procedures

11. MINUSMA is required to monitor effectiveness and timeliness of MovCon operations by establishing specific and measurable key performance indicators (KPIs) and report on cargo backlogs. The Mission is required to prepare: (i) movement discrepancy reports when received cargo does not match the manifest; (ii) incident reports when there is damage to cargo, and (iii) movement completion reports after the rotation or deployment of troops.

12. While adequate KPIs for monitoring and reporting on the customs clearance process were established, MovCon was not monitoring its performance against these KPIs. A review of a sample of 31 (47 per cent) of in-bound cargo showed that the process was taking on average 118 days instead of the expected 30 days. MovCon also did not have KPIs for several important operational areas, such as movement and delivery of cargo and processing of Cargo Movement Requests (CMRs) because MovCon did not prioritize the establishment of the relevant KPIs.

13. Additionally, MINUSMA needed to improve monitoring and reporting of cargo backlogs. A review of documentation related to 30 of the 117 troop/formed police rotations, repatriations and redeployments showed that MovCon consistently prepared movement completion reports after moving personnel. However, MovCon did not prepare cargo discrepancy reports and backlog reports due to inadequate oversight. For example, there was a backlog of 3,572 tons of cargo relating to 2,441 CMRs in the Field Support Suit (FSS) pending movement to different locations for more than two years. Accuracy of the backlog could not be determined as procedures had not been established for reconciling manual records of cargo backlog with the information in FSS.

14. The above occurred due to a high turnover of MovCon key personnel and the absence of mission-specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide staff in effectively carrying out their functions, which in turn contributed to delays in cargo movement and cargo cost recovery as described further in the report.

<p>(1) MINUSMA should: (a) develop mission-specific standard operating procedures for movement control operations to guide Mission personnel in performing their functions; and (b) establish key performance indicators and systematically measure and monitor the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of major movement control operations.</p>

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 1 and stated that it would develop and monitor mission-specific SOPs and KPIs to guide its personnel and ensure effectiveness and timeliness of major movement control operations. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of the SOPs and KPIs for key movement control operations, and evidence that the KPIs are being monitored and regularly reported on.

Staff handling dangerous goods did not have the requisite certification

15. All MovCon staff handling dangerous goods are required to have the mandatory International Air Transport Association (IATA) certification on dangerous goods regulations and must be re-certified every 24 months thereafter.

16. Five MovCon staff who did not possess the required certification worked in the warehouse where they would be required to handle or come in contact with dangerous goods. Lack of training in handling dangerous goods increased the risk of accidents from improper handling. According to the Mission, staff had difficulties passing the IATA training and certification exam as it was administered in English and most staff were French speakers. MINUSMA informed OIOS that to address this, it was planning to introduce a French language version of the training on dangerous goods. Based on the action proposed, no recommendation was made.

B. Controls over passengers and cargo movement

There was a need to improve controls over passenger and cargo on United Nations flights

17. Each passenger travelling on United Nations flights must have an approved movement of personnel form (MOP), and non-MINUSMA passengers must sign a waiver of liability, as they are not covered under the applicable insurance policy.

18. A review of 100 of 151,276 MINUSMA passengers and 100 of 38,616 non-MINUSMA passengers who travelled on MINUSMA aircraft during 2016/17 and 2017/18 showed that: (i) 53 MINUSMA passengers and 18 non-MINUSMA passengers used aircraft without approved MOPs; (ii) there was no documentation on whether the travel of 14 non-MINUSMA passengers was related to the Mission's mandate; and (iii) 8 non-MINUSMA passengers travelled without a duly signed waiver of liability. This increased the risk of unauthorized personnel boarding the Mission's aircraft, as well as legal and financial liabilities in case of injury or death of passengers.

19. MINUSMA is required to properly screen passengers and cargo, calibrate its weighing scales and weigh all checked and hand baggage to ensure the stated allowance is not exceeded. Carriage of weapons and ammunitions by passengers on board United Nations aircraft must be duly authorized by the Head of Mission and/or the Director of Mission Support (DMS).

