



INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

EVALUATION REPORT

**Programme evaluation of the Standing Police
Capacity of the Police Division, DPKO**

12 June 2015*

(*Reissued 6 July 2015 for technical reasons)

Assignment No.: IED-14-012

INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

FUNCTION *“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organisation. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organisation;” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).*

Project team members include:

RAHUL SUR, CHIEF, PEACEKEEPING EVALUATION SECTION &
PROJECT LEADER

HYO JIN KWON, TEAM MEMBER

FREDERIK TRETTIN, TEAM MEMBER

CONTACT INFORMATION OIOS/IED Contact Information:
phone: +1 212-963-8148; fax: +1 212-963-1211; email: ied@un.org

RAHUL SUR, CHIEF, PEACEKEEPING EVALUATION SECTION

Tel: +1 212-963-0495, Fax: +1 212-963-1211

e-mail: sur@un.org

(EDDIE) YEE WOO GUO, DIRECTOR

Tel: +1 917-367-8516, Fax: +1 212-963-1211

e-mail: guoy@un.org

Evaluation of the Standing Police Capacity of the Police Division, DPKO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Standing Police Capacity (SPC) of the Police Division (PD), of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was initially proposed by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004. Subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005, and created following the World Summit in 2005, the SPC is an innovative landmark in international policing. Its 40 personnel are based in Brindisi, Italy, and can be rapidly deployed to provide start-up capacity for new peace operations and assist the police components of existing United Nations peacekeeping operations, special political missions and United Nations funds and programmes.

When deployed, the SPC has made a plausible and positive contribution to missions' police-related work and tasks. It has also been versatile in the range of products and services it has delivered. Yet, the vision behind its creation, that it would be a largely field deployed entity, has never been fully realized. Since its establishment in June 2006, the SPC's field deployment has fluctuated, but overall, its service has been chronically underutilized. From April 2007 to December 2014, its average deployment rate has been 33.5 per cent as against the anticipated rate of 65 per cent communicated to Member States. Its deployment patterns indicate that large peacekeeping missions did not generate demand proportionate to their size. However, special political missions did generate significant demand for its services.

Both financial and non-financial factors are inhibiting demand for the SPC. A significant constraint is its financial model, which requires the SPC to rely on field missions to fund the travel and related allowance costs of personnel deployments. Efforts to encourage missions to budget for SPC deployments have made little headway and current projected demand for the SPC remains low as only two peacekeeping missions and two special political missions have asked for its assistance for the period 2014-2015. Its short deployment span (three to six months) also inhibits demand. Missions request the services of the SPC primarily to acquire skills and profiles they lack internally and on an ad hoc basis. Among the factors favouring demand is the knowledge of the head of the police component in a mission about the SPC. The SPC faces some key challenges to its effectiveness: (i) its occupational specialities have not changed since 2006 with the exception of the addition of posts; (ii) there is potential for duplication between the SPC's work and other sections of PD; (iii) the internal cohesion of the SPC within PD is a long-standing issue; (iv) the established reporting mechanisms do not favour the visibility of the work done by the SPC; (v) it has been inadequately supported in the Global Focal Point arrangements for Police, Justice, and Corrections partnership in Headquarters; and (vi) there is a long-running but inconclusive debate on the efficiency and effectiveness of the SPC's location in Brindisi.

OIOS-IED has made one critical and three important recommendations. These include consideration by the General Assembly to enhance the authority and flexibility of DPKO to effect changes in the SPC's occupational specialities; centralized funding to support the SPC's functioning; deciding a deployment rate for the SPC against which its performance can be measured and addressing the issue of the SPC's location.

Contents	Paragraph	Page
I. Introduction.....	1-2	6
II. Scope and methodology.....	3-5	6-7
III. Background.....	6-14	7-9
IV. Results.....	15-66	9-23
(a) The SPC has been chronically underutilised, resulting in.... poor use of financial resources that have supported staff costs	15-31	9-16
(b) Both financial and non-financial factors are inhibiting SPC.... deployment	32-47	16-20
(c) When deployed, the SPC has made a plausible and positive Contribution to missions' police-related work and tasks.....	48-57	20-22
(d) Risks of duplication and poor cohesion within the PD, low.... visibility of its reported results, inadequate support for partnerships, and uncertainty about its location remain as constraints.	58-66	22-24
V. Conclusion.....	67-75	24-25
VI. Recommendations.....		26
Annexes		
I. SCP Organigram.....		27
II. Program Impact Pathway.....		28
III. Comments on the draft from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations...		29
IV. Comments by the OIOS-IED.....		31
V. Recommendation Action Plan.....		32

Acronyms

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
ECOWAS	Economic Commission of West Africa States
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS/IED	Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services
PD	Police Division
PIP	Program Impact Pathway
SPC	Standing Police Capacity
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNAMID	African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNGSC-UNLB	UN Global Support Centre/UN Logistics Base
UNIOGBIS	UN Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea Bissau
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force in Abyei
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOWA	UN Office in West Africa
UNSMIL	UN Support Mission in Libya
UNPOL	United Nations Police
WACI	West Africa Coast Initiative

I. Introduction

1. A notable aspect of the police components of peacekeeping missions in the past decade has been their fast growth. The number of United Nations police increased from approximately 7,000 in December 2005 to more than 12,400 in December 2014,¹ a gain of about 77 per cent. Simultaneously, the mandated tasks of United Nations police have grown in scale and complexity. From assisting host States and other partners in rebuilding and reforming their police to protecting civilians, United Nations police now provide support across a wide range of police related duties. As a result, most peacekeeping operations require, during their start-up and life cycle, specialist police assistance. The Standing Police Capacity (SPC) of the Police Division (PD) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been designed to offer such assistance and is the focus of this evaluation.

2. This evaluation was requested by DPKO in 2013 and, upon its confirmation as a high-risk topic in the OIOS-IED peacekeeping risk assessment exercise, was conducted under the mandate of Office of Internal Oversight Services, Inspection and Evaluation Division (OIOS-IED). OIOS-IED evaluations are intended to enable “systematic reflection” among Member States and the Secretariat.² The OIOS-IED is grateful for the support provided by DPKO/DFS and the missions contacted during the evaluation process.

