INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

REVIEW REPORT

Review of the logical frameworks underlying selected aspects of United Nations peacekeeping operations

28 August 2015

INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

FUNCTION

"The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organization. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organization;" (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DFS	United Nations Department of Field Support
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FGS	Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, DPKO
IOT	Integrated Operational Team, DPKO
MPS	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, DPKO
OIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
OIOS-IAD	Internal Audit Division, OIOS
OIOS-IED	Inspection and Evaluation Division, OIOS
OMA	Office of Military Affairs, DPKO
PIP	Programme Impact Pathway
PPBME	Programme Planning, Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SFR	Statement of Force Requirement
SUR	Statement of Unit Requirement
TIP	Thematic Impact Pathway
UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangements System

Contents

I. Introduction

1.   Peacekeeping is one of the largest areas of United Nations activity, involving in 2014-15 a budget of almost $8.5 billion, over 107,000 uniformed personnel and more than 18,000 civilian personnel and UN volunteers.[1] Ensuring that it is set up to achieve the results specified in Security Council peacekeeping mandates is both a planning and an accountability issue, approached through the strategic frameworks for DPKO/DFS and individual peacekeeping operations, the budget planning and performance documents submitted by those bodies to the General Assembly and the policy and guidance documents issued by the Departments. Underlying those documents are reasoning and assumptions that jointly constitute the logical framework of the approaches.

2.   The objective of this review was to document the programme and thematic impact pathways that, implicitly or explicitly, underlie the United Nations' approach to selected aspects of its peacekeeping operations. At the programme level, the review updated the overall logical framework of peacekeeping operations developed by OIOS-IED in 2013. At the subprogramme and thematic (or functional) level, it considered the logic underlying one DPKO subprogramme (the Office of Military Affairs) and one DPKO function (force generation). The review was undertaken based on consultations with the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) and the priorities determined by the Under-Secretary-General of OIOS. The resulting programme and thematic impact pathways will support forthcoming evaluation work by OIOS-IED; particularly, the evaluation of force generation.

3.   OIOS-IED thanks staff of the Departments, including staff within the Office of the Military Adviser (OMA) and the Force Generation Service (FGS), for their cooperation with the review. The review also benefited crucially from discussions with OIOS-IAD.

4.   The Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED) of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) undertakes its work in line with General Assembly resolutions 48/218B, 54/244 and 59/272, ST/SGB/273 and ST/SGB/2002/7, which authorize OIOS to initiate, carry out and report on any action that it considers necessary to fulfil its responsibilities.

II. Background

5.   Logical frameworks – which are also linked to theories of change, programme logic, and programme impact pathways – explain how a programme's inputs and outputs are expected to generate particular outcomes and impacts. They list the outputs and activities planned for the programme and the outcomes and impacts that are intended to result. Underlying these are mandates issued by the General Assembly, the Security Council and their constituent bodies, assumptions concerning the causal factors at play and, importantly, the role of other actors and factors.

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[1] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote0415.pdf

6.   Logical frameworks can be depicted graphically in a Programme Impact Pathway (PIP), which is 'a logical framework tool used to identify strategic elements of a project or programme and their causal relationship, as well as the critical assumptions that may influence success and failure.'[2] PIPs show 'pathways from what the programme uses, does and produces (its inputs/resources, activities and outputs) to the impacts to which it wishes to contribute.'[3] (See figure 1)

Figure 1
Components of a Programme Impact Pathway (PIP)

Inputs	Activities	Outputs	Outcomes	Impact
What physical, human and financial resources do we have?	What do we do in our day-to-day work to produce the results we seek?	What things do we produce in order to make a difference?	What are the major changes we are seeking to achieve through our work?	What long-term changes in the world do we want to result from our work?
ASSUMPTIONS				
Examples: staff, budget, Internal policies	*Examples:* drafting, convening, undertaking, ensuring	*Examples:* reports, meetings, advocacy, dissemination	*Examples:* knowledge, behaviour change, monitoring	*Examples:* peace, security, respect for human rights
⇒ DIMINISHING CONTROL OVER PROGRAMME ELEMENTS ⇒				

7.   Logical frameworks are also developed for thematic interventions that may be imposed across all programmes (such as gender mainstreaming) or some programmes (such as mandates to protect civilians). Their graphical depictions are Thematic Impact Pathways (TIPs).

High-level logical frameworks for peacekeeping operations

8.   In peacekeeping, the logical frameworks underlying peacekeeping operations and structures are implied in the strategic frameworks and budget proposal documents prepared by DPKO/DFS and approved by either the General Assembly (much of DPKO/DFS Headquarters activity) or the Security Council (the mandates and budgets of individual peacekeeping operations). The strategic frameworks for peacekeeping operations that are developed biennially list[4]:
   • Expected accomplishments (outcomes),

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[2] The IED Strategic Framework and Programme Impact Pathway (PIP, 2014-15, 24 February 2014

[3] Technical Note: How to prepare and use Programme Impact Pathways (PIPs) for scoping and reporting an IED programme evaluation (prepared for IED by Sue Funnell), June 2012

[4] See, for example, A/69/6 (Prog. 4), A/67/6 (Prog. 4) and A/65/6 (Rev. 1)

- The strategy that will be followed in order to achieve them, and
- Indicators of achievement (against which progress towards the expected accomplishments will be measured).

The budgets submitted for individual peacekeeping operations list[5]:
- Expected accomplishments,
- Indicators of achievement, and
- Outputs.

9.   The budget performance reports submitted annually by each peacekeeping operation compare the planned indicators of achievement and planned outputs in relation to each expected accomplishment with actual indicators of achievement and planned outputs and provide explanations for any variance. Narrative text provides context and an overview of the results, as well as comments on the challenges faced by particular peacekeeping operations in particular areas of their mandates. The compacts signed by Assistant-Secretaries-General and Under-Secretaries-General and their related performance appraisals also list expected achievements and performance against those objectives.