20. OIOS observed the passenger check-in process in Bamako, Kidal, Gao and Mopti noting that, although passengers were screened by functioning scanners in Bamako, Kidal and Gao and by metal detectors in Mopti, MovCon personnel was not systematically enforcing the requirement of seeking approval from the Head of Mission on carrying weapons and ammunitions on board the aircraft. For example, OIOS observed on the flight from Mopti to Bamako on 7 October 2018 that five military officers travelled carrying weapons without authorization from the Head of Mission or DMS.

21. OIOS noted that three weighing scales in the four regions visited had not been calibrated by an independent entity for more than six months since installation. Checked baggage and hand luggage was also not consistently weighed to ensure that prescribed capacity was not exceeded. For instance: (i) the hand luggage was not weighed on any of the five flights observed by OIOS; and (ii) prescribed weights for 4 out of 24 aircraft analyzed was exceeded by between 22 per cent and 45 per cent. In 7 of the 24 cargo manifests reviewed, the weight was not recorded on the manifests.

22. The above occurred due to a lack of detailed guidance and inadequate supervision of MovCon personnel exposing the Mission to the risk of incidents from non-compliance with allowable weight norms and policies on arms on board United Nations aircraft.

(2) MINUSMA should strengthen controls over passenger and cargo movement on its aircraft by: (a) maintaining records of movement of personnel forms for all passengers; (b) ensuring that weighing scales are regularly calibrated by an independent entity; (c) consistently checking weights of luggage to ensure that the allowable weight is not exceeded; and (d) ensuring that arms and ammunitions carried on board are properly authorized.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 2 stating that it started working on improving MOP procedures streamlining the system of approvals. It would coordinate effort of all units involved and take necessary action to strengthen controls over movement of passengers and cargo. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that the Mission is maintaining records for MOPs, calibrating weighing scales at all terminals, monitoring compliance with established allowable weight norms and has strengthened controls over carrying arms on board United Nations aircraft.

Need to revise cost recovery procedures for non-mission passengers and cargo

23. Non-MINUSMA passengers and cargo are authorized on MINUSMA aircraft only for official reasons and when the travel is related to implementation of the Mission's mandate. A memorandum issued by DMS in May 2017, assigned the responsibility for processing MOP forms and initiating cost recovery to the sections sponsoring non-MINUSMA passengers and cargo. The memorandum also established the cost recovery rates for various destinations within the Mission.

24. OIOS reviewed 100 out of 38,616 records of non-MINUSMA passengers travelled in 2016/17 and 2017/18, noting that in all cases there was no indication whether the travel was related to implementation of the Mission's mandate. OIOS estimated that the flight cost related to these 100 passengers was about \$42,000. In addition, a review of 100 of the 446 CMRs of cargo processed during 2016/17 and 2017/18 indicated that the Mission had not recovered the cost of moving non-MINUSMA cargo amounting to \$177,687. There was no documentation justifying the reasons for non-recovery of the associated costs.

25. The above occurred due to a lack of detailed guidance on travel and cargo cost recovery procedures and a lack of oversight by DMS to ensure that Mission components sponsoring non-MINUSMA passengers and cargo were complying with the established procedures.

(3) MINUSMA should revise cost recovery procedures for non-MINUSMA passengers and cargo and establish a mechanism to ensure they are complied with and related costs are recovered in a timely manner.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it will revise travel and cargo cost recovery procedures and establish a mechanism to monitor its implementation by all Mission components. It will review existing SOPs to improve clarity of roles and responsibilities. Recommendation 3 remains

open pending receipt of a copy of the revised procedures and evidence of the mechanism to recover the cost of travel and cargo where applicable.

There were delays in movement of passengers and cargo and a lack of cost effectiveness analysis

26. MINUSMA should utilize the most economical and efficient means to move passengers and cargo by assigning priority levels from one to five, with level one being the highest priority. Due to the high costs involved, cargo is transported by air only when: (i) the priority of the consignment requires urgent movement; (ii) the cargo items are sensitive; (iii) other forms of movement may pose a threat to the safety of the cargo; or (iv) alternative transport modes are unavailable.