II. Scope and methodology

3. The evaluation assessed the results and overall performance of the SPC from 2007 to December 2014, focusing on its effectiveness, efficiency and relevance. Emphasis was placed on the period after 2008, as the SPC’s work was assessed after its first year of operation by a Panel of Experts in 2008.³

4. The results of this evaluation are based on:

- (a) Self-reported data by the SPC;
- (b) A total of 97 semi-structured interviews, in person or by telephone with:
 - (i) Management and staff of the SPC and the PD;
 - (ii) Staff in DPKO/DFS associated with the work of the SPC;
 - (iii) Mission personnel including heads of police components in 11 field missions;⁴
 - (iv) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) personnel;
- (c) A visit to the headquarters of the SPC in Brindisi and a field mission to MINUSTAH;
- (d) Programme performance reports of the SPC and reports by the Secretary-General on various peacekeeping missions;
- (e) The 2008 Panel of Experts report; and

¹ Source: DPKO/DFS fact sheets.

² ST/SGB/2000/8 Regulation 7.1.

³ A/63/630.


⁴ United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS), and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

(f) A review of selected outputs produced by the SPC.⁵

5. The evaluation conducted had some limitations. Given the small size of the SPC and the scale of its work relative to the scale of United Nations policing activity in peace operations, the evaluation could only establish whether the SPC had made plausible contributions toward the work of mission police components. The evaluation was not able to assess the achievement of higher-level outcomes at the strategic level, nor at the level of the police components of peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, due to time and resource constraints, the evaluation team was able to visit only one field location where the SPC had operated (Haiti) in addition to its headquarters in Brindisi.

III. Background

6. In February 2005, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (henceforth “the Special Committee”) requested the United Nations Secretariat to develop the concept of a standing police capacity in co-operation with Member States.⁶ An informal working group consisting of relevant DPKO and Member States representatives from the Special Committee was established on the SPC concept. The Special Committee’s request was born, in part, out of the lessons learned from the use of standby arrangements in the on-call roster of 100 police officers recommended in 2000 by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.⁷ Those arrangements were not able to bring police expertise on board as quickly as had been anticipated. During the World Summit in September 2005, the Heads of State and Governments also called for the creation of an initial operating capability of the SPC. This was officially endorsed by the Special Committee in February 2006 and approved by the General Assembly in 2006.⁸ Some significant milestones in the SPC’s history are as follows:



⁵ Criteria for the selection of outputs included: size, type and geographic location of SPC mission and budget performance period.

⁶ A/59/19/Rev. 1, paragraph 83, A/RES/60/1, paragraph 92.

⁷ A/55/305 – S/2000/809.

⁸ A/RES/60/268.

7. The SPC was established with 27 posts. A head at the D-1 level oversees the SPC's work and reports to the Police Adviser of PD. Fourteen posts were added in 2010, bringing its total staffing to 41. One post was abolished in July 2012 leaving 40 posts. Until recently, the SPC staff consisted of 16 civilians and 24 seconded officers (See Annex I). In 2014, the Secretary-General proposed to abolish 3 posts in SPC and establish them under the Support Account of the PD. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters (ACABQ) supported this request.

8. The SPC acts as the rapidly deployable arm of the PD and operates at the general discretion of the Under-Secretary-General, DPKO. Policies on its organisation and functions were drafted in 2006 and revised in 2013 (henceforth the "2006 policy" and '2013 policy').⁹ The SPC is one of the four sections of PD and has two core functions:

- a. to provide the start-up capability of the police component of new peace operations, to give it strategic direction to ensure its immediate and long-term effectiveness, efficiency and professionalism;
- b. to provide advice, expertise and assistance to the police components of existing United Nations peace operations. If specifically directed, it can also conduct operational assessments and evaluations of police components.

9. The SPC can also provide expertise to other United Nations entities, such as the special political missions managed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Each SPC deployment is based on terms of reference that outline the specific objective(s) to be achieved.

10. The SPC's architects designed it as a field-oriented entity to be routinely deployed in missions, with very little time spent in its headquarters. In April 2005, the SPC Working Group noted 'all participants understood and accepted the fact that SPC personnel would spend the majority of their time, i.e. 80 per cent, working in existing missions.' This explicit reference to a percentage of time that the SPC staff members could expect to be deployed in the field was never incorporated in any of its policy or planning documents. The 2006 policy stated only that 'the average duration of an SPC assignment under its first 'start-up' function would be 120 days, while the duration of its assignments under its second 'advisory' function will vary according to the direction of the Police Adviser and the nature of the tasks assigned to it.' However, the 2006 policy did mention an important limiting parameter: in between its in-mission assignments, the SPC would be based in its duty station for 'approximately 60 days.' The SPC's 2013 policy stated only that, for its first core function, the duration would be determined by 'the operational needs of the mission' and for the second core function, it 'shall vary according to the direction received from the Police Adviser and the nature of the assigned tasks'.

11. At the same time, and despite the fact that the SPC policy documents did not specify the percentage of time that staff could expect to spend in the field, its vacancy announcements and *notes verbales* to permanent missions of Member States to the

⁹ Policy Directive dated 1 May 2006 on the Establishment, Functions and Organization of the United Nations Standing Police Capacity and Policy dated 1 January 2013 on the Functions and Organization of the Standing Police Capacity.

United Nations explicitly did so. For example, the SPC's very first vacancy announcement in October 2006 (for the post of police reform adviser) informed potential applicants that they would be working in the field 65 per cent of the time. Explicit references to this 65/35 per cent ratio continued until 2012 when PD leadership decided to remove such references in vacancy announcements and *notes verbales*. However, no alternative deployment rate was specified. In 2012, an internal review panel recommended discontinuing the use of the term 'under-deployment' and substituting it with 'underutilisation'.

12. Mission requests for SPC deployments are made to the Under-Secretary-General, DPKO, who, acting on the recommendation of the Police Adviser through the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, decides whether and when a deployment will be made and authorizes its terms of reference.

13. SPC's staff costs for the 2013-2014 biennium are \$4,817,832. Those costs are included in the budget of the United Nations Global Support Centre/United Nations Logistics Base (UNGSC/UNLB) at Brindisi, Italy, where SPC has the status of a 'substantive DPKO tenant unit.' SPC's travel budget for the same period is \$100,984. The travel and daily subsistence allowance (DSA) costs associated with SPC deployments are required to be included in annual budgetary submissions of the requesting entity unless other funding arrangements are in place. In effect, the SPC is deployed to missions only when missions request and pay for its services (DSA and travel only), with very few exceptions.

14. A recent institutional arrangement relevant to the work of the SPC is the Global Focal Point (henceforth GFP) for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations, established by the Secretary-General in September 2012.¹⁰

IV. Results

A. The SPC has been chronically underutilized, resulting in poor use of financial resources that have supported staff costs

15. As stated above, the SPC has no explicit policy or managerial target for deployment, but its vacancy announcements and *notes verbales* to permanent missions of Member States to the United Nations initially indicated a staff deployment rate of 65 per cent.