Logical frameworks underlying individual peacekeeping structures and functions

10.   In contrast to these relatively well-articulated high-level logical frameworks, the individual policies and functions related to peacekeeping operations are less visible and/or less well articulated in strategic documents. In the case of particular peacekeeping policies (such as protection of civilians or protection against sexual exploitation and abuse), the underlying logical frameworks are generally apparent from policy and guidance documents issued by DPKO/DFS, many of which are publicly available from the Departments' website. Objectives are usually clearly stated, activities and outputs are usually suggested, and indicators of achievement may also be incorporated. Efforts to ensure that such documents are kept up to date intensified following the observation in an OIOS-IAD audit report on the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in 2010 that some military policies and guidelines no longer reflected current practice in peacekeeping military operations.[6]

11.   However, the logical frameworks underlying the functions undertaken within particular components of DPKO/DFS or particular missions are more difficult to identify. A particular function or group of functions may be reflected in a single line within a strategic plan, if at all. For example, the 2016-2017 proposed strategic framework includes just two expected accomplishments and two indicators of achievement (one of which consists of two sub-indicators) for DPKO's military subprogramme[7] (See table 1). That subprogramme includes the force generation service, the military planning service, the current military operations service and the office of the Military Advisor, and is responsible for some of the most critical and time-sensitive aspects of establishing and sustaining peacekeeping operations. The subprogramme had a budget appropriation of $939,800 in 2014-2015.[8] Workplan documents,

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[5] See, for example, A/68-788 (MONUSCO)
[6] OIOS-IAD Audit Report on Office of Military Affairs, 28 May 2010, para 15
[7] See A/69/6 (Prog. 4), pp 5-6
[8] A/68/6/Add.1 p 27

which are intended to articulate objectives, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement, are not generally publicly available at the subprogramme and lower levels. In the case of OMA, concerns about the link between operational activities and the results-based budget were, in any case, expressed by OIOS-IAD in 2010.[9]

Table 1
Subprogramme 2 – Military
Expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement, 2016-2017

Expected accomplishments of the Secretariat	Indicators of achievement
(a) Rapid deployment and establishment of peacekeeping operations in response to Security Council mandates	(a) (i) No longer than seven days needed to prepare military plans from the date a Security Council resolution is passed (ii) Official pledge requests to troop-contributing countries issued within five days of the date on which the list of potential troop-contributing countries is approved
(b) Increased efficiency and effectiveness of the military components of peacekeeping operations	(b) Implementation by peacekeeping operations of 100 per cent of military-related recommendations from end-of-assignment visit, study and assessment reports endorsed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, in compliance with relevant intergovernmental mandates

Assumptions underlying the frameworks

12.   The assumptions underlying both the strategic frameworks and the various policy and guidance documents – notably the logic connecting activities and outputs with their intended outcomes and impacts – are often implied, rather than explicitly stated in those documents. Nevertheless, they are crucial components. A breakdown in a critical assumption may invalidate the link between an activity or output with its intended outcome and threaten the ability of the programme or policy to achieve one or more of its objectives. Articulating, validating and periodically reviewing critical assumptions is important if logical frameworks are to be – and seen to be – robust, defensible and relevant to changing conditions.

Stakeholders

13.   Stakeholders with direct interests in the logical frameworks developed by DPKO/DFS and its peacekeeping operations include:
- Staff and officials of DPKO/DFS, peacekeeping operations and other United Nations entities whose mandates involve interaction with DPKO/DFS and peacekeeping operations;
- Members of the international community, including humanitarian groups, in countries hosting United Nations peacekeeping operations;

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[9] OIOS-IAD *op. cit.* para 27

- Countries contributing troops and/or police to United Nations peacekeeping operations;
- Principal financial contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations; and
- Member States of the United Nations and its governing bodies, including the Security Council.

Structures and tools for developing logical frameworks in peacekeeping

14.   Developing the strategic framework for peacekeeping is generally the function of the strategic planning units in Headquarters and in each peacekeeping operation. For peacekeeping operations as a whole, this is the role of the Executive Office, under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, who seeks and coordinates contributions from individual divisions. In individual peacekeeping operations, it is the role of a strategic planning cell, generally within the office of the Chief of Staff or the Political Affairs unit. Policy guidance to missions undertaking this process is provided from Headquarters by the Strategic Planning Unit within the Office of Operations.

15.   Typically, the strategic framework is developed more than one year ahead of its operation, in the context of the budget submission. The process follows guidance and templates issued by the Secretariat and it is supported by the Field Budget and Finance Division of DFS. The arrangements are summarized in budget instructions issued annually by the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts. The development and articulation of logical frameworks underlying the resultant frameworks are not required under the guidance.

16.   Policies for implementation in peacekeeping operations are developed by the relevant substantive area in consultation with relevant partners and stakeholders within and beyond the UN System. They are typically developed in response to particular resolutions, events, reviews or other circumstances seen as warranting an explicit or coordinated approach, and may be requested or required by an intergovernmental body.

Monitoring, evaluation and review

17.   No explicit study seems to have been conducted of the adequacy of the strategic and logical frameworks underlying peacekeeping operations in the United Nations. Individual components of peacekeeping activity, including force generation, have been subject to review by internal or external bodies[10] and the report of a major review of United Nations peace operations, which was presented to the Secretary-General in June 2015. However, the assumptions underlying the choice of activities and outputs – their type, intensity, frequency and balance – do not appear to have been systematically tested.