27. A review of 118 of 4,603 CMRs processed during the audit period indicated that only 47 CMRs (40 per cent) were executed within the stipulated time for each category. Additionally, 34 CMRs (29 per cent) were delivered to the receiving Sections/Units on average 134 days after the approval by MovCon, and 37 CMRs (31 per cent) were pending movement 50 days after they had been approved, as opposed to the maximum of 21 days recommended by the Manual.

28. This was because MovCon was not consistent in categorizing priority levels for cargo and passengers. For instance, in 27 out of 100 MOPs sampled by OIOS, passengers were moved under a “must fly” category, which was not a defined category. This meant that in situations where flights were already full, passengers who had prior approval to travel based on the initial categorization of one to four, lost their place on the aircraft. Also, as shown in Table 1, for 812 items reviewed for 118 CMRs, the same types of cargo items were moved under different priority levels without explanation. For instance, carpets and personal effects were occasionally placed under the highest priority category.

Table 1
Analysis of cargo priority levels

Items	Priority level				Total
	1	2	3	4	
Blood	98	50	37	-	185
Air conditioner	-	24	14	7	45
Personal effects	23	193	334	4	554
Carpets	13	8	7	-	28
Total					812

Source: MINUSMA data in the Field Support Suite System priority

29. Further, a review of 63 cargo items from 60 CMRs of 1,881 air cargo CMRs showed that 27 cargo items comprising spare parts, stationary, workshop equipment, tables and chairs were airlifted to different regions of MINUSMA without justification for air transportation. At the time of the audit, the tables and chairs included in cargo were pending collection for more than 60 days in the MovCon warehouse in Kidal, which indicated that they were not a priority and did not need airlifting.

30. In addition, OIOS analyzed comparative cost of ground transportation of containers (an average 40 containers monthly) from Bamako to Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal by the transport contingent of a TCC, and a local commercial contractor. The analysis showed that the Mission was paying on average \$474,800 per month to the TCC, while the cost for the same service would be only \$178,400 per month if tasked using the Mission’s commercial contractor.

31. The above occurred because the Mission did not have a procedure to systematically determine the most economical means of cargo transportation. The Mission explained that it sometimes had to use costly means considering the security situation, but this justification was not being documented. As a result, the Mission was incurring higher costs due to airlifting non-urgent cargo and using a more expensive ground transportation service provider. Recommendation 1, once implemented, will address the issues described in this section.

Need to strengthen controls over cargo approval process

32. All cargo transported by the United Nations must have CMRs approved by MINUSMA staff who are on the list of authorized personnel.

33. Due to a lack of a duly promulgated list of staff authorized to approve CMRs, the approving function in FSS was assigned to staff based on email requests from section chiefs. Out of 102 staff assigned this role, 81 staff had not been delegated the authority to approve such transactions, resulting in unauthorized cargo movements. For instance, in January 2018, a staff member transported personal cargo declaring it as cargo of the Welfare Unit. The investigation by Mission's Special Investigation Unit established that the content of the cargo was not for official business. In another instance, a non-MINUSMA cargo comprising tables, chairs and computers weighing 246 kg were airlifted from Bamako to Kidal as MINUSMA cargo, as this had been authorized by a staff in the Human Rights Division.

34. A review of 76 cargo manifests relating to 118 of 4,603 CMRs raised to move 40,148 tons of cargo indicated that cargo relating to 35 CMRs (30 per cent) were transported without approval, and in 12 cases (10 per cent), although approved, the CMRs were not uploaded in FSS. MINUSMA explained that the missing CMRs could be for empty pallets used to protect the cargo being transported. The above occurred due to lack of controls over cargo movement exposing the Mission to the risk of unauthorized cargo movement at unnecessary cost to the Mission.

(4) MINUSMA should promulgate the list of staff authorized to approve cargo movement requests and implement a mechanism to ensure that only duly authorized cargo is transported by United Nations transportation resources.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the Mission will promulgate a list of staff authorized to approve CMRs and implement a mechanism to ensure that only authorized cargo is transported by United Nations transportation resources. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of a copy of the list of authorized approvers for CMRs and evidence of the mechanism established to ensure that only authorized cargo is transported by United Nations transportation resources.