16. Management interviewees for the evaluation differed on the appropriateness of the 65 per cent deployment rate. The range of desirable deployment rates expressed ranged between 60 to 80 per cent. OIOS-IED notes that a 65 per cent deployment rate translates into 143 working days of mission deployment per year. Prima facie, this appears reasonable given Member States' intent behind the SPC's establishment. It may be noted that the panel of experts' report referenced a deployment rate of 67 per cent.¹¹


¹⁰ Under this, DPKO and the United Nations Development Programme constitute this Global Focal Point.

¹¹ A/63/630, paragraph 23 and 42.

17. Measured against the anticipated and communicated rate of 65 per cent, the SPC's actual deployment rate has fallen far short of expectations (see Chart 1). Between April 2007 and December 2014, it has had an average deployment rate of 33.5 per cent on the basis of staff actually on-board. This translates into 74 days of field deployment per 220 working days per year, 69 days less than anticipated.

18. Overall, its deployment pattern shows marked variations from year to year. Excluding 2007 (the year following when the SPC was created and still recruiting) and 2009 (its year of relocation), the lowest deployment rate was in 2011 with 27.8 per cent. If the exceptional years of 2007 and 2009 are excluded, the average deployment rate of the SPC rises to 37 per cent, 28 percentage points or 43 per cent less than the rate envisaged. Internal documents demonstrate that the SPC's low deployment has been a matter of concern for senior management, Member States, the Special Committee and the financial committees.

Chart 1
Year-to-year deployment rate of the SPC 1 April 2007 to 31 December 2014
(per cent of available days)¹²



19. The relatively high SPC deployments in 2008, 2010, 2013 AND 2014 are accounted for, respectively, by mission start-up in MINURCAT in 2008; post-earthquake assistance to MINUSTAH and police component start-up for UNIOGBIS in 2010; mission start-up in MINUSMA in 2013; and mission start-up in MINUSCA in 2014.

20. The low rate of SPC's utilization has had financial consequences. Organization has had on its payroll staff members who, for reasons beyond their control, were not optimally utilised in the functions for which they were recruited.

¹² The deployment rate is calculated by the ratio of 'actual number of days of SPC staff deployed to the field' to the 'total number of days based on SPC staff on board'. Data for 2007-2011 is taken from the SPC's time keeping system called the 'chrono'-system and from the 'time-sheet'-system for 2012-2014. The total number of worked days is based on the assumption of 220 working days per staff on board (5 working days per week, 52 weeks per year, subtracting 10 UN holidays, subtracting 2.5 leave days per month). In consultation with the SPC it is assumed that SPC staff worked six out of seven days per week while deployed to the field. Differing totals are due to data problems that could not be resolved.

From 2007 to 2014, the United Nations paid a total of approximately \$7.8 million as salary to poorly used personnel who were not field deployed for the anticipated 65 per cent.

The SPC has been used inconsistently in mission start-ups, and its biggest contribution has been to existing missions

21. Analysing SPC deployment patterns by its core functions, deployment data suggests that the SPC has been used inconsistently in its first core function of mission start-ups. For instance, it was not used when UNAMID was established or when MONUC was followed by MONUSCO. Despite a very limited contribution to operational assessments and evaluations of police components, the majority of its deployment days were for its second core function of providing assistance to existing missions.

Chart 2

SPC deployment pattern by core function April 2007 to December 2014




Table 1
SPC deployment days by first and second core functions until December 2014
(days deployed)

1st core function:		2nd core function:	
Mission start-up		Assistance to existing missions	
(3,569)		(9,875)	
MINUSMA	(1076)	MINURCAT	(1072)
MINURCAT	(801)	UNAMA	(970)
BINUCA/MINUSCA	(774)	UNSMIL	(895)
UNOGBIS/UNIOGBIS	(476)	UNPOS	(887)
UNAMI	(286)	MINUSTAH	(779)
UNSMIL	(78)	UNDP-CHAD	(750)
UNISFA	(78)	UNMISS	(731)
		UNMIL	(699)
		UNMIT	(503)
		WACI/UNODC	(331)
		UNISFA	(324)
		MONUC/MONUSCO	(302)
		UNMIS	(236)
		UNOGBIS/UNIOGBIS	(229)
		UNOCI	(186)
		UNOM	(156)
		CoESPU	(137)
		UNIPSIL	(130)
		UNOWA	(130)
		MINUSMA	(118)
		MINURSO	(102)
		UNAMID	(59)
		OHCHR (Syria)	(45)
		UNMIK	(30)
		UNDP-MOZAMBIQUE	(24)
		DPA (Sahel)	(19)
		UNAMI	(15)
		UNOAU	(15)

Large peacekeeping missions did not generate demand for the SPC proportionate to their size

22. There is large variation in the deployment of the SPC. Its deployments, ranked by the number of total days deployed per mission, show, *inter-alia*, the following patterns:


- a. At the time of writing this report, the SPC's largest deployment remains its first deployment to MINURCAT,¹³ followed by its deployment to MINUSMA. All deployments to peacekeeping missions amount to 58.5 per cent of all deployment days of the SPC.
- b. MONUSCO and UNAMID, both large missions, made little use of the SPC's services. The police personnel in these two missions account for 33.1 per cent of the total police components in all peacekeeping missions but for only 2.7 per cent of the SPC's total deployment days for peacekeeping missions.¹⁴

¹³The mission had a maximum strength of 259 police officers on 28 February 2010.

¹⁴MONUSCO and UNAMID combined, had 4,118 police personnel approximately, as of 31 December 2014.

- c. MINUSTAH used SPC for fewer days than the three special political missions UNSMIL, UNAMA and UNPOS.¹⁵

Chart 3
Duration of SPC deployments, April 2007- December 2014
 (number of days)



Special political missions generated significant demand for the SPC’s services despite their tiny size as compared to peacekeeping missions


23. General Assembly Resolution 60/1 of October 2005 describes the core functions of the SPC and mandates it to assist peacekeeping missions. The SPC’s 2006 policy document specified its work as comprising only two core functions. In 2010, its responsibilities were extended to include providing assistance to missions

¹⁵ MINUSTAH’s police component numbered 4,391 in June 2010, which decreased to 2,256 in December 2014.

led by DPA.¹⁶ In 2013, its revised policy stated, ‘in addition to its core functions, the SPC may be requested to provide expertise to other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes as appropriate and in accordance with relevant available skills.’