18.   The Board of Auditors commented in its most recent report that the Administration's own conceptual framework for improved accountability and risk management had identified

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[10] See, for example, Claes Nilsson and Cecilia Hull Wiklund, 'Looking to Contribute – A Guide to the UN Force Generation System for Prospective Troop Contributors', FOI, June 2014

improved formulation of the logical frameworks as one of three systemic issues that needed to be addressed before the Organization could implement results-based management.[11]

Limitations of the review

19.   Given the large size and scope of peacekeeping operations, as well as the significant level of effort already expended on the existing strategic framework and budget preparations and reporting requirements, there was little enthusiasm from management of DPKO/DFS for the original intended breadth of the project, which was to develop Programme and Thematic Impact Pathways for all major aspects of peacekeeping operations, to provide relevant guidance for ongoing monitoring of the effectiveness of these critical operations. Therefore, this current review focused on refining and updating the overall programme impact pathway for peacekeeping operations developed by OIOS-IED in 2013, as well as developing thematic impact pathways for one process (force generation) and one DPKO subprogramme (Office of Military Affairs). The process and the subprogramme were selected as they will support evaluation work currently scheduled in the 2015-16 OIOS-IED risk-based peacekeeping workplan. They also reflect feedback obtained during an entry conference held with DPKO/DFS on 25 September 2014 and subsequent discussions with DPKO staff.

20.   DPKO/DFS operates in a particularly dynamic environment, where priorities can change in response to developments in the external environment or within individual peacekeeping operations. At different points in time, individual components of a PIP or TIP may take on different levels of importance, or new ones may be added. The purpose of the PIP or TIP is to generalize the logical framework, and it cannot be expected to depict actual activities and priorities with accuracy at any single point in time.

21.   Similarly, as high-level depictions of complex structures and themes, PIPs and TIPs cannot (and are not intended to) capture all the nuances of individual components. In the course of this review, consultations were held with a number of DPKO/DFS and other staff, often involving matters of nuance and detail. The fact that the resultant PIPs and TIP cannot fully reflect that detail is not to ignore the significance of understanding it, nor the usefulness of the consultations themselves.

22.   Finally, this review seeks to map rather than assess the adequacy of the logical frameworks underlying peacekeeping activities in the United Nations. Such a mapping is a necessary precursor to any subsequent assessment or evaluation, rather than a substitute for it. Potential evaluation questions arising from the mapping are discussed in the Conclusion below (paras. 61-67).

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[11] A/69/5 (Vol. I), para. 27

III. Programme Impact Pathway - DPKO/DFS

23.   As noted above (para. 2), a PIP summarising the totality of DPKO/DFS operations was developed by OIOS-IED in 2013. That PIP was incorporated into the inception paper for the OIOS-IED programme evaluation of DPKO/DFS Headquarters[12] and is annexed to this report. It was developed on the basis of DPKO/DFS planning and budget documents in consultation with DPKO/DFS staff.

24.   For the purpose of this review, the 2013 PIP was revised to reflect more closely the language of current DPKO/DFS strategic, financial and public documents. However, as a high-level depiction of the functions and objectives of the Departments, the elements of the revised PIP remain substantially the same as those of the 2013 PIP.

Expected outcomes

25.   United Nations peacekeeping operations are the responsibility of both DPKO and DFS. The objective of those operations is stated in the proposed strategic framework for the period 2016-2017 as:

> 'to ensure the effective implementation of Security Council mandates to plan and establish peacekeeping operations, as well as the effective implementation of relevant general Assembly resolutions'

and:

> 'to enable United Nations peacekeeping operations and other United Nations field missions to fulfil their mandates efficiently and effectively, as authorized by the Security Council and the General Assembly'.[13]

26.   DPKO and DFS function as separate departments with separate organisational charts[14]. Six subprogrammes are defined in the 2016-2017 strategic framework, as shown in table 2. The first four of these are conducted within subprogrammes under the DPKO organisational chart, and the remaining two under DFS. Each subprogramme has its own expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement.

27.   In addition to the outcomes (expected accomplishments) listed in the strategic framework, improved crisis prevention and response was categorised as an additional programme outcome for the purpose of this PIP. That objective was described in the strategic framework as the particular goal of work related to strategic partnership and enhanced operational support and cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, and did not seem to be encapsulated in any of the other outcomes listed in the document.[15]

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[12] IED-13-002, Figure 1 (p. 14)
[13] A/69/6 (Prog. 4), p. 4
[14] A/68/6 (Sect. 5), Annexes 1 and 2. Note, however, that the United Nations peacekeeping website shows some functions as capacities that are shared between the two departments.
[15] A/69/6 (Prog. 4), para 4.14.

Table 2
Peacekeeping subprogrammes and their expected accomplishments

Subprogramme	Expected accomplishments
1. Operations	(a) Improved reporting to the security Council, the General Assembly, other intergovernmental bodies and troop-contributing countries to enable fully informed decision-making on issues relating to peacekeeping (b) Effectively and efficiently managed peacekeeping operations
2. Military	(a) Rapid deployment and establishment of peacekeeping operations in response to Security Council mandates (b) Increased efficiency and effectiveness of the military components of peacekeeping operations
3. Rule of law and security institutions	(a) More timely deployment and establishment of the rule of law and security components of peacekeeping operations in response to Security Council mandates (b) Increased efficiency and effectiveness of the rule of law and security components of peacekeeping operations (c) Increased awareness and understanding of the dangers of landmines and explosive remnants of war in affected countries
4. Policy, evaluation and training	(a) Increased awareness of policies, standard operating procedures, guidelines and training standards and tools that are consistent with United Nations principles and reflect lessons learned
5. Field administrative support	(a) Rapid deployment and establishment of peacekeeping operations in response to Security Council mandates (b) Increased efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations (c) More timely response and follow-up to allegations of misconduct
6. Integrated support services	(a) Timely completion of the planning, rapid deployment and establishment of field missions in response to Security Council mandates (b) Increased efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and special political missions supported by the Department of Field Support