There was a need to improve cargo storage facilities and strengthen controls over cargo processing

35. MINUSMA is required to maintain secured cargo storage areas fitted with closed circuit television (CCTV), where possible, and scanners for screening cargo, and proper facility for receiving, sorting and checking cargo.

36. OIOS visits to MovCon facilities indicated that proper cargo facilities had been constructed in Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu. However, MovCon had not installed CCTVs and scanners in any of the facilities for security purposes and to screen cargo. Additionally, in Kidal and Mopti the required warehouse facilities, such as sufficient floor area for receiving, sorting and checking cargo, storage spilt into bays for each cargo destination/location and separate location for dangerous goods, high value consignments, perishable goods and damaged cargo were not constructed.

37. The above occurred because the Mission did not prioritize the need to establish safe and secure cargo facilities in the regions due to budget constraints. The lack of adequately secured areas for processing and insufficient cargo storage space increased security risk and could impact efficient and effective cargo movement.

(5) MINUSMA should improve security of cargo storage facilities and enhance controls over cargo processing.

MINUSMA accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the Mission will establish safe cargo storage facilities in all MovCon locations, and ensure that cargo is duly screened. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of evidence of the improvement made on safe cargo storage facilities and cargo processing.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

38. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MINUSMA for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

(Signed) Eleanor T. Burns
Director, Internal Audit Division
Office of Internal Oversight Services

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of Movement Control Operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ² / Important ³	C/ O ⁴	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁵
1	MINUSMA should: (a) develop mission-specific standard operating procedures for movement control operations to guide Mission personnel in performing their functions; and (b) establish key performance indicators and systematically measure and monitor the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of major movement control operations.	Important	O	Receipt of the SOPs and KPIs for key movement control operations, and evidence that the KPIs are being monitored and regularly reported on.	31 December 2019
2	MINUSMA should strengthen controls over passenger and cargo movement on its aircraft by: (a) maintaining records of movement of personnel forms for all passengers; (b) ensuring that weighing scales are regularly calibrated by an independent entity; (c) consistently checking weights of luggage to ensure that the allowable weight is not exceeded; and (d) ensuring that arms and ammunitions carried on board are properly authorized.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence that the Mission is maintaining records for MOPs, calibrating weighing scales at all terminals, monitoring compliance with established allowable weight norms and has strengthen controls over carrying arms on board United Nations aircraft.	30 April 2020
3	MINUSMA should revise cost recovery procedures for non-MINUSMA passengers and cargo and establish a mechanism to ensure they are complied with and related costs are recovered in a timely manner.	Important	O	Receipt of a copy of the revised procedures and evidence of the mechanism to recover the cost of travel and cargo where applicable.	30 April 2020
4	MINUSMA should promulgate the list of staff authorized to approve cargo movement requests and implement a mechanism to ensure that only duly authorized cargo is transported by United Nations transportation resources.	Important	O	Receipt of a copy of the list of authorized approvers for CMRs and evidence of the mechanism established to ensure that only authorized cargo is transported by United Nations transportation resources.	30 April 2020

² Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided with regard to the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

³ Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

⁴ C = closed, O = open

⁵ Date provided by MINUSMA in response to recommendations.

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Audit of Movement Control Operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ² / Important ³	C/ O ⁴	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ⁵
5	MINUSMA should improve security of cargo storage facilities and enhance controls over cargo processing.	Important	O	Receipt of evidence of the improvement made on safe cargo storage facilities and cargo processing.	30 April 2020