24. Taken together, these four documents suggest that peacekeeping missions were the primary clients, while assistance to DPA-led missions and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes was added subsequently. However, data shows that special political missions accounted for a disproportionately large percentage of the SPC’s total deployment time.¹⁷ A total of 38 police personnel in all special political missions absorbed 4,141 days of the SPC’s deployment time, whereas 12,752 police personnel in all peacekeeping missions accounted for 7,871 days of the SPC’s deployment time. Among special political missions, UNSMIL accounted for most number of SPC deployment days. The SPC has been deployed to two UNDP-led missions: UNDP-Chad and UNDP-Mozambique in 2009 and 2011 respectively. In UNDP-Chad, it was deployed for a cumulative total of 750 days after its first deployment in 2011.

Chart 4
SPC deployment days by entity April 2007 to December 2014



Source: DPKO/DFS & DPA fact sheets. As of December 2014 the total number of police personnel in peacekeeping missions is approximately 12,436. MINURCAT had 259 as of 28 February 2010 and UNMIT 57 as of 30 November 2012. Includes Formed Police Units (FPU) and Individual Police Officers (IPO). No data on number of police personnel available for UNDP and other UN entities.

25. The SPC’s assistance to both special political missions and UNDP is clearly a valid use of its resources. At the same time, despite its low deployment rates and availability of staff, the extent to which special political missions have used the SPC suggests that the SPC’s primary ‘customers’ – peacekeeping missions – have not paid adequate attention to SPC deployment as compared to other entities that were added to its responsibilities subsequent to its establishment.

¹⁶ ST/SGB/2010/1.

¹⁷ For example, UNIOGBIS has 15 police personnel.

Some of SPC’s occupational specialties are deployed more frequently while others deployed rarely

26. There were marked variations in the deployment rate of the SPC’s different occupational specialties (Table 2). Interviews with SPC staff revealed that its low deployment rate had surprised and dismayed many of them. Some considered their professional skills had not been optimally utilized while others emphasized their concern about inadequate use of resources. Interviewees suggested that because of their light workload, some of them improvised and created tasks and responsibilities that had little to do with their job description, such as creating induction packages for staff, in-house tool kits, research papers.

27. The SPC’s occupational specialties can also be ranked by their deployment rate and cumulative days as follows:

**Table 2
Deployment days and rate for each occupational specialty of SPC**

Occupational Specialities	No. of personnel	Staff level	Deployment rate (%)	Cumulative days deployed
Gender	1	P-3	62.8%	479
Police Planning	2	P-3	43.0%	944
Public Order	3	P-3/P-4	43.0%	1360
Community Policing	2	P-3/P-4	41.4%	1172
Police Reform	6	P-3/P-4	40.9%	2509
Legal	2	P-3/P-4	40.7%	848
Transnational Crime	2	P-3/P-4	36.1%	791
Team Leader	3	P-5	35.4%	1227
Training	2	P-4	35.1%	1128
Chief SPC	1	D-1	23.2%	330
Investigations	2	P-3/P-4	22.8%	572
Police Analyst	1	P-3	22.2%	316
Budget/Fund Management	1	P-3	21.9%	152
Police Information Technology	2	P-3	21.4%	387
Team Assistant	2	FS4	20.9%	72
Logistics	2	P-3/P-4	19.6%	400
Detentions	1	P-4	18.6%	261
Human resources management	2	P-3/P-4	17.4%	142
Public Information	1	P-4 (abolished)	12.6%	111
Special Assistant	1	P-4	0	Not applicable
Administrative Support (GS)	2	GS-5	0	Not applicable
Total	41			

Source: OIOS-IED analysis based on deployment data provided by DPKO/DFS. Public information post was abolished in 2012. Deployment rate calculation: Numerator: deployment days for each occupational specialty; Denominator: total available days for each occupational specialty.

28. Table 2 suggests:

- The occupational speciality of gender, which was added in 2010, had high demand, but still could not be deployed to the expected 65 per cent.
- Assisting in the reform of national law enforcement is a high priority for the police components of peace operations. However, as the highest deployed specialty (2509 days), it was deployed at only 40.9 per cent of the capacity.
- Police components also emphasise community policing, as evidenced by the demand for this specialty;

- There was low demand for investigations expertise as missions consider they have this skill internally; and
- Occupational specialties, including police communications, public information and human resources management, had very low deployment rates.

The SPC's occupational specialties have remained static

29. Missions' specific needs for police assistance and skills change constantly. Despite operating in a demand-based environment and facing low deployment rates for several of its established occupational specialties, SPC's occupational specialties have never been reviewed or modified. The only exception was when its strength was increased by 17 with new specialties. While the Mission Management and Support Section (MMSS) of PD gathers information from missions on their projected need for SPC support, this has not been used for re-profiling SPC skills and expertise.

30. Interviewees suggested that considering the dynamic environment in international policing, there was a need to review the usefulness of the SPC's profiles to deliver the best service in the field. In addition, some stakeholder interviewees suggested the urgency of recruiting personnel with necessary language skills.

31. The PD emphasized its difficulty in rapidly modifying the SPC's occupational specialties owing to the lengthy process involved that required a change of job title and description to be approved by the General Assembly.

B. Both financial and non-financial factors are inhibiting SPC deployment

32. The SPC's financial model is a significant constraint on its operations. Twenty-two out of 60 interviewees (including PD management and stakeholders) emphasized the lack of funding for the SPC as a critical bottleneck. One SPC manager described its effects as "totally counterproductive" and suggested that "the budgetary committee" ought to be informed of such limitations. SPC staff also considered that the financial arrangements had prevented the SPC from responding to "real needs" in missions. "We are in nobody's budget," said one interviewee. However, funding was not perceived to be an issue during mission start-up, as the availability of funds was much greater.

Efforts to encourage missions to budget for SPC deployments have made little headway

33. In 2012, 19 peacekeeping and special political missions were strongly encouraged by DPKO/DFS via a code cable to include provisions for travel and DSA expenses for SPC deployments in their future annual budgetary submissions.¹⁸ However, no mission has committed a budget for SPC deployment for the budget cycles of 2012-2013 and so far only two peacekeeping missions have made provisions for SPC's deployment by using their 2014-2015 approved budgets.

¹⁸ Code Cable 1431.

34. During interviews, mission leadership commented on the difficulty of using the SPC due to funding arrangements and the obstacles in making financial provisions in their budgets for SPC deployments. Some stated that results-based budgeting was not flexible enough and allowed “no provision for contingency.” One interviewee stated that the mission’s budget personnel acted as a “filter” that questioned the use of funds for SPC deployment.

35. It is significant that the reasons given by missions for the non-inclusion of provisions for SPC deployment in their budgets appear to contradict the position held at Headquarters. The position of Headquarters’ officials is that missions can budget for SPC deployments in advance and that current budgetary instructions require SPC travel expenses and DSA to be provided for upfront in missions’ budgets.¹⁹ This is an important disconnect between Headquarters and mission officials’ understanding of what is permissible within the Organization’s budgetary processes. This disagreement also suggests that restrictive interpretations of budgetary rules in missions are adversely impacting advance planning for SPC deployments.