Inputs

28.   The financial resources supporting these activities are drawn from the United Nations regular budget, the peacekeeping support account ('other assessed' contributions) and extra budgetary sources. In 2014-2015, the proposed resources (excluding those for two regular budget-funded peacekeeping operations[16]) totalled $434,597,900.[17] Of this, the majority (73.2 per cent) was funded from the support account and a further 22.3 per cent from extra budgetary sources. The regular budget accounted for only 4.5 per cent of the total proposed budget. A total of 1248 posts was sought, of which around half (638) were in the professional and higher categories, one-fifth (278) in the general service category, and the remaining one-quarter (311) in other categories (field service, national professional officers and local level staff).[18]

29.   The Departments respond to Security Council mandates and General Assembly resolutions, and to the priorities outlined in the biennial programme budget and strategic framework.

Activities and outputs

30.   The activities undertaken and outputs generated in pursuit of the Department's objectives are outlined in the proposed programme budget, the biennial strategic framework and other documents, including the DPKO/DFS public website. The proposed programme budget contains the most detailed listing and attaches numerical targets to many of the outputs and performance indicators shown.[19] The activities and outputs in the PIP below (figure 2) were consolidated from those lists.

31.   Activities, outputs and outcomes are shown in the PIP in four groups, reflecting the four major outcome groupings identified in the proposed programme budget and strategic framework.

External factors

32.   The external factors affecting the ability of the departments to undertake the intended activities and deliver the intended outputs are included in the proposed programme budget in the form of statements of assumptions. Those statements follow, and hence qualify, the listing of expected accomplishments of each subprogramme, as well as for executive direction and management. While the external factors and hence the assumptions differ among the subprogrammes, all refer to the need for Member State support, both political and financial and, in some cases, for implementation. Some refer to peacekeeping partners. The external factors identified by DPKO/DFS for the 2014-2015 biennium are shown in table 3.

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[16] The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) are funded under the United Nations regular budget.
[17] A/68/6 (Sect. 5), Table 5.3.
[18] *Ibid.,* table 5.4
[19] See, for example, A/68/6 (Sect. 5), Table 5.14

Table 3
Assumptions underlying the logical framework, as shown in the 2014-15 proposed programme budget (A/68/6 (Sect. 5)

Subprogramme	External factors
DPKO executive direction and management	(para. 5.30) The Office of the Under-Secretary-General is expected to achieve its objective and expected accomplishments on the assumption that Member States will provide the necessary political support and financial resources to implement mission mandates and that peacekeeping partners will provide the necessary support.
1. Operations	(para 5.37) The subprogramme is expected to achieve its objectives and expected accomplishments on the assumption that: (a) parties to the conflict cooperate and will be willing to resolve their disputes peacefully; (b) peacekeeping partners will provide the necessary support; and (c) the security environment will permit the establishment or continuation of peacekeeping operations.
2. Military	(para. 5.43) The subprogramme is expected to achieve its objectives and expected accomplishments on the assumption that Member States contribute the required military personnel and materiel to peacekeeping operations in a timely manner to effect deployment, and that parties to conflict in areas of peacekeeping operations cooperate with the United Nations.
3. Rule of law and security institutions	(para. 5.49) The subprogramme is expected to achieve its objectives and expected accomplishments on the assumption that: national systems and mechanisms will be in place to provide qualified, seconded police and corrections officers within the timelines set; external peacekeeping partners will provide the necessary support, including resources for activities related to the re-establishment of rule of law and security institutions, and host States will be committed to the development of their rule of law and security institutions; and national mine action organizations will be in place in the country of operations.
4. Policy, evaluation and training	(para. 5.56) The subprogramme is expected to achieve its objectives and expected accomplishments on the assumption that Member

	States will provide the necessary support to implement the activities related to training and policy development.
DFS executive direction and management	(para. 5.70) The Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support is expected to achieve its objective and expected accomplishments on the assumption that Member States will provide the necessary political support and financial resources to implement mission mandates and to the concept and implementation of the global field support strategy in a phased approach.
5. Field administrative support	(para. 5.77) The subprogramme is expected to achieve its objectives and expected accomplishments on the assumption that Member States will continue to provide the necessary political support and resources.
6. Integrated support services	(para. 5.83) The subprogramme is expected to achieve its objectives and expected accomplishments on the assumption that vendors and suppliers will deliver goods and services on time and that Member States will provide the required political and resource support.

33. The DPKO/DFS PIP is shown in figure 2 below.

Figure 2
Programme Impact Pathway:
Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ Department of Field Support

INPUTS		ACTIVITIES		OUTPUTS		OUTCOMES		IMPACTS
		• Prepare reports and briefings for S-G, inter-governmental bodies, TCCs and PCCs • Undertake periodic reviews of mandate implementation by missions		• Reports, briefings, substantive servicing of meetings		• Fully-informed decision-making on peacekeeping related issues		Effective implementation of Security Council mandates to plan and establish PKOs
UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions/ mandates Financial resources Staff resources		• Undertake integrated planning of new peacekeeping operations • Generate military, police, rule of law and civilian personnel • Identify and deploy material, equipment and support services to field missions		• Integrated assessments • Timely troop, police and civilian deployments • Gender and geographic balance in PKO staffing • Timely identification and deployment of logistics and ICT capabilities		• Rapid deployment and establishment of PKOs in response to Security Council mandates		
		• Ensure integrated approaches to planning of existing peacekeeping operations • Support, guide and monitor PKOs • Develop and deliver policy, guidance and training materials • Implement recommendations from EOA and other reports endorsed by USG • Mainstream integrated service delivery model into work programme		I • ntegrated mission planning • Direction and support to PKOs • Policy, political, operational guidance and training delivered • Best practices incorporated into design, planning and implementation of PK • Administrative and logistical support provided to PKOs		• Effectively and efficiently managed peacekeeping operations		Effective implementation of relevant General Assembly resolutions
		• Collate and analyse information • Develop strategic partnership with relevant regional and subregional organizations • Enhance operational support and cooperation with those organizations		• Strategic information • Strategic partnerships		• Improved crisis management and response		