APPENDIX I

Management Response

FACSIMILE

18 April 2019

Reference: MINUSMA/ODMS/2019/125

TO: Mr. Daeyoung Park Chief Peacekeeping Audit Service Internal Audit Division OIOS, Entebbe	FROM: Michael Mulinge Kitivi Director of Mission Support <i>for</i> 
ATTN: Mr. Seydou Sirpe Chief Resident Auditor Bamako	
INFO:	
FAX #:	FAX #:
TEL #:	TEL #:
SUBJECT: Draft report on an audit of movement control operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); (Assignment No: AP2017/641/10)	
Total number of transmitted pages including this page: 3	
<p>Reference: Facsimile, IAD-17/641/10, dated 2 April 2019; and, Peacekeeping Audit Service, OIOS, memorandum of 2 April 2019, OIOS-2019.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. In reply to the referenced correspondence, please find attached MINUSMA's Management Response to the OIOS findings and recommendations as presented in the subject report.2. Note has been taken of the areas of concern that warrant attention and the production of an action plan for implementing the recommendations. For enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of MINUSMA operations, all necessary actions to improve will be taken. <p>Best wishes.</p>	
Drafted by: Boniface Mailu, AA/RMCU 	Authorized by: John Rodopoulos, SAO 
Through: Adja SAKHO, OIC RMCU 	

Management Response

Audit of Movement Control Operations in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical ¹ / Important ²	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	MINUSMA should: (a) develop mission-specific standard operating procedures for movement control operations to guide Mission personnel; and (b) establish key performance indicators and systematically measure and monitor effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of key movement control operations.	Important	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chief Movcon 	31 December 2019	<p>MINUSMA concurs with the recommendation.</p> <p>(a) MINUSMA will provide mission-specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) for movement control (MovCon) operations to provide guidance to Mission personnel.</p> <p>(b) MINUSMA will develop and monitor achievement of key performance indicators (KPIs) for effectivity and to ensure compliance with planned timeliness of major MovCon operations.</p>
2	MINUSMA should strengthen controls over passenger and cargo movement including: (i) maintaining records of movement of personnel forms for all passengers traveling on United Nations flights; (ii) ensuring that weighing scales are regularly calibrated by an independent entity; (iii) consistently checking weights of luggage to ensure that the allowable weight is not exceeded; and, (iv) enforcing the requirement that arms and ammunitions carried on board United Nations aircraft are properly authorized.	Important	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chief Movcon ▪ Chief Security ▪ Chief Centralized Warehousing ▪ O-DMS 	30 April 2020	<p>MINUSMA agrees with the recommendations.</p> <p>The Mission has started to work on improving the Movement of Personnel (MOP) procedures and streamlining the system of approvals [serial (i)]. Furthermore, please note that some of the actions to be taken in relation to serials (ii), (iii) and (iv) depend on other MSD Sections. Notwithstanding, MovCon will undertake a coordinated effort to ensure that all necessary steps are taken to implement the recommendations.</p>

¹ Critical recommendations address critical and/or pervasive deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided about the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

² Important recommendations address important (but not critical or pervasive) deficiencies in governance, risk management or control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical1/ Important2	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
3	MINUSMA should revise travel and cargo cost recovery procedures for non-MINUSMA passengers and cargo and establish a mechanism to ensure it is complied with and related costs are recovered in a timely manner.	Important	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chief Movcon ▪ Chief Central Acquisition Unit ▪ Chief Aviation Section ▪ O-DMS 	30 April 2020	MINUSMA concurs with the recommendation. All processes for cost recovery relating to non-MINUSMA passengers are being revised and a mechanism to monitor cargo for all Mission components to comply with the cost recovery procedures will be established. The extant MINUSMA SOP will be reviewed with an aim to improve clarity on roles and responsibilities.
4	MINUSMA should promulgate the list of staff authorized to approve cargo movement requests and implement a mechanism to ensure that only duly authorized cargo is transported by United Nations transportation resources.	Important	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chief Movcon ▪ Chief FTS 	30 April 2020	MINUSMA concurs with the recommendation. Measures will be taken to promulgate the list of staff authorized to approve cargo movement requests and to implement a mechanism to ensure that only duly authorized cargo is transported by United Nations transportation resources.
5	MINUSMA should take necessary action to improve security of cargo storage facilities and enhance controls over cargo screening process.	Important	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chief Movcon ▪ Chief Security ▪ Chief FTS ▪ Chief Engineering ▪ Chief Aviation 	30 April 2020	The Mission agrees with the recommendation and will establish safe cargo storage facilities in all movement control locations to ensure that cargo is duly screened and only authorized cargo is moved.