36. Apart from apparent misunderstandings related to the budgetary process, mission interviewees also considered that funding for SPC purposes needed to be decided at higher levels, including at the level of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). It was felt to be a mission-wide concern, not only that of the police component. It was suggested that giving Police Commissioners greater leeway in decision making and control over their budgets would be a positive development.

37. Some mission staff also expressed the view that activities suggested by Headquarters, which were not a part of the mission’s planning and not supported by the mission’s budget lines, but for which Headquarters nonetheless required the mission to pay, would be viewed negatively and even opposed by mission budget personnel. The question of a budget for the SPC was, for them, one that should be addressed by Headquarters rather than missions. Furthermore, according to the SPC, a significant amount of DSA is owed to SPC staff for their completed deployments. According to the SPC, this presented a serious impediment to the individual staff members for their future deployments.

Projected demand remains low for the SPC in 2014-2015

38. The budgetary constraints that act as a brake on the SPC’s deployment are expected to continue, and only two peacekeeping missions and two special political missions (MINUSTAH, UNMIL, UNIOGBIS and UNAMA) have responded with a willingness to use the SPC for budget period 2014-2015, although they did not make provisions for the SPC’s deployment in their original budgets.

39. Within DPKO, the reported reason for this demand shortfall was that missions were “hesitant to request SPC support and prefer to use the existing expertise within the UNPOL component due to non-availability of funding, short deployment span and [the lack of] continuity in the implementation of programmes.” Both MONUSCO and UNAMID have ruled out any deployment of SPC in 2014-2015. So far, two

¹⁹ See A/63/630 page 8, paragraph 21.

peacekeeping missions have made provisions for the SPC's deployment by using their 2014-2015 approved budgets.

Non-financial factors also reduce demand for the SPC

40. Missions generally considered the SPC's normal deployment span of three to six months too short. MINUSTAH, for example, reported a lack of qualified civilian police expertise to support the technical advisory services required for the development of the Haitian National Police (HNP) in the areas of personnel, budget and finance, procurement and supply, legal affairs, logistics management, monitoring and evaluation, project management, registry and archives, forensics, and information technology.²⁰ When asked why it had not approached the SPC for these skills, the interviewee stated that the short-term deployment of SPC did not make the effort worthwhile. The mission was seeking longer-term solutions. Other missions shared this view.

41. Limited awareness about the SPC, its role and capacity also contributed to low demand, with 13 interviewees referring to this factor. Document analysis reinforces this point. For example, a confidential DPKO/DFS evaluation document analysed and catalogued in detail the skills profiles that would be needed for a mission in terms of civilian police capacities but made a brief reference to the SPC, stating that recruitment gaps for capacity building personnel were unlikely to be completely eliminated and the SPC could be used to cover future gaps. In addition, interviews with the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) of DPKO/DFS showed that they were rarely involved in promoting SPC deployments to missions, considering it a decision best made at the mission level. PD management has recently been trying to increase the SPC's visibility through bulletins, leaflets, and information packages. These have worked only partially. Within the SPC, the preferred solution to low awareness was that the SPC should be authorised to directly approach the missions in order to better "sell its services." PD management stated that this solution is already being implemented.


42. A third factor depressing demand is scepticism in some missions about the added value offered by the SPC's deployment. In particular, some missions considered themselves relatively self-sufficient owing to the size of their police components. One mission that had been without a Police Commissioner and a Deputy Police Commissioner for a prolonged period did not consider it necessary to use the SPC's assistance to help fill the leadership gap. Another was of the view that it had the skills it needed, including in specialized fields such as forensics. However, when the mission needed specialized police personnel, its strategy was to keep United Nations police posts vacant, and fill them through requests to police-contributing countries rather than turn to the SPC for such needs. Some missions were also of the view that SPC personnel who did not have prior peacekeeping experience were inadequately qualified to offer advice to missions given the complexity of the peacekeeping environment. In fact, the percentage of SPC staff with prior peacekeeping experience has been declining since 2012, even though the 2008 panel report recommended that such experience should be required when recruiting.²¹ Current vacancy announcements demonstrate that prior peacekeeping experience is

²⁰ See S/2013/493, page 6.

²¹ Para 63 of A/63/630.

not a requirement, although such experience is given greater importance in the subsequent selection process.

Table 3
Prior peacekeeping experience among SPC Staff April 2007 to December 2014



Data provided by SPC; data as at end-December; excludes administrative staff.

43. A host country’s preferences can also influence a mission’s demand for SPC services. In one case, a host country preferred that, in order to build up its national police capacity, the mission should procure specialist skills from another Member State on a bilateral basis. The mission stated that the SPC did not “figure into this chain of events at all.”

Missions request SPC services to acquire expertise they lack internally on an ad hoc basis

44. Despite the financial and non-financial constraints that adversely affect the SPC’s deployment, missions requested the SPC’s services for varied reasons. Overall, the SPC has been deployed to missions to provide advice, expertise and assistance to the police components of existing United Nations peace operations for approximately 73.5 per cent of its actual days deployed.²²

45. Sixteen out of 29 mission interviewees stated that missions primarily requested the services of the SPC when they considered that they lacked the required expertise or capacity within their police component to address their ad hoc needs. One mission, for example, requested the services of the SPC in 2013 when it could not obtain unarmed and uniformed police officers from Member States.

46. Another factor affecting the likelihood that a mission will request the SPC’s services is the extent of knowledge and experience of the head of police component or mission leadership concerning the SPC and its services. The existence of such knowledge made it more likely that those individuals would ask for its services again, in the same or a subsequent mission. They also passed on their knowledge about the SPC to their staff, who, in turn, were positively influenced in their perceptions of the SPC. This factor was observed in three missions.

²² The percentage includes deployment to peacekeeping mission, special political missions, UNDP, and UNODC, etc.

47. The specific nature of assistance provided also influenced requests for further assistance from the SPC. Where such assistance had been provided, repeat requests for the same service were more likely. One example is the 'E-Smart system' that was first introduced to UNMIT to collect data electronically about the progress being made in the capacity building of national police. Such assistance was requested by MINUSTAH under the acronym 'H-Smart' and now is being again requested by UNMIL under the acronym 'L-Smart'. The same is true for the SPC personnel. When deployed SPC personnel had performed to a mission's satisfaction, the mission was more likely to request their services again, specifying the previously deployed personnel by name.