IV. Programme Impact Pathway – Office of Military Affairs

34.   The subprogramme-level PIP developed for OMA enables an observer to consider in greater detail the logical framework underlying a major structural component of the larger DPKO/DFS entity. The OMA PIP contains the same elements as the overall DPKO/DFS PIP, but focuses only on OMA. To the extent that OMA's work involves collaboration with other entities within DPKO/DFS, the Secretariat more generally (the Office of Legal Affairs, for example) or outside entities including Member States and TCCs, assumptions are made in the logical framework about the ability and willingness of those entities to engage in the required collaboration and provide required services.

Expected outcomes

35.   As with all DPKO/DFS subprogrammes. OMA's expected outcomes are listed in the DPKO/DFS strategic framework and other documents, including OMA's public webpage. Table 1 above shows the expected accomplishments as well as the indicators of achievement identified for OMA for 2016-2017. Those accomplishments have been categorised as *impacts* in the OMA PIP, on the basis that OMA accomplishments contribute to the *outcomes* of DPKO/DFS and hence to the overall impact of the two departments.

36.   It can be noted that, as a subprogramme of DPKO/DFS, OMA's expected outcomes reflect and align with those of DPKO/DFS.

Inputs

37.   In 2014-2015, OMA's proposed programme budget totalled $48,134,100 before recosting.[20] The vast majority of this ($47,200,600) came from the peacekeeping support account, with only $933,500 from the regular budget. 131 posts were sought.

38.   OMA responds primarily to Security Council mandates and to the priorities outlined in the DPKO/DFS biennial programme budget and strategic framework. Its relations with Member States, particularly existing and potential TCCs, may also be seen as a critical input to its work, albeit not independent of its own activities. For that reason, it is not separately identified as an input in the PIP in figure 3.

Activities and outputs

39.   As for DPKO/DFS more generally, OMA's activities and outputs are detailed in the proposed programme budget, the biennial strategic framework and other DPKO/DFS documents, including the DPKO/DFS public website. The activities and outputs shown in the PIP were consolidated from those lists.

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[20] A/68/6 (Sect. 5), table 5.15.

40.   Reflecting the structure of the DPKO/DFS PIP, OMA's activities, outputs and outcomes are shown in the OMA PIP in four groups, reflecting the four major outcome groupings identified for the subprogramme.

External factors

41.   As shown in table 3 above, the external factors identified in the proposed programme budget as qualifying OMA's expected accomplishments relate to the willingness and ability of Member States 'to contribute the required military personnel and materiel to peacekeeping operations in a timely manner to effect deployment' and that 'parties to conflict in areas of peacekeeping operations cooperate with the United Nations'.[21] These are significant potential (and actual) constraints and although they may be influenced by OMA activity, such as outreach, are clearly largely outside its control. The extent to which these external factors actually constrain OMA's ability to deliver on its expected accomplishments has been the object of frequent commentary and considerable research, most recently in the report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which commented that 'the United Nations is the sum of what its Member States put at its disposal' and proposed a number of ways in which greater Member State commitment could improve deployment times and the effectiveness of peace operations.[22]

42.   In addition to the external factors identified by OMA itself, other assumptions underlying the logical framework are likely to relate to its collaboration with other entities within DPKO/DFS and the Secretariat. An important such assumption concerns the advisory, rather than executive, role of the Military Adviser. Lacking the authority to implement his or her advice on matters within the OMA mandate (including instructions to the military leadership of peacekeeping operations), the Military Adviser is nevertheless accountable for its outcomes.

43.   The OMA PIP is shown in figure 3 below.

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[21] A/68/6 (Sect. 5), para. 5.43,
[22] http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf, paras 184-195.

Figure 3
Programme Impact Pathway:
Office of Military Affairs

INPUTS		ACTIVITIES		OUTPUTS		OUTCOMES		IMPACTS
UN Security Council resolutions/ mandates Financial resources Staff resources Office budget		• Prepare reports and briefings on military matters for S-G, inter-governmental bodies, TCCs and PCCs		• Reports, briefings, substantive servicing of meetings • Military advisory briefings to TCCs concerning UN standards • Advice to Member States, regional organizations and UN entities on military aspects of peace-related operations		• Fully-informed decision-making on military issues related to peacekeeping		Rapid deployment and establishment of peacekeeping operations in response to Security Council mandates
		• Undertake integrated planning of new peacekeeping operations • Generate required military forces		• Availability of readily deployable HQ-based military staff for start-up, surge or missions in crisis • Pre-deployment induction • Deployment of military forces, observers and HQ staff • Improved pledging mechanism of standby arrangements system and senior appointments pool		• Rapid deployment and establishment of PKOs in response to Security Council mandates		
		• Monitor, oversee and guide military components • Contribute to peacekeeping liaison, policy, doctrine and capability		• Daily monitoring and support to military units through oversight • Post-appointment briefings for senior military personnel • Input to development of policies, guidelines and SOPs • Quality assurance through oversight, auditing and validation of deployed military capacities • Military strategic guidance documentation for new and existing PKOs		• Effectively and efficiently managed peacekeeping operations		Increased efficiency and effectiveness of the military components of peacekeeping operations
		• Participate in crisis management and response		• Mission-specific briefings on new or anticipated developments, situations, plans, requirements, etc		• Improved crisis management and response		

V. Thematic Impact Pathway – Force Generation

44.   The force generation process is concerned with the supply of troops and equipment to peacekeeping operations in accordance with the mandates provided to the United Nations by the Security Council. In essence, it requires the identification and matching of available troops and equipment with the requirements of individual peacekeeping operations. Those requirements are determined in the planning phase of each peacekeeping operation, and involve OMA's Military Planning Service (MPS), which makes recommendations to the Security Council. The generation and deployment of the force constitute subsequent phases of the force generation process.

45.   The process involves two levels of activity: strategic-level preparatory work, intended to ensure that capabilities are developed and available when needed, and mission-level planning and delivery of troops and equipment in line with individual Security Council mandates. The TIP reflects this dichotomy.

Expected outcomes

46.   Force generation is a process rather than a structural entity within DPKO/DFS, although most of the activities associated with it are undertaken within a single structural unit, OMA's Force Generation Service (FGS). As a function within OMA, the FGS does not have separate status in the DPDO/DFS programme budget or strategic plan, and expected accomplishments are not separately defined for it or for force generation itself.

47.   Expected outcomes and impacts must therefore be inferred, rather than simply adapted from the expected accomplishments listed in official documents. For this review, expected outcomes and impacts were inferred based on the expected accomplishments of DPKO/DFS in general and OMA in particular, supported by FGS documents (including its public webpage) and external reviews.[23] The inclusion of 'rapid deployment and establishment of peacekeeping operations' as one of DPKO's expected accomplishments[24] is clearly relevant to force generation.

48.   Timeliness is also a component of the outcomes. Among OMA's indicators of achievement is one relating to the speed with which pledge requests are issued to TCCs.[25]

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[23] These included Nilsson and Wiklund, *op. cit.*, speeches by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, including to the Chiefs of Defence Conference in March 2015 (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/Chair's%20Note%20-%20final%20(Check%20against%20Delivery).pdf), and background contained in the June 2015 report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=united%20nations%20high%20level%2)

[24] A/69/6 Prog, 4, pp. 5-6

[25] In A/68/6 (Prog. 4), table following para. 4.14, indicator of achievement (a) (ii) is shown as 'Official pledge requests to troop-contributing countries issued within five days of the date on which the list of potential troop-contributing countries is approved'.

However, despite the long-standing existence of proposed targets for deployment times[26], no such overall target is incorporated in official DPKO/DFS planning documentation.

Inputs

49.   Force generation is coordinated and primarily implemented by OMA's Force Generation Service (FGS) in collaboration with counterparts within OMA (particularly the MPS), DPKO (the Office of Operations and the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) of individual missions), DFS and partners in Member States. The FGS is headed by a P-5 level military officer, and includes 27 other staff.[27] It is funded under the peacekeeping support account. Within the budget approved for OMA, no separate budget is approved for force generation.[28]

Activities and outputs

Strategic-level force generation

50.   At the strategic level and in order to improve its ability to generate force requirements when needed, DPKO seeks to understand and enhance the quantity and capability of troops on which it can draw from different Member States. The FGS reaches out to current and prospective TCCs, providing information to them on standards and other requirements and maintaining and updating records associated with the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), which is intended to provide an 'inventory' of troops available at relatively short notice. It also prepares guidance and supports Member States in training and capability development. These activities are on-going and occur in parallel to force generation for individual peacekeeping operations.

51.   To the extent that they are actually undertaken, these activities may be viewed as an investment in the preparedness of the United Nations to generate troops for particular peacekeeping operations. Until recently, no separate unit existed within the FGS to undertake them, and there was clear potential for the day-to-day demands of generating forces for individual peacekeeping operations to compete for the attention of staff. In addition, some of the activities depend on the cooperation of Member States. Maintaining the UNSAS is one such activity, which appears for all practical purposes and for a variety of reasons to have fallen into disuse. Ensuring the effective delivery of pre-deployment training is another.

52.   Efforts to increase the focus on strategic-level force generation have been evident in 2015. A conference that brought together the Chiefs of Defence of 108 Member States was held in March 2015, at which the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr Hervé Ladsous, 'mentioned the requirement for a broad array of Troop Contributing Countries,

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[26] As long ago as August 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the 'Brahimi report') proposed targets for rapid deployment that included 30 days for a traditional peacekeeping mission and 90 days for a complex one. As the more recent High Level Independent Panel pointed out, 'the United Nations has been unable to come close to these targets, and 'with rare exceptions', 'the average deployment time for a UN contingent is six months'.
[27] A/68/6 (Sect. 5), Annex 1.A
[28] A.68/6 (Sect. 5), Table 5.15

properly trained and equipped, to raise the performance of peacekeeping missions' and 'underlin[ed] a variety of reasons for Member States to commit to peacekeeping operations'.[29] At that conference, Mr Ladsous also announced the establishment of a strategic force generation and capability planning cell within DPKO charged with, among other things, engaging better with Member States on such issues. The report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, released in June 2015, referred to DPKO's new strategic force generation approach and made a number of observations and recommendations about its future direction and priorities.[30]

Force generation for individual peacekeeping operations

53.   Notwithstanding the increased emphasis on strategic-level force generation, generating forces for individual peacekeeping operations in response to Security Council mandates accounts for the majority of activities and outputs associated with force generation. The process of mission-level force generation has been described in detail by a number of groups. Abbreviated versions of the process have been depicted in official documents of the United Nations, including a chart contained in the UN Infantry battalion Manual[31] and in the OMA page of the DPKO website[32]. In 2015, OIOS-IAD produced charts depicting the activities associated with the force generation process as part of its audit of the uniformed personnel process.[33] External bodies, including the International Peace Institute[34] and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)[35], have also described the force generation process in some detail. This report draws on all of those sources.