C. When deployed, the SPC has made a plausible and positive contribution to missions' police-related work and tasks

Mission stakeholders provided many specific examples of how the SPC has supported their work

48. Any assessment of the results of the SPC's work must take into account its limited strength, the size of its teams (which are typically small when deployed to existing missions and larger when deployed during mission start-up), its short deployment time spans and the ambitious role envisaged for it in its 2006 and 2013 policies.

49. The SPC's own budget performance reports provide inconsistent information on its results. For example, the SPC reported on its expected accomplishments using the results-based-budgeting framework listing planned indicators of achievement, planned and actual outputs in its annual budget performance document during the 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 budget periods. For the 2011-2012 period these details are not provided and the SPC's performance is reported only more generally in the main text. The SPC's reported outputs mostly exceeded its planned outputs.²³

50. With respect to the utility of its work, 19 out of 29 mission interviewees responded positively and with specific examples. Aspects highlighted included:

- Assisting in the mission's reconfiguration and drafting the concept of operations;
- Assessing and supporting the building national police capacity;
- Assisting the mission's gender mainstreaming work;
- Assisting in database management to better assess existing national police capacities;
- Providing personnel after a natural disaster that caused critical shortfalls in a mission's police leadership;
- Drafting police-related legal documents;
- Liaising and interfacing with local security officials;
- Providing assistance in ad hoc investigations;
- Drafting documents used for soliciting donor support;
- Establishing a presence in the country, handling training and recruitment and setting up field offices;

²³ See A/66/603, A/67/582, A/68/575.

- Filling missions' human resources gaps; and
- Providing cost-efficient remote assistance to missions for on-going projects.

51. Mission interviewees described the SPC's contributions as "useful", "helpful" and "forthcoming." Some interviewees stated that it was "cheap" compared to hiring consultants. One mission stated the SPC had helped it "gain one and a half to two years" in its work towards building national police capacity. Overall, support was strong for the concept behind the SPC and its staff was positively assessed as task-oriented.

52. One recent example of the SPC's work is its assistance to MINUSMA during its start-up phase. The SPC's 10-member team assisted the transition of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to MINUSMA in cooperation with the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union.

53. Mission interviewees in MINUSMA appreciated the SPC's assistance to the mission in developing its command and control mechanisms in the field during its start-up phase. Interviewees stated that the SPC worked closely with national authorities while providing training for election security and assistance in organizing its formed police units. It was also noted that the transition from the SPC to permanent police mission leadership was smooth. Its legal assistance on the standard operating procedures and a memorandum of understanding between the national minister of security and the mission on police issues was especially valued.

54. Areas for improvement were also noted. The SPC's assistance to MINUSMA in transnational crime, for instance, was considered 'premature' as there was insufficient national capacity and interest. It was also noted that the SPC team did not have enough French-speaking personnel.

The SPC has been versatile in its products and services

55. As noted above, the SPC's occupational specialities have not changed since its establishment except when its strength was increased in 2010. Despite this, a purposive sample of the SPC's outputs demonstrated that it has been versatile, delivering products and services adapted to different mission needs. For example:

- In 2010-2011, during its start-up mission to UNAMI, the SPC assessed the professional and technical performance of the Iraqi police service and also drafted standard operating procedures for the Police Adviser's office;
- In 2011-2012, the SPC provided logistics expertise to UNSMIL and drafted the training curriculum for the integration of revolutionaries into the police;
- In 2010-2011, it assisted MONUC, by, *inter-alia*, reviewing and adjusting the concept of operations;
- In UNAMA in 2013, it successfully advocated for the inclusion of female police officers in a conference;
- In MINUSTAH in 2012, it deployed to assist with an allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) that reduced response time considerably and increased timeliness of conclusions and reporting significantly; and

- In 2013, it assisted UNMIL in assessing the financial management capabilities of Liberian police through a high-quality and targeted analysis.

56. However, in some cases, the SPC's involvement in projects could have been planned better. In 2011-2012, it participated in a mission under West African Coast Initiative (WACI) to Guinea, which was established to enhance United Nations engagement in addressing illicit drug trafficking and transnational organized crime in West Africa. The SPC's recommendation that its expertise in organized crime and investigations should be utilized for enhancing the capabilities of transnational crime unit was not followed up upon. Nor was there a 'detailed joint assessment report' that was referenced in its post mission report. The entities responsible for leading WACI did not turn to it for any further assistance, thus bringing its involvement in the project to an end.²⁴

57. Interviewees also pointed out that the SPC had not functioned as a lessons learned centre. The SPC has made almost no contributions to the peacekeeping Policy and Best Practice Service since 2007, although this was required under its 2006 and 2013 policies. For instance only two After Action Reviews from 2008 and 2013 can be found in the Policy and Practice Database.

D. Risks of duplication and poor cohesion within PD, low visibility of SPC's reported results, inadequate support for partnerships, and uncertainty about its location remain as constraints

There is potential for duplication between the SPC's work and other sections of PD

58. Interviews with PD personnel suggested sharply competing visions with respect to the appropriate role that the SPC should play in relation to planning for new missions. Both the SPC and the Strategic Policy and Development Section (SPDS) of PD have been assigned this role, creating the potential for duplication. In addition, there is the potential for duplication with respect to following up after the SPC's deployment in missions. Currently, there is lack of clarity concerning which entity – the SPC or MMSS - has this responsibility and interviews within PD disclosed sensitivities around this issue. Even missions that gave positive feedback noted the lack of follow-up procedures after its deployment and its lack of engagement with missions on a regular basis to assess their needs.

Internal cohesion of the SPC within PD is a long-standing issue

59. Although it is one of the four sections of PD, the SPC has a history of strained relationships within the division. Present in a mild form even when the SPC was based in Headquarters, this has become more acute since its relocation to Brindisi. Various factors appear to have contributed to this, including unclear roles and expectations around the SPC's work vis-à-vis other sections of PD. Specific issues brought to the notice of the evaluation team included lack of consultation with the SPC while planning for missions in Headquarters. Without such involvement, it was

²⁴ These included ECOWAS, DPKO, DPA/UNOWA, UNODC and Interpol.

felt that SPC staff risked arriving in missions without the requisite amount of knowledge. On the other hand, some interviewees in Headquarters were unwilling to concede any role to the SPC in mission planning, seeing its role only as 'tactical'. In one instance, the SPC was not copied on critical documents even when SPC members had made notable contributions. In addition, it was pointed out that the SPC does not share a common computer drive with other sections of PD, which was said to hamper inter-section information flow and collaboration.

60. PD management is aware of this long-standing discontent and has taken concrete steps to address the situation recently. During interviews, SPC staff responded appreciatively to visits by PD management as demonstrating commitment to improve matters. Though the situation has improved the influence of the past remains.