54.   Individual tasks, undertaken within the FGS and/or in collaboration with OMA's MPS, the mission's IOT or DFS, relate to:
- TCC outreach and selection;
- the negotiation and agreement of an MoU detailing the number of troops, the quantity and type of major equipment, the areas in which the TCC is expected to be self-sustaining, the originating locations and ports of entry and exit for the purpose of transportation, and the date on which the MoU enters into force; and
- support for deployment.

55.   Underlying those tasks are activities including (among others) participation in assessment processes, formal and informal interactions with potential TCCs, preparation of statements of force and unit requirements, issuance of notes verbales seeking troop pledges, and reconnaissance visits to the TCC and the mission area.

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[29] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/Chair's%20Note%20-, %20final%20(Check%20against%20Delivery).pdf, para. 3

[30] http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf, pp. xi-xii

[31] DPKO/DFS, 'United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual', Vol 1, August 2012, p. 49.

[32] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/oma.shtml

[33] The audit report had not been released at the time of writing the current document, although draft observations were shared and discussions held with members of the audit team. The audit focused mainly on the nature and effectiveness of the activities undertaken as part of the process, and less on its results.

[34] Smith, A. and Boutellis, A., 'Rethinking Force Generation: Filling the Capability Gaps in UN Peacekeeping', *Providing for Peacekeeping* No. 2, International Peace Institute, 2013.

[35] Nilsson and Wiklund, *op. cit.*

56.   As some observers have pointed out, this process is not linear[36], and different activities are likely to occur in parallel. This amplifies the challenge of coordinating those activities among the different actors. It may also impact decisions by Member States, as essential documents may take time for the FGS to generate.

External factors

57.   As with expected outcomes, the external factors that influence the logical framework of force generation are not explicitly stated in official United Nations documents. However, the external factors cited for the military subprogramme in the DPKO/DFS proposed programme budget include a reference to Member State ability to 'contribute the required military personnel and materiel to peacekeeping operations in a timely manner to effect deployment'[37], which clearly relates to force generation.

58.   Factors important to outcome achievement and largely outside the control of DPKO/DFS include:
- the availability of the required capabilities in Member States; and
- the willingness of Member States to offer those capabilities to the United Nations for the purposes required and under the conditions offered.

In addition, the interaction and parallel nature of many of the activities associated with force generation creates potential bottlenecks for decision-making.

59.   It follows that for this function more than most, external factors are likely to be critical in determining the extent to which timely, quality outcomes can be achieved.
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60.   The force generation TIP is shown in figure 4 below.

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[36] See, for example, Nilsson and Wiklund, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[37] A/68/6 (Sect. 5). Para 5.43, and table 3 above.

Figure 4
Thematic Impact Pathway: Force Generation

INPUTS	ACTIVITIES	OUTPUTS	OUTCOMES	IMPACTS
UN Security Council resolutions/ mandates Mission planning documents (including assessments, CONOPS) Regulations, COE manual, TCC guidance UNSAS Financial resources Staff resources (primarily but not exclusively in FGS) Office budget	*Headquarters: Strategic force generation* • Outreach to actual/ potential TCCs • Regular interaction with Member States to update UNSAS • Member States supported in training and capability development • Records initiated and maintained for all military deployments and pledges	*Headquarters: Strategic force generation* • Ongoing dialogue with current and potential TCCs • UNSAS provides accurate, current input for force generation • Guidelines developed, reconnaissance visits undertaken • Up-to-date records available	*Headquarters: Strategic force generation* • UN has a strategic approach to force generation and rotation, through effective relationships with TCCs and comprehensive understanding of demand and supply of peacekeeping resources • Professional troops are available for provision in a timely manner to UN peacekeeping missions • Capabilities are improved in Member States • Base of potential TCCs is broadened	*Headquarters: Strategic force generation* Member States are committed to developing standards and procedures for force generation in cooperation with the Secretariat Member States work with the Secretariat to develop capacities for peacekeeping missions
	Mission-specific force generation • (Prior to SCR) Formal and informal interaction with potential TCCs • Assessment missions supported • OMA/DFS input to mission planning supported • Requirement (SFR), Statement of Unit requirement (SUR) developed • Military Adviser and DPKO decision-making on TCCs supported	*Mission-specific force generation* • Meetings, notes verbales to Member States • List of TCCs/PCCs developed • Assessments conducted • Support provided for mission planning • Statements developed • TCCs/PCCs selected • MOUs and LOAs finalised • Pre-deployment visits conducted (occasionally)	*Mission-specific force generation* • Member States actively engaged • Member States supply required resources to the mission • Forces deployed in a timely manner • Mssion resources (troops and equipment) match the requirements of the SCR, SRF, SUR and other standards • Troops are capable of implementing the mission mandate	*Mission-specific force generation* UN peacekeeping operations are able to implement their mandates, including responding and adapting to threats to the mission and other UN entities in the mission area and to the civilian population, and creating space for political dialogue, humanitarian aid and development efforts

VII. Conclusion

61.   The programme level PIP, the subprogramme level PIP and the thematic/functional level TIP shown above are essentially maps that show the inputs, activities and outputs of the entities and theme involved and their links to expected outcomes. Their usefulness is in indicating how a particular programme or theme is expected to work. The entry point for evaluation is in testing whether in fact they do work that way – whether the activities that are being undertaken and the outputs being generated enable the expected outcomes to be achieved. If they do not, then the question is whether the underlying logic model is flawed (the inputs, activities and outputs cannot lead to the desired outcomes in the circumstances in which they are generated), or whether the assumptions inherent in it - particularly the role of external actors and factors - are unrealistic or invalid much or all of the time.

62.   One of the questions that might arise from examination of the *outcomes* panel of the two PIPs and the TIP concerns the extent to which the expected outcomes are within the control of DPKO/DFS, and the ways in which their vulnerability to external factors could be reduced by departmental or broader United Nations initiatives. For example, as noted above, the departments' ability to achieve rapid deployment and establishment of peacekeeping operations in response to Security Council mandates is largely dependent on the willingness and ability of Member States to contribute the required troops and assets when needed. Both these factors may potentially be influenced by DPKO/DFS and the United Nations, as recognized in current initiatives that include gaining a better understanding of existing capabilities in Member States, supporting the development of those capabilities through training and standards, encouraging more Member States to participate actively in peacekeeping operations, and providing more options for them to do so (such as special capabilities). Questions of authority and accountability for outcomes also arise when outcomes are largely or importantly outside the control of those charged with achieving them.

63.   In the case of outcomes with an inherently larger element of internal control, such as effectively and efficiently managed peacekeeping operations and improved crisis management and response, the question concerns the extent to which the desired outcomes are in fact being achieved. Identifying the reasons for non-achievement or under-achievement is the first step in designing programmes to achieve better outcomes, and may involve examination of the effectiveness of the actions being undertaken in their pursuit and the way those activities are balanced and coordinated within the departments.

64.   The *activities and outputs* panels of the PIPs and TIP depict the processes over which the departments exert the greatest control. Beyond testing whether the activities are being undertaken and the outputs generated with the required quality, quantity and timeliness (essentially the audit role), the evaluation questions relate to the ability of the activities and outputs to lead to the desired outcomes. Of particular concern may be the coordination and collaboration arrangements. Given the number of entities within DPKO/DFS and the Secretariat that are typically involved in activities such as assessments, mission planning, the direction and support of peacekeeping operations and even the provision of documentation to intergovernmental bodies, together with the unpredictability of the environment within which

they operate, such arrangements present potential bottlenecks. This is so even if the underlying activities and outputs are appropriate and necessary.

65.   The balance of activities and outputs may also be important to assess. As noted above, the approach to force generation has recently changed to enable greater focus on strategic-level activities. In OMA, attention has been given to creating better and more tailored guidance to military components of peacekeeping operations. UNSAS-related activities have declined as the quality and quantity of Member State input has declined. Such flexibility is likely to be particularly necessary in evolving environments.

66.   Of course, appropriate, necessary and flexibly-adjusted activities and outputs may not achieve their intended outcomes if they are bypassed in decision-making structures. Advice may be ignored, plans not implemented, information not used or guidance not followed. The potential for this is greater in an environment such as peacekeeping where political factors affect decision making, and where the authority for many decisions lies with implementers on the ground (the heads of individual peacekeeping operations). Identifying such occurrences, and the reasons for them, is important in ensuring that the logical framework is robust.

67.   The *inputs* panel enables questions of feasibility and efficiency to be considered. If the planned activities are not being undertaken and outputs generated with the necessary quality, speed or frequency, the quality or quantity of the inputs may be at fault. The evaluation question is then whether the activities and outputs can be reconfigured to make better use of the available inputs and thereby achieve better results. If not, the PIP or TIP may be used to support a conclusion that the expected outcomes cannot realistically be achieved with the available inputs and that the underlying logical framework cannot be implemented.

ANNEX
Programme Impact Pathway for DPKO/DFS
(Developed by OIOS-IED, March 2013)

Inputs

- Financial Resources
- Staff time
- Peace and security–related information
- UN Security Council resolutions / mandate
- Programme Budget (strategic framework)
- Missions' work plans

Gender and Human Rights mainstreaming

Activities

- Drafting of background info materials and briefings to UN bodies
- Fact-finding and liaison with TCCs/PCCs, meetings and IAWGs with UN and other partners
- Integrated planning (and review) of operations
- Backstopping of operations (strategic and operational direction, monitoring, resource management)
- Drafting and review of guidance
- Training and drafting of training materials
- Mission-level activities, e.g:
  * Patrolling
  * QIPs
  * Data gathering
  * Training and capacity development
  * Assistance to legislation drafting
  * Facilitation of dialogue
  * Deployment of demining assets

Outputs

- Parliamentary documentation and substantive servicing of meetings
- Sustained dialogue with Member States and partners
- Institutional and operational support agreements
- Mission deployed and different components established
- Strategic, operational, and administrative support to the mission (incl. guidance)
- Mission areas monitored and violations reported
- Combatants are disarmed and demobilised
- Information analysis and early warning produced
- Landmines removed
- Dialogue among national actors promoted
- Mentoring/Advice to national services
- Support to restructuring of national institutions (incl. studies, reform plans, etc)

Efficient and effective peacekeeping operations

Outcomes

- Member States have clear understanding of context for operations
- Increased coordination among partners
- Strengthened capacities of missions to operate
- UN Security Council resolutions incorporated DPKO recommendations
- Adequate support granted to peacekeeping missions
- Traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian/early development work better integrated
- Peace and security conditions are maintained
- *Political space is re-built*
- *Police, security sector and justice institutions have enhanced capacities*
- *Policy and regulatory framework for rule of law is enhanced*

Impact

- Civilians are protected
- Rule of law is restored
- Social and civic conditions for peace are strengthened

ASSUMPTION: Resource Availability (including TCC/PCCs contributions)	DRIVER: Effective mission leadership and management's buy-in	DRIVER: Systems in place for internal coordination (including HQ-field) and efficient use of resources	DRIVER: Monitoring for results and management of change	ASSUMPTION: Country's political will and contribution by partners

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