Established reporting mechanisms do not favour visibility of the work done by the SPC

61. The SPC's work is barely visible within the Organization's established reporting documents. There are two aspects to this challenge. First, the SPC reports on its results within the budget performance documents of the UNGSC/UNLB. As the nature and substance of their work is very different, this does not favour the SPC's visibility to internal and external stakeholders. Second, the SPC's work is not generally referred to in the Secretary-General's mission-specific reports to the Security Council. It is only recently that there has been some change, with references to the SPC in two reports of the Secretary-General on MINUSMA.²⁵

The SPC has been inadequately supported in DPKO's partnership with UNDP with respect to the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations

62. An important development in international policing was the establishment by the Secretary-General in 2012 of the GFP for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations. DPKO and UNDP were appointed as the two co-leaders for the GFP arrangement. Under the terms of the partnership, the responsibilities of the GFP in New York include 'drawing upon expertise in United Nations entities' and 'making them available to colleagues in the field'.²⁶

63. Interviewees recognized the relevance of SPC's work to the GFP. They pointed out potential synergies, suggesting that while UNDP was better placed to financially support police projects, the SPC could provide police expertise at competitive rates. However, the relevant personnel in UNDP had limited knowledge about the SPC, suggesting that PD has been unable to mainstream the SPC in GFP arrangements in UNDP Headquarters. As a result, the SPC has been rarely deployed to assist UNDP field offices in developing national police capacities.

There is a long-running but inconclusive debate on the SPC's location in Brindisi

²⁵ See S/2013/338 and S/2013/582.

²⁶ Fact sheet: Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections jointly issued by UN peacekeeping and UNDP.

64. Since the SPC was relocated to Brindisi in 2009, a lively debate has existed within DPKO/DFS about the suitability of its location. Interviews demonstrated the materiality of this issue for DPKO/DFS management. In the main, two schools of thought exist: the first favours its current location ('the Brindisi school') while the second prefers relocation back to New York ('the New York school'). With some notable exceptions, most missions that have used the SPC's services do not fall into either of these schools. For them, it is immaterial where the SPC is located.

65. The Brindisi school argues that the SPC is closer to missions but is unsure if this has been actually converted into 'rapid' deployment. It also considers that Brindisi enables the SPC to maintain the appropriate distance from bureaucratic processes in Headquarters. Nevertheless, it would like to see closer working relations with New York.

66. The New York school is numerically much stronger than the Brindisi school. It argues that the SPC's current location allows it little involvement in Headquarters planning and decision-making processes and deprives it of adequate visibility and opportunities for interactions with stakeholders, reducing its relevance. One interviewee questioned whether "being in Brindisi hinders their cross-pollination, ability to test assumptions, get feedback, review lessons learned with other parts of PD." It emphasises the limitation of the two-hour working time overlap because of their time zones and argues that relocation of the SPC to New York would enable the PD to better backstop missions. Additionally, it highlights the perceived mismatch between the UNGSC/UNLB's work and the substantive nature of SPC's responsibilities and refutes the contention that its location in Brindisi offers any advantage in air travel to missions. Air travel connections from Brindisi were seen as limited. A minority also called for the consideration of Entebbe as the SPC's location.

V. Conclusion

67. The SPC marked a conceptual milestone in international policing. With its establishment, missions had assured and continuous access to police expertise required in their life cycle that was not readily available within the mission previously. At the same time, nearly nine years after the SPC's establishment, it is now necessary to reassess the two fundamental assumptions on which it was based. The first was that the number, scale and scope of police operations were themselves a guarantee of sufficient demand for the SPC. The second was that its primary users - United Nations peacekeeping missions - would set aside sufficient funds for it from their budgets. Both these assumptions were too optimistic or were not properly managed.

68. Overall, peacekeeping missions, with their large number of police personnel of more than 12,400, have not, in the aggregate generated the anticipated demand due to a number of factors, including both financial and non-financial ones. As a result, from 2007 to 2014, the SPC has been chronically underutilized, with an average annual field deployment of 33.5 per cent against the anticipated rate of 65 per cent indicating an estimated \$7.8 million in poorly used staff costs and only a very partial success, despite the notable work it has done when actually deployed.

69. The SPC's various challenges need to be urgently addressed, as the concept behind the SPC still remains valid. All appropriate steps should be taken to improve

the SPC's deployment, as this is critical to realizing the vision that led to its establishment.

70. In view of the poor utilization of the SPC, the principal, but not exclusive responsibility, for improving this lies with the Police Adviser, to whom the SPC reports directly. In exercising his/her functions, the Police Adviser should continue to collaborate with the Chief of the SPC, to ensure that they achieve this common goal. While it is the responsibility of the Chief of the SPC to ensure excellence in delivery to generate demand, the Police Adviser, as well as the rest of DPKO management, needs to provide support in promoting the use of its services.

71. The missions' heads of police components also have an important part to play as they generate the demand for the SPC's services. Within their missions they must make their budget case convincingly, on the basis of their policing needs assessment, to the appropriate level within the mission, including the Director of Mission Support. Special Representatives of Secretary-General also should actively support the SPC's deployment in their missions given its link to long-term rule of law issues.

72. Responsibility for ensuring that missions understand the role and value of SPC is shared by other sections of PD, which have the advantage of their location in New York and the knowledge this confers. They can and should do more to mainstream the visibility of the SPC to New York-based stakeholders, including UNDP. Concurrently, the Police Adviser should address areas of blurred or overlapping responsibility between the SPC and other sections of PD. A message of integration must be continuously articulated by PD leadership and supported by suitable institutional arrangements.

73. It is noted that despite clear instructions issued by Headquarters to missions to include budgetary provisions for SPC's deployment, missions have responded with silence. A different and firmer approach from DPKO management is now required.

74. If, after a reasonable period of time, these steps do not lead to the desired result and the Organization concludes that there is insufficient demand for the SPC's services, then it may wish to consider other options consistent with making the best use of scarce resources, including downsizing the SPC.

75. Lastly, if DPKO/DFS management considers that the SPC's location is a material factor that needs reconsideration, it should take the necessary steps in full consultation with Member States. However, if it considers that the status quo is acceptable, it should communicate this to all concerned to enable the SPC to put this matter to rest. The debate on the SPC's location has continued too long to be in the SPC's interest. OIOS does not take a position on the matter.

To address the issues identified in this evaluation, OIOS makes the following recommendations:

VI. Recommendations

Critical recommendation:

Recommendation 1: DPKO/DFS should formally establish a target deployment rate of SPC keeping in mind the original intent and assumption of Member States behind the SPC's establishment and the 65 per cent deployment rate conveyed to Member States.

Important recommendations:

Recommendation 2: DPKO/DFS should regularly review SPC's occupational specialties to enable it to better respond to the evolving demands of peacekeeping missions and consequently improving the SPC's deployment rate, and bring this issue to the attention of the General Assembly where such modification is beyond its authority.


Recommendation 3: DPKO/DFS should include the entire costs of supporting the functioning of the SPC in the UNLB's budget, while making proportionate reductions in missions' police related budgets, after formally establishing the SPC's target deployment rate and simultaneously considering missions' requirements and where the SPC can add the greatest value.

Recommendation 4: DPKO/DFS should decide the issue of the location of the SPC in full consultation with Member States.

Annex I

POLICE DIVISION*


(2011-2012 Structure)



*Source: 'Functions and Organization of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC)', Ref. 2012.12

Annex II

Program Impact Pathway (PIP), Standing Police Capacity Function



Annex III

Comments on the draft report received from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) presents below the full text of comments received from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support on the evaluation results contained in the draft report. This practice has been instituted in line with General Assembly resolution 64/263, following the recommendation of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee.

Draft report on the programme evaluation of the Standing Police Capacity of the Police Division, DPKO

1. Whilst we fully concur with the recommendations contained in the report, we would be grateful if the comments set out below could be taken into consideration in finalising the report.
2. Paragraph 20, second sentence reads: *“The Organization has had on its payroll staff members who, for reasons beyond their control, were not adequately utilised in the functions for which they were recruited.”* For consistency with paragraph 26, we suggest amending paragraph 20, second sentence to read: *“The Organization has had on its payroll staff members who, for reasons beyond their control, were not optimally utilised in the functions for which they were recruited.”*
3. Paragraph 33, third line reads: *“However no mission has committed a budget for SPC deployment for the budget cycles of 2012-2013 and 2014-2015. In fact, no peacekeeping mission has ever explicitly included provisions for the SPC’s deployment in its annual budget submission.”* For consistency with paragraph 39, we suggest amending paragraph 33, third line to read: *“However no mission has committed a budget for SPC deployment for the budget cycles of 2012-2013 and so far only two peacekeeping missions have made provisions for SPC’s deployment by using their 2014-2015 approved budgets.”*
4. Paragraph 49, second sentence reads: *“The SPC’s own budget performance reports provide inconsistent information on its results. For example, the SPC reported on its expected accomplishments using the results-based-budgeting framework in its annual budget performance document during the 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 budget periods, but not for the 2011-2012 period.”* As there is evidence of SPC budget performance reporting in the report of the Secretary-General on Budget performance of the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (A/67/582 dated 21 November 2012, paragraphs 15 and 16), we suggest amending paragraph 49 to read: *“The SPC’s own budget performance reports provide information on its results. For example, the SPC reported on its expected accomplishments using the results-based-budgeting framework in its annual budget performance document during the 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 budget periods.”* This information to the auditors was already provided in the earlier comments on the informal draft.
5. Paragraph 57 reads: *“Interviewees also pointed out that the SPC had not functioned*

as a lessons learned centre. The SPC has made no contributions to the peacekeeping Policy and Best Practice Service since 2007, although this was required under its 2006 and 2013 policies.” As there is evidence of SPC’s contributions to the Policy and Best Practice Database, we recommend amending paragraph 57 to read: “Interviewees also pointed out that the SPC had not functioned as a lessons learned centre. The SPC has not consistently contributed to the peacekeeping Policy and Best Practice Service since 2007 although this was required under its 2006 and 2013 policies.”

Annex IV

Comment by the Office of Internal Oversight Services - Inspection and Evaluation Division

OIOS thanks DPKO/DFS for their response to this evaluation report and states as under:

OIOS accepts DPKO/DFS' suggestions on paragraphs 20 and 33.

OIOS maintains paragraph 49. An examination of the relevant budget reports for the years 2010-2011 (A/66/603), 2011-2012 (A/67/582), and 2012-2013 (A/68/575) shows that they provide information about activities of the SPC in the general text. However, only the reports for 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 present further details using the results-based-budgeting framework listing planned indicators of achievement, planned and actual outputs. The report for 2011-2012 does not provide these details. However, the text in paragraph 49 has been suitably modified to reflect this.

OIOS partially accepts DPKO/DFS suggestion with respect to 57. OIOS research on the relevant Police and Practice Database shows only two contributions: the After Action Review on the 'SPC/UNPOL Planned Deployment to Eastern Chad on 30 January 2008' and 'Support to MINUSTAH Police Component' submitted on 28 October 2013.' Paragraph 57 has been suitably modified to reflect this.

Annex V

Recommendation Action Plan
Programme evaluation of the Standing Police Capacity of the Police Division, DPKO
10 April 2015

IED Recommendation	Anticipated Actions	Responsible Entity(ies)	Target date for completion
<p>Recommendation 1: DPKO/DFS should formally establish a target deployment rate of SPC keeping in mind the original intent and assumption of Member States behind the SPC’s establishment and the 65 per cent deployment rate conveyed to Member States.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct a review of SPC deployment target to identify new realistic deployment rate for the current peacekeeping context. - Establish SPC deployment objectives within realistic deployment target linked to SPC result-based budget. 	<p style="text-align: center;">DPKO</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Third quarter of 2016</p>
<p>Recommendation 2: DPKO/DFS should regularly review SPC’s occupational specialties to enable it to better respond to the evolving demands of peacekeeping missions and consequently improving the SPC’s deployment rate, and bring this issue to the attention of the General Assembly where such modification is beyond its authority.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reprofile SPC posts in lowest demand identified by the OIOS evaluation - Conduct SPC scoping exercise on an annual basis to identify future demands and corresponding SPC profiles 	<p style="text-align: center;">DPKO</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Third quarter of 2016</p>
<p>Recommendation 3: DPKO/DFS should include the entire costs of supporting the functioning of the SPC in the UNLB’s budget, while making proportionate reductions in missions’ police related budgets, after formally establishing the SPC’s target deployment rate and simultaneously considering missions’ requirements and where the SPC can add the greatest value.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct annual deployment planning and travel expenses budgeting with peacekeeping missions and other potential requesting entities - Submit travel budget request in UNLB/SPC budget. 	<p style="text-align: center;">UNLB</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Third quarter of 2016</p>
<p>Recommendation 4: DPKO/DFS should decide the issue of the location of the SPC in full consultation with Member States.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct consultations with DPKO and DFS leadership on SPC location - Prepare proposal on the issue of location. 	<p style="text-align: center;">DPKO/DFS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Third quarter of 2016</p>